| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
| * All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
| * |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
| * the code are not to be removed. |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
| * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
| * distribution. |
| * |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
| * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
| * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
| * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
| * openssl-core@openssl.org. |
| * |
| * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
| * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
| * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
| * |
| * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
| * acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
| * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
| * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
| * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
| * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
| * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
| * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
| * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
| * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * ==================================================================== |
| * |
| * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
| * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
| * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by |
| * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source |
| * license. |
| * |
| * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of |
| * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites |
| * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. |
| * |
| * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in |
| * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received |
| * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. |
| * |
| * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not |
| * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third |
| * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights |
| * to make use of the Contribution. |
| * |
| * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN |
| * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA |
| * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY |
| * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR |
| * OTHERWISE. */ |
| |
| #include <openssl/ssl.h> |
| |
| #include <assert.h> |
| #include <stdlib.h> |
| #include <string.h> |
| |
| #include <utility> |
| |
| #include <openssl/err.h> |
| #include <openssl/hmac.h> |
| #include <openssl/lhash.h> |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> |
| #include <openssl/rand.h> |
| |
| #include "internal.h" |
| #include "../crypto/internal.h" |
| |
| |
| BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN |
| |
| // The address of this is a magic value, a pointer to which is returned by |
| // SSL_magic_pending_session_ptr(). It allows a session callback to indicate |
| // that it needs to asynchronously fetch session information. |
| static const char g_pending_session_magic = 0; |
| |
| static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class = |
| CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA; |
| |
| static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session); |
| static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session); |
| |
| UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> ssl_session_new(const SSL_X509_METHOD *x509_method) { |
| return MakeUnique<SSL_SESSION>(x509_method); |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t ssl_hash_session_id(Span<const uint8_t> session_id) { |
| // Take the first four bytes of |session_id|. Session IDs are generated by the |
| // server randomly, so we can assume even using the first four bytes results |
| // in a good distribution. |
| uint8_t tmp_storage[sizeof(uint32_t)]; |
| if (session_id.size() < sizeof(tmp_storage)) { |
| OPENSSL_memset(tmp_storage, 0, sizeof(tmp_storage)); |
| OPENSSL_memcpy(tmp_storage, session_id.data(), session_id.size()); |
| session_id = tmp_storage; |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t hash = |
| ((uint32_t)session_id[0]) | |
| ((uint32_t)session_id[1] << 8) | |
| ((uint32_t)session_id[2] << 16) | |
| ((uint32_t)session_id[3] << 24); |
| |
| return hash; |
| } |
| |
| UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> SSL_SESSION_dup(SSL_SESSION *session, int dup_flags) { |
| UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> new_session = ssl_session_new(session->x509_method); |
| if (!new_session) { |
| return nullptr; |
| } |
| |
| new_session->is_server = session->is_server; |
| new_session->ssl_version = session->ssl_version; |
| new_session->is_quic = session->is_quic; |
| new_session->sid_ctx_length = session->sid_ctx_length; |
| OPENSSL_memcpy(new_session->sid_ctx, session->sid_ctx, session->sid_ctx_length); |
| |
| // Copy the key material. |
| new_session->secret_length = session->secret_length; |
| OPENSSL_memcpy(new_session->secret, session->secret, session->secret_length); |
| new_session->cipher = session->cipher; |
| |
| // Copy authentication state. |
| if (session->psk_identity != nullptr) { |
| new_session->psk_identity.reset( |
| OPENSSL_strdup(session->psk_identity.get())); |
| if (new_session->psk_identity == nullptr) { |
| return nullptr; |
| } |
| } |
| if (session->certs != nullptr) { |
| auto buf_up_ref = [](const CRYPTO_BUFFER *buf) { |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_up_ref(const_cast<CRYPTO_BUFFER *>(buf)); |
| return const_cast<CRYPTO_BUFFER*>(buf); |
| }; |
