| // Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
| // | |
| // Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); | |
| // you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. | |
| // You may obtain a copy of the License at | |
| // | |
| // https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 | |
| // | |
| // Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software | |
| // distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, | |
| // WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. | |
| // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and | |
| // limitations under the License. | |
| #include <openssl/pkcs8.h> | |
| #include <limits.h> | |
| #include <openssl/asn1.h> | |
| #include <openssl/asn1t.h> | |
| #include <openssl/bio.h> | |
| #include <openssl/buf.h> | |
| #include <openssl/bytestring.h> | |
| #include <openssl/cipher.h> | |
| #include <openssl/digest.h> | |
| #include <openssl/err.h> | |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
| #include <openssl/hmac.h> | |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> | |
| #include <openssl/nid.h> | |
| #include <openssl/rand.h> | |
| #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
| #include "../bytestring/internal.h" | |
| #include "../internal.h" | |
| #include "../mem_internal.h" | |
| #include "../x509/internal.h" | |
| #include "internal.h" | |
| using namespace bssl; | |
| int bssl::pkcs12_iterations_acceptable(uint64_t iterations) { | |
| #if defined(FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION) | |
| static const uint64_t kIterationsLimit = 2048; | |
| #else | |
| // Windows imposes a limit of 600K. Mozilla say: “so them increasing | |
| // maximum to something like 100M or 1G (to have few decades of breathing | |
| // room) would be very welcome”[1]. So here we set the limit to 100M. | |
| // | |
| // [1] https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1436873#c14 | |
| static const uint64_t kIterationsLimit = 100 * 1000000; | |
| #endif | |
| assert(kIterationsLimit <= UINT32_MAX); | |
| return 0 < iterations && iterations <= kIterationsLimit; | |
| } | |
| ASN1_SEQUENCE(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO) = { | |
| ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, version, ASN1_INTEGER), | |
| ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, pkeyalg, X509_ALGOR), | |
| ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, pkey, ASN1_OCTET_STRING), | |
| ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, attributes, bssl::X509_ATTRIBUTE, | |
| 0), | |
| } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO) | |
| IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO) | |
| EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKCS82PKEY(const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8) { | |
| uint8_t *der = nullptr; | |
| int der_len = i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(p8, &der); | |
| if (der_len < 0) { | |
| return nullptr; | |
| } | |
| CBS cbs; | |
| CBS_init(&cbs, der, (size_t)der_len); | |
| EVP_PKEY *ret = EVP_parse_private_key(&cbs); | |
| if (ret == nullptr || CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(ret); | |
| OPENSSL_free(der); | |
| return nullptr; | |
| } | |
| OPENSSL_free(der); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *EVP_PKEY2PKCS8(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { | |
| CBB cbb; | |
| uint8_t *der = nullptr; | |
| size_t der_len; | |
| if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0) || !EVP_marshal_private_key(&cbb, pkey) || | |
| !CBB_finish(&cbb, &der, &der_len) || der_len > LONG_MAX) { | |
| CBB_cleanup(&cbb); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_ENCODE_ERROR); | |
| OPENSSL_free(der); | |
| return nullptr; | |
| } | |
| const uint8_t *p = der; | |
| PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(nullptr, &p, (long)der_len); | |
| if (p8 == nullptr || p != der + der_len) { | |
| PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| OPENSSL_free(der); | |
