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boringssl / boringssl / f10ea55e9139d444d277cd03da519a2076e975dc / . / crypto / x509 / x509_test.cc
blob: 521d7573fb2a6b15ddf85290ba0716d3c9afbea8 [file] [log] [blame]
/* Copyright (c) 2016, Google Inc.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
#include <algorithm>
#include <functional>
#include <string>
#include <vector>
#include <gtest/gtest.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/curve25519.h>
#include <openssl/digest.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/pool.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include "../internal.h"
#include "../test/test_util.h"
#include "../x509v3/internal.h"
std::string GetTestData(const char *path);
static const char kCrossSigningRootPEM[] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
"MIICcTCCAdqgAwIBAgIIagJHiPvE0MowDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwPDEaMBgGA1UE\n"
"ChMRQm9yaW5nU1NMIFRFU1RJTkcxHjAcBgNVBAMTFUNyb3NzLXNpZ25pbmcgUm9v\n"
"dCBDQTAgFw0xNTAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8yMTAwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFowPDEaMBgGA1UE\n"
"ChMRQm9yaW5nU1NMIFRFU1RJTkcxHjAcBgNVBAMTFUNyb3NzLXNpZ25pbmcgUm9v\n"
"dCBDQTCBnzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOBjQAwgYkCgYEAwo3qFvSB9Zmlbpzn9wJp\n"
"ikI75Rxkatez8VkLqyxbOhPYl2Haz8F5p1gDG96dCI6jcLGgu3AKT9uhEQyyUko5\n"
"EKYasazSeA9CQrdyhPg0mkTYVETnPM1W/ebid1YtqQbq1CMWlq2aTDoSGAReGFKP\n"
"RTdXAbuAXzpCfi/d8LqV13UCAwEAAaN6MHgwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgIEMB0GA1Ud\n"
"JQQWMBQGCCsGAQUFBwMBBggrBgEFBQcDAjAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MBkGA1Ud\n"
"DgQSBBBHKHC7V3Z/3oLvEZx0RZRwMBsGA1UdIwQUMBKAEEcocLtXdn/egu8RnHRF\n"
"lHAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADgYEAnglibsy6mGtpIXivtlcz4zIEnHw/lNW+r/eC\n"
"CY7evZTmOoOuC/x9SS3MF9vawt1HFUummWM6ZgErqVBOXIB4//ykrcCgf5ZbF5Hr\n"
"+3EFprKhBqYiXdD8hpBkrBoXwn85LPYWNd2TceCrx0YtLIprE2R5MB2RIq8y4Jk3\n"
"YFXvkME=\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
static const char kRootCAPEM[] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
"MIICVTCCAb6gAwIBAgIIAj5CwoHlWuYwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwLjEaMBgGA1UE\n"
"ChMRQm9yaW5nU1NMIFRFU1RJTkcxEDAOBgNVBAMTB1Jvb3QgQ0EwIBcNMTUwMTAx\n"
"MDAwMDAwWhgPMjEwMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaMC4xGjAYBgNVBAoTEUJvcmluZ1NTTCBU\n"
"RVNUSU5HMRAwDgYDVQQDEwdSb290IENBMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCB\n"
"iQKBgQDpDn8RDOZa5oaDcPZRBy4CeBH1siSSOO4mYgLHlPE+oXdqwI/VImi2XeJM\n"
"2uCFETXCknJJjYG0iJdrt/yyRFvZTQZw+QzGj+mz36NqhGxDWb6dstB2m8PX+plZ\n"
"w7jl81MDvUnWs8yiQ/6twgu5AbhWKZQDJKcNKCEpqa6UW0r5nwIDAQABo3oweDAO\n"
"BgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAgQwHQYDVR0lBBYwFAYIKwYBBQUHAwEGCCsGAQUFBwMCMA8G\n"
"A1UdEwEB/wQFMAMBAf8wGQYDVR0OBBIEEEA31wH7QC+4HH5UBCeMWQEwGwYDVR0j\n"
"BBQwEoAQQDfXAftAL7gcflQEJ4xZATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOBgQDXylEK77Za\n"
"kKeY6ZerrScWyZhrjIGtHFu09qVpdJEzrk87k2G7iHHR9CAvSofCgEExKtWNS9dN\n"
"+9WiZp/U48iHLk7qaYXdEuO07No4BYtXn+lkOykE+FUxmA4wvOF1cTd2tdj3MzX2\n"
"kfGIBAYhzGZWhY3JbhIfTEfY1PNM1pWChQ==\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
static const char kRootCrossSignedPEM[] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
"MIICYzCCAcygAwIBAgIIAj5CwoHlWuYwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwPDEaMBgGA1UE\n"
"ChMRQm9yaW5nU1NMIFRFU1RJTkcxHjAcBgNVBAMTFUNyb3NzLXNpZ25pbmcgUm9v\n"
"dCBDQTAgFw0xNTAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8yMTAwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFowLjEaMBgGA1UE\n"
"ChMRQm9yaW5nU1NMIFRFU1RJTkcxEDAOBgNVBAMTB1Jvb3QgQ0EwgZ8wDQYJKoZI\n"
"hvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBAOkOfxEM5lrmhoNw9lEHLgJ4EfWyJJI47iZiAseU\n"
"8T6hd2rAj9UiaLZd4kza4IURNcKSckmNgbSIl2u3/LJEW9lNBnD5DMaP6bPfo2qE\n"
"bENZvp2y0Habw9f6mVnDuOXzUwO9SdazzKJD/q3CC7kBuFYplAMkpw0oISmprpRb\n"
"SvmfAgMBAAGjejB4MA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwICBDAdBgNVHSUEFjAUBggrBgEFBQcD\n"
"AQYIKwYBBQUHAwIwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAZBgNVHQ4EEgQQQDfXAftAL7gc\n"
"flQEJ4xZATAbBgNVHSMEFDASgBBHKHC7V3Z/3oLvEZx0RZRwMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB\n"
"CwUAA4GBAErTxYJ0en9HVRHAAr5OO5wuk5Iq3VMc79TMyQLCXVL8YH8Uk7KEwv+q\n"
"9MEKZv2eR/Vfm4HlXlUuIqfgUXbwrAYC/YVVX86Wnbpy/jc73NYVCq8FEZeO+0XU\n"
"90SWAPDdp+iL7aZdimnMtG1qlM1edmz8AKbrhN/R3IbA2CL0nCWV\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
static const char kIntermediatePEM[] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
"MIICXjCCAcegAwIBAgIJAKJMH+7rscPcMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMC4xGjAYBgNV\n"
"BAoTEUJvcmluZ1NTTCBURVNUSU5HMRAwDgYDVQQDEwdSb290IENBMCAXDTE1MDEw\n"
"MTAwMDAwMFoYDzIxMDAwMTAxMDAwMDAwWjA2MRowGAYDVQQKExFCb3JpbmdTU0wg\n"
"VEVTVElORzEYMBYGA1UEAxMPSW50ZXJtZWRpYXRlIENBMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB\n"
"AQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQC7YtI0l8ocTYJ0gKyXTtPL4iMJCNY4OcxXl48jkncVG1Hl\n"
"blicgNUa1r9m9YFtVkxvBinb8dXiUpEGhVg4awRPDcatlsBSEBuJkiZGYbRcAmSu\n"
"CmZYnf6u3aYQ18SU8WqVERPpE4cwVVs+6kwlzRw0+XDoZAczu8ZezVhCUc6NbQID\n"
"AQABo3oweDAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAgQwHQYDVR0lBBYwFAYIKwYBBQUHAwEGCCsG\n"
"AQUFBwMCMA8GA1UdEwEB/wQFMAMBAf8wGQYDVR0OBBIEEIwaaKi1dttdV3sfjRSy\n"
"BqMwGwYDVR0jBBQwEoAQQDfXAftAL7gcflQEJ4xZATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOB\n"
"gQCvnolNWEHuQS8PFVVyuLR+FKBeUUdrVbSfHSzTqNAqQGp0C9fk5oCzDq6ZgTfY\n"
"ESXM4cJhb3IAnW0UM0NFsYSKQJ50JZL2L3z5ZLQhHdbs4RmODGoC40BVdnJ4/qgB\n"
"aGSh09eQRvAVmbVCviDK2ipkWNegdyI19jFfNP5uIkGlYg==\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
static const char kIntermediateSelfSignedPEM[] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
"MIICZjCCAc+gAwIBAgIJAKJMH+7rscPcMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMDYxGjAYBgNV\n"
"BAoTEUJvcmluZ1NTTCBURVNUSU5HMRgwFgYDVQQDEw9JbnRlcm1lZGlhdGUgQ0Ew\n"
"IBcNMTUwMTAxMDAwMDAwWhgPMjEwMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaMDYxGjAYBgNVBAoTEUJv\n"
"cmluZ1NTTCBURVNUSU5HMRgwFgYDVQQDEw9JbnRlcm1lZGlhdGUgQ0EwgZ8wDQYJ\n"
"KoZIhvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBALti0jSXyhxNgnSArJdO08viIwkI1jg5zFeX\n"
"jyOSdxUbUeVuWJyA1RrWv2b1gW1WTG8GKdvx1eJSkQaFWDhrBE8Nxq2WwFIQG4mS\n"
"JkZhtFwCZK4KZlid/q7dphDXxJTxapURE+kThzBVWz7qTCXNHDT5cOhkBzO7xl7N\n"
"WEJRzo1tAgMBAAGjejB4MA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwICBDAdBgNVHSUEFjAUBggrBgEF\n"
"BQcDAQYIKwYBBQUHAwIwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAZBgNVHQ4EEgQQjBpoqLV2\n"
"211Xex+NFLIGozAbBgNVHSMEFDASgBCMGmiotXbbXVd7H40UsgajMA0GCSqGSIb3\n"
"DQEBCwUAA4GBALcccSrAQ0/EqQBsx0ZDTUydHXXNP2DrUkpUKmAXIe8McqIVSlkT\n"
"6H4xz7z8VRKBo9j+drjjtCw2i0CQc8aOLxRb5WJ8eVLnaW2XRlUqAzhF0CrulfVI\n"
"E4Vs6ZLU+fra1WAuIj6qFiigRja+3YkZArG8tMA9vtlhTX/g7YBZIkqH\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
static const char kLeafPEM[] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
"MIICXjCCAcegAwIBAgIIWjO48ufpunYwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwNjEaMBgGA1UE\n"
"ChMRQm9yaW5nU1NMIFRFU1RJTkcxGDAWBgNVBAMTD0ludGVybWVkaWF0ZSBDQTAg\n"
"Fw0xNTAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8yMTAwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFowMjEaMBgGA1UEChMRQm9y\n"
"aW5nU1NMIFRFU1RJTkcxFDASBgNVBAMTC2V4YW1wbGUuY29tMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3\n"
"DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDD0U0ZYgqShJ7oOjsyNKyVXEHqeafmk/bAoPqY/h1c\n"
"oPw2E8KmeqiUSoTPjG5IXSblOxcqpbAXgnjPzo8DI3GNMhAf8SYNYsoH7gc7Uy7j\n"
"5x8bUrisGnuTHqkqH6d4/e7ETJ7i3CpR8bvK16DggEvQTudLipz8FBHtYhFakfdh\n"
"TwIDAQABo3cwdTAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCBaAwHQYDVR0lBBYwFAYIKwYBBQUHAwEG\n"
"CCsGAQUFBwMCMAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwGQYDVR0OBBIEEKN5pvbur7mlXjeMEYA0\n"
"4nUwGwYDVR0jBBQwEoAQjBpoqLV2211Xex+NFLIGozANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOB\n"
"gQBj/p+JChp//LnXWC1k121LM/ii7hFzQzMrt70bny406SGz9jAjaPOX4S3gt38y\n"
"rhjpPukBlSzgQXFg66y6q5qp1nQTD1Cw6NkKBe9WuBlY3iYfmsf7WT8nhlT1CttU\n"
"xNCwyMX9mtdXdQicOfNjIGUCD5OLV5PgHFPRKiHHioBAhg==\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
static const char kLeafNoKeyUsagePEM[] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
"MIICNTCCAZ6gAwIBAgIJAIFQGaLQ0G2mMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMDYxGjAYBgNV\n"
"BAoTEUJvcmluZ1NTTCBURVNUSU5HMRgwFgYDVQQDEw9JbnRlcm1lZGlhdGUgQ0Ew\n"
"IBcNMTUwMTAxMDAwMDAwWhgPMjEwMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaMDcxGjAYBgNVBAoTEUJv\n"
"cmluZ1NTTCBURVNUSU5HMRkwFwYDVQQDExBldmlsLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tMIGfMA0G\n"
"CSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDOKoZe75NPz77EOaMMl4/0s3PyQw++zJvp\n"
"ejHAxZiTPCJgMbEHLrSzNoHdopg+CLUH5bE4wTXM8w9Inv5P8OAFJt7gJuPUunmk\n"
"j+NoU3QfzOR6BroePcz1vXX9jyVHRs087M/sLqWRHu9IR+/A+UTcBaWaFiDVUxtJ\n"
"YOwFMwjNPQIDAQABo0gwRjAMBgNVHRMBAf8EAjAAMBkGA1UdDgQSBBBJfLEUWHq1\n"
"27rZ1AVx2J5GMBsGA1UdIwQUMBKAEIwaaKi1dttdV3sfjRSyBqMwDQYJKoZIhvcN\n"
"AQELBQADgYEALVKN2Y3LZJOtu6SxFIYKxbLaXhTGTdIjxipZhmbBRDFjbZjZZOTe\n"
"6Oo+VDNPYco4rBexK7umYXJyfTqoY0E8dbiImhTcGTEj7OAB3DbBomgU1AYe+t2D\n"
"uwBqh4Y3Eto+Zn4pMVsxGEfUpjzjZDel7bN1/oU/9KWPpDfywfUmjgk=\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
static const char kForgeryPEM[] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
"MIICZzCCAdCgAwIBAgIIdTlMzQoKkeMwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwNzEaMBgGA1UE\n"
"ChMRQm9yaW5nU1NMIFRFU1RJTkcxGTAXBgNVBAMTEGV2aWwuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20w\n"
"IBcNMTUwMTAxMDAwMDAwWhgPMjEwMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaMDoxGjAYBgNVBAoTEUJv\n"
"cmluZ1NTTCBURVNUSU5HMRwwGgYDVQQDExNmb3JnZXJ5LmV4YW1wbGUuY29tMIGf\n"
"MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDADTwruBQZGb7Ay6s9HiYv5d1lwtEy\n"
"xQdA2Sy8Rn8uA20Q4KgqwVY7wzIZ+z5Butrsmwb70gdG1XU+yRaDeE7XVoW6jSpm\n"
"0sw35/5vJbTcL4THEFbnX0OPZnvpuZDFUkvVtq5kxpDWsVyM24G8EEq7kPih3Sa3\n"
"OMhXVXF8kso6UQIDAQABo3cwdTAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCBaAwHQYDVR0lBBYwFAYI\n"
"KwYBBQUHAwEGCCsGAQUFBwMCMAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwGQYDVR0OBBIEEEYJ/WHM\n"
"8p64erPWIg4/liwwGwYDVR0jBBQwEoAQSXyxFFh6tdu62dQFcdieRjANBgkqhkiG\n"
"9w0BAQsFAAOBgQA+zH7bHPElWRWJvjxDqRexmYLn+D3Aivs8XgXQJsM94W0EzSUf\n"
"DSLfRgaQwcb2gg2xpDFoG+W0vc6O651uF23WGt5JaFFJJxqjII05IexfCNhuPmp4\n"
"4UZAXPttuJXpn74IY1tuouaM06B3vXKZR+/ityKmfJvSwxacmFcK+2ziAg==\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
// kExamplePSSCert is an example RSA-PSS self-signed certificate, signed with
// the default hash functions.
