| // Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
| // Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. |
| // |
| // Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); |
| // you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. |
| // You may obtain a copy of the License at |
| // |
| // https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 |
| // |
| // Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software |
| // distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, |
| // WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. |
| // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and |
| // limitations under the License. |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_FIPSMODULE_BN_INTERNAL_H |
| #define OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_FIPSMODULE_BN_INTERNAL_H |
| |
| #include <openssl/bn.h> |
| |
| #if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) && defined(_MSC_VER) |
| #include <intrin.h> |
| #pragma intrinsic(__umulh, _umul128) |
| #endif |
| |
| #include "../../internal.h" |
| |
| |
| BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN |
| |
| #if defined(OPENSSL_64_BIT) |
| |
| #if defined(BORINGSSL_HAS_UINT128) |
| // MSVC doesn't support two-word integers on 64-bit. |
| #define BN_ULLONG uint128_t |
| #if defined(BORINGSSL_CAN_DIVIDE_UINT128) |
| #define BN_CAN_DIVIDE_ULLONG |
| #endif |
| #endif |
| |
| #define BN_BITS2 64 |
| #define BN_BITS2_LG 6 |
| #define BN_BYTES 8 |
| #define BN_BITS4 32 |
| #define BN_MASK2 (0xffffffffffffffffUL) |
| #define BN_MASK2l (0xffffffffUL) |
| #define BN_MASK2h (0xffffffff00000000UL) |
| #define BN_MASK2h1 (0xffffffff80000000UL) |
| #define BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS 1 |
| #define BN_DEC_CONV (10000000000000000000UL) |
| #define BN_DEC_NUM 19 |
| #define TOBN(hi, lo) ((BN_ULONG)(hi) << 32 | (lo)) |
| |
| #elif defined(OPENSSL_32_BIT) |
| |
| #define BN_ULLONG uint64_t |
| #define BN_CAN_DIVIDE_ULLONG |
| #define BN_BITS2 32 |
| #define BN_BITS2_LG 5 |
| #define BN_BYTES 4 |
| #define BN_BITS4 16 |
| #define BN_MASK2 (0xffffffffUL) |
| #define BN_MASK2l (0xffffUL) |
| #define BN_MASK2h1 (0xffff8000UL) |
| #define BN_MASK2h (0xffff0000UL) |
| // On some 32-bit platforms, Montgomery multiplication is done using 64-bit |
| // arithmetic with SIMD instructions. On such platforms, `BN_MONT_CTX::n0` |
| // needs to be two words long. Only certain 32-bit platforms actually make use |
| // of n0[1] and shorter R value would suffice for the others. However, |
| // currently only the assembly files know which is which. |
| #define BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS 2 |
| #define BN_DEC_CONV (1000000000UL) |
| #define BN_DEC_NUM 9 |
| #define TOBN(hi, lo) (lo), (hi) |
| |
| #else |
| #error "Must define either OPENSSL_32_BIT or OPENSSL_64_BIT" |
| #endif |
| |
| #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && (defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)) |
| #define BN_CAN_USE_INLINE_ASM |
| #endif |
| |
| // MOD_EXP_CTIME_ALIGN is the alignment needed for `BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime`'s |
| // tables. |
| // |
| // TODO(davidben): Historically, this alignment came from cache line |
| // assumptions, which we've since removed. Is 64-byte alignment still necessary |
| // or ideal? The true alignment requirement seems to now be 32 bytes, coming |
| // from RSAZ's use of VMOVDQA to a YMM register. Non-x86_64 has even fewer |
| // requirements. |
| #define MOD_EXP_CTIME_ALIGN 64 |
| |
| // MOD_EXP_CTIME_STORAGE_LEN is the number of `BN_ULONG`s needed for the |
| // `BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime` stack-allocated storage buffer. The buffer is |
| // just the right size for the RSAZ and is about ~1KB larger than what's |
| // necessary (4480 bytes) for 1024-bit inputs. |
| #define MOD_EXP_CTIME_STORAGE_LEN \ |
| (((320u * 3u) + (32u * 9u * 16u)) / sizeof(BN_ULONG)) |
| |
| #define STATIC_BIGNUM(x) \ |
| { \ |
| (BN_ULONG *)(x), sizeof(x) / sizeof(BN_ULONG), \ |
| sizeof(x) / sizeof(BN_ULONG), 0, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA \ |
| } |
| |
| // bn_minimal_width returns the minimal number of words needed to represent |
| // `bn`. |
| int bn_minimal_width(const BIGNUM *bn); |
| |
| // bn_set_minimal_width sets `bn->width` to `bn_minimal_width(bn)`. If `bn` is |
| // zero, `bn->neg` is set to zero. |
| void bn_set_minimal_width(BIGNUM *bn); |
| |
| // bn_wexpand ensures that `bn` has at least `words` works of space without |
| // altering its value. It returns one on success or zero on allocation |
| // failure. |
| int bn_wexpand(BIGNUM *bn, size_t words); |
| |
| // bn_expand acts the same as `bn_wexpand`, but takes a number of bits rather |
| // than a number of words. |