| return p8; | |
| err: | |
| OPENSSL_free(der); | |
| return nullptr; | |
| } | |
| PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *PKCS8_decrypt(X509_SIG *pkcs8, const char *pass, | |
| int pass_len_in) { | |
| size_t pass_len; | |
| if (pass_len_in == -1 && pass != nullptr) { | |
| pass_len = strlen(pass); | |
| } else { | |
| pass_len = (size_t)pass_len_in; | |
| } | |
| PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *ret = nullptr; | |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey = nullptr; | |
| uint8_t *in = nullptr; | |
| // Convert the legacy ASN.1 object to a byte string. | |
| int in_len = i2d_X509_SIG(pkcs8, &in); | |
| if (in_len < 0) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| CBS cbs; | |
| CBS_init(&cbs, in, in_len); | |
| pkey = PKCS8_parse_encrypted_private_key(&cbs, pass, pass_len); | |
| if (pkey == nullptr || CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| ret = EVP_PKEY2PKCS8(pkey); | |
| err: | |
| OPENSSL_free(in); | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| X509_SIG *PKCS8_encrypt(int pbe_nid, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const char *pass, | |
| int pass_len_in, const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_len, | |
| int iterations, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf) { | |
| size_t pass_len; | |
| if (pass_len_in == -1 && pass != nullptr) { | |
| pass_len = strlen(pass); | |
| } else { | |
| pass_len = (size_t)pass_len_in; | |
| } | |
| // Parse out the private key. | |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8inf); | |
| if (pkey == nullptr) { | |
| return nullptr; | |
| } | |
| X509_SIG *ret = nullptr; | |
| uint8_t *der = nullptr; | |
| const uint8_t *ptr; | |
| size_t der_len; | |
| CBB cbb; | |
| if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 128) || | |
| !PKCS8_marshal_encrypted_private_key(&cbb, pbe_nid, cipher, pass, | |
| pass_len, salt, salt_len, iterations, | |
| pkey) || | |
| !CBB_finish(&cbb, &der, &der_len)) { | |
| CBB_cleanup(&cbb); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| // Convert back to legacy ASN.1 objects. | |
| ptr = der; | |
| ret = d2i_X509_SIG(nullptr, &ptr, der_len); | |
| if (ret == nullptr || ptr != der + der_len) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| X509_SIG_free(ret); | |
| ret = nullptr; | |
| } | |
| err: | |
| OPENSSL_free(der); | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| struct pkcs12_context { | |
| EVP_PKEY **out_key; | |
| STACK_OF(X509) *out_certs; | |
| const char *password; | |
| size_t password_len; | |
| }; | |
| // PKCS12_handle_sequence parses a BER-encoded SEQUENCE of elements in a PKCS#12 | |
| // structure. | |
| static int PKCS12_handle_sequence( | |
| CBS *sequence, struct pkcs12_context *ctx, | |
| int (*handle_element)(CBS *cbs, struct pkcs12_context *ctx)) { | |
| uint8_t *storage = nullptr; | |
| CBS in; | |
| int ret = 0; | |
| // Although a BER->DER conversion is done at the beginning of `PKCS12_parse`, | |
| // the ASN.1 data gets wrapped in OCTETSTRINGs and/or encrypted and the | |
| // conversion cannot see through those wrappings. So each time we step | |
| // through one we need to convert to DER again. | |
| if (!CBS_asn1_ber_to_der(sequence, &in, &storage)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| CBS child; | |
| if (!CBS_get_asn1(&in, &child, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || CBS_len(&in) != 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| while (CBS_len(&child) > 0) { | |
| CBS element; | |
| if (!CBS_get_asn1(&child, &element, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (!handle_element(&element, ctx)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| ret = 1; | |
| err: | |
| OPENSSL_free(storage); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| // 1.2.840.113549.1.12.10.1.1 | |
| static const uint8_t kKeyBag[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, | |
| 0x01, 0x0c, 0x0a, 0x01, 0x01}; | |
| // 1.2.840.113549.1.12.10.1.2 | |
| static const uint8_t kPKCS8ShroudedKeyBag[] = { | |