static const char kExamplePSSCert[] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
"MIICYjCCAcagAwIBAgIJAI3qUyT6SIfzMBIGCSqGSIb3DQEBCjAFogMCAWowRTEL\n"
"MAkGA1UEBhMCQVUxEzARBgNVBAgMClNvbWUtU3RhdGUxITAfBgNVBAoMGEludGVy\n"
"bmV0IFdpZGdpdHMgUHR5IEx0ZDAeFw0xNDEwMDkxOTA5NTVaFw0xNTEwMDkxOTA5\n"
"NTVaMEUxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkFVMRMwEQYDVQQIDApTb21lLVN0YXRlMSEwHwYDVQQK\n"
"DBhJbnRlcm5ldCBXaWRnaXRzIFB0eSBMdGQwgZ8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADgY0A\n"
"MIGJAoGBAPi4bIO0vNmoV8CltFl2jFQdeesiUgR+0zfrQf2D+fCmhRU0dXFahKg8\n"
"0u9aTtPel4rd/7vPCqqGkr64UOTNb4AzMHYTj8p73OxaymPHAyXvqIqDWHYg+hZ3\n"
"13mSYwFIGth7Z/FSVUlO1m5KXNd6NzYM3t2PROjCpywrta9kS2EHAgMBAAGjUDBO\n"
"MB0GA1UdDgQWBBTQQfuJQR6nrVrsNF1JEflVgXgfEzAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBTQQfuJ\n"
"QR6nrVrsNF1JEflVgXgfEzAMBgNVHRMEBTADAQH/MBIGCSqGSIb3DQEBCjAFogMC\n"
"AWoDgYEASUy2RZcgNbNQZA0/7F+V1YTLEXwD16bm+iSVnzGwtexmQVEYIZG74K/w\n"
"xbdZQdTbpNJkp1QPjPfh0zsatw6dmt5QoZ8K8No0DjR9dgf+Wvv5WJvJUIQBoAVN\n"
"Z0IL+OQFz6+LcTHxD27JJCebrATXZA0wThGTQDm7crL+a+SujBY=\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
// kBadPSSCertPEM is a self-signed RSA-PSS certificate with bad parameters.
static const char kBadPSSCertPEM[] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
"MIIDdjCCAjqgAwIBAgIJANcwZLyfEv7DMD4GCSqGSIb3DQEBCjAxoA0wCwYJYIZI\n"
"AWUDBAIBoRowGAYJKoZIhvcNAQEIMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQCAaIEAgIA3jAnMSUwIwYD\n"
"VQQDDBxUZXN0IEludmFsaWQgUFNTIGNlcnRpZmljYXRlMB4XDTE1MTEwNDE2MDIz\n"
"NVoXDTE1MTIwNDE2MDIzNVowJzElMCMGA1UEAwwcVGVzdCBJbnZhbGlkIFBTUyBj\n"
"ZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMTaM7WH\n"
"qVCAGAIA+zL1KWvvASTrhlq+1ePdO7wsrWX2KiYoTYrJYTnxhLnn0wrHqApt79nL\n"
"IBG7cfShyZqFHOY/IzlYPMVt+gPo293gw96Fds5JBsjhjkyGnOyr9OUntFqvxDbT\n"
"IIFU7o9IdxD4edaqjRv+fegVE+B79pDk4s0ujsk6dULtCg9Rst0ucGFo19mr+b7k\n"
"dbfn8pZ72ZNDJPueVdrUAWw9oll61UcYfk75XdrLk6JlL41GrYHc8KlfXf43gGQq\n"
"QfrpHkg4Ih2cI6Wt2nhFGAzrlcorzLliQIUJRIhM8h4IgDfpBpaPdVQLqS2pFbXa\n"
"5eQjqiyJwak2vJ8CAwEAAaNQME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFCt180N4oGUt5LbzBwQ4Ia+2\n"
"4V97MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFCt180N4oGUt5LbzBwQ4Ia+24V97MAwGA1UdEwQFMAMB\n"
"Af8wMQYJKoZIhvcNAQEKMCSgDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgGhDTALBgkqhkiG9w0BAQii\n"
"BAICAN4DggEBAAjBtm90lGxgddjc4Xu/nbXXFHVs2zVcHv/mqOZoQkGB9r/BVgLb\n"
"xhHrFZ2pHGElbUYPfifdS9ztB73e1d4J+P29o0yBqfd4/wGAc/JA8qgn6AAEO/Xn\n"
"plhFeTRJQtLZVl75CkHXgUGUd3h+ADvKtcBuW9dSUncaUrgNKR8u/h/2sMG38RWY\n"
"DzBddC/66YTa3r7KkVUfW7yqRQfELiGKdcm+bjlTEMsvS+EhHup9CzbpoCx2Fx9p\n"
"NPtFY3yEObQhmL1JyoCRWqBE75GzFPbRaiux5UpEkns+i3trkGssZzsOuVqHNTNZ\n"
"lC9+9hPHIoc9UMmAQNo1vGIW3NWVoeGbaJ8=\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
static const char kRSAKey[] =
"-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
"MIICXgIBAAKBgQDYK8imMuRi/03z0K1Zi0WnvfFHvwlYeyK9Na6XJYaUoIDAtB92\n"
"kWdGMdAQhLciHnAjkXLI6W15OoV3gA/ElRZ1xUpxTMhjP6PyY5wqT5r6y8FxbiiF\n"
"KKAnHmUcrgfVW28tQ+0rkLGMryRtrukXOgXBv7gcrmU7G1jC2a7WqmeI8QIDAQAB\n"
"AoGBAIBy09Fd4DOq/Ijp8HeKuCMKTHqTW1xGHshLQ6jwVV2vWZIn9aIgmDsvkjCe\n"
"i6ssZvnbjVcwzSoByhjN8ZCf/i15HECWDFFh6gt0P5z0MnChwzZmvatV/FXCT0j+\n"
"WmGNB/gkehKjGXLLcjTb6dRYVJSCZhVuOLLcbWIV10gggJQBAkEA8S8sGe4ezyyZ\n"
"m4e9r95g6s43kPqtj5rewTsUxt+2n4eVodD+ZUlCULWVNAFLkYRTBCASlSrm9Xhj\n"
"QpmWAHJUkQJBAOVzQdFUaewLtdOJoPCtpYoY1zd22eae8TQEmpGOR11L6kbxLQsk\n"
"aMly/DOnOaa82tqAGTdqDEZgSNmCeKKknmECQAvpnY8GUOVAubGR6c+W90iBuQLj\n"
"LtFp/9ihd2w/PoDwrHZaoUYVcT4VSfJQog/k7kjE4MYXYWL8eEKg3WTWQNECQQDk\n"
"104Wi91Umd1PzF0ijd2jXOERJU1wEKe6XLkYYNHWQAe5l4J4MWj9OdxFXAxIuuR/\n"
"tfDwbqkta4xcux67//khAkEAvvRXLHTaa6VFzTaiiO8SaFsHV3lQyXOtMrBpB5jd\n"
"moZWgjHvB2W9Ckn7sDqsPB+U2tyX0joDdQEyuiMECDY8oQ==\n"
"-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n";
// kCRLTestRoot is a test root certificate. It has private key:
//
// -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
// MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEAo16WiLWZuaymsD8n5SKPmxV1y6jjgr3BS/dUBpbrzd1aeFzN
// lI8l2jfAnzUyp+I21RQ+nh/MhqjGElkTtK9xMn1Y+S9GMRh+5R/Du0iCb1tCZIPY
// 07Tgrb0KMNWe0v2QKVVruuYSgxIWodBfxlKO64Z8AJ5IbnWpuRqO6rctN9qUoMlT
// IAB6dL4G0tDJ/PGFWOJYwOMEIX54bly2wgyYJVBKiRRt4f7n8H922qmvPNA9idmX
// 9G1VAtgV6x97XXi7ULORIQvn9lVQF6nTYDBJhyuPB+mLThbLP2o9orxGx7aCtnnB
// ZUIxUvHNOI0FaSaZH7Fi0xsZ/GkG2HZe7ImPJwIDAQABAoIBAQCJF9MTHfHGkk+/
// DwCXlA0Wg0e6hBuHl10iNobYkMWIl/xXjOknhYiqOqb181py76472SVC5ERprC+r
// Lf0PXzqKuA117mnkwT2bYLCL9Skf8WEhoFLQNbVlloF6wYjqXcYgKYKh8HgQbZl4
// aLg2YQl2NADTNABsUWj/4H2WEelsODVviqfFs725lFg9KHDI8zxAZXLzDt/M9uVL
// GxJiX12tr0AwaeAFZ1oPM/y+LznM3N3+Ht3jHHw3jZ/u8Z1RdAmdpu3bZ6tbwGBr
// 9edsH5rKkm9aBvMrY7eX5VHqaqyRNFyG152ZOJh4XiiFG7EmgTPCpaHo50Y018Re
// grVtk+FBAoGBANY3lY+V8ZOwMxSHes+kTnoimHO5Ob7nxrOC71i27x+4HHsYUeAr
// /zOOghiDIn+oNkuiX5CIOWZKx159Bp65CPpCbTb/fh+HYnSgXFgCw7XptycO7LXM
// 5GwR5jSfpfzBFdYxjxoUzDMFBwTEYRTm0HkUHkH+s+ajjw5wqqbcGLcfAoGBAMM8
// DKW6Tb66xsf708f0jonAjKYTLZ+WOcwsBEWSFHoY8dUjvW5gqx5acHTEsc5ZTeh4
// BCFLa+Mn9cuJWVJNs09k7Xb2PNl92HQ4GN2vbdkJhExbkT6oLDHg1hVD0w8KLfz1
// lTAW6pS+6CdOHMEJpvqx89EgU/1GgIQ1fXYczE75AoGAKeJoXdDFkUjsU+FBhAPu
// TDcjc80Nm2QaF9NMFR5/lsYa236f06MGnQAKM9zADBHJu/Qdl1brUjLg1HrBppsr
// RDNkw1IlSOjhuUf5hkPUHGd8Jijm440SRIcjabqla8wdBupdvo2+d2NOQgJbsQiI
// ToQ+fkzcxAXK3Nnuo/1436UCgYBjLH7UNOZHS8OsVM0I1r8NVKVdu4JCfeJQR8/H
// s2P5ffBir+wLRMnH+nMDreMQiibcPxMCArkERAlE4jlgaJ38Z62E76KLbLTmnJRt
// EC9Bv+bXjvAiHvWMRMUbOj/ddPNVez7Uld+FvdBaHwDWQlvzHzBWfBCOKSEhh7Z6
// qDhUqQKBgQDPMDx2i5rfmQp3imV9xUcCkIRsyYQVf8Eo7NV07IdUy/otmksgn4Zt
// Lbf3v2dvxOpTNTONWjp2c+iUQo8QxJCZr5Sfb21oQ9Ktcrmc/CY7LeBVDibXwxdM
// vRG8kBzvslFWh7REzC3u06GSVhyKDfW93kN2cKVwGoahRlhj7oHuZQ==
// -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
static const char kCRLTestRoot[] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
"MIIDbzCCAlegAwIBAgIJAODri7v0dDUFMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAME4xCzAJBgNV\n"
"BAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMRYwFAYDVQQHDA1Nb3VudGFpbiBW\n"
"aWV3MRIwEAYDVQQKDAlCb3JpbmdTU0wwHhcNMTYwOTI2MTUwNjI2WhcNMjYwOTI0\n"
"MTUwNjI2WjBOMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQG\n"
"A1UEBwwNTW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzESMBAGA1UECgwJQm9yaW5nU1NMMIIBIjANBgkq\n"
"hkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAo16WiLWZuaymsD8n5SKPmxV1y6jjgr3B\n"
"S/dUBpbrzd1aeFzNlI8l2jfAnzUyp+I21RQ+nh/MhqjGElkTtK9xMn1Y+S9GMRh+\n"
"5R/Du0iCb1tCZIPY07Tgrb0KMNWe0v2QKVVruuYSgxIWodBfxlKO64Z8AJ5IbnWp\n"
"uRqO6rctN9qUoMlTIAB6dL4G0tDJ/PGFWOJYwOMEIX54bly2wgyYJVBKiRRt4f7n\n"
"8H922qmvPNA9idmX9G1VAtgV6x97XXi7ULORIQvn9lVQF6nTYDBJhyuPB+mLThbL\n"
"P2o9orxGx7aCtnnBZUIxUvHNOI0FaSaZH7Fi0xsZ/GkG2HZe7ImPJwIDAQABo1Aw\n"
"TjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUWPt3N5cZ/CRvubbrkqfBnAqhq94wHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUWPt3\n"
"N5cZ/CRvubbrkqfBnAqhq94wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOC\n"
"AQEAORu6M0MOwXy+3VEBwNilfTxyqDfruQsc1jA4PT8Oe8zora1WxE1JB4q2FJOz\n"
"EAuM3H/NXvEnBuN+ITvKZAJUfm4NKX97qmjMJwLKWe1gVv+VQTr63aR7mgWJReQN\n"
"XdMztlVeZs2dppV6uEg3ia1X0G7LARxGpA9ETbMyCpb39XxlYuTClcbA5ftDN99B\n"
"3Xg9KNdd++Ew22O3HWRDvdDpTO/JkzQfzi3sYwUtzMEonENhczJhGf7bQMmvL/w5\n"
"24Wxj4Z7KzzWIHsNqE/RIs6RV3fcW61j/mRgW2XyoWnMVeBzvcJr9NXp4VQYmFPw\n"
"amd8GKMZQvP0ufGnUn7D7uartA==\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
static const char kCRLTestLeaf[] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
"MIIDkDCCAnigAwIBAgICEAAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwTjELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMx\n"
"EzARBgNVBAgMCkNhbGlmb3JuaWExFjAUBgNVBAcMDU1vdW50YWluIFZpZXcxEjAQ\n"
"BgNVBAoMCUJvcmluZ1NTTDAeFw0xNjA5MjYxNTA4MzFaFw0xNzA5MjYxNTA4MzFa\n"
"MEsxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMRIwEAYDVQQKDAlC\n"
"b3JpbmdTU0wxEzARBgNVBAMMCmJvcmluZy5zc2wwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUA\n"
"A4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDc5v1S1M0W+QWM+raWfO0LH8uvqEwuJQgODqMaGnSlWUx9\n"
"8iQcnWfjyPja3lWg9K62hSOFDuSyEkysKHDxijz5R93CfLcfnVXjWQDJe7EJTTDP\n"
"ozEvxN6RjAeYv7CF000euYr3QT5iyBjg76+bon1p0jHZBJeNPP1KqGYgyxp+hzpx\n"
"e0gZmTlGAXd8JQK4v8kpdYwD6PPifFL/jpmQpqOtQmH/6zcLjY4ojmqpEdBqIKIX\n"
"+saA29hMq0+NK3K+wgg31RU+cVWxu3tLOIiesETkeDgArjWRS1Vkzbi4v9SJxtNu\n"
"OZuAxWiynRJw3JwH/OFHYZIvQqz68ZBoj96cepjPAgMBAAGjezB5MAkGA1UdEwQC\n"
"MAAwLAYJYIZIAYb4QgENBB8WHU9wZW5TU0wgR2VuZXJhdGVkIENlcnRpZmljYXRl\n"
"MB0GA1UdDgQWBBTGn0OVVh/aoYt0bvEKG+PIERqnDzAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBRY+3c3\n"
"lxn8JG+5tuuSp8GcCqGr3jANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAd2nM8gCQN2Dc8QJw\n"
"XSZXyuI3DBGGCHcay/3iXu0JvTC3EiQo8J6Djv7WLI0N5KH8mkm40u89fJAB2lLZ\n"
"ShuHVtcC182bOKnePgwp9CNwQ21p0rDEu/P3X46ZvFgdxx82E9xLa0tBB8PiPDWh\n"
"lV16jbaKTgX5AZqjnsyjR5o9/mbZVupZJXx5Syq+XA8qiJfstSYJs4KyKK9UOjql\n"
"ICkJVKpi2ahDBqX4MOH4SLfzVk8pqSpviS6yaA1RXqjpkxiN45WWaXDldVHMSkhC\n"
"5CNXsXi4b1nAntu89crwSLA3rEwzCWeYj+BX7e1T9rr3oJdwOU/2KQtW1js1yQUG\n"
"tjJMFw==\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
static const char kBasicCRL[] =
"-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----\n"
"MIIBpzCBkAIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBOMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UE\n"
"CAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQGA1UEBwwNTW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzESMBAGA1UECgwJ\n"
"Qm9yaW5nU1NMFw0xNjA5MjYxNTEwNTVaFw0xNjEwMjYxNTEwNTVaoA4wDDAKBgNV\n"
"HRQEAwIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAnrBKKgvd9x9zwK9rtUvVeFeJ7+LN\n"
"ZEAc+a5oxpPNEsJx6hXoApYEbzXMxuWBQoCs5iEBycSGudct21L+MVf27M38KrWo\n"
"eOkq0a2siqViQZO2Fb/SUFR0k9zb8xl86Zf65lgPplALun0bV/HT7MJcl04Tc4os\n"
"dsAReBs5nqTGNEd5AlC1iKHvQZkM//MD51DspKnDpsDiUVi54h9C1SpfZmX8H2Vv\n"
"diyu0fZ/bPAM3VAGawatf/SyWfBMyKpoPXEG39oAzmjjOj8en82psn7m474IGaho\n"
"/vBbhl1ms5qQiLYPjm4YELtnXQoFyC72tBjbdFd/ZE9k4CNKDbxFUXFbkw==\n"
"-----END X509 CRL-----\n";
static const char kRevokedCRL[] =
"-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----\n"
"MIIBvjCBpwIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBOMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UE\n"
"CAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQGA1UEBwwNTW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzESMBAGA1UECgwJ\n"
"Qm9yaW5nU1NMFw0xNjA5MjYxNTEyNDRaFw0xNjEwMjYxNTEyNDRaMBUwEwICEAAX\n"
"DTE2MDkyNjE1MTIyNlqgDjAMMAoGA1UdFAQDAgECMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IB\n"
"AQCUGaM4DcWzlQKrcZvI8TMeR8BpsvQeo5BoI/XZu2a8h//PyRyMwYeaOM+3zl0d\n"
"sjgCT8b3C1FPgT+P2Lkowv7rJ+FHJRNQkogr+RuqCSPTq65ha4WKlRGWkMFybzVH\n"
"NloxC+aU3lgp/NlX9yUtfqYmJek1CDrOOGPrAEAwj1l/BUeYKNGqfBWYJQtPJu+5\n"
"OaSvIYGpETCZJscUWODmLEb/O3DM438vLvxonwGqXqS0KX37+CHpUlyhnSovxXxp\n"
"Pz4aF+L7OtczxL0GYtD2fR9B7TDMqsNmHXgQrixvvOY7MUdLGbd4RfJL3yA53hyO\n"
"xzfKY2TzxLiOmctG0hXFkH5J\n"
"-----END X509 CRL-----\n";
static const char kBadIssuerCRL[] =
"-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----\n"
"MIIBwjCBqwIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBSMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UE\n"
"CAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQGA1UEBwwNTW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzEWMBQGA1UECgwN\n"
"Tm90IEJvcmluZ1NTTBcNMTYwOTI2MTUxMjQ0WhcNMTYxMDI2MTUxMjQ0WjAVMBMC\n"
"AhAAFw0xNjA5MjYxNTEyMjZaoA4wDDAKBgNVHRQEAwIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsF\n"
"AAOCAQEAlBmjOA3Fs5UCq3GbyPEzHkfAabL0HqOQaCP12btmvIf/z8kcjMGHmjjP\n"
"t85dHbI4Ak/G9wtRT4E/j9i5KML+6yfhRyUTUJKIK/kbqgkj06uuYWuFipURlpDB\n"
"cm81RzZaMQvmlN5YKfzZV/clLX6mJiXpNQg6zjhj6wBAMI9ZfwVHmCjRqnwVmCUL\n"
"TybvuTmkryGBqREwmSbHFFjg5ixG/ztwzON/Ly78aJ8Bql6ktCl9+/gh6VJcoZ0q\n"
"L8V8aT8+Ghfi+zrXM8S9BmLQ9n0fQe0wzKrDZh14EK4sb7zmOzFHSxm3eEXyS98g\n"
"Od4cjsc3ymNk88S4jpnLRtIVxZB+SQ==\n"
"-----END X509 CRL-----\n";
// kKnownCriticalCRL is kBasicCRL but with a critical issuing distribution point
// extension.