| new_session->certs.reset(sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_deep_copy( |
| session->certs.get(), buf_up_ref, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free)); |
| if (new_session->certs == nullptr) { |
| return nullptr; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (!session->x509_method->session_dup(new_session.get(), session)) { |
| return nullptr; |
| } |
| |
| new_session->verify_result = session->verify_result; |
| |
| new_session->ocsp_response = UpRef(session->ocsp_response); |
| new_session->signed_cert_timestamp_list = |
| UpRef(session->signed_cert_timestamp_list); |
| |
| OPENSSL_memcpy(new_session->peer_sha256, session->peer_sha256, |
| SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
| new_session->peer_sha256_valid = session->peer_sha256_valid; |
| |
| new_session->peer_signature_algorithm = session->peer_signature_algorithm; |
| |
| new_session->timeout = session->timeout; |
| new_session->auth_timeout = session->auth_timeout; |
| new_session->time = session->time; |
| |
| // Copy non-authentication connection properties. |
| if (dup_flags & SSL_SESSION_INCLUDE_NONAUTH) { |
| new_session->session_id_length = session->session_id_length; |
| OPENSSL_memcpy(new_session->session_id, session->session_id, |
| session->session_id_length); |
| |
| new_session->group_id = session->group_id; |
| |
| OPENSSL_memcpy(new_session->original_handshake_hash, |
| session->original_handshake_hash, |
| session->original_handshake_hash_len); |
| new_session->original_handshake_hash_len = |
| session->original_handshake_hash_len; |
| new_session->ticket_lifetime_hint = session->ticket_lifetime_hint; |
| new_session->ticket_age_add = session->ticket_age_add; |
| new_session->ticket_max_early_data = session->ticket_max_early_data; |
| new_session->extended_master_secret = session->extended_master_secret; |
| new_session->has_application_settings = session->has_application_settings; |
| |
| if (!new_session->early_alpn.CopyFrom(session->early_alpn) || |
| !new_session->quic_early_data_context.CopyFrom( |
| session->quic_early_data_context) || |
| !new_session->local_application_settings.CopyFrom( |
| session->local_application_settings) || |
| !new_session->peer_application_settings.CopyFrom( |
| session->peer_application_settings)) { |
| return nullptr; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // Copy the ticket. |
| if (dup_flags & SSL_SESSION_INCLUDE_TICKET && |
| !new_session->ticket.CopyFrom(session->ticket)) { |
| return nullptr; |
| } |
| |
| // The new_session does not get a copy of the ex_data. |
| |
| new_session->not_resumable = true; |
| return new_session; |
| } |
| |
| void ssl_session_rebase_time(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session) { |
| struct OPENSSL_timeval now; |
| ssl_get_current_time(ssl, &now); |
| |
| // To avoid overflows and underflows, if we've gone back in time, update the |
| // time, but mark the session expired. |
| if (session->time > now.tv_sec) { |
| session->time = now.tv_sec; |
| session->timeout = 0; |
| session->auth_timeout = 0; |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| // Adjust the session time and timeouts. If the session has already expired, |
| // clamp the timeouts at zero. |
| uint64_t delta = now.tv_sec - session->time; |
| session->time = now.tv_sec; |
| if (session->timeout < delta) { |
| session->timeout = 0; |
| } else { |
| session->timeout -= delta; |
| } |
| if (session->auth_timeout < delta) { |
| session->auth_timeout = 0; |
| } else { |
| session->auth_timeout -= delta; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void ssl_session_renew_timeout(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session, |
| uint32_t timeout) { |
| // Rebase the timestamp relative to the current time so |timeout| is measured |
| // correctly. |
| ssl_session_rebase_time(ssl, session); |
| |
| if (session->timeout > timeout) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| session->timeout = timeout; |
| if (session->timeout > session->auth_timeout) { |
| session->timeout = session->auth_timeout; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| uint16_t ssl_session_protocol_version(const SSL_SESSION *session) { |
| uint16_t ret; |
| if (!ssl_protocol_version_from_wire(&ret, session->ssl_version)) { |
| // An |SSL_SESSION| will never have an invalid version. This is enforced by |
| // the parser. |
| assert(0); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| const EVP_MD *ssl_session_get_digest(const SSL_SESSION *session) { |
| return ssl_get_handshake_digest(ssl_session_protocol_version(session), |
| session->cipher); |
| } |
| |
| bool ssl_get_new_session(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { |
| SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; |
| if (ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_SESSION_CREATION) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED); |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> session = ssl_session_new(ssl->ctx->x509_method); |
| if (session == NULL) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| session->is_server = ssl->server; |
| session->ssl_version = ssl->version; |
| session->is_quic = ssl->quic_method != nullptr; |
| |
| // Fill in the time from the |SSL_CTX|'s clock. |
| struct OPENSSL_timeval now; |
| ssl_get_current_time(ssl, &now); |
| session->time = now.tv_sec; |
| |
| uint16_t version = ssl_protocol_version(ssl); |
| if (version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) { |
| // TLS 1.3 uses tickets as authenticators, so we are willing to use them for |
| // longer. |
| session->timeout = ssl->session_ctx->session_psk_dhe_timeout; |
| session->auth_timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_AUTH_TIMEOUT; |
| } else { |
| // TLS 1.2 resumption does not incorporate new key material, so we use a |
