| // Copyright 2003-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
| // | |
| // Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); | |
| // you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. | |
| // You may obtain a copy of the License at | |
| // | |
| // https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 | |
| // | |
| // Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software | |
| // distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, | |
| // WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. | |
| // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and | |
| // limitations under the License. | |
| #include <string_view> | |
| #include <stdio.h> | |
| #include <string.h> | |
| #include <utility> | |
| #include <openssl/asn1.h> | |
| #include <openssl/asn1t.h> | |
| #include <openssl/base.h> | |
| #include <openssl/bio.h> | |
| #include <openssl/bytestring.h> | |
| #include <openssl/conf.h> | |
| #include <openssl/err.h> | |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> | |
| #include <openssl/obj.h> | |
| #include <openssl/span.h> | |
| #include <openssl/stack.h> | |
| #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
| #include "../internal.h" | |
| #include "internal.h" | |
| BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN | |
| namespace { | |
| int starts_with(const CBS *cbs, uint8_t c) { | |
| return CBS_len(cbs) > 0 && CBS_data(cbs)[0] == c; | |
| } | |
| int starts_with_str(const CBS *cbs, std::string_view str) { | |
| return CBS_len(cbs) >= str.size() && | |
| !OPENSSL_memcmp(CBS_data(cbs), str.data(), str.size()); | |
| } | |
| int ends_with(const CBS *cbs, uint8_t c) { | |
| return CBS_len(cbs) > 0 && CBS_data(cbs)[CBS_len(cbs) - 1] == c; | |
| } | |
| int equal_case(const CBS *a, const CBS *b) { | |
| if (CBS_len(a) != CBS_len(b)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| // Note we cannot use `OPENSSL_strncasecmp` because that would stop | |
| // iterating at NUL. | |
| const uint8_t *a_data = CBS_data(a), *b_data = CBS_data(b); | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < CBS_len(a); i++) { | |
| if (OPENSSL_tolower(a_data[i]) != OPENSSL_tolower(b_data[i])) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int has_suffix_case(const CBS *a, const CBS *b) { | |
| if (CBS_len(a) < CBS_len(b)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| CBS copy = *a; | |
| CBS_skip(©, CBS_len(a) - CBS_len(b)); | |
| return equal_case(©, b); | |
| } | |
| bool is_allowed_rfc822_local_part(const CBS *cbs) { | |
| if (CBS_len(cbs) == 0) { | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < CBS_len(cbs); i++) { | |
| uint8_t c = CBS_data(cbs)[i]; | |
| if (!(OPENSSL_isalnum(c) || c == '!' || c == '#' || c == '$' || c == '%' || | |
| c == '&' || c == '\'' || c == '*' || c == '+' || c == '-' || | |
| c == '/' || c == '=' || c == '?' || c == '^' || c == '_' || | |
| c == '`' || c == '{' || c == '|' || c == '}' || c == '~' || | |
| c == '.')) { | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| bool is_allowed_rfc822_domain(const CBS *cbs) { | |
| if (CBS_len(cbs) == 0) { | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < CBS_len(cbs); i++) { | |
| uint8_t c = CBS_data(cbs)[i]; | |
| if (!(OPENSSL_isalnum(c) || c == '-' || c == '.')) { | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| // Removes the port part of a URI authority string, if present, leaving the | |
| // host. Returns true if the port was syntactically valid (contained only | |
| // digits), or was not present (vacuously valid). | |
| bool nc_uri_remove_port(CBS *in_out) { | |
| CBS host, unused; | |
| if (CBS_get_until_first(in_out, &host, ':')) { | |
| if (!CBS_skip(in_out, 1) || | |
| CBS_get_until_first_not_of(in_out, &unused, "0123456789")) { | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| *in_out = host; | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| // There was no port. | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| // Strips a single trailing dot from `host` if present. | |
| // Per RFC 9499, we allow names to be written relative to the root (e.g. | |
| // "www.example.com" is allowed even though technically the FQDN is | |
| // "www.example.com." with a trailing dot representing the common root), and | |