static const char kKnownCriticalCRL[] =
"-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----\n"
"MIIBujCBowIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBOMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UE\n"
"CAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQGA1UEBwwNTW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzESMBAGA1UECgwJ\n"
"Qm9yaW5nU1NMFw0xNjA5MjYxNTEwNTVaFw0xNjEwMjYxNTEwNTVaoCEwHzAKBgNV\n"
"HRQEAwIBATARBgNVHRwBAf8EBzAFoQMBAf8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAA+3\n"
"i+5e5Ub8sccfgOBs6WVJFI9c8gvJjrJ8/dYfFIAuCyeocs7DFXn1n13CRZ+URR/Q\n"
"mVWgU28+xeusuSPYFpd9cyYTcVyNUGNTI3lwgcE/yVjPaOmzSZKdPakApRxtpKKQ\n"
"NN/56aQz3bnT/ZSHQNciRB8U6jiD9V30t0w+FDTpGaG+7bzzUH3UVF9xf9Ctp60A\n"
"3mfLe0scas7owSt4AEFuj2SPvcE7yvdOXbu+IEv21cEJUVExJAbhvIweHXh6yRW+\n"
"7VVeiNzdIjkZjyTmAzoXGha4+wbxXyBRbfH+XWcO/H+8nwyG8Gktdu2QB9S9nnIp\n"
"o/1TpfOMSGhMyMoyPrk=\n"
"-----END X509 CRL-----\n";
// kUnknownCriticalCRL is kBasicCRL but with an unknown critical extension.
static const char kUnknownCriticalCRL[] =
"-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----\n"
"MIIBvDCBpQIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBOMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UE\n"
"CAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQGA1UEBwwNTW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzESMBAGA1UECgwJ\n"
"Qm9yaW5nU1NMFw0xNjA5MjYxNTEwNTVaFw0xNjEwMjYxNTEwNTVaoCMwITAKBgNV\n"
"HRQEAwIBATATBgwqhkiG9xIEAYS3CQABAf8EADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEA\n"
"GvBP0xqL509InMj/3493YVRV+ldTpBv5uTD6jewzf5XdaxEQ/VjTNe5zKnxbpAib\n"
"Kf7cwX0PMSkZjx7k7kKdDlEucwVvDoqC+O9aJcqVmM6GDyNb9xENxd0XCXja6MZC\n"
"yVgP4AwLauB2vSiEprYJyI1APph3iAEeDm60lTXX/wBM/tupQDDujKh2GPyvBRfJ\n"
"+wEDwGg3ICwvu4gO4zeC5qnFR+bpL9t5tOMAQnVZ0NWv+k7mkd2LbHdD44dxrfXC\n"
"nhtfERx99SDmC/jtUAJrGhtCO8acr7exCeYcduN7KKCm91OeCJKK6OzWst0Og1DB\n"
"kwzzU2rL3G65CrZ7H0SZsQ==\n"
"-----END X509 CRL-----\n";
// kUnknownCriticalCRL2 is kBasicCRL but with a critical issuing distribution
// point extension followed by an unknown critical extension
static const char kUnknownCriticalCRL2[] =
"-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----\n"
"MIIBzzCBuAIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBOMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UE\n"
"CAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQGA1UEBwwNTW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzESMBAGA1UECgwJ\n"
"Qm9yaW5nU1NMFw0xNjA5MjYxNTEwNTVaFw0xNjEwMjYxNTEwNTVaoDYwNDAKBgNV\n"
"HRQEAwIBATARBgNVHRwBAf8EBzAFoQMBAf8wEwYMKoZIhvcSBAGEtwkAAQH/BAAw\n"
"DQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBACTcpQC8jXL12JN5YzOcQ64ubQIe0XxRAd30p7qB\n"
"BTXGpgqBjrjxRfLms7EBYodEXB2oXMsDq3km0vT1MfYdsDD05S+SQ9CDsq/pUfaC\n"
"E2WNI5p8WircRnroYvbN2vkjlRbMd1+yNITohXYXCJwjEOAWOx3XIM10bwPYBv4R\n"
"rDobuLHoMgL3yHgMHmAkP7YpkBucNqeBV8cCdeAZLuhXFWi6yfr3r/X18yWbC/r2\n"
"2xXdkrSqXLFo7ToyP8YKTgiXpya4x6m53biEYwa2ULlas0igL6DK7wjYZX95Uy7H\n"
"GKljn9weIYiMPV/BzGymwfv2EW0preLwtyJNJPaxbdin6Jc=\n"
"-----END X509 CRL-----\n";
// kEd25519Cert is a self-signed Ed25519 certificate.
static const char kEd25519Cert[] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
"MIIBkTCCAUOgAwIBAgIJAJwooam0UCDmMAUGAytlcDBFMQswCQYDVQQGEwJBVTET\n"
"MBEGA1UECAwKU29tZS1TdGF0ZTEhMB8GA1UECgwYSW50ZXJuZXQgV2lkZ2l0cyBQ\n"
"dHkgTHRkMB4XDTE0MDQyMzIzMjE1N1oXDTE0MDUyMzIzMjE1N1owRTELMAkGA1UE\n"
"BhMCQVUxEzARBgNVBAgMClNvbWUtU3RhdGUxITAfBgNVBAoMGEludGVybmV0IFdp\n"
"ZGdpdHMgUHR5IEx0ZDAqMAUGAytlcAMhANdamAGCsQq31Uv+08lkBzoO4XLz2qYj\n"
"Ja8CGmj3B1Eao1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUoux7eV+fJK2v3ah6QPU/lj1/+7UwHwYD\n"
"VR0jBBgwFoAUoux7eV+fJK2v3ah6QPU/lj1/+7UwDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAFBgMr\n"
"ZXADQQBuCzqji8VP9xU8mHEMjXGChX7YP5J664UyVKHKH9Z1u4wEbB8dJ3ScaWSL\n"
"r+VHVKUhsrvcdCelnXRrrSD7xWAL\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
// kEd25519CertNull is an invalid self-signed Ed25519 with an explicit NULL in
// the signature algorithm.
static const char kEd25519CertNull[] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
"MIIBlTCCAUWgAwIBAgIJAJwooam0UCDmMAcGAytlcAUAMEUxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkFV\n"
"MRMwEQYDVQQIDApTb21lLVN0YXRlMSEwHwYDVQQKDBhJbnRlcm5ldCBXaWRnaXRz\n"
"IFB0eSBMdGQwHhcNMTQwNDIzMjMyMTU3WhcNMTQwNTIzMjMyMTU3WjBFMQswCQYD\n"
"VQQGEwJBVTETMBEGA1UECAwKU29tZS1TdGF0ZTEhMB8GA1UECgwYSW50ZXJuZXQg\n"
"V2lkZ2l0cyBQdHkgTHRkMCowBQYDK2VwAyEA11qYAYKxCrfVS/7TyWQHOg7hcvPa\n"
"piMlrwIaaPcHURqjUDBOMB0GA1UdDgQWBBSi7Ht5X58kra/dqHpA9T+WPX/7tTAf\n"
"BgNVHSMEGDAWgBSi7Ht5X58kra/dqHpA9T+WPX/7tTAMBgNVHRMEBTADAQH/MAcG\n"
"AytlcAUAA0EA70uefNocdJohkKPNROKVyBuBD3LXMyvmdTklsaxSRY3PcZdOohlr\n"
"recgVPpVS7B+d9g4EwtZXIh4lodTBDHBBw==\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
// kSANTypesLeaf is a leaf certificate (signed by |kSANTypesRoot|) which
// contains SANS for example.com, test@example.com, 127.0.0.1, and
// https://example.com/. (The latter is useless for now since crypto/x509
// doesn't deal with URI SANs directly.)
static const char kSANTypesLeaf[] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
"MIIClzCCAgCgAwIBAgIJAOjwnT/iW+qmMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMCsxFzAVBgNV\n"
"BAoTDkJvcmluZ1NTTCBUZXN0MRAwDgYDVQQDEwdSb290IENBMB4XDTE1MDEwMTAw\n"
"MDAwMFoXDTI1MDEwMTAwMDAwMFowLzEXMBUGA1UEChMOQm9yaW5nU1NMIFRlc3Qx\n"
"FDASBgNVBAMTC2V4YW1wbGUuY29tMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKB\n"
"gQDbRn2TLhInBki8Bighq37EtqJd/h5SRYh6NkelCA2SQlvCgcC+l3mYQPtPbRT9\n"
"KxOLwqUuZ9jUCZ7WIji3Sgt0cyvCNPHRk+WW2XR781ifbGE8wLBB1NkrKyQjd1sc\n"
"O711Xc4gVM+hY4cdHiTE8x0aUIuqthRD7ZendWL0FMhS1wIDAQABo4G+MIG7MA4G\n"
"A1UdDwEB/wQEAwIFoDAdBgNVHSUEFjAUBggrBgEFBQcDAQYIKwYBBQUHAwIwDAYD\n"
"VR0TAQH/BAIwADAZBgNVHQ4EEgQQn5EWH0NDPkmm3m22gNefYDAbBgNVHSMEFDAS\n"
"gBBAN9cB+0AvuBx+VAQnjFkBMEQGA1UdEQQ9MDuCC2V4YW1wbGUuY29tgRB0ZXN0\n"
"QGV4YW1wbGUuY29thwR/AAABhhRodHRwczovL2V4YW1wbGUuY29tLzANBgkqhkiG\n"
"9w0BAQsFAAOBgQBtwJvY6+Tk6D6DOtDVaNoJ5y8E25CCuE/Ga4OuIcYJas+yLckf\n"
"dZwUV3GUG2oBXl2MrpUFxXd4hKBO1CmlBY+hZEeIx0Yp6QWK9P/vnZeydOTP26mk\n"
"jusJ2PqSmtKNU1Zcaba4d29oFejmOAfeguhR8AHpsc/zHEaS5Q9cJsuJcw==\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
// -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
// MIICWwIBAAKBgQDbRn2TLhInBki8Bighq37EtqJd/h5SRYh6NkelCA2SQlvCgcC+
// l3mYQPtPbRT9KxOLwqUuZ9jUCZ7WIji3Sgt0cyvCNPHRk+WW2XR781ifbGE8wLBB
// 1NkrKyQjd1scO711Xc4gVM+hY4cdHiTE8x0aUIuqthRD7ZendWL0FMhS1wIDAQAB
// AoGACwf7z0i1DxOI2zSwFimLghfyCSp8mgT3fbZ3Wj0SebYu6ZUffjceneM/AVrq
// gGYHYLOVHcWJqfkl7X3hPo9SDhzLx0mM545/q21ZWCwjhswH7WiCEqV2/zeDO9WU
// NIO1VU0VoLm0AQ7ZvwnyB+fpgF9kkkDtbBJW7XWrfNVtlnECQQD97YENpEJ3X1kj
// 3rrkrHWDkKAyoWWY1i8Fm7LnganC9Bv6AVwgn5ZlE/479aWHF8vbOFEA3pFPiNZJ
// t9FTCfpJAkEA3RCXjGI0Y6GALFLwEs+nL/XZAfJaIpJEZVLCVosYQOSaMS4SchfC
// GGYVquT7ZgKk9uvz89Fg87OtBMWS9lrkHwJADGkGLKeBhBoJ3kHtem2fVK3F1pOi
// xoR5SdnhNYVVyaxqjZ5xZTrHe+stOrr3uxGDqhQniVZXXb6/Ul0Egv1y2QJAVg/h
// kAujba4wIhFf2VLyOZ+yjil1ocPj0LZ5Zgvcs1bMGJ1hHP3W2HzVrqRaowoggui1
// HpTC891dXGA2qKYV7QJAFDmT2A7OVvh3y4AEgzVwHrDmCMwMHKjCIntS7fjxrJnF
// YvJUG1zoHwUVrxxbR3DbpTODlktLcl/0b97D0IkH3w==
// -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
static const char kSANTypesRoot[] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
"MIICTTCCAbagAwIBAgIIAj5CwoHlWuYwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwKzEXMBUGA1UE\n"
"ChMOQm9yaW5nU1NMIFRlc3QxEDAOBgNVBAMTB1Jvb3QgQ0EwHhcNMTUwMTAxMDAw\n"
"MDAwWhcNMjUwMTAxMDAwMDAwWjArMRcwFQYDVQQKEw5Cb3JpbmdTU0wgVGVzdDEQ\n"
"MA4GA1UEAxMHUm9vdCBDQTCBnzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOBjQAwgYkCgYEA6Q5/\n"
"EQzmWuaGg3D2UQcuAngR9bIkkjjuJmICx5TxPqF3asCP1SJotl3iTNrghRE1wpJy\n"
"SY2BtIiXa7f8skRb2U0GcPkMxo/ps9+jaoRsQ1m+nbLQdpvD1/qZWcO45fNTA71J\n"
"1rPMokP+rcILuQG4VimUAySnDSghKamulFtK+Z8CAwEAAaN6MHgwDgYDVR0PAQH/\n"
"BAQDAgIEMB0GA1UdJQQWMBQGCCsGAQUFBwMBBggrBgEFBQcDAjAPBgNVHRMBAf8E\n"
"BTADAQH/MBkGA1UdDgQSBBBAN9cB+0AvuBx+VAQnjFkBMBsGA1UdIwQUMBKAEEA3\n"
"1wH7QC+4HH5UBCeMWQEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADgYEAc4N6hTE62/3gwg+kyc2f\n"
"c/Jj1mHrOt+0NRaBnmvbmNpsEjHS96Ef4Wt/ZlPXPkkv1C1VosJnOIMF3Q522wRH\n"
"bqaxARldS12VAa3gcWisDWD+SqSyDxjyojz0XDiJkTrFuCTCUiZO+1GLB7SO10Ms\n"
"d5YVX0c90VMnUhF/dlrqS9U=\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
// -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
// MIICXAIBAAKBgQDpDn8RDOZa5oaDcPZRBy4CeBH1siSSOO4mYgLHlPE+oXdqwI/V
// Imi2XeJM2uCFETXCknJJjYG0iJdrt/yyRFvZTQZw+QzGj+mz36NqhGxDWb6dstB2
// m8PX+plZw7jl81MDvUnWs8yiQ/6twgu5AbhWKZQDJKcNKCEpqa6UW0r5nwIDAQAB
// AoGALEF5daZqc+aEsp8X1yky3nsoheyPL0kqSBWii33IFemZgKcSaRnAoqjPWWLS
// 8dHj0I/4rej2MW8iuezVSpDak9tK5boHORC3w4p/wifkizQkLt1DANxTVbzcKvrt
// aZ7LjVaKkhjRJbLddniowFHkkWVbUccjvzcUd7Y2VuLbAhECQQDq4FE88aHio8zg
// bxSd0PwjEFwLYQTR19u812SoR8PmR6ofIL+pDwOV+fVs+OGcAAOgkhIukOrksQ4A
// 1cKtnyhXAkEA/gRI+u3tZ7UE1twIkBfZ6IvCdRodkPqHAYIxMRLzL+MhyZt4MEGc
// Ngb/F6U9/WOBFnoR/PI7IwE3ejutzKcL+QJBAKh+6eilk7QKPETZi1m3/dmNt+p1
// 3EZJ65pqjwxmB3Rg/vs7vCMk4TarTdSyKu+F1xRPFfoP/mK3Xctdjj6NyhsCQAYF
// 7/0TOzfkUPMPUJyqFB6xgbDpJ55ScnUUsznoqx+NkTWInDb4t02IqO/UmT2y6FKy
// Hk8TJ1fTJY+ebqaVp3ECQApx9gQ+n0zIhx97FMUuiRse73xkcW4+pZ8nF+8DmeQL
// /JKuuFGmzkG+rUbXFmo/Zg2ozVplw71NnQJ4znPsf7A=
// -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
// The following four certificates were generated with this Go program, varying
// |includeNetscapeExtension| and defining rootKeyPEM and rootCertPEM to be
// strings containing the kSANTypesRoot, above.