| // much shorter timeout. |
| session->timeout = ssl->session_ctx->session_timeout; |
| session->auth_timeout = ssl->session_ctx->session_timeout; |
| } |
| |
| if (hs->config->cert->sid_ctx_length > sizeof(session->sid_ctx)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return false; |
| } |
| OPENSSL_memcpy(session->sid_ctx, hs->config->cert->sid_ctx, |
| hs->config->cert->sid_ctx_length); |
| session->sid_ctx_length = hs->config->cert->sid_ctx_length; |
| |
| // The session is marked not resumable until it is completely filled in. |
| session->not_resumable = true; |
| session->verify_result = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL; |
| |
| hs->new_session = std::move(session); |
| ssl_set_session(ssl, NULL); |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| bool ssl_ctx_rotate_ticket_encryption_key(SSL_CTX *ctx) { |
| OPENSSL_timeval now; |
| ssl_ctx_get_current_time(ctx, &now); |
| { |
| // Avoid acquiring a write lock in the common case (i.e. a non-default key |
| // is used or the default keys have not expired yet). |
| MutexReadLock lock(&ctx->lock); |
| if (ctx->ticket_key_current && |
| (ctx->ticket_key_current->next_rotation_tv_sec == 0 || |
| ctx->ticket_key_current->next_rotation_tv_sec > now.tv_sec) && |
| (!ctx->ticket_key_prev || |
| ctx->ticket_key_prev->next_rotation_tv_sec > now.tv_sec)) { |
| return true; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| MutexWriteLock lock(&ctx->lock); |
| if (!ctx->ticket_key_current || |
| (ctx->ticket_key_current->next_rotation_tv_sec != 0 && |
| ctx->ticket_key_current->next_rotation_tv_sec <= now.tv_sec)) { |
| // The current key has not been initialized or it is expired. |
| auto new_key = bssl::MakeUnique<TicketKey>(); |
| if (!new_key) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| RAND_bytes(new_key->name, 16); |
| RAND_bytes(new_key->hmac_key, 16); |
| RAND_bytes(new_key->aes_key, 16); |
| new_key->next_rotation_tv_sec = |
| now.tv_sec + SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_KEY_ROTATION_INTERVAL; |
| if (ctx->ticket_key_current) { |
| // The current key expired. Rotate it to prev and bump up its rotation |
| // timestamp. Note that even with the new rotation time it may still be |
| // expired and get dropped below. |
| ctx->ticket_key_current->next_rotation_tv_sec += |
| SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_KEY_ROTATION_INTERVAL; |
| ctx->ticket_key_prev = std::move(ctx->ticket_key_current); |
| } |
| ctx->ticket_key_current = std::move(new_key); |
| } |
| |
| // Drop an expired prev key. |
| if (ctx->ticket_key_prev && |
| ctx->ticket_key_prev->next_rotation_tv_sec <= now.tv_sec) { |
| ctx->ticket_key_prev.reset(); |
| } |
| |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| static int ssl_encrypt_ticket_with_cipher_ctx(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out, |
| const uint8_t *session_buf, |
| size_t session_len) { |
| ScopedEVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; |
| ScopedHMAC_CTX hctx; |
| |
| // If the session is too long, emit a dummy value rather than abort the |
| // connection. |
| static const size_t kMaxTicketOverhead = |
| 16 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE; |
| if (session_len > 0xffff - kMaxTicketOverhead) { |
| static const char kTicketPlaceholder[] = "TICKET TOO LARGE"; |
| return CBB_add_bytes(out, (const uint8_t *)kTicketPlaceholder, |
| strlen(kTicketPlaceholder)); |
| } |
| |
| // Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does all the |
| // work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. |
| SSL_CTX *tctx = hs->ssl->session_ctx.get(); |
| uint8_t iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; |
| uint8_t key_name[16]; |
| if (tctx->ticket_key_cb != NULL) { |
| if (tctx->ticket_key_cb(hs->ssl, key_name, iv, ctx.get(), hctx.get(), |
| 1 /* encrypt */) < 0) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } else { |
| // Rotate ticket key if necessary. |
| if (!ssl_ctx_rotate_ticket_encryption_key(tctx)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| MutexReadLock lock(&tctx->lock); |
| if (!RAND_bytes(iv, 16) || |
| !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx.get(), EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, |
| tctx->ticket_key_current->aes_key, iv) || |
| !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx.get(), tctx->ticket_key_current->hmac_key, 16, |
| tlsext_tick_md(), NULL)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| OPENSSL_memcpy(key_name, tctx->ticket_key_current->name, 16); |
| } |
| |
| uint8_t *ptr; |
| if (!CBB_add_bytes(out, key_name, 16) || |
| !CBB_add_bytes(out, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx.get())) || |
| !CBB_reserve(out, &ptr, session_len + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| size_t total = 0; |
| #if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE) |
| OPENSSL_memcpy(ptr, session_buf, session_len); |
| total = session_len; |
| #else |
| int len; |
| if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx.get(), ptr + total, &len, session_buf, session_len)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| total += len; |
| if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx.get(), ptr + total, &len)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| total += len; |
| #endif |
| if (!CBB_did_write(out, total)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| unsigned hlen; |
| if (!HMAC_Update(hctx.get(), CBB_data(out), CBB_len(out)) || |
| !CBB_reserve(out, &ptr, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE) || |
| !HMAC_Final(hctx.get(), ptr, &hlen) || |
| !CBB_did_write(out, hlen)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int ssl_encrypt_ticket_with_method(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out, |