| // normalize names into this relative form for consistency. | |
| void nc_uri_remove_trailing_dot(CBS *host) { | |
| if (ends_with(host, '.')) { | |
| uint8_t unused_byte; | |
| BSSL_CHECK(CBS_get_last_u8(host, &unused_byte)); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| // Returns whether the authority portion of a URI contains a syntactically valid | |
| // fully qualified domain name (FQDN). | |
| // | |
| // RFC 3986, section 3.2: | |
| // authority = [ userinfo "@" ] host [ ":" port ] | |
| // | |
| // RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10: if a URI name constraint applies, applications | |
| // MUST reject a certificate with a subjectAltName with a URI that "does not | |
| // include an authority component with a host name specified as a fully | |
| // qualified domain name". | |
| // | |
| // Therefore we reject IP addresses in this function, and reject authority | |
| // components containing a userinfo component. The caller is responsible for | |
| // having removed any colon and port component, and normalizing to DNS relative | |
| // form by removing any trailing dot. | |
| bool nc_uri_is_fqdn(const CBS *uri_authority) { | |
| if (CBS_len(uri_authority) == 0) { | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| CBS host_to_parse = *uri_authority; | |
| // Reject userinfo, and IPv6 addresses delimited by square brackets. IPv4 | |
| // addresses are rejected later. | |
| CBS unused; | |
| if (CBS_get_until_first_of(&host_to_parse, &unused, "@[]")) { | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| // Validate that the host is identified by a registered name. Following RFC | |
| // 3986, section 3.2.2: we refer to the preferred name syntax rules for DNS | |
| // registered names found in RFC 1034, section 3.5, modified by RFC 1123: | |
| // | |
| // <domain> ::= <subdomain> | " " | |
| // <subdomain> ::= <label> | <subdomain> "." <label> | |
| // <label> ::= <let-dig> [ [ <ldh-str> ] <let-dig> ] | |
| // <ldh-str> ::= <let-dig-hyp> | <let-dig-hyp> <ldh-str> | |
| // <let-dig-hyp> ::= <let-dig> | "-" | |
| // <let-dig> ::= <letter> | <digit> | |
| // <letter> ::= any one of the 52 alphabetic characters A through Z in | |
| // upper case and a through z in lower case | |
| // <digit> ::= any one of the ten digits 0 through 9 | |
| // | |
| // Additionally: | |
| // - The first and last character of each label is a letter or digit. | |
| // - Label length is no more than 63 characters. | |
| CBS label; | |
| CBS_init(&label, nullptr, 0); | |
| while (CBS_len(&host_to_parse) > 0) { | |
| if (CBS_get_until_first(&host_to_parse, &label, '.')) { | |
| // Consume the dot. | |
| CBS_skip(&host_to_parse, 1); | |
| // A trailing dot should have already been removed by the caller. | |
| if (CBS_len(&host_to_parse) == 0) { | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| } else { | |
| // This is the last label. | |
| label = host_to_parse; | |
| CBS_skip(&host_to_parse, CBS_len(&label)); | |
| } | |
| if (CBS_len(&label) == 0 || CBS_len(&label) > 63 || | |
| !OPENSSL_isalnum(CBS_data(&label)[0]) || | |
| !OPENSSL_isalnum(CBS_data(&label)[CBS_len(&label) - 1])) { | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| for (uint8_t c : Span<const uint8_t>(label)) { | |
| if (!OPENSSL_isalnum(c) && c != '-') { | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| // Reject IP addresses by looking for (following the WHATWG URL parser) a | |
| // completely numeric (decimal, octal, or hex) last component. An empty final | |
| // component (e.g. if the host itself was empty) is also rejected here. | |
| // https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#concept-host-parser | |
| // https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#ends-in-a-number-checker | |
| // | |
| // Check for 0x or 0X followed by zero or more hex digits. | |
| if (starts_with_str(&label, "0x") || starts_with_str(&label, "0X")) { | |
| for (uint8_t c : Span<const uint8_t>(label).subspan(2)) { | |
| if (!OPENSSL_isxdigit(c)) { | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| // Check for decimal or octal digits. | |
| for (uint8_t c : Span<const uint8_t>(label)) { | |
| if (!OPENSSL_isdigit(c)) { | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| // Performs basic parsing of a URI to extract the host portion for name | |