// package main
// import (
// "crypto/ecdsa"
// "crypto/elliptic"
// "crypto/rand"
// "crypto/x509"
// "crypto/x509/pkix"
// "encoding/asn1"
// "encoding/pem"
// "math/big"
// "os"
// "time"
// )
// const includeNetscapeExtension = true
// func main() {
// block, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(rootKeyPEM))
// rootPriv, _ := x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(block.Bytes)
// block, _ = pem.Decode([]byte(rootCertPEM))
// root, _ := x509.ParseCertificate(block.Bytes)
// interTemplate := &x509.Certificate{
// SerialNumber: big.NewInt(2),
// Subject: pkix.Name{
// CommonName: "No Basic Constraints (Netscape)",
// },
// NotBefore: time.Date(2000, time.January, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC),
// NotAfter: time.Date(2099, time.January, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC),
// }
// if includeNetscapeExtension {
// interTemplate.ExtraExtensions = []pkix.Extension{
// pkix.Extension{
// Id: asn1.ObjectIdentifier([]int{2, 16, 840, 1, 113730, 1, 1}),
// Value: []byte{0x03, 0x02, 2, 0x04},
// },
// }
// } else {
// interTemplate.KeyUsage = x509.KeyUsageCertSign
// }
// interKey, _ := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
// interDER, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, interTemplate, root, &interKey.PublicKey, rootPriv)
// if err != nil {
// panic(err)
// }
// pem.Encode(os.Stdout, &pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: interDER})
// inter, _ := x509.ParseCertificate(interDER)
// leafTemplate := &x509.Certificate{
// SerialNumber: big.NewInt(3),
// Subject: pkix.Name{
// CommonName: "Leaf from CA with no Basic Constraints",
// },
// NotBefore: time.Date(2000, time.January, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC),
// NotAfter: time.Date(2099, time.January, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC),
// BasicConstraintsValid: true,
// }
// leafKey, _ := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
// leafDER, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, leafTemplate, inter, &leafKey.PublicKey, interKey)
// if err != nil {
// panic(err)
// }
// pem.Encode(os.Stdout, &pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: leafDER})
// }
// kNoBasicConstraintsCertSignIntermediate doesn't have isCA set, but contains
// certSign in the keyUsage.
static const char kNoBasicConstraintsCertSignIntermediate[] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
"MIIBqjCCAROgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADArMRcwFQYDVQQKEw5Cb3Jp\n"
"bmdTU0wgVGVzdDEQMA4GA1UEAxMHUm9vdCBDQTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8y\n"
"MDk5MDEwMTAwMDAwMFowHzEdMBsGA1UEAxMUTm8gQmFzaWMgQ29uc3RyYWludHMw\n"
"WTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAASEFMblfxIEDO8My7wHtHWTuDzNyID1\n"
"OsPkMGkn32O/pSyXxXuAqDeFoMVffUMTyfm8JcYugSEbrv2qEXXM4bZRoy8wLTAO\n"
"BgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAgQwGwYDVR0jBBQwEoAQQDfXAftAL7gcflQEJ4xZATANBgkq\n"
"hkiG9w0BAQsFAAOBgQC1Lh6hIAm3K5kRh5iIydU0YAEm7eV6ZSskERDUq3DLJyl9\n"
"ZUZCHUzvb464dkwZjeNzaUVS1pdElJslwX3DtGgeJLJGCnk8zUjBjaNrrDm0kzPW\n"
"xKt/6oif1ci/KCKqKNXJAIFbc4e+IiBpenwpxHk3If4NM+Ek0nKoO8Uj0NkgTQ==\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
static const char kNoBasicConstraintsCertSignLeaf[] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
"MIIBUDCB96ADAgECAgEDMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCMB8xHTAbBgNVBAMTFE5vIEJhc2lj\n"
"IENvbnN0cmFpbnRzMCAXDTAwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFoYDzIwOTkwMTAxMDAwMDAwWjAx\n"
"MS8wLQYDVQQDEyZMZWFmIGZyb20gQ0Egd2l0aCBubyBCYXNpYyBDb25zdHJhaW50\n"
"czBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABEsYPMwzdJKjB+2gpC90ib2ilHoB\n"
"w/arQ6ikUX0CNUDDaKaOu/jF39ogzVlg4lDFrjCKShSfCCcrwgONv70IZGijEDAO\n"
"MAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSAAwRQIgbV7R99yM+okXSIs6Fp3o\n"
"eCOXiDL60IBxaTOcLS44ywcCIQDbn87Gj5cFgHBYAkzdHqDsyGXkxQTHDq9jmX24\n"
"Djy3Zw==\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
// kNoBasicConstraintsNetscapeCAIntermediate doesn't have isCA set, but contains
// a Netscape certificate-type extension that asserts a type of "SSL CA".
static const char kNoBasicConstraintsNetscapeCAIntermediate[] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
"MIIBuDCCASGgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADArMRcwFQYDVQQKEw5Cb3Jp\n"
"bmdTU0wgVGVzdDEQMA4GA1UEAxMHUm9vdCBDQTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8y\n"
"MDk5MDEwMTAwMDAwMFowKjEoMCYGA1UEAxMfTm8gQmFzaWMgQ29uc3RyYWludHMg\n"
"KE5ldHNjYXBlKTBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABCeMbmCaOtMzXBqi\n"
"PrCdNOH23CkaawUA+pAezitAN4RXS1O2CGK5sJjGPVVeogROU8G7/b+mU+ciZIzH\n"
"1PP8FJKjMjAwMBsGA1UdIwQUMBKAEEA31wH7QC+4HH5UBCeMWQEwEQYJYIZIAYb4\n"
"QgEBBAQDAgIEMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4GBAAgNWjh7cfBTClTAk+Ml//5xb9Ju\n"
"tkBhG6Rm+kkMD+qiSMO6t7xS7CsA0+jIBjkdEYaLZ3oxtQCBdZsVNxUvRxZ0AUfF\n"
"G3DtRFTsrI1f7IQhpMuqEMF4shPW+5x54hrq0Fo6xMs6XoinJZcTUaaB8EeXRF6M\n"
"P9p6HuyLrmn0c/F0\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
static const char kNoBasicConstraintsNetscapeCALeaf[] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
"MIIBXDCCAQKgAwIBAgIBAzAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAqMSgwJgYDVQQDEx9ObyBCYXNp\n"
"YyBDb25zdHJhaW50cyAoTmV0c2NhcGUpMCAXDTAwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFoYDzIwOTkw\n"
"MTAxMDAwMDAwWjAxMS8wLQYDVQQDEyZMZWFmIGZyb20gQ0Egd2l0aCBubyBCYXNp\n"
"YyBDb25zdHJhaW50czBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABDlJKolDu3R2\n"
"tPqSDycr0QJcWhxdBv76V0EEVflcHRxED6vAioTEcnQszt1OfKtBZvjlo0yp6i6Q\n"
"DaYit0ZInmWjEDAOMAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSAAwRQIhAJsh\n"
"aZL6BHeEfoUBj1oZ2Ln91qzj3UCVMJ+vrmwAFdYyAiA3wp2JphgchvmoUFuzPXwj\n"
"XyPwWPbymSTpzKhB4xB7qQ==\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
static const char kSelfSignedMismatchAlgorithms[] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
"MIIFMjCCAxqgAwIBAgIJAL0mG5fOeJ7xMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBDQUAMC0xCzAJBgNV\n"
"BAYTAkdCMQ8wDQYDVQQHDAZMb25kb24xDTALBgNVBAoMBFRlc3QwIBcNMTgwOTE3\n"
"MTIxNzU3WhgPMjExODA4MjQxMjE3NTdaMC0xCzAJBgNVBAYTAkdCMQ8wDQYDVQQH\n"
"DAZMb25kb24xDTALBgNVBAoMBFRlc3QwggIiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4ICDwAw\n"
"ggIKAoICAQDCMhBrRAGGw+n2GdctBr/cEK4FZA6ajiHjihgpCHoSBdyL4R2jGKLS\n"
"g0WgaMXa1HpkKN7LcIySosEBPlmcRkr1RqbEvQStOSvoFCXYvtx3alM6HTbXMcDR\n"
"mqoKoABP6LXsPSoMWIgqMtP2X9EOppzHVIK1yFYFfbIlvYUV2Ka+MuMe0Vh5wvD1\n"
"4GanPb+cWSKgdRSVQovCCMY3yWtZKVEaxRpCsk/mYYIFWz0tcgMjIKwDx1XXgiAV\n"
"nU6NK43xbaw3XhtnaD/pv9lhTTbNrlcln9LjTD097BaK4R+1AEPHnpfxA9Ui3upn\n"
"kbsNUdGdOB0ksZi/vd7lh833YgquQUIAhYrbfvq/HFCpVV1gljzlS3sqULYpLE//\n"
"i3OsuL2mE+CYIJGpIi2GeJJWXciNMTJDOqTn+fRDtVb4RPp4Y70DJirp7XzaBi3q\n"
"H0edANCzPSRCDbZsOhzIXhXshldiXVRX666DDlbMQgLTEnNKrkwv6DmU8o15XQsb\n"
"8k1Os2YwXmkEOxUQ7AJZXVTZSf6UK9Znmdq1ZrHjybMfRUkHVxJcnKvrxfryralv\n"
"gzfvu+D6HuxrCo3Ojqa+nDgIbxKEBtdrcsMhq1jWPFhjwo1fSadAkKOfdCAuXJRD\n"
"THg3b4Sf+W7Cpc570YHrIpBf7WFl2XsPcEM0mJZ5+yATASCubNozQwIDAQABo1Mw\n"
"UTAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUES0hupZSqY21JOba10QyZuxm91EwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUES0h\n"
"upZSqY21JOba10QyZuxm91EwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsF\n"
"AAOCAgEABTN5S30ng/RMpBweDm2N561PdpaCdiRXtAFCRVWR2mkDYC/Xj9Vqe6be\n"
"PyM7L/5OKYVjzF1yJu67z/dx+ja5o+41g17jdqla7hyPx+9B4uRyDh+1KJTa+duj\n"
"mw/aA1LCr6O6W4WizDOsChJ6FaB2Y1+GlFnKWb5nUdhVJqXQE1WOX9dZnw8Y4Npd\n"
"VmAsjWot0BZorJrt3fwfcv3QfA896twkbo7Llv/8qzg4sXZXZ4ZtgAOqnPngiSn+\n"
"JT/vYCXZ406VvAFpFqMcVz2dO/VGuL8lGIMHRKNyafrsV81EzH1W/XmRWOgvgj6r\n"
"yQI63ln/AMY72HQ97xLkE1xKunGz6bK5Ug5+O43Uftc4Mb6MUgzo+ZqEQ3Ob+cAV\n"
"cvjmtwDaPO/O39O5Xq0tLTlkn2/cKf4OQ6S++GDxzyRVHh5JXgP4j9+jfZY57Woy\n"
"R1bE7N50JjY4cDermBJKdlBIjL7UPhqmLyaG7V0hBitFlgGBUCcJtJOV0xYd5aF3\n"
"pxNkvMXhBmh95fjxJ0cJjpO7tN1RAwtMMNgsl7OUbuVRQCHOPW5DgP5qY21jDeRn\n"
"BY82382l+9QzykmJLI5MZnmj4BA9uIDCwMtoTTvP++SsvhUAbuvh7MOOUQL0EY4m\n"
"KStYq7X9PKseN+PvmfeoffIKc5R/Ha39oi7cGMVHCr8aiEhsf94=\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
// kCommonNameWithSANs is a leaf certificate signed by kSANTypesRoot, with
// *.host1.test as the common name and a SAN list of *.host2.test and
// foo.host3.test.
static const char kCommonNameWithSANs[] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
"MIIB2zCCAUSgAwIBAgIBAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADArMRcwFQYDVQQKEw5Cb3Jp\n"
"bmdTU0wgVGVzdDEQMA4GA1UEAxMHUm9vdCBDQTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8y\n"
"MDk5MDEwMTAwMDAwMFowNzEeMBwGA1UEChMVQ29tbW9uIG5hbWUgd2l0aCBTQU5z\n"
"MRUwEwYDVQQDDAwqLmhvc3QxLnRlc3QwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNC\n"
"AASgWzfnFnpQrokSLIC+LhCKJDUAY/2usfIDpOnafYoYCasbYetkmOslgyY4Nn07\n"
"zjvjNROprA/0bdULXAkdL9bNo0gwRjAbBgNVHSMEFDASgBBAN9cB+0AvuBx+VAQn\n"
"jFkBMCcGA1UdEQQgMB6CDCouaG9zdDIudGVzdIIOZm9vLmhvc3QzLnRlc3QwDQYJ\n"
"KoZIhvcNAQELBQADgYEAtv2e3hBhsslXB1HTxgusjoschWOVtvGZUaYlhkKzKTCL\n"
"4YpDn50BccnucBU/b9phYvaEZtyzOv4ZXhxTGyLnLrIVB9x5ikfCcfl+LNYNjDwM\n"
"enm/h1zOfJ7wXLyscD4kU29Wc/zxBd70thIgLYn16CC1S9NtXKsXXDXv5VVH/bg=\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
// kCommonNameWithSANs is a leaf certificate signed by kSANTypesRoot, with
// *.host1.test as the common name and no SAN list.