| 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x0c, 0x0a, 0x01, 0x02}; | |
| // 1.2.840.113549.1.12.10.1.3 | |
| static const uint8_t kCertBag[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, | |
| 0x01, 0x0c, 0x0a, 0x01, 0x03}; | |
| // 1.2.840.113549.1.9.20 | |
| static const uint8_t kFriendlyName[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, | |
| 0x0d, 0x01, 0x09, 0x14}; | |
| // 1.2.840.113549.1.9.21 | |
| static const uint8_t kLocalKeyID[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, | |
| 0x0d, 0x01, 0x09, 0x15}; | |
| // 1.2.840.113549.1.9.22.1 | |
| static const uint8_t kX509Certificate[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, | |
| 0x0d, 0x01, 0x09, 0x16, 0x01}; | |
| // parse_bag_attributes parses the bagAttributes field of a SafeBag structure. | |
| // It sets `*out_friendly_name` to a newly-allocated copy of the friendly name, | |
| // encoded as a UTF-8 string, or NULL if there is none. It returns one on | |
| // success and zero on error. | |
| static int parse_bag_attributes(CBS *attrs, uint8_t **out_friendly_name, | |
| size_t *out_friendly_name_len) { | |
| *out_friendly_name = nullptr; | |
| *out_friendly_name_len = 0; | |
| // See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7292#section-4.2. | |
| while (CBS_len(attrs) != 0) { | |
| CBS attr, oid, values; | |
| if (!CBS_get_asn1(attrs, &attr, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || | |
| !CBS_get_asn1(&attr, &oid, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) || | |
| !CBS_get_asn1(&attr, &values, CBS_ASN1_SET) || CBS_len(&attr) != 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (CBS_mem_equal(&oid, kFriendlyName, sizeof(kFriendlyName))) { | |
| // See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2985, section 5.5.1. | |
| CBS value; | |
| if (*out_friendly_name != nullptr || | |
| !CBS_get_asn1(&values, &value, CBS_ASN1_BMPSTRING) || | |
| CBS_len(&values) != 0 || CBS_len(&value) == 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| // Convert the friendly name to UTF-8. | |
| CBB cbb; | |
| if (!CBB_init(&cbb, CBS_len(&value))) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| while (CBS_len(&value) != 0) { | |
| uint32_t c; | |
| if (!CBS_get_ucs2_be(&value, &c) || !CBB_add_utf8(&cbb, c)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_INVALID_CHARACTERS); | |
| CBB_cleanup(&cbb); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (!CBB_finish(&cbb, out_friendly_name, out_friendly_name_len)) { | |
| CBB_cleanup(&cbb); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| err: | |
| OPENSSL_free(*out_friendly_name); | |
| *out_friendly_name = nullptr; | |
| *out_friendly_name_len = 0; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| // PKCS12_handle_safe_bag parses a single SafeBag element in a PKCS#12 | |
| // structure. | |
| static int PKCS12_handle_safe_bag(CBS *safe_bag, struct pkcs12_context *ctx) { | |
| CBS bag_id, wrapped_value, bag_attrs; | |
| if (!CBS_get_asn1(safe_bag, &bag_id, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) || | |
| !CBS_get_asn1(safe_bag, &wrapped_value, | |
| CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (CBS_len(safe_bag) == 0) { | |
| CBS_init(&bag_attrs, nullptr, 0); | |
| } else if (!CBS_get_asn1(safe_bag, &bag_attrs, CBS_ASN1_SET) || | |
| CBS_len(safe_bag) != 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| const int is_key_bag = CBS_mem_equal(&bag_id, kKeyBag, sizeof(kKeyBag)); | |
| const int is_shrouded_key_bag = CBS_mem_equal(&bag_id, kPKCS8ShroudedKeyBag, | |
| sizeof(kPKCS8ShroudedKeyBag)); | |
| if (is_key_bag || is_shrouded_key_bag) { | |
| // See RFC 7292, section 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. | |
| if (*ctx->out_key) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_MULTIPLE_PRIVATE_KEYS_IN_PKCS12); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey = | |
| is_key_bag ? EVP_parse_private_key(&wrapped_value) | |
| : PKCS8_parse_encrypted_private_key( | |
| &wrapped_value, ctx->password, ctx->password_len); | |