| // constraints matching. This is not a full URI parser. This returns false if no | |
| // valid URI host could be obtained, which means the certificate should be | |
| // rejected. | |
| bool nc_get_valid_uri_host(CBS *out, const ASN1_IA5STRING *uri_name) { | |
| CBS uri_cbs; | |
| CBS_init(&uri_cbs, uri_name->data, uri_name->length); | |
| // RFC 3986, section 3: | |
| // URI = scheme ":" hier-part [ "?" query ] [ "#" fragment ] | |
| // Check for the scheme and skip past it. | |
| // RFC 3986, section 3.1: | |
| // scheme = ALPHA *( ALPHA / DIGIT / "+" / "-" / "." ) | |
| CBS scheme; | |
| uint8_t byte; | |
| if (!CBS_get_until_first(&uri_cbs, &scheme, ':') || | |
| // Consume the colon. | |
| !CBS_get_u8(&uri_cbs, &byte) || | |
| // Test that the first byte is a letter. | |
| !CBS_get_u8(&scheme, &byte) || !OPENSSL_isalpha(byte)) { | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| // Check that the rest of the scheme consists of allowed characters. | |
| for (uint8_t c : Span<const uint8_t>(scheme)) { | |
| if (!OPENSSL_isalnum(c) && c != '+' && c != '-' && c != '.') { | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| // RFC 3986, section 3.2: | |
| // The authority component is preceded by a double slash ("//") and is | |
| // terminated by the next slash ("/"), question mark ("?"), or number | |
| // sign ("#") character, or by the end of the URI. | |
| if (!CBS_get_u8(&uri_cbs, &byte) || byte != '/' || | |
| !CBS_get_u8(&uri_cbs, &byte) || byte != '/') { | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| CBS authority; | |
| if (!CBS_get_until_first_of(&uri_cbs, &authority, "/?#")) { | |
| authority = uri_cbs; | |
| } | |
| // RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10: reject URI with no authority component. | |
| if (CBS_len(&authority) == 0) { | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| if (!nc_uri_remove_port(&authority)) { | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| CBS host = authority; | |
| nc_uri_remove_trailing_dot(&host); | |
| if (!nc_uri_is_fqdn(&host)) { | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| *out = host; | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| // directoryName name constraint matching. The canonical encoding of X509_NAME | |
| // makes this comparison easy. It is matched if the constraint is a prefix of | |
| // the name. | |
| int nc_dn(const X509_NAME *nm, const X509_NAME *base) { | |
| const X509NameCache *nm_cache = x509_name_get_cache(nm); | |
| if (nm_cache == nullptr) { | |
| return X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; | |
| } | |
| const X509NameCache *base_cache = x509_name_get_cache(base); | |
| if (base_cache == nullptr) { | |
| return X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; | |
| } | |
| if (base_cache->canon.size() > nm_cache->canon.size()) { | |
| return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; | |
| } | |
| if (base_cache->canon != | |
| Span(nm_cache->canon).first(base_cache->canon.size())) { | |
| return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; | |
| } | |
| return X509_V_OK; | |
| } | |
| // DNS name constraint matching. | |
| int nc_dns(const ASN1_IA5STRING *dns, const ASN1_IA5STRING *base, | |
| bool excluding) { | |
| CBS dns_cbs, base_cbs; | |
| CBS_init(&dns_cbs, dns->data, dns->length); | |
| CBS_init(&base_cbs, base->data, base->length); | |
| // Empty matches everything | |
| if (CBS_len(&base_cbs) == 0) { | |
| return X509_V_OK; | |
| } | |
| // Normalize absolute DNS names by removing the trailing dot, if any. | |
| if (ends_with(&dns_cbs, '.')) { | |
| uint8_t unused; | |
| CBS_get_last_u8(&dns_cbs, &unused); | |
| } | |
| if (ends_with(&base_cbs, '.')) { | |
| uint8_t unused; | |
| CBS_get_last_u8(&base_cbs, &unused); | |
| } | |
| // Wildcard partial-match handling ("*.bar.com" matching name constraint | |
| // "foo.bar.com"). This only handles the case where the dnsname and the | |
| // constraint match after removing the leftmost label, otherwise it is handled | |
| // by falling through to the check of whether the dnsname is fully within or | |
| // fully outside of the constraint. | |
| if (excluding && starts_with_str(&dns_cbs, "*.")) { | |
| CBS unused; | |
| CBS base_parent_cbs = base_cbs; | |
