|  | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | 
|  | * All rights reserved. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * This package is an SSL implementation written | 
|  | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | 
|  | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | 
|  | * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions | 
|  | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | 
|  | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation | 
|  | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | 
|  | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | 
|  | * | 
|  | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | 
|  | * the code are not to be removed. | 
|  | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | 
|  | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | 
|  | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | 
|  | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | 
|  | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | 
|  | * are met: | 
|  | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | 
|  | *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | 
|  | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | 
|  | *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | 
|  | *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | 
|  | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | 
|  | *    must display the following acknowledgement: | 
|  | *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by | 
|  | *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | 
|  | *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | 
|  | *    being used are not cryptographic related :-). | 
|  | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | 
|  | *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | 
|  | *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | 
|  | * | 
|  | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | 
|  | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | 
|  | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | 
|  | * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | 
|  | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | 
|  | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | 
|  | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | 
|  | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | 
|  | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | 
|  | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | 
|  | * SUCH DAMAGE. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | 
|  | * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be | 
|  | * copied and put under another distribution licence | 
|  | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ | 
|  |  | 
|  | #include <openssl/asn1.h> | 
|  | #include <openssl/asn1t.h> | 
|  | #include <openssl/digest.h> | 
|  | #include <openssl/err.h> | 
|  | #include <openssl/mem.h> | 
|  | #include <openssl/obj.h> | 
|  | #include <openssl/stack.h> | 
|  | #include <openssl/thread.h> | 
|  | #include <openssl/x509.h> | 
|  | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> | 
|  |  | 
|  | #include <assert.h> | 
|  |  | 
|  | #include "../asn1/internal.h" | 
|  | #include "../internal.h" | 
|  | #include "internal.h" | 
|  |  | 
|  | static int X509_REVOKED_cmp(const X509_REVOKED *const *a, | 
|  | const X509_REVOKED *const *b); | 
|  | static int setup_idp(X509_CRL *crl, ISSUING_DIST_POINT *idp); | 
|  |  | 
|  | ASN1_SEQUENCE(X509_REVOKED) = { | 
|  | ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REVOKED, serialNumber, ASN1_INTEGER), | 
|  | ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REVOKED, revocationDate, ASN1_TIME), | 
|  | ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_REVOKED, extensions, X509_EXTENSION), | 
|  | } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X509_REVOKED) | 
|  |  | 
|  | static int crl_lookup(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED **ret, | 
|  | const ASN1_INTEGER *serial, X509_NAME *issuer); | 
|  |  | 
|  | // The X509_CRL_INFO structure needs a bit of customisation. Since we cache | 
|  | // the original encoding the signature wont be affected by reordering of the | 
|  | // revoked field. | 
|  | static int crl_inf_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, | 
|  | void *exarg) { | 
|  | X509_CRL_INFO *a = (X509_CRL_INFO *)*pval; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (!a || !a->revoked) { | 
|  | return 1; | 
|  | } | 
|  | switch (operation) { | 
|  | // Just set cmp function here. We don't sort because that would | 
|  | // affect the output of X509_CRL_print(). | 
|  | case ASN1_OP_D2I_POST: | 
|  | (void)sk_X509_REVOKED_set_cmp_func(a->revoked, X509_REVOKED_cmp); | 
|  | break; | 
|  | } | 
|  | return 1; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  |  | 
|  | ASN1_SEQUENCE_enc(X509_CRL_INFO, enc, crl_inf_cb) = { | 
|  | ASN1_OPT(X509_CRL_INFO, version, ASN1_INTEGER), | 
|  | ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL_INFO, sig_alg, X509_ALGOR), | 
|  | ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL_INFO, issuer, X509_NAME), | 
|  | ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL_INFO, lastUpdate, ASN1_TIME), | 
|  | ASN1_OPT(X509_CRL_INFO, nextUpdate, ASN1_TIME), | 
|  | ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CRL_INFO, revoked, X509_REVOKED), | 
|  | ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CRL_INFO, extensions, X509_EXTENSION, 0), | 
|  | } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_enc(X509_CRL_INFO, X509_CRL_INFO) | 
|  |  | 
|  | static int crl_parse_entry_extensions(X509_CRL *crl) { | 