static const char kCommonNameWithoutSANs[] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
"MIIBtTCCAR6gAwIBAgIBAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADArMRcwFQYDVQQKEw5Cb3Jp\n"
"bmdTU0wgVGVzdDEQMA4GA1UEAxMHUm9vdCBDQTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8y\n"
"MDk5MDEwMTAwMDAwMFowOjEhMB8GA1UEChMYQ29tbW9uIG5hbWUgd2l0aG91dCBT\n"
"QU5zMRUwEwYDVQQDDAwqLmhvc3QxLnRlc3QwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMB\n"
"BwNCAARt2vjlIrPE+kr11VS1rRP/AYQu4fvf1bNw/K9rwYlVBhmLMPYasEmpCtKE\n"
"0bDIFydtDYC3wZDpSS+YiaG40sdAox8wHTAbBgNVHSMEFDASgBBAN9cB+0AvuBx+\n"
"VAQnjFkBMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4GBAHRbIeaCEytOpJpw9O2dlB656AHe1+t5\n"
"4JiS5mvtzoVOLn7fFk5EFQtZS7sG1Uc2XjlSw+iyvFoTFEqfKyU/mIdc2vBuPwA2\n"
"+YXT8aE4S+UZ9oz5j0gDpikGnkSCW0cyHD8L8fntNjaQRSaM482JpmtdmuxClmWO\n"
"pFFXI2B5usgI\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
// kCommonNameWithEmailSAN is a leaf certificate signed by kSANTypesRoot, with
// *.host1.test as the common name and the email address test@host2.test in the
// SAN list.
static const char kCommonNameWithEmailSAN[] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
"MIIBvDCCASWgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADArMRcwFQYDVQQKEw5Cb3Jp\n"
"bmdTU0wgVGVzdDEQMA4GA1UEAxMHUm9vdCBDQTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8y\n"
"MDk5MDEwMTAwMDAwMFowFzEVMBMGA1UEAwwMKi5ob3N0MS50ZXN0MFkwEwYHKoZI\n"
"zj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEtevOxcTjpPzlNGoUMFfZyr1k03/Hiuh+EsnuScDs\n"
"8XLKi6fDkvSaDClI99ycabQZRPIrvyT+dglDC6ugQd+CYqNJMEcwDAYDVR0TAQH/\n"
"BAIwADAbBgNVHSMEFDASgBBAN9cB+0AvuBx+VAQnjFkBMBoGA1UdEQQTMBGBD3Rl\n"
"c3RAaG9zdDIudGVzdDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOBgQCGbqb78OWJWl4zb+qw0Dz2\n"
"HJgZZJt6/+nNG/XJKdaYeS4eofsbwsJI4fuuOF6ZvYCJxVNtGqdfZDgycvFA9hjv\n"
"NGosBF1/spP17cmzTahLjxs71jDvHV/EQJbKGl/Zpta1Em1VrzSrwoOFabPXzZTJ\n"
"aet/mER21Z/9ZsTUoJQPJw==\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
// kCommonNameWithIPSAN is a leaf certificate signed by kSANTypesRoot, with
// *.host1.test as the common name and the IP address 127.0.0.1 in the
// SAN list.
static const char kCommonNameWithIPSAN[] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
"MIIBsTCCARqgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADArMRcwFQYDVQQKEw5Cb3Jp\n"
"bmdTU0wgVGVzdDEQMA4GA1UEAxMHUm9vdCBDQTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8y\n"
"MDk5MDEwMTAwMDAwMFowFzEVMBMGA1UEAwwMKi5ob3N0MS50ZXN0MFkwEwYHKoZI\n"
"zj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEFKrgkxm8PysXbwnHQeTD3p8YY0+sY4ssnZgmj8wX\n"
"KTyn893fdBHWlz71GO6t82wMTF5d+ZYwI2XU52pfl4SB2aM+MDwwDAYDVR0TAQH/\n"
"BAIwADAbBgNVHSMEFDASgBBAN9cB+0AvuBx+VAQnjFkBMA8GA1UdEQQIMAaHBH8A\n"
"AAEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADgYEAQWZ8Oj059ZjS109V/ijMYT28xuAN5n6HHxCO\n"
"DopTP56Zu9+gme5wTETWEfocspZvgecoUOcedTFoKSQ7JafO09NcVLA+D6ddYpju\n"
"mgfuiLy9dDhqvX/NHaLBMxOBWWbOLwWE+ibyX+pOzjWRCw1L7eUXOr6PhZAOQsmU\n"
"D0+O6KI=\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
// kConstrainedIntermediate is an intermediate signed by kSANTypesRoot, with
// permitted DNS names of permitted1.test and foo.permitted2.test and an
// excluded DNS name of excluded.permitted1.test. Its private key is:
//
// -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
// MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQgTXUM4tJWM7OzATty
// JhNOfIv/d8heWFBeKOfMR+RfaROhRANCAASbbbWYiN6mn+BCpg4XNpibOH0D/DN4
// kZ5C/Ml2YVomC9T83OKk2CzB8fPAabPb4P4Vv+fIabpEfjWS5nzKLY1y
// -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
static const char kConstrainedIntermediate[] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
"MIICDjCCAXegAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADArMRcwFQYDVQQKEw5Cb3Jp\n"
"bmdTU0wgVGVzdDEQMA4GA1UEAxMHUm9vdCBDQTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8y\n"
"MDk5MDEwMTAwMDAwMFowKDEmMCQGA1UEAxMdTmFtZSBDb25zdHJhaW50cyBJbnRl\n"
"cm1lZGlhdGUwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAASbbbWYiN6mn+BCpg4X\n"
"NpibOH0D/DN4kZ5C/Ml2YVomC9T83OKk2CzB8fPAabPb4P4Vv+fIabpEfjWS5nzK\n"
"LY1yo4GJMIGGMA8GA1UdEwEB/wQFMAMBAf8wGwYDVR0jBBQwEoAQQDfXAftAL7gc\n"
"flQEJ4xZATBWBgNVHR4BAf8ETDBKoCowEYIPcGVybWl0dGVkMS50ZXN0MBWCE2Zv\n"
"by5wZXJtaXR0ZWQyLnRlc3ShHDAaghhleGNsdWRlZC5wZXJtaXR0ZWQxLnRlc3Qw\n"
"DQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADgYEAFq1Ka05hiKREwRpSceQPzIIH4B5a5IVBg5/EvmQI\n"
"9V0fXyAE1GmahPt70sIBxIgzNTEaY8P/IoOuCdlZWe0msmyEO3S6YSAzOWR5Van6\n"
"cXmFM1uMd95TlkxUMRdV+jKJTvG6R/BM2zltaV7Xt662k5HtzT5Svw0rZlFaggZz\n"
"UyM=\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
// kCommonNamePermittedLeaf is a leaf certificate signed by
// kConstrainedIntermediate. Its common name is permitted by the name
// constraints.
static const char kCommonNamePermittedLeaf[] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
"MIIBaDCCAQ2gAwIBAgIBAzAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAoMSYwJAYDVQQDEx1OYW1lIENv\n"
"bnN0cmFpbnRzIEludGVybWVkaWF0ZTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8yMDk5MDEw\n"
"MTAwMDAwMFowPjEeMBwGA1UEChMVQ29tbW9uIG5hbWUgcGVybWl0dGVkMRwwGgYD\n"
"VQQDExNmb28ucGVybWl0dGVkMS50ZXN0MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcD\n"
"QgAENX5Ycs8q8MRzPYUz6DqLHhJR3wcmniFRgkiEa7MxE/mRe00y0VGwH7xi7Aoc\n"
"emXPrtD4JwN5bssbcxWGAKYYzaMQMA4wDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAKBggqhkjOPQQD\n"
"AgNJADBGAiEAtsnWuRQXtw2xbieC78Y8SVEtTjcZUx8uZyQe1GPLfGICIQDR4fNY\n"
"yg3PC94ydPNQZVsFxAne32CbonWWsokalTFpUQ==\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
static const char kCommonNamePermitted[] = "foo.permitted1.test";
// kCommonNameNotPermittedLeaf is a leaf certificate signed by
// kConstrainedIntermediate. Its common name is not permitted by the name
// constraints.
static const char kCommonNameNotPermittedLeaf[] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
"MIIBazCCARCgAwIBAgIBBDAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAoMSYwJAYDVQQDEx1OYW1lIENv\n"
"bnN0cmFpbnRzIEludGVybWVkaWF0ZTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8yMDk5MDEw\n"
"MTAwMDAwMFowQTEiMCAGA1UEChMZQ29tbW9uIG5hbWUgbm90IHBlcm1pdHRlZDEb\n"
"MBkGA1UEAxMSbm90LXBlcm1pdHRlZC50ZXN0MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0D\n"
"AQcDQgAEzfghKuWf0JoXb0Drp09C3yXMSQQ1byt+AUaymvsHOWsxQ9v1Q+vkF/IM\n"
"HRqGTk2TyxrB2iClVEn/Uu+YtYox1KMQMA4wDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAKBggqhkjO\n"
"PQQDAgNJADBGAiEAxaUslxmoWL1tIvnDz7gDkto/HcmdU0jHVuUQLXcCG8wCIQCN\n"
"5xZjitlCQU8UB5qSu9wH4B+0JcVO3Ss4Az76HEJWMw==\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
static const char kCommonNameNotPermitted[] = "not-permitted.test";
// kCommonNameNotPermittedWithSANsLeaf is a leaf certificate signed by
// kConstrainedIntermediate. Its common name is not permitted by the name
// constraints but it has a SAN list.
static const char kCommonNameNotPermittedWithSANsLeaf[] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
"MIIBqTCCAU+gAwIBAgIBBjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAoMSYwJAYDVQQDEx1OYW1lIENv\n"
"bnN0cmFpbnRzIEludGVybWVkaWF0ZTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8yMDk5MDEw\n"
"MTAwMDAwMFowSzEsMCoGA1UEChMjQ29tbW9uIG5hbWUgbm90IHBlcm1pdHRlZCB3\n"
"aXRoIFNBTlMxGzAZBgNVBAMTEm5vdC1wZXJtaXR0ZWQudGVzdDBZMBMGByqGSM49\n"
"AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABKsn9wOApXFHrqhLdQgbFSeaSoAIbxgO0zVSRZUb5naR\n"
"93zoL3MFOvZEF8xiEqh7le+l3XuUig0fwqpcsZzRNJajRTBDMAwGA1UdEwEB/wQC\n"
"MAAwMwYDVR0RBCwwKoITZm9vLnBlcm1pdHRlZDEudGVzdIITZm9vLnBlcm1pdHRl\n"
"ZDIudGVzdDAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgNIADBFAiACk+1f184KkKAXuntmrz+Ygcq8MiZl\n"
"4delx44FtcNaegIhAIA5nYfzxNcTXxDo3U+x1vSLH6Y7faLvHiFySp7O//q+\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
static const char kCommonNameNotPermittedWithSANs[] = "not-permitted.test";
// kCommonNameNotDNSLeaf is a leaf certificate signed by
// kConstrainedIntermediate. Its common name is not a DNS name.
static const char kCommonNameNotDNSLeaf[] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
"MIIBYTCCAQagAwIBAgIBCDAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAoMSYwJAYDVQQDEx1OYW1lIENv\n"
"bnN0cmFpbnRzIEludGVybWVkaWF0ZTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8yMDk5MDEw\n"
"MTAwMDAwMFowNzEcMBoGA1UEChMTQ29tbW9uIG5hbWUgbm90IEROUzEXMBUGA1UE\n"
"AxMOTm90IGEgRE5TIG5hbWUwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAASnueyc\n"
"Zxtnw5ke2J2T0/LwAK37auQP/RSFd9mem+BJVbgviawtAlignJmafp7Zw4/GdYEJ\n"
"Vm8qlriOJtluvXGcoxAwDjAMBgNVHRMBAf8EAjAAMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0kAMEYC\n"
"IQChUAmVNI39VHe0zemRE09VDcSEgOxr1nTvjLcg/Q8pVQIhAJYZnJI0YZAi05QH\n"
"RHNlAkTK2TnUaVn3fGSylaLiFS1r\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
static const char kCommonNameNotDNS[] = "Not a DNS name";
// The following six certificates are issued by |kSANTypesRoot| and have
// different extended key usage values. They were created with the following
// Go program:
//
// func main() {
// block, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(rootKeyPEM))
// rootPriv, _ := x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(block.Bytes)
// block, _ = pem.Decode([]byte(rootCertPEM))
// root, _ := x509.ParseCertificate(block.Bytes)
//
// leafTemplate := &x509.Certificate{
// SerialNumber: big.NewInt(3),
// Subject: pkix.Name{
// CommonName: "EKU msSGC",
// },
// NotBefore: time.Date(2000, time.January, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC),
// NotAfter: time.Date(2099, time.January, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC),
// BasicConstraintsValid: true,
// ExtKeyUsage: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{FILL IN HERE},
// }
// leafKey, _ := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
// leafDER, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, leafTemplate, root, &leafKey.PublicKey, rootPriv)
// if err != nil {
// panic(err)
// }
// pem.Encode(os.Stdout, &pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: leafDER})
// }
static const char kMicrosoftSGCCert[] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
"MIIBtDCCAR2gAwIBAgIBAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADArMRcwFQYDVQQKEw5Cb3Jp\n"
"bmdTU0wgVGVzdDEQMA4GA1UEAxMHUm9vdCBDQTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8y\n"
"MDk5MDEwMTAwMDAwMFowFDESMBAGA1UEAxMJRUtVIG1zU0dDMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0C\n"
"AQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEEn61v3Vs+q6bTyyRnrJvuKBE8PTNVLbXGB52jig4Qse2\n"
"mGygNEysS0uzZ0luz+rn2hDRUFL6sHLUs1d8UMbI/6NEMEIwFQYDVR0lBA4wDAYK\n"
"KwYBBAGCNwoDAzAMBgNVHRMBAf8EAjAAMBsGA1UdIwQUMBKAEEA31wH7QC+4HH5U\n"
"BCeMWQEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADgYEAgDQI9RSo3E3ZVnU71TV/LjG9xwHtfk6I\n"
"rlNnlJJ0lsTHAuMc1mwCbzhtsmasetwYlIa9G8GFWB9Gh/QqHA7G649iGGmXShqe\n"
"aVDuWgeSEJxBPE2jILoMm4pEYF7jfonTn7XXX6O78yuSlP+NPIU0gUKHkWZ1sWk0\n"
"cC4l0r/6jik=\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
static const char kNetscapeSGCCert[] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
"MIIBszCCARygAwIBAgIBAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADArMRcwFQYDVQQKEw5Cb3Jp\n"
"bmdTU0wgVGVzdDEQMA4GA1UEAxMHUm9vdCBDQTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8y\n"
"MDk5MDEwMTAwMDAwMFowFDESMBAGA1UEAxMJRUtVIG1zU0dDMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0C\n"
"AQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE3NbT+TnBfq1DWJCezjaUL52YhDU7cOkI2S2PoWgJ1v7x\n"
"kKLwBonUFZjppZs69SyBHeJdti+KoJ3qTW+hCG08EaNDMEEwFAYDVR0lBA0wCwYJ\n"
"YIZIAYb4QgQBMAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwGwYDVR0jBBQwEoAQQDfXAftAL7gcflQE\n"
"J4xZATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOBgQBuiyVcfazekHkCWksxdFmjPmMtWCxFjkzc\n"
"8VBxFE0CfSHQAfZ8J7tXd1FbAq/eXdZvvo8v0JB4sOM4Ex1ob1fuvDFHdSAHAD7W\n"
"dhKIjJyzVojoxjCjyue0XMeEPl7RiqbdxoS/R5HFAqAF0T2OeQAqP9gTpOXoau1M\n"
"RQHX6HQJJg==\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
static const char kServerEKUCert[] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
"MIIBsjCCARugAwIBAgIBAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADArMRcwFQYDVQQKEw5Cb3Jp\n"
"bmdTU0wgVGVzdDEQMA4GA1UEAxMHUm9vdCBDQTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8y\n"
"MDk5MDEwMTAwMDAwMFowFDESMBAGA1UEAxMJRUtVIG1zU0dDMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0C\n"
"AQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEDd35i+VWPwIOKLrLWTuP5cqD+yJDB5nujEzPgkXP5LKJ\n"
"SZRbHTqTdpYZB2jy6y90RY2Bsjx7FfZ7nN5G2g1GOKNCMEAwEwYDVR0lBAwwCgYI\n"
"KwYBBQUHAwEwDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAbBgNVHSMEFDASgBBAN9cB+0AvuBx+VAQn\n"
"jFkBMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4GBAIKmbMBjuivL/rxDu7u7Vr3o3cdmEggBJxwL\n"
"iatNW3x1wg0645aNYOktW/iQ7mAAiziTY73GFyfiJDWqnY+CwA94ZWyQidjHdN/I\n"
"6BR52sN/dkYEoInYEbmDNMc/if+T0yqeBQLP4BeKLiT8p0qqaimae6LgibS19hDP\n"
"2hoEMdz2\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
static const char kServerEKUPlusMicrosoftSGCCert[] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
"MIIBvjCCASegAwIBAgIBAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADArMRcwFQYDVQQKEw5Cb3Jp\n"
"bmdTU0wgVGVzdDEQMA4GA1UEAxMHUm9vdCBDQTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8y\n"
"MDk5MDEwMTAwMDAwMFowFDESMBAGA1UEAxMJRUtVIG1zU0dDMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0C\n"
"AQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEDO1MYPxq+U4oXMIK8UnsS4C696wpcu4UOmcMJJ5CUd5Z\n"
"ZpJShN6kYKnrb3GK/6xEgbUGntmrzSRG5FYqk6QgD6NOMEwwHwYDVR0lBBgwFgYI\n"
"KwYBBQUHAwEGCisGAQQBgjcKAwMwDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAbBgNVHSMEFDASgBBA\n"
"N9cB+0AvuBx+VAQnjFkBMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4GBAHOu2IBa4lHzVGS36HxS\n"
"SejUE87Ji1ysM6BgkYbfxfS9MuV+J3UnqH57JjbH/3CFl4ZDWceF6SGBSCn8LqKa\n"
"KHpwoNFU3zA99iQzVJgbUyN0PbKwHEanLyKDJZyFk71R39ToxhSNQgaQYjZYCy1H\n"
"5V9oXd1bodEqVsOZ/mur24Ku\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
static const char kAnyEKU[] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
"MIIBrjCCARegAwIBAgIBAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADArMRcwFQYDVQQKEw5Cb3Jp\n"
"bmdTU0wgVGVzdDEQMA4GA1UEAxMHUm9vdCBDQTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8y\n"
"MDk5MDEwMTAwMDAwMFowFDESMBAGA1UEAxMJRUtVIG1zU0dDMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0C\n"
"AQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE9nsLABDporlTvx1OBUc4Hd5vxfX+8nS/OhbHmKtFLYNu\n"
"1CLLrImbwMQYD2G+PgLO6sQHmASq2jmJKp6ZWsRkTqM+MDwwDwYDVR0lBAgwBgYE\n"
"VR0lADAMBgNVHRMBAf8EAjAAMBsGA1UdIwQUMBKAEEA31wH7QC+4HH5UBCeMWQEw\n"
"DQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADgYEAxgjgn1SAzQ+2GeCicZ5ndvVhKIeFelGCQ989XTVq\n"
"uUbAYBW6v8GXNuVzoXYxDgNSanF6U+w+INrJ6daKVrIxAxdk9QFgBXqJoupuRAA3\n"
"/OqnmYux0EqOTLbTK1P8DhaiaD0KV6dWGUwzqsgBmPkZ0lgNaPjvb1mKV3jhBkjz\n"
"L6A=\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
static const char kNoEKU[] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
"MIIBnTCCAQagAwIBAgIBAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADArMRcwFQYDVQQKEw5Cb3Jp\n"
"bmdTU0wgVGVzdDEQMA4GA1UEAxMHUm9vdCBDQTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8y\n"
"MDk5MDEwMTAwMDAwMFowFDESMBAGA1UEAxMJRUtVIG1zU0dDMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0C\n"
"AQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEpSFSqbYY86ZcMamE606dqdyjWlwhSHKOLUFsUUIzkMPz\n"
"KHRu/x3Yzi8+Hm8eFK/TnCbkpYsYw4hIw00176dYzaMtMCswDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIw\n"
"ADAbBgNVHSMEFDASgBBAN9cB+0AvuBx+VAQnjFkBMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4GB\n"
"AHvYzynIkjLThExHRS+385hfv4vgrQSMmCM1SAnEIjSBGsU7RPgiGAstN06XivuF\n"
"T1fNugRmTu4OtOIbfdYkcjavJufw9hR9zWTt77CNMTy9XmOZLgdS5boFTtLCztr3\n"
"TXHOSQQD8Dl4BK0wOet+TP6LBEjHlRFjAqK4bu9xpxV2\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
// CertFromPEM parses the given, NUL-terminated pem block and returns an
// |X509*|.