| int bn_expand(BIGNUM *bn, size_t bits); |
| |
| // bn_resize_words adjusts `bn->width` to be `words`. It returns one on success |
| // and zero on allocation error or if `bn`'s value is too large. |
| OPENSSL_EXPORT int bn_resize_words(BIGNUM *bn, size_t words); |
| |
| // bn_select_words sets `r` to `a` if `mask` is all ones or `b` if `mask` is |
| // all zeros. |
| void bn_select_words(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG mask, const BN_ULONG *a, |
| const BN_ULONG *b, size_t num); |
| |
| // bn_set_words sets `bn` to the value encoded in the `num` words in `words`, |
| // least significant word first. |
| int bn_set_words(BIGNUM *bn, const BN_ULONG *words, size_t num); |
| |
| // bn_set_static_words acts like `bn_set_words`, but doesn't copy the data. A |
| // flag is set on `bn` so that `BN_free` won't attempt to free the data. |
| // |
| // The `STATIC_BIGNUM` macro is probably a better solution for this outside of |
| // the FIPS module. Inside of the FIPS module that macro generates rel.ro data, |
| // which doesn't work with FIPS requirements. |
| void bn_set_static_words(BIGNUM *bn, const BN_ULONG *words, size_t num); |
| |
| // bn_fits_in_words returns one if `bn` may be represented in `num` words, plus |
| // a sign bit, and zero otherwise. |
| int bn_fits_in_words(const BIGNUM *bn, size_t num); |
| |
| // bn_copy_words copies the value of `bn` to `out` and returns one if the value |
| // is representable in `num` words. Otherwise, it returns zero. |
| int bn_copy_words(BN_ULONG *out, size_t num, const BIGNUM *bn); |
| |
| // bn_assert_fits_in_bytes asserts that `bn` fits in `num` bytes. This is a |
| // no-op in release builds, but triggers an assert in debug builds, and |
| // declassifies all bytes which are therefore known to be zero in constant-time |
| // validation. |
| void bn_assert_fits_in_bytes(const BIGNUM *bn, size_t num); |
| |
| // bn_secret marks `bn`'s contents, but not its width or sign, as secret. See |
| // `CONSTTIME_SECRET` for details. |
| inline void bn_secret(BIGNUM *bn) { |
| CONSTTIME_SECRET(bn->d, bn->width * sizeof(BN_ULONG)); |
| } |
| |
| // bn_declassify marks `bn`'s value as public. See `CONSTTIME_DECLASSIFY` for |
| // details. |
| inline void bn_declassify(BIGNUM *bn) { |
| CONSTTIME_DECLASSIFY(bn->d, bn->width * sizeof(BN_ULONG)); |
| } |
| |
| #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && defined(OPENSSL_X86) |
| // See asm/bn-586.pl. |
| #define BN_ADD_ASM |
| #define BN_MUL_ASM |
| #endif |
| |
| #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) && \ |
| (defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)) |
| // See asm/x86_64-gcc.c |
| #define BN_ADD_ASM |
| #define BN_MUL_ASM |
| #endif |
| |
| #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64) |
| // See asm/bn-armv8.pl. |
| #define BN_ADD_ASM |
| #endif |
| |
| // bn_mul_add_words multiples `ap` by `w`, adds the result to `rp`, and places |
| // the result in `rp`. `ap` and `rp` must both be `num` words long. It returns |
| // the carry word of the operation. `ap` and `rp` may be equal but otherwise may |
| // not alias. |
| #if defined(BN_MUL_ASM) |
| extern "C" |
| #endif |
| BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, size_t num, |
| BN_ULONG w); |
| |
| // bn_mul_words multiples `ap` by `w` and places the result in `rp`. `ap` and |
| // `rp` must both be `num` words long. It returns the carry word of the |
| // operation. `ap` and `rp` may be equal but otherwise may not alias. |
| #if defined(BN_MUL_ASM) |
| extern "C" |
| #endif |
| BN_ULONG bn_mul_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, size_t num, |
| BN_ULONG w); |
| |
| // bn_sqr_add_words computes `tmp` where `tmp[2*i]` and `tmp[2*i+1]` are |
| // `ap[i]`'s square, for all `i` up to `num`, and adds the result to `rp`. If |
| // the result does not fit in `2*num` words, the final carry bit is truncated. |
| // `ap` is an array of `num` words and `rp` an array of `2*num` words. `ap` and |
| // `rp` may not alias. |
| // |
| // This gives the contribution of the `ap[i]*ap[i]` terms when squaring `ap`. |
| #if defined(BN_MUL_ASM) |
| extern "C" |
| #endif |
| void bn_sqr_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, size_t num); |
| |
| // bn_add_words adds `ap` to `bp` and places the result in `rp`, each of which |
| // are `num` words long. It returns the carry bit, which is one if the operation |
| // overflowed and zero otherwise. Any pair of `ap`, `bp`, and `rp` may be equal |
| // to each other but otherwise may not alias. |
| |
| #if defined(BN_ADD_ASM) |
| extern "C" |
| #endif |
| BN_ULONG bn_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp, |
| size_t num); |
| |
| // bn_sub_words subtracts `bp` from `ap` and places the result in `rp`. It |
| // returns the borrow bit, which is one if the computation underflowed and zero |
