| // Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
| // |
| // Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); |
| // you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. |
| // You may obtain a copy of the License at |
| // |
| // https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 |
| // |
| // Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software |
| // distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, |
| // WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. |
| // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and |
| // limitations under the License. |
| |
| #include <string.h> |
| |
| #include <openssl/asn1.h> |
| #include <openssl/digest.h> |
| #include <openssl/err.h> |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> |
| #include <openssl/md5.h> |
| #include <openssl/obj.h> |
| #include <openssl/sha.h> |
| #include <openssl/stack.h> |
| #include <openssl/x509.h> |
| |
| #include "../internal.h" |
| #include "internal.h" |
| |
| |
| int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) { |
| return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer, b->cert_info->issuer)); |
| } |
| |
| int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) { |
| return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject, b->cert_info->subject)); |
| } |
| |
| int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) { |
| return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer, b->crl->issuer)); |
| } |
| |
| int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) { |
| return OPENSSL_memcmp(a->crl_hash, b->crl_hash, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
| } |
| |
| X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a) { |
| return a->cert_info->issuer; |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x) { |
| return X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer); |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x) { |
| return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer)); |
| } |
| |
| X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a) { |
| return a->cert_info->subject; |
| } |
| |
| ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a) { |
| return a->cert_info->serialNumber; |
| } |
| |
| const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *x509) { |
| return x509->cert_info->serialNumber; |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x) { |
| return X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject); |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x) { |
| return X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject); |
| } |
| |
| // Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB: |
| // Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const" |
| // arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these |
| // operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring |
| // certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the |
| // "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast. |
| int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) { |
| // Fill in the |cert_hash| fields. |
| // |
| // TODO(davidben): This may fail, in which case the the hash will be all |
| // zeros. This produces a consistent comparison (failures are sticky), but |
| // not a good one. OpenSSL now returns -2, but this is not a consistent |
| // comparison and may cause misbehaving sorts by transitivity. For now, we |
| // retain the old OpenSSL behavior, which was to ignore the error. See |
| // https://crbug.com/boringssl/355. |
| x509v3_cache_extensions((X509 *)a); |
| x509v3_cache_extensions((X509 *)b); |
| |
| return OPENSSL_memcmp(a->cert_hash, b->cert_hash, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
| } |
| |
| int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b) { |
| int ret; |
| |
| // Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date |
| |
| if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) { |
| ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL); |
| if (ret < 0) { |
| return -2; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) { |
| ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL); |
| if (ret < 0) { |
| return -2; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen; |
| |
| if (ret) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| return OPENSSL_memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen); |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x) { |
| // Make sure the X509_NAME structure contains a valid cached encoding. |
| if (i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL) < 0) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| uint8_t md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
| SHA1(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md); |
| return CRYPTO_load_u32_le(md); |
| } |
| |
| // I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding, |
| // this is reasonably efficient. |
| |
| uint32_t X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x) { |
| // Make sure the X509_NAME structure contains a valid cached encoding. |
| if (i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL) < 0) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| uint8_t md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
| MD5((const uint8_t *)x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length, md); |
| return CRYPTO_load_u32_le(md); |
| } |
| |
| X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(const STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name, |
| const ASN1_INTEGER *serial) { |
| if (serial->type != V_ASN1_INTEGER && serial->type != V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { |
| X509 *x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); |
| if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get0_serialNumber(x509), serial) == 0 && |
| X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x509), name) == 0) { |
| return x509; |
| } |
| } |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| X509 *X509_find_by_subject(const STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name) { |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { |
| X509 *x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); |
| if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0) { |
| return x509; |
| } |
| } |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| EVP_PKEY *X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 *x) { |
| if (x == NULL) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| return X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info->key); |
| } |
| |
| EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(const X509 *x) { |
| if (x == NULL) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| return X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key); |
| } |
| |
| ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x) { |
| if (!x) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| return x->cert_info->key->public_key; |
| } |
| |
| int X509_check_private_key(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *k) { |
| const EVP_PKEY *xk = X509_get0_pubkey(x); |
| if (xk == NULL) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k); |
| if (ret > 0) { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| switch (ret) { |
| case 0: |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH); |
| return 0; |
| case -1: |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH); |
| return 0; |
| case -2: |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| // Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference |
| // count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of |
| // each X509 structure. |
| STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { |
| STACK_OF(X509) *ret = sk_X509_dup(chain); |
| if (ret == NULL) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) { |
| X509_up_ref(sk_X509_value(ret, i)); |
| } |
| return ret; |
| } |