| const uint8_t *session_buf, |
| size_t session_len) { |
| SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; |
| const SSL_TICKET_AEAD_METHOD *method = ssl->session_ctx->ticket_aead_method; |
| const size_t max_overhead = method->max_overhead(ssl); |
| const size_t max_out = session_len + max_overhead; |
| if (max_out < max_overhead) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| uint8_t *ptr; |
| if (!CBB_reserve(out, &ptr, max_out)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| size_t out_len; |
| if (!method->seal(ssl, ptr, &out_len, max_out, session_buf, |
| session_len)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_TICKET_ENCRYPTION_FAILED); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!CBB_did_write(out, out_len)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| bool ssl_encrypt_ticket(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out, |
| const SSL_SESSION *session) { |
| // Serialize the SSL_SESSION to be encoded into the ticket. |
| uint8_t *session_buf = nullptr; |
| size_t session_len; |
| if (!SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_for_ticket(session, &session_buf, &session_len)) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> free_session_buf(session_buf); |
| |
| if (hs->ssl->session_ctx->ticket_aead_method) { |
| return ssl_encrypt_ticket_with_method(hs, out, session_buf, session_len); |
| } else { |
| return ssl_encrypt_ticket_with_cipher_ctx(hs, out, session_buf, |
| session_len); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| bool ssl_session_is_context_valid(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, |
| const SSL_SESSION *session) { |
| if (session == NULL) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| return session->sid_ctx_length == hs->config->cert->sid_ctx_length && |
| OPENSSL_memcmp(session->sid_ctx, hs->config->cert->sid_ctx, |
| hs->config->cert->sid_ctx_length) == 0; |
| } |
| |
| bool ssl_session_is_time_valid(const SSL *ssl, const SSL_SESSION *session) { |
| if (session == NULL) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| struct OPENSSL_timeval now; |
| ssl_get_current_time(ssl, &now); |
| |
| // Reject tickets from the future to avoid underflow. |
| if (now.tv_sec < session->time) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| return session->timeout > now.tv_sec - session->time; |
| } |
| |
| bool ssl_session_is_resumable(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, |
| const SSL_SESSION *session) { |
| const SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; |
| return ssl_session_is_context_valid(hs, session) && |
| // The session must have been created by the same type of end point as |
| // we're now using it with. |
| ssl->server == session->is_server && |
| // The session must not be expired. |
| ssl_session_is_time_valid(ssl, session) && |
| // Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated |
| // version. |
| ssl->version == session->ssl_version && |
| // Only resume if the session's cipher matches the negotiated one. This |
| // is stricter than necessary for TLS 1.3, which allows cross-cipher |
| // resumption if the PRF hashes match. We require an exact match for |
| // simplicity. If loosening this, the 0-RTT accept logic must be |
| // updated to check the cipher. |
| hs->new_cipher == session->cipher && |
| // If the session contains a client certificate (either the full |
| // certificate or just the hash) then require that the form of the |
| // certificate matches the current configuration. |
| ((sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(session->certs.get()) == 0 && |
| !session->peer_sha256_valid) || |
| session->peer_sha256_valid == |
| hs->config->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs) && |
| // Only resume if the underlying transport protocol hasn't changed. |
| // This is to prevent cross-protocol resumption between QUIC and TCP. |
| (hs->ssl->quic_method != nullptr) == session->is_quic; |
| } |
| |
| // ssl_lookup_session looks up |session_id| in the session cache and sets |
| // |*out_session| to an |SSL_SESSION| object if found. |
| static enum ssl_hs_wait_t ssl_lookup_session( |
| SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> *out_session, |
| Span<const uint8_t> session_id) { |
| SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; |
| out_session->reset(); |
| |
| if (session_id.empty() || session_id.size() > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) { |
| return ssl_hs_ok; |
| } |
| |
| UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> session; |
| // Try the internal cache, if it exists. |
| if (!(ssl->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & |
| SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP)) { |
| uint32_t hash = ssl_hash_session_id(session_id); |
| auto cmp = [](const void *key, const SSL_SESSION *sess) -> int { |
| Span<const uint8_t> key_id = |
| *reinterpret_cast<const Span<const uint8_t> *>(key); |
| Span<const uint8_t> sess_id = |
| MakeConstSpan(sess->session_id, sess->session_id_length); |
| return key_id == sess_id ? 0 : 1; |
| }; |
| MutexReadLock lock(&ssl->session_ctx->lock); |
| // |lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve_key| returns a non-owning pointer. |
| session = UpRef(lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve_key(ssl->session_ctx->sessions, |
| &session_id, hash, cmp)); |
| // TODO(davidben): This should probably move it to the front of the list. |
| } |
| |
| // Fall back to the external cache, if it exists. |
| if (!session && ssl->session_ctx->get_session_cb != nullptr) { |
| int copy = 1; |
| session.reset(ssl->session_ctx->get_session_cb(ssl, session_id.data(), |
| session_id.size(), ©)); |
| if (!session) { |
| return ssl_hs_ok; |
| } |
| |
| if (session.get() == SSL_magic_pending_session_ptr()) { |