| // otherwise. Any pair of `ap`, `bp`, and `rp` may be equal to each other but |
| // otherwise may not alias. |
| #if defined(BN_ADD_ASM) |
| extern "C" |
| #endif |
| BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp, |
| size_t num); |
| |
| // bn_mul_comba4 sets `r` to the product of `a` and `b`. |
| #if defined(BN_MUL_ASM) |
| extern "C" |
| #endif |
| void bn_mul_comba4(BN_ULONG r[8], const BN_ULONG a[4], const BN_ULONG b[4]); |
| |
| // bn_mul_comba8 sets `r` to the product of `a` and `b`. |
| #if defined(BN_MUL_ASM) |
| extern "C" |
| #endif |
| void bn_mul_comba8(BN_ULONG r[16], const BN_ULONG a[8], |
| const BN_ULONG b[8]); |
| |
| // bn_sqr_comba8 sets `r` to `a`^2. |
| #if defined(BN_MUL_ASM) |
| extern "C" |
| #endif |
| void bn_sqr_comba8(BN_ULONG r[16], const BN_ULONG a[8]); |
| |
| // bn_sqr_comba4 sets `r` to `a`^2. |
| #if defined(BN_MUL_ASM) |
| extern "C" |
| #endif |
| void bn_sqr_comba4(BN_ULONG r[8], const BN_ULONG a[4]); |
| |
| // bn_less_than_words returns one if `a` < `b` and zero otherwise, where `a` |
| // and `b` both are `len` words long. It runs in constant time. |
| int bn_less_than_words(const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, size_t len); |
| |
| // bn_in_range_words returns one if `min_inclusive` <= `a` < `max_exclusive`, |
| // where `a` and `max_exclusive` both are `len` words long. `a` and |
| // `max_exclusive` are treated as secret. |
| int bn_in_range_words(const BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG min_inclusive, |
| const BN_ULONG *max_exclusive, size_t len); |
| |
| // bn_rand_range_words sets `out` to a uniformly distributed random number from |
| // `min_inclusive` to `max_exclusive`. Both `out` and `max_exclusive` are `len` |
| // words long. |
| // |
| // This function runs in time independent of the result, but `min_inclusive` and |
| // `max_exclusive` are public data. (Information about the range is unavoidably |
| // leaked by how many iterations it took to select a number.) |
| int bn_rand_range_words(BN_ULONG *out, BN_ULONG min_inclusive, |
| const BN_ULONG *max_exclusive, size_t len, |
| const uint8_t additional_data[32]); |
| |
| // bn_range_secret_range behaves like `BN_rand_range_ex`, but treats |
| // `max_exclusive` as secret. Because of this constraint, the distribution of |
| // values returned is more complex. |
| // |
| // Rather than repeatedly generating values until one is in range, which would |
| // leak information, it generates one value. If the value is in range, it sets |
| // `*out_is_uniform` to one. Otherwise, it sets `*out_is_uniform` to zero, |
| // fixing up the value to force it in range. |
| // |
| // The subset of calls to `bn_rand_secret_range` which set `*out_is_uniform` to |
| // one are uniformly distributed in the target range. Calls overall are not. |
| // This function is intended for use in situations where the extra values are |
| // still usable and where the number of iterations needed to reach the target |
| // number of uniform outputs may be blinded for negligible probabilities of |
| // timing leaks. |
| // |
| // Although this function treats `max_exclusive` as secret, it treats the number |
| // of bits in `max_exclusive` as public. |
| int bn_rand_secret_range(BIGNUM *r, int *out_is_uniform, BN_ULONG min_inclusive, |
| const BIGNUM *max_exclusive); |
| |
| // BN_MONTGOMERY_MAX_WORDS is the maximum number of words allowed in a `BIGNUM` |
| // used with Montgomery reduction. Ideally this limit would be applied to all |
| // `BIGNUM`s, in `bn_wexpand`, but the exactfloat library needs to create 8 MiB |
| // values for other operations. |
| // |
| // This limit is set so that one number fits within 2 KiB, giving room to |
| // allocate a few of them on the stack. It is also set to limit the DoS impact |
| // of large RSA, DH, and DSA keys, which scale cubically. |
| #define BN_MONTGOMERY_MAX_WORDS (16384 / BN_BITS2) |
| |
| BSSL_NAMESPACE_END |
| |
| struct bn_mont_ctx_st { |
| // RR is R^2, reduced modulo `N`. It is used to convert to Montgomery form. It |
| // is guaranteed to have the same width as `N`. |
| BIGNUM RR; |
| // N is the modulus. It is always stored in minimal form, so `N.width` |
| // determines R. |
| BIGNUM N; |
| BN_ULONG n0[BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS]; // least significant words of (R*Ri-1)/N |
| }; |
| |
| BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN |
| |
| #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && \ |
| (defined(OPENSSL_X86) || defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) || \ |
| defined(OPENSSL_ARM) || defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64)) |
| #define OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT |
| // bn_mul_mont_words writes `ap` * `bp` mod `np` to `rp`, each `num` words |