| if (pkey == nullptr) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (CBS_len(&wrapped_value) != 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA); | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| *ctx->out_key = pkey; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| if (CBS_mem_equal(&bag_id, kCertBag, sizeof(kCertBag))) { | |
| // See RFC 7292, section 4.2.3. | |
| CBS cert_bag, cert_type, wrapped_cert, cert; | |
| if (!CBS_get_asn1(&wrapped_value, &cert_bag, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || | |
| !CBS_get_asn1(&cert_bag, &cert_type, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) || | |
| !CBS_get_asn1(&cert_bag, &wrapped_cert, | |
| CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0) || | |
| !CBS_get_asn1(&wrapped_cert, &cert, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| // Skip unknown certificate types. | |
| if (!CBS_mem_equal(&cert_type, kX509Certificate, | |
| sizeof(kX509Certificate))) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| if (CBS_len(&cert) > LONG_MAX) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| const uint8_t *inp = CBS_data(&cert); | |
| X509 *x509 = d2i_X509(nullptr, &inp, (long)CBS_len(&cert)); | |
| if (!x509) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (inp != CBS_data(&cert) + CBS_len(&cert)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA); | |
| X509_free(x509); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| uint8_t *friendly_name; | |
| size_t friendly_name_len; | |
| if (!parse_bag_attributes(&bag_attrs, &friendly_name, &friendly_name_len)) { | |
| X509_free(x509); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int ok = friendly_name_len == 0 || | |
| X509_alias_set1(x509, friendly_name, friendly_name_len); | |
| OPENSSL_free(friendly_name); | |
| if (!ok || 0 == sk_X509_push(ctx->out_certs, x509)) { | |
| X509_free(x509); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| // Unknown element type - ignore it. | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| // 1.2.840.113549.1.7.1 | |
| static const uint8_t kPKCS7Data[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, | |
| 0x0d, 0x01, 0x07, 0x01}; | |
| // 1.2.840.113549.1.7.6 | |
| static const uint8_t kPKCS7EncryptedData[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, | |
| 0x0d, 0x01, 0x07, 0x06}; | |
| // PKCS12_handle_content_info parses a single PKCS#7 ContentInfo element in a | |
| // PKCS#12 structure. | |
| static int PKCS12_handle_content_info(CBS *content_info, | |
| struct pkcs12_context *ctx) { | |
| CBS content_type, wrapped_contents, contents; | |
| int ret = 0; | |
| uint8_t *storage = nullptr; | |
| if (!CBS_get_asn1(content_info, &content_type, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) || | |
| !CBS_get_asn1(content_info, &wrapped_contents, | |
| CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0) || | |
| CBS_len(content_info) != 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (CBS_mem_equal(&content_type, kPKCS7EncryptedData, | |
| sizeof(kPKCS7EncryptedData))) { | |
| // See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315#section-13. | |
| // | |
| // PKCS#7 encrypted data inside a PKCS#12 structure is generally an | |
| // encrypted certificate bag and it's generally encrypted with 40-bit | |
| // RC2-CBC. | |
| CBS version_bytes, eci, contents_type, ai, encrypted_contents; | |
| uint8_t *out; | |
| size_t out_len; | |
| if (!CBS_get_asn1(&wrapped_contents, &contents, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || | |
| !CBS_get_asn1(&contents, &version_bytes, CBS_ASN1_INTEGER) || | |
| // EncryptedContentInfo, see | |
| // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315#section-10.1 | |
| !CBS_get_asn1(&contents, &eci, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || | |
| !CBS_get_asn1(&eci, &contents_type, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) || | |
| // AlgorithmIdentifier, see | |
| // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.1.1.2 | |