| session.release(); // This pointer is not actually owned. |
| return ssl_hs_pending_session; |
| } |
| |
| // Increment reference count now if the session callback asks us to do so |
| // (note that if the session structures returned by the callback are shared |
| // between threads, it must handle the reference count itself [i.e. copy == |
| // 0], or things won't be thread-safe). |
| if (copy) { |
| SSL_SESSION_up_ref(session.get()); |
| } |
| |
| // Add the externally cached session to the internal cache if necessary. |
| if (!(ssl->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & |
| SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)) { |
| SSL_CTX_add_session(ssl->session_ctx.get(), session.get()); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (session && !ssl_session_is_time_valid(ssl, session.get())) { |
| // The session was from the cache, so remove it. |
| SSL_CTX_remove_session(ssl->session_ctx.get(), session.get()); |
| session.reset(); |
| } |
| |
| *out_session = std::move(session); |
| return ssl_hs_ok; |
| } |
| |
| enum ssl_hs_wait_t ssl_get_prev_session(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, |
| UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> *out_session, |
| bool *out_tickets_supported, |
| bool *out_renew_ticket, |
| const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello) { |
| // This is used only by servers. |
| assert(hs->ssl->server); |
| UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> session; |
| bool renew_ticket = false; |
| |
| // If tickets are disabled, always behave as if no tickets are present. |
| CBS ticket; |
| const bool tickets_supported = |
| !(SSL_get_options(hs->ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) && |
| ssl_client_hello_get_extension(client_hello, &ticket, |
| TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket); |
| if (tickets_supported && CBS_len(&ticket) != 0) { |
| switch (ssl_process_ticket(hs, &session, &renew_ticket, ticket, |
| MakeConstSpan(client_hello->session_id, |
| client_hello->session_id_len))) { |
| case ssl_ticket_aead_success: |
| break; |
| case ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket: |
| assert(!session); |
| break; |
| case ssl_ticket_aead_error: |
| return ssl_hs_error; |
| case ssl_ticket_aead_retry: |
| return ssl_hs_pending_ticket; |
| } |
| } else { |
| // The client didn't send a ticket, so the session ID is a real ID. |
| enum ssl_hs_wait_t lookup_ret = ssl_lookup_session( |
| hs, &session, |
| MakeConstSpan(client_hello->session_id, client_hello->session_id_len)); |
| if (lookup_ret != ssl_hs_ok) { |
| return lookup_ret; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| *out_session = std::move(session); |
| *out_tickets_supported = tickets_supported; |
| *out_renew_ticket = renew_ticket; |
| return ssl_hs_ok; |
| } |
| |
| static bool remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session, bool lock) { |
| if (session == nullptr || session->session_id_length == 0) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| if (lock) { |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&ctx->lock); |
| } |
| |
| SSL_SESSION *found_session = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ctx->sessions, session); |
| bool found = found_session == session; |
| if (found) { |
| found_session = lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(ctx->sessions, session); |
| SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, session); |
| } |
| |
| if (lock) { |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&ctx->lock); |
| } |
| |
| if (found) { |
| // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/251): Callbacks should not be called |
| // under a lock. |
| if (ctx->remove_session_cb != nullptr) { |
| ctx->remove_session_cb(ctx, found_session); |
| } |
| SSL_SESSION_free(found_session); |
| } |
| |
| return found; |
| } |
| |
| void ssl_set_session(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session) { |
| if (ssl->session.get() == session) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| ssl->session = UpRef(session); |
| } |
| |
| // locked by SSL_CTX in the calling function |
| static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session) { |
| if (session->next == NULL || session->prev == NULL) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| if (session->next == (SSL_SESSION *)&ctx->session_cache_tail) { |
| // last element in list |
| if (session->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&ctx->session_cache_head) { |
| // only one element in list |
| ctx->session_cache_head = NULL; |
| ctx->session_cache_tail = NULL; |
| } else { |
| ctx->session_cache_tail = session->prev; |
| session->prev->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail); |
| } |
| } else { |
| if (session->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&ctx->session_cache_head) { |
| // first element in list |
| ctx->session_cache_head = session->next; |
| session->next->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head); |
| } else { // middle of list |
| session->next->prev = session->prev; |
| session->prev->next = session->next; |
| } |
| } |
| session->prev = session->next = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session) { |
| if (session->next != NULL && session->prev != NULL) { |
| SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, session); |
| } |
| |
| if (ctx->session_cache_head == NULL) { |
| ctx->session_cache_head = session; |
| ctx->session_cache_tail = session; |
| session->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head); |
| session->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail); |
| } else { |
| session->next = ctx->session_cache_head; |
| session->next->prev = session; |
| session->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head); |