| // long. Inputs and outputs are in Montgomery form. `n0` is a pointer to the |
| // corresponding field in `BN_MONT_CTX`. |
| // |
| // If at least one of `ap` or `bp` is fully reduced, `rp` will be fully reduced. |
| // If neither is fully-reduced, the output may not be either. |
| // |
| // This function allocates up to 2 * `num` words (plus a constant allocation) on |
| // the stack, so `num` should be at most `BN_MONTGOMERY_MAX_WORDS`. |
| // Additionally, `num` must be at least 128 / `BN_BITS2`. |
| // |
| // TODO(davidben): The x86_64 implementation expects a 32-bit input and masks |
| // off upper bits. The aarch64 implementation expects a 64-bit input and does |
| // not. `size_t` is the safer option but not strictly correct for x86_64. But |
| // the `BN_MONTGOMERY_MAX_WORDS` bound makes this moot. |
| // |
| // See also discussion in `ToWord` in abi_test.h for notes on smaller-than-word |
| // inputs. |
| extern "C" void bn_mul_mont_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, |
| const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, |
| const BN_ULONG n0[BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS], |
| size_t num); |
| |
| #if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) |
| inline int bn_mulx_adx_capable() { |
| // MULX is in BMI2. |
| return CRYPTO_is_BMI2_capable() && CRYPTO_is_ADX_capable(); |
| } |
| extern "C" void bn_mul_mont_nohw(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, |
| const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, |
| const BN_ULONG n0[BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS], |
| size_t num); |
| inline int bn_mul4x_mont_capable(size_t num) { |
| return num >= 8 && (num & 3) == 0; |
| } |
| extern "C" void bn_mul4x_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, |
| const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, |
| const BN_ULONG n0[BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS], |
| size_t num); |
| inline int bn_mulx4x_mont_capable(size_t num) { |
| return bn_mul4x_mont_capable(num) && bn_mulx_adx_capable(); |
| } |
| extern "C" void bn_mulx4x_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, |
| const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, |
| const BN_ULONG n0[BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS], |
| size_t num); |
| inline int bn_sqr8x_mont_capable(size_t num) { |
| return num >= 8 && (num & 7) == 0; |
| } |
| extern "C" void bn_sqr8x_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, |
| BN_ULONG mulx_adx_capable, const BN_ULONG *np, |
| const BN_ULONG n0[BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS], |
| size_t num); |
| #elif defined(OPENSSL_ARM) |
| inline int bn_mul8x_mont_neon_capable(size_t num) { |
| return (num & 7) == 0 && CRYPTO_is_NEON_capable(); |
| } |
| extern "C" void bn_mul8x_mont_neon(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, |
| const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, |
| const BN_ULONG n0[BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS], |
| size_t num); |
| extern "C" void bn_mul_mont_nohw(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, |
| const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, |
| const BN_ULONG n0[BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS], |
| size_t num); |
| #endif |
| |
| #endif // OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT |
| |
| #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) |
| #define OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT5 |
| |
| // The following functions implement `bn_mul_mont_gather5`. See |
| // `bn_mul_mont_gather5` for details. |
| inline int bn_mul4x_mont_gather5_capable(int num) { return (num & 7) == 0; } |
| extern "C" void bn_mul4x_mont_gather5(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, |
| const BN_ULONG *table, const BN_ULONG *np, |
| const BN_ULONG n0[BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS], |
| int num, int power); |
| |
| inline int bn_mulx4x_mont_gather5_capable(int num) { |
| return bn_mul4x_mont_gather5_capable(num) && CRYPTO_is_ADX_capable() && |
| CRYPTO_is_BMI1_capable() && CRYPTO_is_BMI2_capable(); |
| } |
| extern "C" void bn_mulx4x_mont_gather5(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, |
| const BN_ULONG *table, |
| const BN_ULONG *np, |
| const BN_ULONG n0[BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS], |
| int num, int power); |
| |
| extern "C" void bn_mul_mont_gather5_nohw( |
| BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *table, const BN_ULONG *np, |
| const BN_ULONG n0[BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS], int num, int power); |
| |
| // bn_scatter5 stores `inp` to index `power` of `table`. `inp` and each entry of |
| // `table` are `num` words long. `power` must be less than 32 and is treated as |