| CBS dns_parent_cbs = dns_cbs; | |
| CBS_skip(&dns_parent_cbs, 2); | |
| if (CBS_get_until_first(&base_parent_cbs, &unused, '.') && | |
| CBS_skip(&base_parent_cbs, 1)) { | |
| if (equal_case(&dns_parent_cbs, &base_parent_cbs)) { | |
| return X509_V_OK; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| // If `base_cbs` begins with a '.', do a simple suffix comparison. This is | |
| // not part of RFC5280, but is part of OpenSSL's original behavior. | |
| if (starts_with(&base_cbs, '.')) { | |
| if (has_suffix_case(&dns_cbs, &base_cbs)) { | |
| return X509_V_OK; | |
| } | |
| return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; | |
| } | |
| // Otherwise can add zero or more components on the left so compare RHS | |
| // and if dns is longer and expect '.' as preceding character. | |
| if (CBS_len(&dns_cbs) > CBS_len(&base_cbs)) { | |
| uint8_t dot; | |
| if (!CBS_skip(&dns_cbs, CBS_len(&dns_cbs) - CBS_len(&base_cbs) - 1) || | |
| !CBS_get_u8(&dns_cbs, &dot) || dot != '.') { | |
| return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (!equal_case(&dns_cbs, &base_cbs)) { | |
| return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; | |
| } | |
| return X509_V_OK; | |
| } | |
| int nc_email(const ASN1_IA5STRING *eml, const ASN1_IA5STRING *base, | |
| bool case_insensitive_local_part) { | |
| CBS eml_cbs, base_cbs; | |
| CBS_init(&eml_cbs, eml->data, eml->length); | |
| CBS_init(&base_cbs, base->data, base->length); | |
| CBS eml_local; | |
| if (!CBS_get_until_first(&eml_cbs, &eml_local, '@') || | |
| !CBS_skip(&eml_cbs, 1)) { | |
| return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX; | |
| } | |
| CBS eml_domain = eml_cbs; | |
| // Exactly one '@' in eml. | |
| CBS unused; | |
| if (CBS_get_until_first(&eml_cbs, &unused, '@')) { | |
| return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX; | |
| } | |
| if (!is_allowed_rfc822_local_part(&eml_local) || | |
| !is_allowed_rfc822_domain(&eml_domain)) { | |
| return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX; | |
| } | |
| CBS base_local, base_domain; | |
| bool base_has_at = CBS_get_until_first(&base_cbs, &base_local, '@'); | |
| if (base_has_at) { | |
| CBS_skip(&base_cbs, 1); | |
| base_domain = base_cbs; | |
| if (CBS_get_until_first(&base_cbs, &unused, '@')) { | |
| // If we did the full parsing then it is possible for a @ to be in a | |
| // quoted local-part of the name, but we don't do that, so just error if @ | |
| // appears more than once. | |
| return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX; | |
| } | |
| if (!is_allowed_rfc822_local_part(&base_local)) { | |
| return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX; | |
| } | |
| } else { | |
| base_domain = base_cbs; | |
| } | |
| if (!is_allowed_rfc822_domain(&base_domain)) { | |
| return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX; | |
| } | |
| // RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.10: | |
| // To indicate a particular mailbox, the constraint is the complete mail | |
| // address. For example, "root@example.com" indicates the root mailbox on | |
| // the host "example.com". | |
| if (base_has_at) { | |
| bool local_part_matches = | |
| case_insensitive_local_part | |
| ? equal_case(&base_local, &eml_local) | |
| : CBS_mem_equal(&base_local, CBS_data(&eml_local), | |
| CBS_len(&eml_local)); | |
| bool domain_matches = equal_case(&base_domain, &eml_domain); | |
| if (!local_part_matches || !domain_matches) { | |
| return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; | |
| } | |
| return X509_V_OK; | |
| } | |
| // RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.10: | |
| // To specify any address within a domain, the constraint is specified with a | |
| // leading period (as with URIs). For example, ".example.com" indicates all | |
| // the Internet mail addresses in the domain "example.com", but not Internet | |
| // mail addresses on the host "example.com". | |
| if (starts_with(&base_domain, '.')) { | |
| if (has_suffix_case(&eml_domain, &base_domain)) { | |
| return X509_V_OK; | |
| } | |
| return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; | |
| } | |
| // RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.10: | |
| // To indicate all Internet mail addresses on a particular host, the | |