static bssl::UniquePtr<X509> CertFromPEM(const char *pem) {
bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> bio(BIO_new_mem_buf(pem, strlen(pem)));
return bssl::UniquePtr<X509>(
PEM_read_bio_X509(bio.get(), nullptr, nullptr, nullptr));
}
// CRLFromPEM parses the given, NUL-terminated pem block and returns an
// |X509_CRL*|.
static bssl::UniquePtr<X509_CRL> CRLFromPEM(const char *pem) {
bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> bio(BIO_new_mem_buf(pem, strlen(pem)));
return bssl::UniquePtr<X509_CRL>(
PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(bio.get(), nullptr, nullptr, nullptr));
}
// PrivateKeyFromPEM parses the given, NUL-terminated pem block and returns an
// |EVP_PKEY*|.
static bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> PrivateKeyFromPEM(const char *pem) {
bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> bio(
BIO_new_mem_buf(const_cast<char *>(pem), strlen(pem)));
return bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY>(
PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bio.get(), nullptr, nullptr, nullptr));
}
// CertsToStack converts a vector of |X509*| to an OpenSSL STACK_OF(X509),
// bumping the reference counts for each certificate in question.
static bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509)> CertsToStack(
const std::vector<X509 *> &certs) {
bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509)> stack(sk_X509_new_null());
if (!stack) {
return nullptr;
}
for (auto cert : certs) {
if (!bssl::PushToStack(stack.get(), bssl::UpRef(cert))) {
return nullptr;
}
}
return stack;
}
// CRLsToStack converts a vector of |X509_CRL*| to an OpenSSL
// STACK_OF(X509_CRL), bumping the reference counts for each CRL in question.
static bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509_CRL)> CRLsToStack(
const std::vector<X509_CRL *> &crls) {
bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509_CRL)> stack(sk_X509_CRL_new_null());
if (!stack) {
return nullptr;
}
for (auto crl : crls) {
if (!bssl::PushToStack(stack.get(), bssl::UpRef(crl))) {
return nullptr;
}
}
return stack;
}
static int Verify(X509 *leaf, const std::vector<X509 *> &roots,
const std::vector<X509 *> &intermediates,
const std::vector<X509_CRL *> &crls, unsigned long flags,
bool use_additional_untrusted,
std::function<void(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *)> configure_callback,
int (*verify_callback)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *) = nullptr) {
bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509)> roots_stack(CertsToStack(roots));
bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509)> intermediates_stack(
CertsToStack(intermediates));
bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509_CRL)> crls_stack(CRLsToStack(crls));
if (!roots_stack ||
!intermediates_stack ||
!crls_stack) {
return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
}
bssl::UniquePtr<X509_STORE_CTX> ctx(X509_STORE_CTX_new());
bssl::UniquePtr<X509_STORE> store(X509_STORE_new());
if (!ctx ||
!store) {
return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
}
if (use_additional_untrusted) {
X509_STORE_set0_additional_untrusted(store.get(),
intermediates_stack.get());
}
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(
ctx.get(), store.get(), leaf,
use_additional_untrusted ? nullptr : intermediates_stack.get())) {
return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
}
X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(ctx.get(), roots_stack.get());
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(ctx.get(), crls_stack.get());
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
if (param == nullptr) {
return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
}
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(param, 1474934400 /* Sep 27th, 2016 */);
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(param, 16);
if (configure_callback) {
configure_callback(param);
}
if (flags) {
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(param, flags);
}
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(ctx.get(), param);
ERR_clear_error();
if (X509_verify_cert(ctx.get()) != 1) {
return X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx.get());
}
return X509_V_OK;
}
static int Verify(X509 *leaf, const std::vector<X509 *> &roots,
const std::vector<X509 *> &intermediates,
const std::vector<X509_CRL *> &crls,
unsigned long flags = 0) {
const int r1 =
Verify(leaf, roots, intermediates, crls, flags, false, nullptr);
const int r2 =
Verify(leaf, roots, intermediates, crls, flags, true, nullptr);
if (r1 != r2) {
fprintf(stderr,
"Verify with, and without, use_additional_untrusted gave different "
"results: %d vs %d.\n",
r1, r2);
return false;
}
return r1;
}
TEST(X509Test, TestVerify) {
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cross_signing_root(CertFromPEM(kCrossSigningRootPEM));
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root(CertFromPEM(kRootCAPEM));
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root_cross_signed(CertFromPEM(kRootCrossSignedPEM));
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> intermediate(CertFromPEM(kIntermediatePEM));
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> intermediate_self_signed(
CertFromPEM(kIntermediateSelfSignedPEM));
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf(CertFromPEM(kLeafPEM));
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf_no_key_usage(CertFromPEM(kLeafNoKeyUsagePEM));
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> forgery(CertFromPEM(kForgeryPEM));
ASSERT_TRUE(cross_signing_root);
ASSERT_TRUE(root);
ASSERT_TRUE(root_cross_signed);
ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate);
ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate_self_signed);
ASSERT_TRUE(leaf);
ASSERT_TRUE(forgery);
ASSERT_TRUE(leaf_no_key_usage);
std::vector<X509*> empty;
std::vector<X509_CRL*> empty_crls;
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY,
Verify(leaf.get(), empty, empty, empty_crls));
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY,
Verify(leaf.get(), empty, {intermediate.get()}, empty_crls));
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_OK,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, empty_crls));
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_OK,
Verify(leaf.get(), {cross_signing_root.get()},
{intermediate.get(), root_cross_signed.get()}, empty_crls));
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_OK,
Verify(leaf.get(), {cross_signing_root.get(), root.get()},
{intermediate.get(), root_cross_signed.get()}, empty_crls));
/* This is the “altchains” test – we remove the cross-signing CA but include
* the cross-sign in the intermediates. */
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_OK,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()},
{intermediate.get(), root_cross_signed.get()}, empty_crls));
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()},
{intermediate.get(), root_cross_signed.get()}, empty_crls,
X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS));
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA,
Verify(forgery.get(), {intermediate_self_signed.get()},
{leaf_no_key_usage.get()}, empty_crls));
/* Test that one cannot skip Basic Constraints checking with a contorted set
* of roots and intermediates. This is a regression test for CVE-2015-1793. */
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA,
Verify(forgery.get(),
{intermediate_self_signed.get(), root_cross_signed.get()},
{leaf_no_key_usage.get(), intermediate.get()}, empty_crls));
}
static const char kHostname[] = "example.com";
static const char kWrongHostname[] = "example2.com";
static const char kEmail[] = "test@example.com";
static const char kWrongEmail[] = "test2@example.com";
static const uint8_t kIP[4] = {127, 0, 0, 1};
static const uint8_t kWrongIP[4] = {127, 0, 0, 2};
static const char kIPString[] = "127.0.0.1";
static const char kWrongIPString[] = "127.0.0.2";
TEST(X509Test, ZeroLengthsWithX509PARAM) {
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf(CertFromPEM(kSANTypesLeaf));
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root(CertFromPEM(kSANTypesRoot));
ASSERT_TRUE(leaf);
ASSERT_TRUE(root);
std::vector<X509_CRL *> empty_crls;
struct X509Test {
const char *correct_value;
size_t correct_value_len;
const char *incorrect_value;
size_t incorrect_value_len;
int (*func)(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *, const char *, size_t);
int mismatch_error;
};
const std::vector<X509Test> kTests = {
{kHostname, strlen(kHostname), kWrongHostname, strlen(kWrongHostname),
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH},
{kEmail, strlen(kEmail), kWrongEmail, strlen(kWrongEmail),
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH},
};
for (size_t i = 0; i < kTests.size(); i++) {
SCOPED_TRACE(i);
const X509Test &test = kTests[i];
// The correct value should work.
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_OK,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {}, empty_crls, 0, false,
[&test](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
ASSERT_TRUE(test.func(param, test.correct_value,
test.correct_value_len));
}));
// The wrong value should trigger a verification error.
ASSERT_EQ(test.mismatch_error,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {}, empty_crls, 0, false,
[&test](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
ASSERT_TRUE(test.func(param, test.incorrect_value,
test.incorrect_value_len));
}));
// Passing zero as the length, unlike OpenSSL, should trigger an error and
// should cause verification to fail.
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {}, empty_crls, 0, false,
[&test](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
ASSERT_FALSE(test.func(param, test.correct_value, 0));
}));
// Passing an empty value should be an error when setting and should cause
// verification to fail.
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {}, empty_crls, 0, false,
[&test](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
ASSERT_FALSE(test.func(param, nullptr, 0));
}));
// Passing a value with embedded NULs should also be an error and should
// also cause verification to fail.
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {}, empty_crls, 0, false,
[&test](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
ASSERT_FALSE(test.func(param, "a", 2));
}));
}
// IP addresses work slightly differently:
// The correct value should still work.
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {}, empty_crls, 0,
false, [](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
ASSERT_TRUE(X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip(
param, kIP, sizeof(kIP)));
}));
// Incorrect values should still fail.
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {}, empty_crls, 0, false,
[](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
ASSERT_TRUE(X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip(param, kWrongIP,
sizeof(kWrongIP)));
}));
// Zero length values should trigger an error when setting and cause
// verification to always fail.
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {}, empty_crls, 0, false,
[](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
ASSERT_FALSE(X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip(param, kIP, 0));
}));
// ... and so should NULL values.
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {}, empty_crls, 0, false,
[](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
ASSERT_FALSE(X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip(param, nullptr, 0));
}));
// Zero bytes in an IP address are, of course, fine. This is tested above
// because |kIP| contains zeros.
}
TEST(X509Test, ZeroLengthsWithCheckFunctions) {
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf(CertFromPEM(kSANTypesLeaf));
EXPECT_EQ(
1, X509_check_host(leaf.get(), kHostname, strlen(kHostname), 0, nullptr));
EXPECT_NE(1, X509_check_host(leaf.get(), kWrongHostname,
strlen(kWrongHostname), 0, nullptr));
EXPECT_EQ(1, X509_check_email(leaf.get(), kEmail, strlen(kEmail), 0));
EXPECT_NE(1,
X509_check_email(leaf.get(), kWrongEmail, strlen(kWrongEmail), 0));
EXPECT_EQ(1, X509_check_ip(leaf.get(), kIP, sizeof(kIP), 0));
EXPECT_NE(1, X509_check_ip(leaf.get(), kWrongIP, sizeof(kWrongIP), 0));
EXPECT_EQ(1, X509_check_ip_asc(leaf.get(), kIPString, 0));
EXPECT_NE(1, X509_check_ip_asc(leaf.get(), kWrongIPString, 0));
// OpenSSL supports passing zero as the length for host and email. We do not
// and it should always fail.
EXPECT_NE(1, X509_check_host(leaf.get(), kHostname, 0, 0, nullptr));
EXPECT_NE(1, X509_check_host(leaf.get(), kWrongHostname, 0, 0, nullptr));
EXPECT_NE(1, X509_check_email(leaf.get(), kEmail, 0, 0));
EXPECT_NE(1, X509_check_email(leaf.get(), kWrongEmail, 0, 0));
EXPECT_NE(1, X509_check_ip(leaf.get(), kIP, 0, 0));
EXPECT_NE(1, X509_check_ip(leaf.get(), kWrongIP, 0, 0));
// Unlike all the other functions, |X509_check_ip_asc| doesn't take a length,
// so it cannot be zero.