| // public. `table` must be 32*`num` words long. `table` must be aligned to at |
| // least 16 bytes. |
| extern "C" void bn_scatter5(const BN_ULONG *inp, size_t num, BN_ULONG *table, |
| size_t power); |
| |
| // bn_gather5 loads index `power` of `table` and stores it in `out`. `out` and |
| // each entry of `table` are `num` words long. `power` must be less than 32 and |
| // is treated as secret. `table` must be aligned to at least 16 bytes. |
| extern "C" void bn_gather5(BN_ULONG *out, size_t num, const BN_ULONG *table, |
| size_t power); |
| |
| // The following functions implement `bn_power5`. See `bn_power5` for details. |
| extern "C" void bn_power5_nohw(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, |
| const BN_ULONG *table, const BN_ULONG *np, |
| const BN_ULONG n0[BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS], int num, |
| int power); |
| |
| inline int bn_power5_capable(int num) { return (num & 7) == 0; } |
| |
| inline int bn_powerx5_capable(int num) { |
| return bn_power5_capable(num) && CRYPTO_is_ADX_capable() && |
| CRYPTO_is_BMI1_capable() && CRYPTO_is_BMI2_capable(); |
| } |
| extern "C" void bn_powerx5(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, |
| const BN_ULONG *table, const BN_ULONG *np, |
| const BN_ULONG n0[BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS], int num, |
| int power); |
| |
| #endif // !OPENSSL_NO_ASM && OPENSSL_X86_64 |
| |
| uint64_t bn_mont_n0(const BIGNUM *n); |
| |
| // bn_mont_ctx_set_RR_consttime initializes `mont->RR`. It returns one on |
| // success and zero on error. `mont->N` and `mont->n0` must have been |
| // initialized already. The bit width of `mont->N` is assumed public, but |
| // `mont->N` is otherwise treated as secret. |
| int bn_mont_ctx_set_RR_consttime(BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx); |
| |
| #if defined(_MSC_VER) |
| #if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) |
| #define BN_UMULT_LOHI(low, high, a, b) ((low) = _umul128((a), (b), &(high))) |
| #elif defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64) |
| #define BN_UMULT_LOHI(low, high, a, b) \ |
| do { \ |
| const BN_ULONG _a = (a); \ |
| const BN_ULONG _b = (b); \ |
| (low) = _a * _b; \ |
| (high) = __umulh(_a, _b); \ |
| } while (0) |
| #endif |
| #endif // _MSC_VER |
| |
| #if !defined(BN_ULLONG) && !defined(BN_UMULT_LOHI) |
| #error "Either BN_ULLONG or BN_UMULT_LOHI must be defined on every platform." |
| #endif |
| |
| // bn_jacobi returns the Jacobi symbol of `a` and `b` (which is -1, 0 or 1), or |
| // -2 on error. |
| int bn_jacobi(const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); |
| |
| // bn_is_bit_set_words returns one if bit `bit` is set in `a` and zero |
| // otherwise. |
| int bn_is_bit_set_words(const BN_ULONG *a, size_t num, size_t bit); |
| |
| // bn_one_to_montgomery sets `r` to one in Montgomery form. It returns one on |
| // success and zero on error. This function treats the bit width of the modulus |
| // as public. |
| int bn_one_to_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx); |
| |
| // bn_less_than_montgomery_R returns one if `bn` is less than the Montgomery R |
| // value for `mont` and zero otherwise. |
| int bn_less_than_montgomery_R(const BIGNUM *bn, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont); |
| |
| // bn_mod_u16_consttime returns `bn` mod `d`, ignoring `bn`'s sign bit. It runs |
| // in time independent of the value of `bn`, but it treats `d` as public. |
| OPENSSL_EXPORT uint16_t bn_mod_u16_consttime(const BIGNUM *bn, uint16_t d); |
| |
| // bn_odd_number_is_obviously_composite returns one if `bn` is divisible by one |
| // of the first several odd primes and zero otherwise. |
| int bn_odd_number_is_obviously_composite(const BIGNUM *bn); |
| |
| // A BN_MILLER_RABIN stores state common to each Miller-Rabin iteration. It is |
| // initialized within an existing `BN_CTX` scope and may not be used after |
| // that scope is released with `BN_CTX_end`. Field names match those in FIPS |
| // 186-5, section B.3.1. |
| typedef struct { |
| // w1 is w-1. |
| BIGNUM *w1; |
| // m is (w-1)/2^a. |
| BIGNUM *m; |
| // one_mont is 1 (mod w) in Montgomery form. |
| BIGNUM *one_mont; |
| // w1_mont is w-1 (mod w) in Montgomery form. |
| BIGNUM *w1_mont; |
| // w_bits is BN_num_bits(w). |
| int w_bits; |
| // a is the largest integer such that 2^a divides w-1. |
| int a; |
| } BN_MILLER_RABIN; |
| |
| // bn_miller_rabin_init initializes `miller_rabin` for testing if `mont->N` is |
| // prime. It returns one on success and zero on error. |
| OPENSSL_EXPORT int bn_miller_rabin_init(BN_MILLER_RABIN *miller_rabin, |
| const BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx); |
| |
| // bn_miller_rabin_iteration performs one Miller-Rabin iteration, checking if |