| !CBS_get_asn1(&eci, &ai, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || | |
| !CBS_get_asn1_implicit_string(&eci, &encrypted_contents, &storage, | |
| CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0, | |
| CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (!CBS_mem_equal(&contents_type, kPKCS7Data, sizeof(kPKCS7Data))) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (!pkcs8_pbe_decrypt(&out, &out_len, &ai, ctx->password, | |
| ctx->password_len, CBS_data(&encrypted_contents), | |
| CBS_len(&encrypted_contents))) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| CBS safe_contents; | |
| CBS_init(&safe_contents, out, out_len); | |
| ret = PKCS12_handle_sequence(&safe_contents, ctx, PKCS12_handle_safe_bag); | |
| OPENSSL_free(out); | |
| } else if (CBS_mem_equal(&content_type, kPKCS7Data, sizeof(kPKCS7Data))) { | |
| CBS octet_string_contents; | |
| if (!CBS_get_asn1(&wrapped_contents, &octet_string_contents, | |
| CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| ret = PKCS12_handle_sequence(&octet_string_contents, ctx, | |
| PKCS12_handle_safe_bag); | |
| } else { | |
| // Unknown element type - ignore it. | |
| ret = 1; | |
| } | |
| err: | |
| OPENSSL_free(storage); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| static int pkcs12_check_mac(int *out_mac_ok, const char *password, | |
| size_t password_len, const CBS *salt, | |
| uint32_t iterations, const EVP_MD *md, | |
| const CBS *authsafes, const CBS *expected_mac) { | |
| int ret = 0; | |
| uint8_t hmac_key[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
| if (!pkcs12_key_gen(password, password_len, CBS_data(salt), CBS_len(salt), | |
| PKCS12_MAC_ID, iterations, EVP_MD_size(md), hmac_key, | |
| md)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| uint8_t hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
| unsigned hmac_len; | |
| if (nullptr == HMAC(md, hmac_key, EVP_MD_size(md), CBS_data(authsafes), | |
| CBS_len(authsafes), hmac, &hmac_len)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| *out_mac_ok = CBS_mem_equal(expected_mac, hmac, hmac_len); | |
| if (CRYPTO_fuzzer_mode_enabled()) { | |
| *out_mac_ok = 1; | |
| } | |
| ret = 1; | |
| err: | |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(hmac_key, sizeof(hmac_key)); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int PKCS12_get_key_and_certs(EVP_PKEY **out_key, STACK_OF(X509) *out_certs, | |
| CBS *ber_in, const char *password) { | |
| uint8_t *storage = nullptr; | |
| CBS in, pfx, mac_data, authsafe, content_type, wrapped_authsafes, authsafes; | |
| uint64_t version; | |
| int ret = 0; | |
| struct pkcs12_context ctx; | |
| const size_t original_out_certs_len = sk_X509_num(out_certs); | |
| // The input may be in BER format. | |
| if (!CBS_asn1_ber_to_der(ber_in, &in, &storage)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| *out_key = nullptr; | |
| OPENSSL_memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); | |
| // See ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-12/pkcs-12v1.pdf, section | |
| // four. | |
| if (!CBS_get_asn1(&in, &pfx, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || CBS_len(&in) != 0 || | |
| !CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&pfx, &version)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (version < 3) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_VERSION); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (!CBS_get_asn1(&pfx, &authsafe, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (CBS_len(&pfx) == 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_MISSING_MAC); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (!CBS_get_asn1(&pfx, &mac_data, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| // authsafe is a PKCS#7 ContentInfo. See | |
| // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315#section-7. | |
| if (!CBS_get_asn1(&authsafe, &content_type, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) || | |
| !CBS_get_asn1(&authsafe, &wrapped_authsafes, | |
| CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| // The content type can either be data or signedData. The latter indicates | |
| // that it's signed by a public key, which isn't supported. | |
| if (!CBS_mem_equal(&content_type, kPKCS7Data, sizeof(kPKCS7Data))) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_PKCS12_PUBLIC_KEY_INTEGRITY_NOT_SUPPORTED); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (!CBS_get_asn1(&wrapped_authsafes, &authsafes, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| ctx.out_key = out_key; | |
| ctx.out_certs = out_certs; | |
| ctx.password = password; | |
| ctx.password_len = password != nullptr ? strlen(password) : 0; | |
| // Verify the MAC. | |
| { | |
| CBS mac, salt, expected_mac; | |
| if (!CBS_get_asn1(&mac_data, &mac, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| const EVP_MD *md = EVP_parse_digest_algorithm(&mac); | |
| if (md == nullptr) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (!CBS_get_asn1(&mac, &expected_mac, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) || | |
| !CBS_get_asn1(&mac_data, &salt, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| // The iteration count is optional and the default is one. | |
| uint32_t iterations = 1; | |
| if (CBS_len(&mac_data) > 0) { | |
| uint64_t iterations_u64; | |
| if (!CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&mac_data, &iterations_u64) || | |
| !pkcs12_iterations_acceptable(iterations_u64)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| iterations = (uint32_t)iterations_u64; | |
| } | |
| int mac_ok; | |
| if (!pkcs12_check_mac(&mac_ok, ctx.password, ctx.password_len, &salt, | |
| iterations, md, &authsafes, &expected_mac)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (!mac_ok && ctx.password_len == 0) { | |
| // PKCS#12 encodes passwords as NUL-terminated UCS-2, so the empty | |
| // password is encoded as {0, 0}. Some implementations use the empty byte | |
| // array for "no password". OpenSSL considers a non-NULL password as {0, | |
| // 0} and a NULL password as {}. It then, in high-level PKCS#12 parsing | |
| // code, tries both options. We match this behavior. | |
| ctx.password = ctx.password != nullptr ? nullptr : ""; | |
| if (!pkcs12_check_mac(&mac_ok, ctx.password, ctx.password_len, &salt, | |
| iterations, md, &authsafes, &expected_mac)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (!mac_ok) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_INCORRECT_PASSWORD); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| // authsafes contains a series of PKCS#7 ContentInfos. | |
| if (!PKCS12_handle_sequence(&authsafes, &ctx, PKCS12_handle_content_info)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| ret = 1; | |
| err: | |
| OPENSSL_free(storage); | |
| if (!ret) { | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(*out_key); | |
| *out_key = nullptr; | |
| while (sk_X509_num(out_certs) > original_out_certs_len) { | |
| X509 *x509 = sk_X509_pop(out_certs); | |
| X509_free(x509); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| void PKCS12_PBE_add() {} | |
| struct pkcs12_st { | |
| uint8_t *ber_bytes; | |
| size_t ber_len; | |
| }; | |
| PKCS12 *d2i_PKCS12(PKCS12 **out_p12, const uint8_t **ber_bytes, | |
| size_t ber_len) { | |
| PKCS12 *p12 = New<PKCS12>(); | |
| if (!p12) { | |
| return nullptr; | |
| } | |
| p12->ber_bytes = | |
| reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(OPENSSL_memdup(*ber_bytes, ber_len)); | |
| if (!p12->ber_bytes) { | |
| Delete(p12); | |
| return nullptr; | |
| } | |
| p12->ber_len = ber_len; | |
| *ber_bytes += ber_len; | |
| if (out_p12) { | |
| PKCS12_free(*out_p12); | |
| *out_p12 = p12; | |
| } | |
| return p12; | |
| } | |
| PKCS12 *d2i_PKCS12_bio(BIO *bio, PKCS12 **out_p12) { | |
| size_t used = 0; | |
| BUF_MEM *buf; | |
| const uint8_t *dummy; | |
| static const size_t kMaxSize = 256 * 1024; | |
| PKCS12 *ret = nullptr; | |
| buf = BUF_MEM_new(); | |
| if (buf == nullptr) { | |
| return nullptr; | |
| } | |
| if (BUF_MEM_grow(buf, 8192) == 0) { | |
| goto out; | |
| } | |
| for (;;) { | |