| // constraint is specified as the host name. For example, the constraint | |
| // "example.com" is satisfied by any mail address at the host "example.com". | |
| if (equal_case(&base_domain, &eml_domain)) { | |
| return X509_V_OK; | |
| } | |
| return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; | |
| } | |
| int nc_uri(const ASN1_IA5STRING *uri, const ASN1_IA5STRING *base) { | |
| // Parse a URI name to extract the host name as a fully qualified domain name. | |
| CBS uri_host; | |
| if (!nc_get_valid_uri_host(&uri_host, uri)) { | |
| return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX; | |
| } | |
| CBS base_cbs; | |
| CBS_init(&base_cbs, base->data, base->length); | |
| nc_uri_remove_trailing_dot(&base_cbs); | |
| // Make a copy of the name constraint string, which will be modified and | |
| // checked for FQDN validity. | |
| CBS base_fqdn = base_cbs; | |
| // If present, strip a leading dot, which denotes a name constraint that | |
| // matches all DNS subdomains. | |
| const bool base_has_leading_dot = starts_with(&base_fqdn, '.'); | |
| if (base_has_leading_dot) { | |
| CBS_skip(&base_fqdn, 1); | |
| } | |
| // Validate that the name constraint is a proper FQDN. | |
| if (!nc_uri_is_fqdn(&base_fqdn)) { | |
| return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_SYNTAX; | |
| } | |
| // Special case: initial '.' is RHS match | |
| if (base_has_leading_dot) { | |
| if (has_suffix_case(&uri_host, &base_cbs)) { | |
| return X509_V_OK; | |
| } | |
| return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; | |
| } | |
| if (!equal_case(&base_cbs, &uri_host)) { | |
| return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; | |
| } | |
| return X509_V_OK; | |
| } | |
| int nc_match_single(const GENERAL_NAME *gen, const GENERAL_NAME *base, | |
| bool excluding, bool case_insensitive_local_part) { | |
| switch (base->type) { | |
| case GEN_DIRNAME: | |
| return nc_dn(gen->d.directoryName, base->d.directoryName); | |
| case GEN_DNS: | |
| return nc_dns(gen->d.dNSName, base->d.dNSName, excluding); | |
| case GEN_EMAIL: | |
| return nc_email(gen->d.rfc822Name, base->d.rfc822Name, | |
| case_insensitive_local_part); | |
| case GEN_URI: | |
| return nc_uri(gen->d.uniformResourceIdentifier, | |
| base->d.uniformResourceIdentifier); | |
| default: | |
| return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_TYPE; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| int nc_match(const GENERAL_NAME *gen, const NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc, | |
| bool case_insensitive_exclude_localpart) { | |
| // Permitted subtrees: if any subtrees exist of the name type, then at least | |
| // one subtree must match. If no subtrees match the type, then that name type | |
| // is unconstrained. | |
| enum { | |
| kUnconstrainedNameType = 0, | |
| kNoMatch, | |
| kMatch, | |
| } match_status = kUnconstrainedNameType; | |
| for (const GENERAL_SUBTREE *sub : nc->permittedSubtrees) { | |
| if (gen->type != sub->base->type) { | |
| continue; | |
| } | |
| if (sub->minimum || sub->maximum) { | |
| return X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX; | |
| } | |
| // If we already have a match don't bother trying any more | |
| if (match_status == kMatch) { | |
| continue; | |
| } | |
| match_status = kNoMatch; | |
| int r = nc_match_single(gen, sub->base, /*excluding=*/false, | |
| /*case_insensitive_local_part=*/false); | |
| if (r == X509_V_OK) { | |
| match_status = kMatch; | |
| } else if (r != X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION) { | |
| return r; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (match_status == kNoMatch) { | |
| return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; | |
| } | |
| // Excluded subtrees: must not match any of these | |
| for (const GENERAL_SUBTREE *sub : nc->excludedSubtrees) { | |
| if (gen->type != sub->base->type) { | |
| continue; | |
| } | |
| if (sub->minimum || sub->maximum) { | |
| return X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX; | |
| } | |
| int r = nc_match_single(gen, sub->base, /*excluding=*/true, | |
| /*case_insensitive_local_part=*/ | |
| case_insensitive_exclude_localpart); | |
| if (r == X509_V_OK) { | |
| return X509_V_ERR_EXCLUDED_VIOLATION; | |