}
TEST(X509Test, TestCRL) {
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root(CertFromPEM(kCRLTestRoot));
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf(CertFromPEM(kCRLTestLeaf));
bssl::UniquePtr<X509_CRL> basic_crl(CRLFromPEM(kBasicCRL));
bssl::UniquePtr<X509_CRL> revoked_crl(CRLFromPEM(kRevokedCRL));
bssl::UniquePtr<X509_CRL> bad_issuer_crl(CRLFromPEM(kBadIssuerCRL));
bssl::UniquePtr<X509_CRL> known_critical_crl(CRLFromPEM(kKnownCriticalCRL));
bssl::UniquePtr<X509_CRL> unknown_critical_crl(
CRLFromPEM(kUnknownCriticalCRL));
bssl::UniquePtr<X509_CRL> unknown_critical_crl2(
CRLFromPEM(kUnknownCriticalCRL2));
ASSERT_TRUE(root);
ASSERT_TRUE(leaf);
ASSERT_TRUE(basic_crl);
ASSERT_TRUE(revoked_crl);
ASSERT_TRUE(bad_issuer_crl);
ASSERT_TRUE(known_critical_crl);
ASSERT_TRUE(unknown_critical_crl);
ASSERT_TRUE(unknown_critical_crl2);
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {root.get()},
{basic_crl.get()}, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK));
ASSERT_EQ(
X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {root.get()},
{basic_crl.get(), revoked_crl.get()}, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK));
std::vector<X509_CRL *> empty_crls;
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {root.get()}, empty_crls,
X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK));
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {root.get()},
{bad_issuer_crl.get()}, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK));
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_OK,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {root.get()},
{known_critical_crl.get()}, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK));
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {root.get()},
{unknown_critical_crl.get()}, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK));
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {root.get()},
{unknown_critical_crl2.get()}, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK));
}
TEST(X509Test, ManyNamesAndConstraints) {
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> many_constraints(
CertFromPEM(GetTestData("crypto/x509/many_constraints.pem").c_str()));
ASSERT_TRUE(many_constraints);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> many_names1(
CertFromPEM(GetTestData("crypto/x509/many_names1.pem").c_str()));
ASSERT_TRUE(many_names1);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> many_names2(
CertFromPEM(GetTestData("crypto/x509/many_names2.pem").c_str()));
ASSERT_TRUE(many_names2);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> many_names3(
CertFromPEM(GetTestData("crypto/x509/many_names3.pem").c_str()));
ASSERT_TRUE(many_names3);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> some_names1(
CertFromPEM(GetTestData("crypto/x509/some_names1.pem").c_str()));
ASSERT_TRUE(some_names1);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> some_names2(
CertFromPEM(GetTestData("crypto/x509/some_names2.pem").c_str()));
ASSERT_TRUE(some_names2);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> some_names3(
CertFromPEM(GetTestData("crypto/x509/some_names3.pem").c_str()));
ASSERT_TRUE(some_names3);
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED,
Verify(many_names1.get(), {many_constraints.get()},
{many_constraints.get()}, {}));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED,
Verify(many_names2.get(), {many_constraints.get()},
{many_constraints.get()}, {}));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED,
Verify(many_names3.get(), {many_constraints.get()},
{many_constraints.get()}, {}));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(some_names1.get(), {many_constraints.get()},
{many_constraints.get()}, {}));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(some_names2.get(), {many_constraints.get()},
{many_constraints.get()}, {}));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(some_names3.get(), {many_constraints.get()},
{many_constraints.get()}, {}));
}
TEST(X509Test, TestPSS) {
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert(CertFromPEM(kExamplePSSCert));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey(X509_get_pubkey(cert.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(pkey);
ASSERT_TRUE(X509_verify(cert.get(), pkey.get()));
}
TEST(X509Test, TestPSSBadParameters) {
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert(CertFromPEM(kBadPSSCertPEM));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey(X509_get_pubkey(cert.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(pkey);
ASSERT_FALSE(X509_verify(cert.get(), pkey.get()));
ERR_clear_error();
}
TEST(X509Test, TestEd25519) {
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert(CertFromPEM(kEd25519Cert));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey(X509_get_pubkey(cert.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(pkey);
ASSERT_TRUE(X509_verify(cert.get(), pkey.get()));
}
TEST(X509Test, TestEd25519BadParameters) {
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert(CertFromPEM(kEd25519CertNull));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey(X509_get_pubkey(cert.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(pkey);
ASSERT_FALSE(X509_verify(cert.get(), pkey.get()));
uint32_t err = ERR_get_error();
ASSERT_EQ(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
ASSERT_EQ(X509_R_INVALID_PARAMETER, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
ERR_clear_error();
}
static bool SignatureRoundTrips(EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
// Make a certificate like signed with |md_ctx|'s settings.'
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert(CertFromPEM(kLeafPEM));
if (!cert || !X509_sign_ctx(cert.get(), md_ctx)) {
return false;
}
// Ensure that |pkey| may still be used to verify the resulting signature. All
// settings in |md_ctx| must have been serialized appropriately.
return !!X509_verify(cert.get(), pkey);
}
TEST(X509Test, RSASign) {
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey(PrivateKeyFromPEM(kRSAKey));
ASSERT_TRUE(pkey);
// Test PKCS#1 v1.5.
bssl::ScopedEVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
ASSERT_TRUE(
EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx.get(), NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(SignatureRoundTrips(md_ctx.get(), pkey.get()));
// Test RSA-PSS with custom parameters.
md_ctx.Reset();
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx.get(), &pkey_ctx, EVP_sha256(), NULL,
pkey.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkey_ctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING));
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(pkey_ctx, EVP_sha512()));
ASSERT_TRUE(SignatureRoundTrips(md_ctx.get(), pkey.get()));
}
TEST(X509Test, Ed25519Sign) {
uint8_t pub_bytes[32], priv_bytes[64];
ED25519_keypair(pub_bytes, priv_bytes);
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pub(
EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key(EVP_PKEY_ED25519, nullptr, pub_bytes, 32));
ASSERT_TRUE(pub);
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> priv(
EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_ED25519, nullptr, priv_bytes, 32));
ASSERT_TRUE(priv);
bssl::ScopedEVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
ASSERT_TRUE(
EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx.get(), nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, priv.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(SignatureRoundTrips(md_ctx.get(), pub.get()));
}
static bool PEMToDER(bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> *out, size_t *out_len,
const char *pem) {
bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> bio(BIO_new_mem_buf(pem, strlen(pem)));
if (!bio) {
return false;
}
char *name, *header;
uint8_t *data;
long data_len;
if (!PEM_read_bio(bio.get(), &name, &header, &data, &data_len)) {
fprintf(stderr, "failed to read PEM data.\n");
return false;
}
OPENSSL_free(name);
OPENSSL_free(header);
out->reset(data);
*out_len = data_len;
return true;
}
TEST(X509Test, TestFromBuffer) {
size_t data_len;
bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> data;
ASSERT_TRUE(PEMToDER(&data, &data_len, kRootCAPEM));
bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buf(
CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(data.get(), data_len, nullptr));
ASSERT_TRUE(buf);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root(X509_parse_from_buffer(buf.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(root);
const uint8_t *enc_pointer = root->cert_info->enc.enc;
const uint8_t *buf_pointer = CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(buf.get());
ASSERT_GE(enc_pointer, buf_pointer);
ASSERT_LT(enc_pointer, buf_pointer + CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(buf.get()));
buf.reset();
/* This ensures the X509 took a reference to |buf|, otherwise this will be a
* reference to free memory and ASAN should notice. */
ASSERT_EQ(0x30, enc_pointer[0]);
}
TEST(X509Test, TestFromBufferWithTrailingData) {
size_t data_len;
bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> data;
ASSERT_TRUE(PEMToDER(&data, &data_len, kRootCAPEM));
std::unique_ptr<uint8_t[]> trailing_data(new uint8_t[data_len + 1]);
OPENSSL_memcpy(trailing_data.get(), data.get(), data_len);
bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buf_trailing_data(
CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(trailing_data.get(), data_len + 1, nullptr));
ASSERT_TRUE(buf_trailing_data);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root_trailing_data(
X509_parse_from_buffer(buf_trailing_data.get()));
ASSERT_FALSE(root_trailing_data);
}
TEST(X509Test, TestFromBufferModified) {
size_t data_len;
bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> data;
ASSERT_TRUE(PEMToDER(&data, &data_len, kRootCAPEM));
bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buf(
CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(data.get(), data_len, nullptr));
ASSERT_TRUE(buf);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root(X509_parse_from_buffer(buf.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(root);
bssl::UniquePtr<ASN1_INTEGER> fourty_two(ASN1_INTEGER_new());
ASN1_INTEGER_set(fourty_two.get(), 42);
X509_set_serialNumber(root.get(), fourty_two.get());
ASSERT_EQ(static_cast<long>(data_len), i2d_X509(root.get(), nullptr));
X509_CINF_set_modified(root->cert_info);
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<long>(data_len), i2d_X509(root.get(), nullptr));
}
TEST(X509Test, TestFromBufferReused) {
size_t data_len;
bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> data;
ASSERT_TRUE(PEMToDER(&data, &data_len, kRootCAPEM));
bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buf(
CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(data.get(), data_len, nullptr));
ASSERT_TRUE(buf);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root(X509_parse_from_buffer(buf.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(root);
size_t data2_len;
bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> data2;
ASSERT_TRUE(PEMToDER(&data2, &data2_len, kLeafPEM));
X509 *x509p = root.get();
const uint8_t *inp = data2.get();
X509 *ret = d2i_X509(&x509p, &inp, data2_len);
ASSERT_EQ(root.get(), ret);
ASSERT_EQ(nullptr, root->buf);
// Free |data2| and ensure that |root| took its own copy. Otherwise the
// following will trigger a use-after-free.
data2.reset();
uint8_t *i2d = nullptr;
int i2d_len = i2d_X509(root.get(), &i2d);
ASSERT_GE(i2d_len, 0);
bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> i2d_storage(i2d);
ASSERT_TRUE(PEMToDER(&data2, &data2_len, kLeafPEM));
ASSERT_EQ(static_cast<long>(data2_len), i2d_len);
ASSERT_EQ(0, OPENSSL_memcmp(data2.get(), i2d, i2d_len));
ASSERT_EQ(nullptr, root->buf);
}
TEST(X509Test, TestFailedParseFromBuffer) {
static const uint8_t kNonsense[] = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5};
bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buf(
CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(kNonsense, sizeof(kNonsense), nullptr));
ASSERT_TRUE(buf);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert(X509_parse_from_buffer(buf.get()));
ASSERT_FALSE(cert);
ERR_clear_error();
// Test a buffer with trailing data.
size_t data_len;
bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> data;
ASSERT_TRUE(PEMToDER(&data, &data_len, kRootCAPEM));
std::unique_ptr<uint8_t[]> data_with_trailing_byte(new uint8_t[data_len + 1]);
OPENSSL_memcpy(data_with_trailing_byte.get(), data.get(), data_len);
data_with_trailing_byte[data_len] = 0;
bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buf_with_trailing_byte(
CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(data_with_trailing_byte.get(), data_len + 1, nullptr));
ASSERT_TRUE(buf_with_trailing_byte);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root(
X509_parse_from_buffer(buf_with_trailing_byte.get()));
ASSERT_FALSE(root);
ERR_clear_error();
}
TEST(X509Test, TestPrintUTCTIME) {
static const struct {
const char *val, *want;
} asn1_utctime_tests[] = {
{"", "Bad time value"},
// Correct RFC 5280 form. Test years < 2000 and > 2000.
{"090303125425Z", "Mar 3 12:54:25 2009 GMT"},
{"900303125425Z", "Mar 3 12:54:25 1990 GMT"},
{"000303125425Z", "Mar 3 12:54:25 2000 GMT"},
// Correct form, bad values.
{"000000000000Z", "Bad time value"},
{"999999999999Z", "Bad time value"},
// Missing components. Not legal RFC 5280, but permitted.
{"090303125425", "Mar 3 12:54:25 2009"},
{"9003031254", "Mar 3 12:54:00 1990"},
{"9003031254Z", "Mar 3 12:54:00 1990 GMT"},
// GENERALIZEDTIME confused for UTCTIME.
{"20090303125425Z", "Bad time value"},
// Legal ASN.1, but not legal RFC 5280.
{"9003031254+0800", "Bad time value"},
{"9003031254-0800", "Bad time value"},
// Trailing garbage.
{"9003031254Z ", "Bad time value"},
};
for (auto t : asn1_utctime_tests) {
SCOPED_TRACE(t.val);
bssl::UniquePtr<ASN1_UTCTIME> tm(ASN1_UTCTIME_new());
bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> bio(BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()));
// Use this instead of ASN1_UTCTIME_set() because some callers get
// type-confused and pass ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME to ASN1_UTCTIME_print().
// ASN1_UTCTIME_set_string() is stricter, and would reject the inputs in
// question.
ASSERT_TRUE(ASN1_STRING_set(tm.get(), t.val, strlen(t.val)));
const int ok = ASN1_UTCTIME_print(bio.get(), tm.get());
const uint8_t *contents;
size_t len;
ASSERT_TRUE(BIO_mem_contents(bio.get(), &contents, &len));
EXPECT_EQ(ok, (strcmp(t.want, "Bad time value") != 0) ? 1 : 0);
EXPECT_EQ(t.want,
std::string(reinterpret_cast<const char *>(contents), len));
}
}
TEST(X509Test, PrettyPrintIntegers) {
static const char *kTests[] = {
// Small numbers are pretty-printed in decimal.
"0",
"-1",
"1",
"42",
"-42",
"256",
"-256",
// Large numbers are pretty-printed in hex to avoid taking quadratic time.
"0x0123456789",
"-0x0123456789",
};
for (const char *in : kTests) {
SCOPED_TRACE(in);
BIGNUM *bn = nullptr;
ASSERT_TRUE(BN_asc2bn(&bn, in));
bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> free_bn(bn);
{
bssl::UniquePtr<ASN1_INTEGER> asn1(BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(bn, nullptr));
ASSERT_TRUE(asn1);
bssl::UniquePtr<char> out(i2s_ASN1_INTEGER(nullptr, asn1.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(out.get());
EXPECT_STREQ(in, out.get());
}
{
bssl::UniquePtr<ASN1_ENUMERATED> asn1(BN_to_ASN1_ENUMERATED(bn, nullptr));
ASSERT_TRUE(asn1);
bssl::UniquePtr<char> out(i2s_ASN1_ENUMERATED(nullptr, asn1.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(out.get());
EXPECT_STREQ(in, out.get());
}
}
}
TEST(X509Test, X509NameSet) {
bssl::UniquePtr<X509_NAME> name(X509_NAME_new());
EXPECT_TRUE(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(
name.get(), "C", MBSTRING_ASC, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>("US"),
-1, -1, 0));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_NAME_entry_count(name.get()), 1);
EXPECT_TRUE(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(
name.get(), "C", MBSTRING_ASC, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>("CA"),
-1, -1, 0));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_NAME_entry_count(name.get()), 2);
EXPECT_TRUE(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(
name.get(), "C", MBSTRING_ASC, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>("UK"),
-1, -1, 0));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_NAME_entry_count(name.get()), 3);
EXPECT_TRUE(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(
name.get(), "C", MBSTRING_ASC, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>("JP"),
-1, 1, 0));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_NAME_entry_count(name.get()), 4);
// Check that the correct entries get incremented when inserting new entry.
EXPECT_EQ(X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(name.get(), 1)), 1);
EXPECT_EQ(X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(name.get(), 2)), 2);
}
TEST(X509Test, StringDecoding) {
static const struct {
std::vector<uint8_t> in;
int type;
const char *expected;
} kTests[] = {
// Non-minimal, two-byte UTF-8.
{{0xc0, 0x81}, V_ASN1_UTF8STRING, nullptr},
// Non-minimal, three-byte UTF-8.
{{0xe0, 0x80, 0x81}, V_ASN1_UTF8STRING, nullptr},
// Non-minimal, four-byte UTF-8.
{{0xf0, 0x80, 0x80, 0x81}, V_ASN1_UTF8STRING, nullptr},
// Truncated, four-byte UTF-8.
{{0xf0, 0x80, 0x80}, V_ASN1_UTF8STRING, nullptr},
// Low-surrogate value.
{{0xed, 0xa0, 0x80}, V_ASN1_UTF8STRING, nullptr},
// High-surrogate value.
{{0xed, 0xb0, 0x81}, V_ASN1_UTF8STRING, nullptr},
// Initial BOMs should be rejected from UCS-2 and UCS-4.
{{0xfe, 0xff, 0, 88}, V_ASN1_BMPSTRING, nullptr},
{{0, 0, 0xfe, 0xff, 0, 0, 0, 88}, V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING, nullptr},
// Otherwise, BOMs should pass through.
{{0, 88, 0xfe, 0xff}, V_ASN1_BMPSTRING, "X\xef\xbb\xbf"},
{{0, 0, 0, 88, 0, 0, 0xfe, 0xff}, V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING,
"X\xef\xbb\xbf"},
// The maximum code-point should pass though.
{{0, 16, 0xff, 0xfd}, V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING, "\xf4\x8f\xbf\xbd"},
// Values outside the Unicode space should not.
{{0, 17, 0, 0}, V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING, nullptr},
// Non-characters should be rejected.
{{0, 1, 0xff, 0xff}, V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING, nullptr},
{{0, 1, 0xff, 0xfe}, V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING, nullptr},
{{0, 0, 0xfd, 0xd5}, V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING, nullptr},
// BMPString is UCS-2, not UTF-16, so surrogate pairs are invalid.