| ctx->session_cache_head = session; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static bool add_session_locked(SSL_CTX *ctx, UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> session) { |
| SSL_SESSION *new_session = session.get(); |
| SSL_SESSION *old_session; |
| if (!lh_SSL_SESSION_insert(ctx->sessions, &old_session, new_session)) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| // |ctx->sessions| took ownership of |new_session| and gave us back a |
| // reference to |old_session|. (|old_session| may be the same as |
| // |new_session|, in which case we traded identical references with |
| // |ctx->sessions|.) |
| session.release(); |
| session.reset(old_session); |
| |
| if (old_session != nullptr) { |
| if (old_session == new_session) { |
| // |session| was already in the cache. There are no linked list pointers |
| // to update. |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| // There was a session ID collision. |old_session| was replaced with |
| // |session| in the hash table, so |old_session| must be removed from the |
| // linked list to match. |
| SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, old_session); |
| } |
| |
| // This does not increment the reference count. Although |session| is inserted |
| // into two structures (a doubly-linked list and the hash table), |ctx| only |
| // takes one reference. |
| SSL_SESSION_list_add(ctx, new_session); |
| |
| // Enforce any cache size limits. |
| if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0) { |
| while (lh_SSL_SESSION_num_items(ctx->sessions) > |
| SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx)) { |
| if (!remove_session(ctx, ctx->session_cache_tail, |
| /*lock=*/false)) { |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| void ssl_update_cache(SSL *ssl) { |
| SSL_CTX *ctx = ssl->session_ctx.get(); |
| SSL_SESSION *session = ssl->s3->established_session.get(); |
| int mode = SSL_is_server(ssl) ? SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER : SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT; |
| if (!SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(session) || |
| (ctx->session_cache_mode & mode) != mode) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| // Clients never use the internal session cache. |
| if (ssl->server && |
| !(ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)) { |
| UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> ref = UpRef(session); |
| bool remove_expired_sessions = false; |
| { |
| MutexWriteLock lock(&ctx->lock); |
| add_session_locked(ctx, std::move(ref)); |
| |
| if (!(ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) { |
| // Automatically flush the internal session cache every 255 connections. |
| ctx->handshakes_since_cache_flush++; |
| if (ctx->handshakes_since_cache_flush >= 255) { |
| remove_expired_sessions = true; |
| ctx->handshakes_since_cache_flush = 0; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (remove_expired_sessions) { |
| // |SSL_CTX_flush_sessions| takes the lock we just released. We could |
| // merge the critical sections, but we'd then call user code under a |
| // lock, or compute |now| earlier, even when not flushing. |
| OPENSSL_timeval now; |
| ssl_get_current_time(ssl, &now); |
| SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(ctx, now.tv_sec); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (ctx->new_session_cb != nullptr) { |
| UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> ref = UpRef(session); |
| if (ctx->new_session_cb(ssl, ref.get())) { |
| // |new_session_cb|'s return value signals whether it took ownership. |
| ref.release(); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| BSSL_NAMESPACE_END |
| |
| using namespace bssl; |
| |
| ssl_session_st::ssl_session_st(const SSL_X509_METHOD *method) |
| : RefCounted(CheckSubClass()), |
| x509_method(method), |
| extended_master_secret(false), |
| peer_sha256_valid(false), |
| not_resumable(false), |
| ticket_age_add_valid(false), |
| is_server(false), |
| is_quic(false), |
| has_application_settings(false) { |
| CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ex_data); |
| time = ::time(nullptr); |
| } |
| |
| ssl_session_st::~ssl_session_st() { |
| CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, this, &ex_data); |
| x509_method->session_clear(this); |
| } |
| |
| SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { |
| return ssl_session_new(ctx->x509_method).release(); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_SESSION_up_ref(SSL_SESSION *session) { |
| session->UpRefInternal(); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *session) { |
| if (session != nullptr) { |
| session->DecRefInternal(); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| const uint8_t *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *session, |
| unsigned *out_len) { |
| if (out_len != NULL) { |
| *out_len = session->session_id_length; |
| } |
| return session->session_id; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_SESSION_set1_id(SSL_SESSION *session, const uint8_t *sid, |
| size_t sid_len) { |
| if (sid_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| // Use memmove in case someone passes in the output of |SSL_SESSION_get_id|. |
| OPENSSL_memmove(session->session_id, sid, sid_len); |
| session->session_id_length = sid_len; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *session) { |
| return session->timeout; |
| } |
| |
| uint64_t SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *session) { |
| if (session == NULL) { |
| // NULL should crash, but silently accept it here for compatibility. |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return session->time; |
| } |
| |
| X509 *SSL_SESSION_get0_peer(const SSL_SESSION *session) { |
| return session->x509_peer; |