| } else if (r != X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION) { | |
| return r; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return X509_V_OK; | |
| } | |
| int print_nc_ipadd(BIO *bp, const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ip) { | |
| int i, len; | |
| unsigned char *p; | |
| p = ip->data; | |
| len = ip->length; | |
| BIO_puts(bp, "IP:"); | |
| if (len == 8) { | |
| BIO_printf(bp, "%d.%d.%d.%d/%d.%d.%d.%d", p[0], p[1], p[2], p[3], p[4], | |
| p[5], p[6], p[7]); | |
| } else if (len == 32) { | |
| for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { | |
| uint16_t v = ((uint16_t)p[0] << 8) | p[1]; | |
| BIO_printf(bp, "%X", v); | |
| p += 2; | |
| if (i == 7) { | |
| BIO_puts(bp, "/"); | |
| } else if (i != 15) { | |
| BIO_puts(bp, ":"); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } else { | |
| BIO_printf(bp, "IP Address:<invalid>"); | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int do_i2r_name_constraints(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, | |
| const STACK_OF(GENERAL_SUBTREE) *trees, BIO *bp, | |
| int ind, const char *name) { | |
| if (sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(trees) > 0) { | |
| BIO_printf(bp, "%*s%s:\n", ind, "", name); | |
| } | |
| for (const GENERAL_SUBTREE *tree : trees) { | |
| BIO_printf(bp, "%*s", ind + 2, ""); | |
| if (tree->base->type == GEN_IPADD) { | |
| print_nc_ipadd(bp, tree->base->d.ip); | |
| } else { | |
| GENERAL_NAME_print(bp, tree->base); | |
| } | |
| BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int i2r_NAME_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *a, BIO *bp, | |
| int ind) { | |
| NAME_CONSTRAINTS *ncons = reinterpret_cast<NAME_CONSTRAINTS *>(a); | |
| do_i2r_name_constraints(method, ncons->permittedSubtrees, bp, ind, | |
| "Permitted"); | |
| do_i2r_name_constraints(method, ncons->excludedSubtrees, bp, ind, "Excluded"); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| void *v2i_NAME_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, | |
| const X509V3_CTX *ctx, | |
| const STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval) { | |
| UniquePtr<NAME_CONSTRAINTS> ncons(NAME_CONSTRAINTS_new()); | |
| if (!ncons) { | |
| return nullptr; | |
| } | |
| for (const CONF_VALUE *val : nval) { | |
| CONF_VALUE tval; | |
| STACK_OF(GENERAL_SUBTREE) **ptree = nullptr; | |
| if (!strncmp(val->name, "permitted", 9) && val->name[9]) { | |
| ptree = &ncons->permittedSubtrees; | |
| tval.name = val->name + 10; | |
| } else if (!strncmp(val->name, "excluded", 8) && val->name[8]) { | |
| ptree = &ncons->excludedSubtrees; | |
| tval.name = val->name + 9; | |
| } else { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, X509V3_R_INVALID_SYNTAX); | |
| return nullptr; | |
| } | |
| tval.value = val->value; | |
| UniquePtr<GENERAL_SUBTREE> sub(GENERAL_SUBTREE_new()); | |
| if (sub == nullptr || | |
| !v2i_GENERAL_NAME_ex(sub->base, method, ctx, &tval, 1)) { | |
| return nullptr; | |
| } | |
| if (!*ptree) { | |
| *ptree = sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_new_null(); | |
| } | |
| if (!*ptree || !PushToStack(*ptree, std::move(sub))) { | |
| return nullptr; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return ncons.release(); | |
| } | |
| } // namespace | |
| BSSL_NAMESPACE_END | |
| using namespace bssl; | |
| const X509V3_EXT_METHOD bssl::v3_name_constraints = { | |
| NID_name_constraints, | |
| 0, | |
| ASN1_ITEM_ref(NAME_CONSTRAINTS), | |
| nullptr, | |
| nullptr, | |
| nullptr, | |
| nullptr, | |
| nullptr, | |
| nullptr, | |
| nullptr, | |
| v2i_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, | |
| i2r_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, | |
| nullptr, | |
| nullptr, | |
| }; | |
| ASN1_SEQUENCE(GENERAL_SUBTREE) = { | |
| ASN1_SIMPLE(GENERAL_SUBTREE, base, GENERAL_NAME), | |
| ASN1_IMP_OPT(GENERAL_SUBTREE, minimum, ASN1_INTEGER, 0), | |
| ASN1_IMP_OPT(GENERAL_SUBTREE, maximum, ASN1_INTEGER, 1), | |
| } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(GENERAL_SUBTREE) | |
| ASN1_SEQUENCE(NAME_CONSTRAINTS) = { | |
| ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(NAME_CONSTRAINTS, permittedSubtrees, | |
| GENERAL_SUBTREE, 0), | |
| ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(NAME_CONSTRAINTS, excludedSubtrees, | |