{{0xd8, 0, 0xdc, 1}, V_ASN1_BMPSTRING, nullptr},
};
for (size_t i = 0; i < OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kTests); i++) {
SCOPED_TRACE(i);
const auto& test = kTests[i];
ASN1_STRING s;
s.type = test.type;
s.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(test.in.data());
s.length = test.in.size();
uint8_t *utf8;
const int utf8_len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&utf8, &s);
EXPECT_EQ(utf8_len < 0, test.expected == nullptr);
if (utf8_len >= 0) {
if (test.expected != nullptr) {
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(test.expected), Bytes(utf8, utf8_len));
}
OPENSSL_free(utf8);
} else {
ERR_clear_error();
}
}
}
TEST(X509Test, NoBasicConstraintsCertSign) {
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root(CertFromPEM(kSANTypesRoot));
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> intermediate(
CertFromPEM(kNoBasicConstraintsCertSignIntermediate));
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf(CertFromPEM(kNoBasicConstraintsCertSignLeaf));
ASSERT_TRUE(root);
ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate);
ASSERT_TRUE(leaf);
// The intermediate has keyUsage certSign, but is not marked as a CA in the
// basicConstraints.
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, {}, 0));
}
TEST(X509Test, NoBasicConstraintsNetscapeCA) {
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root(CertFromPEM(kSANTypesRoot));
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> intermediate(
CertFromPEM(kNoBasicConstraintsNetscapeCAIntermediate));
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf(CertFromPEM(kNoBasicConstraintsNetscapeCALeaf));
ASSERT_TRUE(root);
ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate);
ASSERT_TRUE(leaf);
// The intermediate has a Netscape certificate type of "SSL CA", but is not
// marked as a CA in the basicConstraints.
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, {}, 0));
}
TEST(X509Test, MismatchAlgorithms) {
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert(CertFromPEM(kSelfSignedMismatchAlgorithms));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey(X509_get_pubkey(cert.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(pkey);
EXPECT_FALSE(X509_verify(cert.get(), pkey.get()));
uint32_t err = ERR_get_error();
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
}
TEST(X509Test, PEMX509Info) {
std::string cert = kRootCAPEM;
auto cert_obj = CertFromPEM(kRootCAPEM);
ASSERT_TRUE(cert_obj);
std::string rsa = kRSAKey;
auto rsa_obj = PrivateKeyFromPEM(kRSAKey);
ASSERT_TRUE(rsa_obj);
std::string crl = kBasicCRL;
auto crl_obj = CRLFromPEM(kBasicCRL);
ASSERT_TRUE(crl_obj);
std::string unknown =
"-----BEGIN UNKNOWN-----\n"
"AAAA\n"
"-----END UNKNOWN-----\n";
std::string invalid =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
"AAAA\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
// Each X509_INFO contains at most one certificate, CRL, etc. The format
// creates a new X509_INFO when a repeated type is seen.
std::string pem =
// The first few entries have one of everything in different orders.
cert + rsa + crl +
rsa + crl + cert +
// Unknown types are ignored.
crl + unknown + cert + rsa +
// Seeing a new certificate starts a new entry, so now we have a bunch of
// certificate-only entries.
cert + cert + cert +
// The key folds into the certificate's entry.
cert + rsa +
// Doubled keys also start new entries.
rsa + rsa + rsa + rsa + crl +
// As do CRLs.
crl + crl;
const struct ExpectedInfo {
const X509 *cert;
const EVP_PKEY *key;
const X509_CRL *crl;
} kExpected[] = {
{cert_obj.get(), rsa_obj.get(), crl_obj.get()},
{cert_obj.get(), rsa_obj.get(), crl_obj.get()},
{cert_obj.get(), rsa_obj.get(), crl_obj.get()},
{cert_obj.get(), nullptr, nullptr},
{cert_obj.get(), nullptr, nullptr},
{cert_obj.get(), nullptr, nullptr},
{cert_obj.get(), rsa_obj.get(), nullptr},
{nullptr, rsa_obj.get(), nullptr},
{nullptr, rsa_obj.get(), nullptr},
{nullptr, rsa_obj.get(), nullptr},
{nullptr, rsa_obj.get(), crl_obj.get()},
{nullptr, nullptr, crl_obj.get()},
{nullptr, nullptr, crl_obj.get()},
};
auto check_info = [](const ExpectedInfo *expected, const X509_INFO *info) {
if (expected->cert != nullptr) {
EXPECT_EQ(0, X509_cmp(expected->cert, info->x509));
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(nullptr, info->x509);
}
if (expected->crl != nullptr) {
EXPECT_EQ(0, X509_CRL_cmp(expected->crl, info->crl));
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(nullptr, info->crl);
}
if (expected->key != nullptr) {
ASSERT_NE(nullptr, info->x_pkey);
// EVP_PKEY_cmp returns one if the keys are equal.
EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_PKEY_cmp(expected->key, info->x_pkey->dec_pkey));
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(nullptr, info->x_pkey);
}
};
bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> bio(BIO_new_mem_buf(pem.data(), pem.size()));
ASSERT_TRUE(bio);
bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509_INFO)> infos(
PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(bio.get(), nullptr, nullptr, nullptr));
ASSERT_TRUE(infos);
ASSERT_EQ(OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kExpected), sk_X509_INFO_num(infos.get()));
for (size_t i = 0; i < OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kExpected); i++) {
SCOPED_TRACE(i);
check_info(&kExpected[i], sk_X509_INFO_value(infos.get(), i));
}
// Passing an existing stack appends to it.
bio.reset(BIO_new_mem_buf(pem.data(), pem.size()));
ASSERT_TRUE(bio);
ASSERT_EQ(infos.get(),
PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(bio.get(), infos.get(), nullptr, nullptr));
ASSERT_EQ(2 * OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kExpected), sk_X509_INFO_num(infos.get()));
for (size_t i = 0; i < OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kExpected); i++) {
SCOPED_TRACE(i);
check_info(&kExpected[i], sk_X509_INFO_value(infos.get(), i));
check_info(
&kExpected[i],
sk_X509_INFO_value(infos.get(), i + OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kExpected)));
}
// Gracefully handle errors in both the append and fresh cases.
std::string bad_pem = cert + cert + invalid;
bio.reset(BIO_new_mem_buf(bad_pem.data(), bad_pem.size()));
ASSERT_TRUE(bio);
bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509_INFO)> infos2(
PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(bio.get(), nullptr, nullptr, nullptr));
EXPECT_FALSE(infos2);
bio.reset(BIO_new_mem_buf(bad_pem.data(), bad_pem.size()));
ASSERT_TRUE(bio);
EXPECT_FALSE(
PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(bio.get(), infos.get(), nullptr, nullptr));
EXPECT_EQ(2 * OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kExpected), sk_X509_INFO_num(infos.get()));
}
TEST(X509Test, ReadBIOEmpty) {
bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> bio(BIO_new_mem_buf(nullptr, 0));
ASSERT_TRUE(bio);
// CPython expects |ASN1_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG| on EOF, to terminate a series of
// certificates.
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> x509(d2i_X509_bio(bio.get(), nullptr));
EXPECT_FALSE(x509);
uint32_t err = ERR_get_error();
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
EXPECT_EQ(ASN1_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
}
TEST(X509Test, ReadBIOOneByte) {
bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> bio(BIO_new_mem_buf("\x30", 1));
ASSERT_TRUE(bio);
// CPython expects |ASN1_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG| on EOF, to terminate a series of
// certificates. This EOF appeared after some data, however, so we do not wish
// to signal EOF.
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> x509(d2i_X509_bio(bio.get(), nullptr));
EXPECT_FALSE(x509);
uint32_t err = ERR_get_error();
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
EXPECT_EQ(ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
}
TEST(X509Test, PartialBIOReturn) {
// Create a filter BIO that only reads and writes one byte at a time.
bssl::UniquePtr<BIO_METHOD> method(BIO_meth_new(0, nullptr));
ASSERT_TRUE(method);
ASSERT_TRUE(BIO_meth_set_create(method.get(), [](BIO *b) -> int {
BIO_set_init(b, 1);
return 1;
}));
ASSERT_TRUE(
BIO_meth_set_read(method.get(), [](BIO *b, char *out, int len) -> int {
return BIO_read(BIO_next(b), out, std::min(len, 1));
}));
ASSERT_TRUE(BIO_meth_set_write(
method.get(), [](BIO *b, const char *in, int len) -> int {
return BIO_write(BIO_next(b), in, std::min(len, 1));
}));
bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> bio(BIO_new(method.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(bio);
BIO *mem_bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
ASSERT_TRUE(mem_bio);
BIO_push(bio.get(), mem_bio); // BIO_push takes ownership.
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert(CertFromPEM(kLeafPEM));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
uint8_t *der = nullptr;
int der_len = i2d_X509(cert.get(), &der);
ASSERT_GT(der_len, 0);
bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> free_der(der);
// Write the certificate into the BIO. Though we only write one byte at a
// time, the write should succeed.
ASSERT_EQ(1, i2d_X509_bio(bio.get(), cert.get()));
const uint8_t *der2;
size_t der2_len;
ASSERT_TRUE(BIO_mem_contents(mem_bio, &der2, &der2_len));
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(der, static_cast<size_t>(der_len)), Bytes(der2, der2_len));
// Read the certificate back out of the BIO. Though we only read one byte at a
// time, the read should succeed.
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert2(d2i_X509_bio(bio.get(), nullptr));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert2);
EXPECT_EQ(0, X509_cmp(cert.get(), cert2.get()));
}
TEST(X509Test, CommonNameFallback) {
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root = CertFromPEM(kSANTypesRoot);
ASSERT_TRUE(root);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> with_sans = CertFromPEM(kCommonNameWithSANs);
ASSERT_TRUE(with_sans);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> without_sans = CertFromPEM(kCommonNameWithoutSANs);
ASSERT_TRUE(without_sans);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> with_email = CertFromPEM(kCommonNameWithEmailSAN);
ASSERT_TRUE(with_email);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> with_ip = CertFromPEM(kCommonNameWithIPSAN);
ASSERT_TRUE(with_ip);
auto verify_cert = [&](X509 *leaf, unsigned flags, const char *host) {
return Verify(
leaf, {root.get()}, {}, {}, 0, false, [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
ASSERT_TRUE(X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(param, host, strlen(host)));
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags(param, flags);
});
};
// By default, the common name is ignored if the SAN list is present but
// otherwise is checked.
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH,
verify_cert(with_sans.get(), 0 /* no flags */, "foo.host1.test"));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK,
verify_cert(with_sans.get(), 0 /* no flags */, "foo.host2.test"));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK,
verify_cert(with_sans.get(), 0 /* no flags */, "foo.host3.test"));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, verify_cert(without_sans.get(), 0 /* no flags */,
"foo.host1.test"));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH,
verify_cert(with_email.get(), 0 /* no flags */, "foo.host1.test"));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH,
verify_cert(with_ip.get(), 0 /* no flags */, "foo.host1.test"));
// X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT is ignored.
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH,
verify_cert(with_sans.get(), X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT,
"foo.host1.test"));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK,
verify_cert(with_sans.get(), X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT,
"foo.host2.test"));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK,
verify_cert(with_sans.get(), X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT,
"foo.host3.test"));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, verify_cert(without_sans.get(),
X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT,
"foo.host1.test"));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH,
verify_cert(with_email.get(), X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT,
"foo.host1.test"));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH,
verify_cert(with_ip.get(), X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT,
"foo.host1.test"));
// X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT implements the correct behavior: the
// common name is never checked.
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH,
verify_cert(with_sans.get(), X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT,
"foo.host1.test"));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK,
verify_cert(with_sans.get(), X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT,
"foo.host2.test"));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK,
verify_cert(with_sans.get(), X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT,
"foo.host3.test"));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH,
verify_cert(without_sans.get(), X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT,
"foo.host1.test"));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH,
verify_cert(with_email.get(), X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT,
"foo.host1.test"));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH,
verify_cert(with_ip.get(), X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT,
"foo.host1.test"));
}
TEST(X509Test, LooksLikeDNSName) {
static const char *kValid[] = {
"example.com",
"eXample123-.com",
"*.example.com",
"exa_mple.com",
"example.com.",
"project-dev:us-central1:main",
};
static const char *kInvalid[] = {
"-eXample123-.com",
"",
".",
"*",
"*.",
"example..com",
".example.com",
"example.com..",
"*foo.example.com",
"foo.*.example.com",
"foo,bar",
};
for (const char *str : kValid) {
SCOPED_TRACE(str);
EXPECT_TRUE(x509v3_looks_like_dns_name(
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(str), strlen(str)));
}
for (const char *str : kInvalid) {
SCOPED_TRACE(str);
EXPECT_FALSE(x509v3_looks_like_dns_name(
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(str), strlen(str)));
}
}
TEST(X509Test, CommonNameAndNameConstraints) {
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root = CertFromPEM(kSANTypesRoot);
ASSERT_TRUE(root);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> intermediate = CertFromPEM(kConstrainedIntermediate);
ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> permitted = CertFromPEM(kCommonNamePermittedLeaf);
ASSERT_TRUE(permitted);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> not_permitted =
CertFromPEM(kCommonNameNotPermittedLeaf);
ASSERT_TRUE(not_permitted);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> not_permitted_with_sans =
CertFromPEM(kCommonNameNotPermittedWithSANsLeaf);
ASSERT_TRUE(not_permitted_with_sans);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> not_dns = CertFromPEM(kCommonNameNotDNSLeaf);
ASSERT_TRUE(not_dns);
auto verify_cert = [&](X509 *leaf, unsigned flags, const char *host) {
return Verify(
leaf, {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, {}, 0, false,
[&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
ASSERT_TRUE(X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(param, host, strlen(host)));
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags(param, flags);
});
};
// Certificates which would otherwise trigger the common name fallback are
// rejected whenever there are name constraints. We do this whether or not
// the common name matches the constraints.
EXPECT_EQ(
X509_V_ERR_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_WITHOUT_SANS,
verify_cert(permitted.get(), 0 /* no flags */, kCommonNamePermitted));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_WITHOUT_SANS,
verify_cert(not_permitted.get(), 0 /* no flags */,
kCommonNameNotPermitted));
// This occurs even if the built-in name checks aren't used. The caller may
// separately call |X509_check_host|.
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_WITHOUT_SANS,
Verify(not_permitted.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, {},
0 /* no flags */, false, nullptr));
// If the leaf certificate has SANs, the common name fallback is always
// disabled, so the name constraints do not apply.
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(not_permitted_with_sans.get(), {root.get()},
{intermediate.get()}, {}, 0, false, nullptr));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH,
verify_cert(not_permitted_with_sans.get(), 0 /* no flags */,
kCommonNameNotPermittedWithSANs));
// If the common name does not look like a DNS name, we apply neither name
// constraints nor common name fallback.
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(not_dns.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()},
{}, 0, false, nullptr));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH,
verify_cert(not_dns.get(), 0 /* no flags */, kCommonNameNotDNS));
}
TEST(X509Test, ServerGatedCryptoEKUs) {
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root = CertFromPEM(kSANTypesRoot);
ASSERT_TRUE(root);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> ms_sgc = CertFromPEM(kMicrosoftSGCCert);
ASSERT_TRUE(ms_sgc);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> ns_sgc = CertFromPEM(kNetscapeSGCCert);
ASSERT_TRUE(ns_sgc);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> server_eku = CertFromPEM(kServerEKUCert);
ASSERT_TRUE(server_eku);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> server_eku_plus_ms_sgc =
CertFromPEM(kServerEKUPlusMicrosoftSGCCert);
ASSERT_TRUE(server_eku_plus_ms_sgc);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> any_eku = CertFromPEM(kAnyEKU);
ASSERT_TRUE(any_eku);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> no_eku = CertFromPEM(kNoEKU);
ASSERT_TRUE(no_eku);
auto verify_cert = [&root](X509 *leaf) {
return Verify(leaf, {root.get()}, /*intermediates=*/{}, /*crls=*/{},
/*flags=*/0, /*use_additional_untrusted=*/false,
[&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
ASSERT_TRUE(X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(
param, X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER));
});
};
// Neither the Microsoft nor Netscape SGC EKU should be sufficient for
// |X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER|. The "any" EKU probably, technically, should be.
// However, we've never accepted it and it's not acceptable in leaf
// certificates by the Baseline, so perhaps we don't need this complexity.
for (X509 *leaf : {ms_sgc.get(), ns_sgc.get(), any_eku.get()}) {
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE, verify_cert(leaf));
}
// The server-auth EKU is sufficient, and it doesn't matter if an SGC EKU is
// also included. Lastly, not specifying an EKU is also valid.
for (X509 *leaf : {server_eku.get(), server_eku_plus_ms_sgc.get(),
no_eku.get()}) {
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, verify_cert(leaf));
}
}