| } |
| |
| const STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) * |
| SSL_SESSION_get0_peer_certificates(const SSL_SESSION *session) { |
| return session->certs.get(); |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_SESSION_get0_signed_cert_timestamp_list(const SSL_SESSION *session, |
| const uint8_t **out, |
| size_t *out_len) { |
| if (session->signed_cert_timestamp_list) { |
| *out = CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(session->signed_cert_timestamp_list.get()); |
| *out_len = CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(session->signed_cert_timestamp_list.get()); |
| } else { |
| *out = nullptr; |
| *out_len = 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_SESSION_get0_ocsp_response(const SSL_SESSION *session, |
| const uint8_t **out, size_t *out_len) { |
| if (session->ocsp_response) { |
| *out = CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(session->ocsp_response.get()); |
| *out_len = CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(session->ocsp_response.get()); |
| } else { |
| *out = nullptr; |
| *out_len = 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| size_t SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(const SSL_SESSION *session, uint8_t *out, |
| size_t max_out) { |
| // TODO(davidben): Fix secret_length's type and remove these casts. |
| if (max_out == 0) { |
| return (size_t)session->secret_length; |
| } |
| if (max_out > (size_t)session->secret_length) { |
| max_out = (size_t)session->secret_length; |
| } |
| OPENSSL_memcpy(out, session->secret, max_out); |
| return max_out; |
| } |
| |
| uint64_t SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *session, uint64_t time) { |
| if (session == NULL) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| session->time = time; |
| return time; |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *session, uint32_t timeout) { |
| if (session == NULL) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| session->timeout = timeout; |
| session->auth_timeout = timeout; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| const uint8_t *SSL_SESSION_get0_id_context(const SSL_SESSION *session, |
| unsigned *out_len) { |
| if (out_len != NULL) { |
| *out_len = session->sid_ctx_length; |
| } |
| return session->sid_ctx; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(SSL_SESSION *session, const uint8_t *sid_ctx, |
| size_t sid_ctx_len) { |
| if (sid_ctx_len > sizeof(session->sid_ctx)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static_assert(sizeof(session->sid_ctx) < 256, "sid_ctx_len does not fit"); |
| session->sid_ctx_length = (uint8_t)sid_ctx_len; |
| OPENSSL_memcpy(session->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len); |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_SESSION_should_be_single_use(const SSL_SESSION *session) { |
| return ssl_session_protocol_version(session) >= TLS1_3_VERSION; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(const SSL_SESSION *session) { |
| return !session->not_resumable && |
| (session->session_id_length != 0 || !session->ticket.empty()); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_SESSION_has_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *session) { |
| return !session->ticket.empty(); |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *session, |
| const uint8_t **out_ticket, size_t *out_len) { |
| if (out_ticket != nullptr) { |
| *out_ticket = session->ticket.data(); |
| } |
| *out_len = session->ticket.size(); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_SESSION_set_ticket(SSL_SESSION *session, const uint8_t *ticket, |
| size_t ticket_len) { |
| return session->ticket.CopyFrom(MakeConstSpan(ticket, ticket_len)); |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t SSL_SESSION_get_ticket_lifetime_hint(const SSL_SESSION *session) { |
| return session->ticket_lifetime_hint; |
| } |
| |
| const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(const SSL_SESSION *session) { |
| return session->cipher; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_SESSION_has_peer_sha256(const SSL_SESSION *session) { |
| return session->peer_sha256_valid; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_SESSION_get0_peer_sha256(const SSL_SESSION *session, |
| const uint8_t **out_ptr, size_t *out_len) { |
| if (session->peer_sha256_valid) { |
| *out_ptr = session->peer_sha256; |
| *out_len = sizeof(session->peer_sha256); |
| } else { |
| *out_ptr = nullptr; |
| *out_len = 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_SESSION_early_data_capable(const SSL_SESSION *session) { |
| return ssl_session_protocol_version(session) >= TLS1_3_VERSION && |
| session->ticket_max_early_data != 0; |
| } |
| |
| SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_copy_without_early_data(SSL_SESSION *session) { |
| if (!SSL_SESSION_early_data_capable(session)) { |
| return UpRef(session).release(); |
| } |
| |
| bssl::UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> copy = |
| SSL_SESSION_dup(session, SSL_SESSION_DUP_ALL); |
| if (!copy) { |
| return nullptr; |
| } |
| |
| copy->ticket_max_early_data = 0; |
| // Copied sessions are non-resumable until they're completely filled in. |
| copy->not_resumable = session->not_resumable; |
| assert(!SSL_SESSION_early_data_capable(copy.get())); |
| return copy.release(); |
| } |
| |
| SSL_SESSION *SSL_magic_pending_session_ptr(void) { |
| return (SSL_SESSION *)&g_pending_session_magic; |
| } |
| |
| SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl) { |
| // Once the initially handshake completes, we return the most recently |
| // established session. In particular, if there is a pending renegotiation, we |
| // do not return information about it until it completes. |
| // |
| // Code in the handshake must either use |hs->new_session| (if updating a |