| GENERAL_SUBTREE, 1), | |
| } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(NAME_CONSTRAINTS) | |
| IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(GENERAL_SUBTREE) | |
| IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(NAME_CONSTRAINTS) | |
| //- | |
| // Check a certificate conforms to a specified set of constraints. | |
| // Return values: | |
| // X509_V_OK: All constraints obeyed. | |
| // X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION: Permitted subtree violation. | |
| // X509_V_ERR_EXCLUDED_VIOLATION: Excluded subtree violation. | |
| // X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX: Min or max values present and matching type. | |
| // X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED: Unspecified error. | |
| // X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_TYPE: Unsupported constraint type. | |
| // X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_SYNTAX: Bad or unsupported constraint | |
| // syntax. | |
| // X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX: Bad or unsupported syntax of name. | |
| int NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(const X509 *x, const NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc) { | |
| const X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_subject_name(x); | |
| // Guard against certificates with an excessive number of names or | |
| // constraints causing a computationally expensive name constraints | |
| // check. | |
| const auto *x_impl = FromOpaque(x); | |
| size_t name_count = | |
| X509_NAME_entry_count(nm) + sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(x_impl->altname.get()); | |
| size_t constraint_count = sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(nc->permittedSubtrees) + | |
| sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(nc->excludedSubtrees); | |
| size_t check_count = constraint_count * name_count; | |
| if (name_count < (size_t)X509_NAME_entry_count(nm) || | |
| constraint_count < sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(nc->permittedSubtrees) || | |
| (constraint_count && check_count / constraint_count != name_count) || | |
| check_count > 1 << 20) { | |
| return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; | |
| } | |
| if (X509_NAME_entry_count(nm) > 0) { | |
| GENERAL_NAME gntmp; | |
| gntmp.type = GEN_DIRNAME; | |
| gntmp.d.directoryName = const_cast<X509_NAME *>(nm); | |
| int r = nc_match(&gntmp, nc, /*case_insensitive_exclude_localpart=*/false); | |
| if (r != X509_V_OK) { | |
| return r; | |
| } | |
| gntmp.type = GEN_EMAIL; | |
| // Process any email address attributes in subject name | |
| for (int i = -1;;) { | |
| i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(nm, NID_pkcs9_emailAddress, i); | |
| if (i == -1) { | |
| break; | |
| } | |
| const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne = X509_NAME_get_entry(nm, i); | |
| gntmp.d.rfc822Name = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(ne); | |
| if (gntmp.d.rfc822Name->type != V_ASN1_IA5STRING) { | |
| return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX; | |
| } | |
| // Whether local_part should be matched case-sensitive or not is somewhat | |
| // unclear. RFC 2821 says that it should be case-sensitive. RFC 2985 says | |
| // that emailAddress attributes in a Name are fully case-insensitive. | |
| // Some other verifier implementations always do local-part comparison | |
| // case-sensitive, while some always do it case-insensitive. Many but not | |
| // all SMTP servers interpret addresses as case-insensitive. | |
| // | |
| // Give how poorly specified this is, and the conflicting implementations | |
| // in the wild, this implementation will do case-insensitive match for | |
| // excluded names from the subject to avoid potentially allowing | |
| // something that wasn't expected. | |
| r = nc_match(&gntmp, nc, /*case_insensitive_exclude_localpart=*/true); | |
| if (r != X509_V_OK) { | |
| return r; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| for (const GENERAL_NAME *gen : x_impl->altname.get()) { | |
| int r = nc_match(gen, nc, /*case_insensitive_exclude_localpart=*/false); | |
| if (r != X509_V_OK) { | |
| return r; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return X509_V_OK; | |
| } |