|  | STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revoked = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(crl); | 
|  | for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revoked); i++) { | 
|  | X509_REVOKED *rev = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revoked, i); | 
|  |  | 
|  | int crit; | 
|  | ASN1_ENUMERATED *reason = | 
|  | X509_REVOKED_get_ext_d2i(rev, NID_crl_reason, &crit, NULL); | 
|  | if (!reason && crit != -1) { | 
|  | crl->flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; | 
|  | return 1; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (reason) { | 
|  | rev->reason = ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(reason); | 
|  | ASN1_ENUMERATED_free(reason); | 
|  | } else { | 
|  | rev->reason = CRL_REASON_NONE; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | // We do not support any critical CRL entry extensions. | 
|  | const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts = rev->extensions; | 
|  | for (size_t j = 0; j < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); j++) { | 
|  | const X509_EXTENSION *ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, j); | 
|  | if (X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)) { | 
|  | crl->flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL; | 
|  | break; | 
|  | } | 
|  | } | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | return 1; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | // The X509_CRL structure needs a bit of customisation. Cache some extensions | 
|  | // and hash of the whole CRL. | 
|  | static int crl_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, | 
|  | void *exarg) { | 
|  | X509_CRL *crl = (X509_CRL *)*pval; | 
|  | int i; | 
|  |  | 
|  | switch (operation) { | 
|  | case ASN1_OP_NEW_POST: | 
|  | crl->idp = NULL; | 
|  | crl->akid = NULL; | 
|  | crl->flags = 0; | 
|  | crl->idp_flags = 0; | 
|  | break; | 
|  |  | 
|  | case ASN1_OP_D2I_POST: { | 
|  | // The version must be one of v1(0) or v2(1). | 
|  | long version = X509_CRL_VERSION_1; | 
|  | if (crl->crl->version != NULL) { | 
|  | version = ASN1_INTEGER_get(crl->crl->version); | 
|  | // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/364): |X509_CRL_VERSION_1| | 
|  | // should also be rejected. This means an explicitly-encoded X.509v1 | 
|  | // version. v1 is DEFAULT, so DER requires it be omitted. | 
|  | if (version < X509_CRL_VERSION_1 || version > X509_CRL_VERSION_2) { | 
|  | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_VERSION); | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  | } | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | // Per RFC 5280, section 5.1.2.1, extensions require v2. | 
|  | if (version != X509_CRL_VERSION_2 && crl->crl->extensions != NULL) { | 
|  | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_FIELD_FOR_VERSION); | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (!X509_CRL_digest(crl, EVP_sha256(), crl->crl_hash, NULL)) { | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | crl->idp = | 
|  | X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(crl, NID_issuing_distribution_point, &i, NULL); | 
|  | if (crl->idp != NULL) { | 
|  | if (!setup_idp(crl, crl->idp)) { | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  | } | 
|  | } else if (i != -1) { | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | crl->akid = | 
|  | X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(crl, NID_authority_key_identifier, &i, NULL); | 
|  | if (crl->akid == NULL && i != -1) { | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | // See if we have any unhandled critical CRL extensions and indicate | 
|  | // this in a flag. We only currently handle IDP so anything else | 
|  | // critical sets the flag. This code accesses the X509_CRL structure | 
|  | // directly: applications shouldn't do this. | 
|  | const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts = crl->crl->extensions; | 
|  | for (size_t idx = 0; idx < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); idx++) { | 
|  | const X509_EXTENSION *ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, idx); | 
|  | int nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ext)); | 
|  | if (X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)) { | 
|  | if (nid == NID_issuing_distribution_point || | 
|  | nid == NID_authority_key_identifier) { | 
|  | continue; | 
|  | } | 
|  | crl->flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL; | 
|  | break; | 
|  | } | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (!crl_parse_entry_extensions(crl)) { | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | break; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | case ASN1_OP_FREE_POST: | 
|  | AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(crl->akid); | 
|  | ISSUING_DIST_POINT_free(crl->idp); | 
|  | break; | 
|  | } | 
|  | return 1; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | // Convert IDP into a more convenient form | 
|  | // | 
|  | // TODO(davidben): Each of these flags are already booleans, so this is not | 
|  | // really more convenient. We can probably remove |idp_flags|. | 
|  | static int setup_idp(X509_CRL *crl, ISSUING_DIST_POINT *idp) { | 
|  | int idp_only = 0; | 
|  | // Set various flags according to IDP | 
|  | crl->idp_flags |= IDP_PRESENT; | 
|  | if (idp->onlyuser > 0) { | 
|  | idp_only++; | 
|  | crl->idp_flags |= IDP_ONLYUSER; | 
|  | } | 
|  | if (idp->onlyCA > 0) { | 
|  | idp_only++; | 
|  | crl->idp_flags |= IDP_ONLYCA; | 
|  | } | 
|  | if (idp->onlyattr > 0) { | 
|  | idp_only++; | 
|  | crl->idp_flags |= IDP_ONLYATTR; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | // Per RFC 5280, section 5.2.5, at most one of onlyContainsUserCerts, | 