| // partial session) or |ssl_handshake_session| (if trying to query properties |
| // consistently across TLS 1.2 resumption and other handshakes). |
| if (ssl->s3->established_session != nullptr) { |
| return ssl->s3->established_session.get(); |
| } |
| |
| // Otherwise, we must be in the initial handshake. |
| SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs.get(); |
| assert(hs != nullptr); |
| assert(!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete); |
| |
| // Return the 0-RTT session, if in the 0-RTT state. While the handshake has |
| // not actually completed, the public accessors all report properties as if |
| // it has. |
| if (hs->early_session) { |
| return hs->early_session.get(); |
| } |
| |
| // Otherwise, return the partial session. |
| return (SSL_SESSION *)ssl_handshake_session(hs); |
| } |
| |
| SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl) { |
| SSL_SESSION *ret = SSL_get_session(ssl); |
| if (ret != NULL) { |
| SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ret); |
| } |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, |
| CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused, |
| CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused, |
| CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) { |
| return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, argl, argp, free_func); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *session, int idx, void *arg) { |
| return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&session->ex_data, idx, arg); |
| } |
| |
| void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *session, int idx) { |
| return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&session->ex_data, idx); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session) { |
| UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> owned_session = UpRef(session); |
| MutexWriteLock lock(&ctx->lock); |
| return add_session_locked(ctx, std::move(owned_session)); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session) { |
| return remove_session(ctx, session, /*lock=*/true); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_session(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session) { |
| // SSL_set_session may only be called before the handshake has started. |
| if (ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete || |
| ssl->s3->hs == NULL || |
| ssl->s3->hs->state != 0) { |
| abort(); |
| } |
| |
| ssl_set_session(ssl, session); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t timeout) { |
| if (ctx == NULL) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| // Historically, zero was treated as |SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT|. |
| if (timeout == 0) { |
| timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT; |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t old_timeout = ctx->session_timeout; |
| ctx->session_timeout = timeout; |
| return old_timeout; |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t SSL_CTX_get_timeout(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { |
| if (ctx == NULL) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return ctx->session_timeout; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_session_psk_dhe_timeout(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t timeout) { |
| ctx->session_psk_dhe_timeout = timeout; |
| } |
| |
| typedef struct timeout_param_st { |
| SSL_CTX *ctx; |
| uint64_t time; |
| LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *cache; |
| } TIMEOUT_PARAM; |
| |
| static void timeout_doall_arg(SSL_SESSION *session, void *void_param) { |
| TIMEOUT_PARAM *param = reinterpret_cast<TIMEOUT_PARAM *>(void_param); |
| |
| if (param->time == 0 || |
| session->time + session->timeout < session->time || |
| param->time > (session->time + session->timeout)) { |
| // TODO(davidben): This can probably just call |remove_session|. |
| (void) lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(param->cache, session); |
| SSL_SESSION_list_remove(param->ctx, session); |
| // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/251): Callbacks should not be called |
| // under a lock. |
| if (param->ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL) { |
| param->ctx->remove_session_cb(param->ctx, session); |
| } |
| SSL_SESSION_free(session); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint64_t time) { |
| TIMEOUT_PARAM tp; |
| |
| tp.ctx = ctx; |
| tp.cache = ctx->sessions; |
| if (tp.cache == NULL) { |
| return; |
| } |
| tp.time = time; |
| MutexWriteLock lock(&ctx->lock); |
| lh_SSL_SESSION_doall_arg(tp.cache, timeout_doall_arg, &tp); |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session)) { |
| ctx->new_session_cb = cb; |
| } |
| |
| int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session) { |
| return ctx->new_session_cb; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb( |
| SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session)) { |
| ctx->remove_session_cb = cb; |
| } |
| |
| void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| SSL_SESSION *session) { |
| return ctx->remove_session_cb; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| SSL_SESSION *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *id, |
| int id_len, int *out_copy)) { |
| ctx->get_session_cb = cb; |
| } |
| |
| SSL_SESSION *(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, |
| const uint8_t *id, |
| int id_len, |
| int *out_copy) { |
| return ctx->get_session_cb; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback( |
| SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value)) { |
| ctx->info_callback = cb; |
| } |
| |
| void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx))(const SSL *ssl, int type, |
| int value) { |
| return ctx->info_callback; |
| } |