| // `b` is a composite witness for `mont->N`. `miller_rabin` must have been |
| // initialized with `bn_miller_rabin_setup`. On success, it returns one and sets |
| // `*out_is_possibly_prime` to one if `mont->N` may still be prime or zero if |
| // `b` shows it is composite. On allocation or internal failure, it returns |
| // zero. |
| OPENSSL_EXPORT int bn_miller_rabin_iteration( |
| const BN_MILLER_RABIN *miller_rabin, int *out_is_possibly_prime, |
| const BIGNUM *b, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx); |
| |
| // bn_rshift1_words sets `r` to `a` >> 1, where both arrays are `num` bits wide. |
| void bn_rshift1_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, size_t num); |
| |
| // bn_rshift_words sets `r` to `a` >> `shift`, where both arrays are `num` bits |
| // wide. |
| void bn_rshift_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, unsigned shift, |
| size_t num); |
| |
| // bn_rshift_secret_shift behaves like `BN_rshift` but runs in time independent |
| // of both `a` and `n`. |
| OPENSSL_EXPORT int bn_rshift_secret_shift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, |
| unsigned n, BN_CTX *ctx); |
| |
| // bn_reduce_once sets `r` to `a` mod `m` where 0 <= `a` < 2*`m`. It returns |
| // zero if `a` < `m` and a mask of all ones if `a` >= `m`. Each array is `num` |
| // words long, but `a` has an additional word specified by `carry`. `carry` must |
| // be zero or one, as implied by the bounds on `a`. |
| // |
| // `r`, `a`, and `m` may not alias. Use `bn_reduce_once_in_place` if `r` and `a` |
| // must alias. |
| BN_ULONG bn_reduce_once(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG carry, |
| const BN_ULONG *m, size_t num); |
| |
| // bn_reduce_once_in_place behaves like `bn_reduce_once` but acts in-place on |
| // `r`, using `tmp` as scratch space. `r`, `tmp`, and `m` may not alias. |
| BN_ULONG bn_reduce_once_in_place(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG carry, const BN_ULONG *m, |
| BN_ULONG *tmp, size_t num); |
| |
| |
| // Constant-time non-modular arithmetic. |
| // |
| // The following functions implement non-modular arithmetic in constant-time |
| // and pessimally set `r->width` to the largest possible word size. |
| // |
| // Note this means that, e.g., repeatedly multiplying by one will cause widths |
| // to increase without bound. The corresponding public API functions minimize |
| // their outputs to avoid regressing calculator consumers. |
| |
| // bn_uadd_consttime behaves like `BN_uadd`, but it pessimally sets |
| // `r->width` = `a->width` + `b->width` + 1. |
| int bn_uadd_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b); |
| |
| // bn_usub_consttime behaves like `BN_usub`, but it pessimally sets |
| // `r->width` = `a->width`. |
| int bn_usub_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b); |
| |
| // bn_abs_sub_consttime sets `r` to the absolute value of `a` - `b`, treating |
| // both inputs as secret. It returns one on success and zero on error. |
| OPENSSL_EXPORT int bn_abs_sub_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, |
| const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); |
| |
| // bn_mul_consttime behaves like `BN_mul`, but it rejects negative inputs and |
| // pessimally sets `r->width` to `a->width` + `b->width`, to avoid leaking |
| // information about `a` and `b`. |
| int bn_mul_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); |
| |
| // bn_sqrt_consttime behaves like `BN_sqrt`, but it pessimally sets `r->width` |
| // to 2*`a->width`, to avoid leaking information about `a` and `b`. |
| int bn_sqr_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx); |
| |
| // bn_div_consttime behaves like `BN_div`, but it rejects negative inputs and |
| // treats both inputs, including their magnitudes, as secret. It is, as a |
| // result, much slower than `BN_div` and should only be used for rare operations |
| // where Montgomery reduction is not available. `divisor_min_bits` is a |
| // public lower bound for `BN_num_bits(divisor)`. When `divisor`'s bit width is |
| // public, this can speed up the operation. |
| // |
| // Note that `quotient->width` will be set pessimally to `numerator->width`. |
| OPENSSL_EXPORT int bn_div_consttime(BIGNUM *quotient, BIGNUM *remainder, |
| const BIGNUM *numerator, |
| const BIGNUM *divisor, |
| unsigned divisor_min_bits, BN_CTX *ctx); |
| |
| // bn_is_relatively_prime checks whether GCD(`x`, `y`) is one. On success, it |
| // returns one and sets `*out_relatively_prime` to one if the GCD was one and |
| // zero otherwise. On error, it returns zero. |
| OPENSSL_EXPORT int bn_is_relatively_prime(int *out_relatively_prime, |
| const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, |
| BN_CTX *ctx); |
| |
| // bn_lcm_consttime sets `r` to LCM(`a`, `b`). It returns one and success and |