|  | // onlyContainsCACerts, and onlyContainsAttributeCerts may be true. | 
|  | // | 
|  | // TODO(crbug.com/boringssl/443): Move this check to the |ISSUING_DIST_POINT| | 
|  | // parser. | 
|  | if (idp_only > 1) { | 
|  | crl->idp_flags |= IDP_INVALID; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (idp->indirectCRL > 0) { | 
|  | crl->idp_flags |= IDP_INDIRECT; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (idp->onlysomereasons) { | 
|  | crl->idp_flags |= IDP_REASONS; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | // TODO(davidben): The new verifier does not support nameRelativeToCRLIssuer. | 
|  | // Remove this? | 
|  | return DIST_POINT_set_dpname(idp->distpoint, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | ASN1_SEQUENCE_ref(X509_CRL, crl_cb) = { | 
|  | ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL, crl, X509_CRL_INFO), | 
|  | ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL, sig_alg, X509_ALGOR), | 
|  | ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL, signature, ASN1_BIT_STRING), | 
|  | } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_ref(X509_CRL, X509_CRL) | 
|  |  | 
|  | // Although |X509_REVOKED| contains an |X509_NAME|, it can be const. It is not | 
|  | // affected by https://crbug.com/boringssl/407 because the  |X509_NAME| does | 
|  | // not participate in serialization. | 
|  | IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(X509_REVOKED) | 
|  | IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION_const(X509_REVOKED) | 
|  |  | 
|  | IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CRL_INFO) | 
|  | IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CRL) | 
|  | IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509_CRL) | 
|  |  | 
|  | static int X509_REVOKED_cmp(const X509_REVOKED *const *a, | 
|  | const X509_REVOKED *const *b) { | 
|  | return ASN1_STRING_cmp((*a)->serialNumber, (*b)->serialNumber); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | int X509_CRL_add0_revoked(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED *rev) { | 
|  | X509_CRL_INFO *inf; | 
|  | inf = crl->crl; | 
|  | if (!inf->revoked) { | 
|  | inf->revoked = sk_X509_REVOKED_new(X509_REVOKED_cmp); | 
|  | } | 
|  | if (!inf->revoked || !sk_X509_REVOKED_push(inf->revoked, rev)) { | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  | } | 
|  | asn1_encoding_clear(&inf->enc); | 
|  | return 1; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | int X509_CRL_verify(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { | 
|  | if (X509_ALGOR_cmp(crl->sig_alg, crl->crl->sig_alg) != 0) { | 
|  | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH); | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | return ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL_INFO), crl->sig_alg, | 
|  | crl->signature, crl->crl, pkey); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | int X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED **ret, | 
|  | const ASN1_INTEGER *serial) { | 
|  | return crl_lookup(crl, ret, serial, NULL); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | int X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED **ret, X509 *x) { | 
|  | return crl_lookup(crl, ret, X509_get_serialNumber(x), | 
|  | X509_get_issuer_name(x)); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static int crl_revoked_issuer_match(X509_CRL *crl, X509_NAME *nm, | 
|  | X509_REVOKED *rev) { | 
|  | return nm == NULL || X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)) == 0; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static CRYPTO_MUTEX g_crl_sort_lock = CRYPTO_MUTEX_INIT; | 
|  |  | 
|  | static int crl_lookup(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED **ret, | 
|  | const ASN1_INTEGER *serial, X509_NAME *issuer) { | 
|  | // Use an assert, rather than a runtime error, because returning nothing for a | 
|  | // CRL is arguably failing open, rather than closed. | 
|  | assert(serial->type == V_ASN1_INTEGER || serial->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER); | 
|  | X509_REVOKED rtmp, *rev; | 
|  | size_t idx; | 
|  | rtmp.serialNumber = (ASN1_INTEGER *)serial; | 
|  | // Sort revoked into serial number order if not already sorted. Do this | 
|  | // under a lock to avoid race condition. | 
|  |  | 
|  | CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_read(&g_crl_sort_lock); | 
|  | const int is_sorted = sk_X509_REVOKED_is_sorted(crl->crl->revoked); | 
|  | CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_read(&g_crl_sort_lock); | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (!is_sorted) { | 
|  | CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&g_crl_sort_lock); | 
|  | if (!sk_X509_REVOKED_is_sorted(crl->crl->revoked)) { | 
|  | sk_X509_REVOKED_sort(crl->crl->revoked); | 
|  | } | 
|  | CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&g_crl_sort_lock); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (!sk_X509_REVOKED_find(crl->crl->revoked, &idx, &rtmp)) { | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  | } | 
|  | // Need to look for matching name | 
|  | for (; idx < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(crl->crl->revoked); idx++) { | 
|  | rev = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(crl->crl->revoked, idx); | 
|  | if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(rev->serialNumber, serial)) { | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  | } | 
|  | if (crl_revoked_issuer_match(crl, issuer, rev)) { | 
|  | if (ret) { | 
|  | *ret = rev; | 
|  | } | 
|  | return 1; | 
|  | } | 
|  | } | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  | } |