| // zero on error. `a` and `b` are both treated as secret. |
| OPENSSL_EXPORT int bn_lcm_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, |
| BN_CTX *ctx); |
| |
| // bn_mont_ctx_init zero-initialies `mont`. |
| void bn_mont_ctx_init(BN_MONT_CTX *mont); |
| |
| // bn_mont_ctx_cleanup releases memory associated with `mont`, without freeing |
| // `mont` itself. |
| void bn_mont_ctx_cleanup(BN_MONT_CTX *mont); |
| |
| |
| // Constant-time modular arithmetic. |
| // |
| // The following functions implement basic constant-time modular arithmetic. |
| |
| // bn_mod_add_words sets `r` to `a` + `b` (mod `m`), using `tmp` as scratch |
| // space. Each array is `num` words long. `a` and `b` must be < `m`. Any pair of |
| // `r`, `a`, and `b` may alias. |
| void bn_mod_add_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, |
| const BN_ULONG *m, BN_ULONG *tmp, size_t num); |
| |
| // bn_mod_add_consttime acts like `BN_mod_add_quick` but takes a `BN_CTX`. |
| int bn_mod_add_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, |
| const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); |
| |
| // bn_mod_sub_words sets `r` to `a` - `b` (mod `m`), using `tmp` as scratch |
| // space. Each array is `num` words long. `a` and `b` must be < `m`. Any pair of |
| // `r`, `a`, and `b` may alias. |
| void bn_mod_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, |
| const BN_ULONG *m, BN_ULONG *tmp, size_t num); |
| |
| // bn_mod_sub_consttime acts like `BN_mod_sub_quick` but takes a `BN_CTX`. |
| int bn_mod_sub_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, |
| const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); |
| |
| // bn_mod_lshift1_consttime acts like `BN_mod_lshift1_quick` but takes a |
| // `BN_CTX`. |
| int bn_mod_lshift1_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, |
| BN_CTX *ctx); |
| |
| // bn_mod_lshift_consttime acts like `BN_mod_lshift_quick` but takes a `BN_CTX`. |
| int bn_mod_lshift_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n, const BIGNUM *m, |
| BN_CTX *ctx); |
| |
| // bn_mod_inverse_consttime sets `r` to `a`^-1, mod `n`. `a` must be non- |
| // negative and less than `n`. It returns one on success and zero on error. On |
| // failure, if the failure was caused by `a` having no inverse mod `n` then |
| // `*out_no_inverse` will be set to one; otherwise it will be set to zero. |
| // |
| // This function treats both `a` and `n` as secret, provided they are both non- |
| // zero and the inverse exists. It should only be used for even moduli where |
| // none of the less general implementations are applicable. |
| OPENSSL_EXPORT int bn_mod_inverse_consttime(BIGNUM *r, int *out_no_inverse, |
| const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, |
| BN_CTX *ctx); |
| |
| // bn_mod_inverse_prime sets `out` to the modular inverse of `a` modulo `p`, |
| // computed with Fermat's Little Theorem. It returns one on success and zero on |
| // error. If `mont_p` is NULL, one will be computed temporarily. |
| int bn_mod_inverse_prime(BIGNUM *out, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, |
| BN_CTX *ctx, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont_p); |
| |
| // bn_mod_inverse_secret_prime behaves like `bn_mod_inverse_prime` but uses |
| // `BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime` instead of `BN_mod_exp_mont` in hopes of |
| // protecting the exponent. |
| int bn_mod_inverse_secret_prime(BIGNUM *out, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, |
| BN_CTX *ctx, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont_p); |
| |
| // BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked takes `lock` and checks whether `*pmont` is NULL. If |
| // so, it creates a new `BN_MONT_CTX` and sets the modulus for it to `mod`. It |
| // then stores it as `*pmont`. It returns one on success and zero on error. Note |
| // this function assumes `mod` is public. |
| // |
| // If `*pmont` is already non-NULL then it does nothing and returns one. |
| int BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(UniquePtr<BN_MONT_CTX> *pmont, Mutex *lock, |
| const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *bn_ctx); |
| |
| |
| // Low-level operations for small numbers. |
| // |
| // The following functions implement algorithms suitable for use with scalars |
| // and field elements in elliptic curves. They rely on the number being small |
| // both to stack-allocate various temporaries and because they do not implement |
| // optimizations useful for the larger values used in RSA. |
| |
| // BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS is the largest size input these functions handle. This |
| // limit allows temporaries to be more easily stack-allocated. This limit is set |
| // to accommodate P-521. |
| #if defined(OPENSSL_32_BIT) |
| #define BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS 17 |
| #else |
| #define BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS 9 |
| #endif |
| |
| // bn_mul_small sets `r` to `a`*`b`. `num_r` must be `num_a` + `num_b`. `r` may |
| // not alias with `a` or `b`. |
| void bn_mul_small(BN_ULONG *r, size_t num_r, const BN_ULONG *a, size_t num_a, |
| const BN_ULONG *b, size_t num_b); |
| |
| // bn_sqr_small sets `r` to `a`^2. `num_r` must be `num_a`*2. `r` and `a` may |
| // not alias. |
| void bn_sqr_small(BN_ULONG *r, size_t num_r, const BN_ULONG *a, size_t num_a); |
| |
| // In the following functions, the modulus must be at most `BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS` |
| // words long. |
| |
| // bn_to_montgomery_small sets `r` to `a` translated to the Montgomery domain. |
| // `r` and `a` are `num` words long, which must be `mont->N.width`. `a` must be |
| // fully reduced and may alias `r`. |
| void bn_to_montgomery_small(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, size_t num, |
| const BN_MONT_CTX *mont); |
| |
| // bn_from_montgomery_small sets `r` to `a` translated out of the Montgomery |
| // domain. `r` and `a` are `num_r` and `num_a` words long, respectively. `num_r` |
| // must be `mont->N.width`. `a` must be at most `mont->N`^2 and may alias `r`. |
| // |
| // Unlike most of these functions, only `num_r` is bounded by |
| // `BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS`. `num_a` may exceed it, but must be at most 2 * `num_r`. |
| void bn_from_montgomery_small(BN_ULONG *r, size_t num_r, const BN_ULONG *a, |
| size_t num_a, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont); |
| |
| // bn_mod_mul_montgomery_small sets `r` to `a` * `b` mod `mont->N`. Both inputs |
| // and outputs are in the Montgomery domain. Each array is `num` words long, |
| // which must be `mont->N.width`. Any two of `r`, `a`, and `b` may alias. `a` |
| // and `b` must be reduced on input. |
| void bn_mod_mul_montgomery_small(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, |
| const BN_ULONG *b, size_t num, |
| const BN_MONT_CTX *mont); |
| |
| // bn_mod_exp_mont_small sets `r` to `a`^`p` mod `mont->N`. It returns one on |
| // success and zero on programmer or internal error. Both inputs and outputs are |
| // in the Montgomery domain. `r` and `a` are `num` words long, which must be |
| // `mont->N.width` and at most `BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS`. `num_p`, measured in bits, |
| // must fit in `size_t`. `a` must be fully-reduced. This function runs in time |
| // independent of `a`, but `p` and `mont->N` are public values. `a` must be |
| // fully-reduced and may alias with `r`. |
| // |
| // Note this function differs from `BN_mod_exp_mont` which uses Montgomery |
| // reduction but takes input and output outside the Montgomery domain. Combine |
| // this function with `bn_from_montgomery_small` and `bn_to_montgomery_small` |
| // if necessary. |
| void bn_mod_exp_mont_small(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, size_t num, |
| const BN_ULONG *p, size_t num_p, |
| const BN_MONT_CTX *mont); |
| |
| // bn_mod_inverse0_prime_mont_small sets `r` to `a`^-1 mod `mont->N`. If `a` is |
| // zero, `r` is set to zero. `mont->N` must be a prime. `r` and `a` are `num` |
| // words long, which must be `mont->N.width` and at most `BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS`. |
| // `a` must be fully-reduced and may alias `r`. This function runs in time |
| // independent of `a`, but `mont->N` is a public value. |
| void bn_mod_inverse0_prime_mont_small(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, |
| size_t num, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont); |
| |
| |
| // Word-based byte conversion functions. |
| |
| // bn_big_endian_to_words interprets `in_len` bytes from `in` as a big-endian, |
| // unsigned integer and writes the result to `out_len` words in `out`. `out_len` |
| // must be large enough to represent any `in_len`-byte value. That is, `in_len` |
| // must be at most `BN_BYTES * out_len`. |
| void bn_big_endian_to_words(BN_ULONG *out, size_t out_len, const uint8_t *in, |
| size_t in_len); |
| |
| // bn_words_to_big_endian represents `in_len` words from `in` as a big-endian, |
| // unsigned integer in `out_len` bytes. It writes the result to `out`. `out_len` |
| // must be large enough to represent `in` without truncation. |
| // |
| // Note `out_len` may be less than `BN_BYTES * in_len` if `in` is known to have |
| // leading zeros. |
| void bn_words_to_big_endian(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len, const BN_ULONG *in, |
| size_t in_len); |
| |
| BSSL_NAMESPACE_END |
| |
| |
| #endif // OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_FIPSMODULE_BN_INTERNAL_H |