| size_t max_read = buf->length - used; | |
| int n = BIO_read(bio, &buf->data[used], | |
| max_read > INT_MAX ? INT_MAX : (int)max_read); | |
| if (n < 0) { | |
| if (used == 0) { | |
| goto out; | |
| } | |
| // Workaround a bug in node.js. It uses a memory BIO for this in the wrong | |
| // mode. | |
| n = 0; | |
| } | |
| if (n == 0) { | |
| break; | |
| } | |
| used += n; | |
| if (used < buf->length) { | |
| continue; | |
| } | |
| if (buf->length > kMaxSize || BUF_MEM_grow(buf, buf->length * 2) == 0) { | |
| goto out; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| dummy = (uint8_t *)buf->data; | |
| ret = d2i_PKCS12(out_p12, &dummy, used); | |
| out: | |
| BUF_MEM_free(buf); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| PKCS12 *d2i_PKCS12_fp(FILE *fp, PKCS12 **out_p12) { | |
| BIO *bio; | |
| PKCS12 *ret; | |
| bio = BIO_new_fp(fp, 0 /* don't take ownership */); | |
| if (!bio) { | |
| return nullptr; | |
| } | |
| ret = d2i_PKCS12_bio(bio, out_p12); | |
| BIO_free(bio); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int i2d_PKCS12(const PKCS12 *p12, uint8_t **out) { | |
| if (p12->ber_len > INT_MAX) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, ERR_R_OVERFLOW); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| if (out == nullptr) { | |
| return (int)p12->ber_len; | |
| } | |
| if (*out == nullptr) { | |
| *out = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>( | |
| OPENSSL_memdup(p12->ber_bytes, p12->ber_len)); | |
| if (*out == nullptr) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| } else { | |
| OPENSSL_memcpy(*out, p12->ber_bytes, p12->ber_len); | |
| *out += p12->ber_len; | |
| } | |
| return (int)p12->ber_len; | |
| } | |
| int i2d_PKCS12_bio(BIO *bio, const PKCS12 *p12) { | |
| return BIO_write_all(bio, p12->ber_bytes, p12->ber_len); | |
| } | |
| int i2d_PKCS12_fp(FILE *fp, const PKCS12 *p12) { | |
| BIO *bio = BIO_new_fp(fp, 0 /* don't take ownership */); | |
| if (bio == nullptr) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int ret = i2d_PKCS12_bio(bio, p12); | |
| BIO_free(bio); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int PKCS12_parse(const PKCS12 *p12, const char *password, EVP_PKEY **out_pkey, | |
| X509 **out_cert, STACK_OF(X509) **out_ca_certs) { | |
| CBS ber_bytes; | |
| STACK_OF(X509) *ca_certs = nullptr; | |
| char ca_certs_alloced = 0; | |
| if (out_ca_certs != nullptr && *out_ca_certs != nullptr) { | |
| ca_certs = *out_ca_certs; | |
| } | |
| if (!ca_certs) { | |
| ca_certs = sk_X509_new_null(); | |
| if (ca_certs == nullptr) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ca_certs_alloced = 1; | |
| } | |
| CBS_init(&ber_bytes, p12->ber_bytes, p12->ber_len); | |
| if (!PKCS12_get_key_and_certs(out_pkey, ca_certs, &ber_bytes, password)) { | |
| if (ca_certs_alloced) { | |
| sk_X509_free(ca_certs); | |
| } | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| // OpenSSL selects the last certificate which matches the private key as | |
| // `out_cert`. | |
| *out_cert = nullptr; | |
| size_t num_certs = sk_X509_num(ca_certs); | |
| if (*out_pkey != nullptr && num_certs > 0) { | |
| for (size_t i = num_certs - 1; i < num_certs; i--) { | |
| X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ca_certs, i); | |
| if (X509_check_private_key(cert, *out_pkey)) { | |
| *out_cert = cert; | |
| sk_X509_delete(ca_certs, i); | |
| break; | |
| } | |
| ERR_clear_error(); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (out_ca_certs) { | |
| *out_ca_certs = ca_certs; | |
| } else { | |
| sk_X509_pop_free(ca_certs, X509_free); | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int PKCS12_verify_mac(const PKCS12 *p12, const char *password, | |
| int password_len) { | |
| if (password == nullptr) { | |
| if (password_len != 0) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } else if (password_len != -1 && | |
| (password[password_len] != 0 || | |
| OPENSSL_memchr(password, 0, password_len) != nullptr)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey = nullptr; | |
| X509 *cert = nullptr; | |
| if (!PKCS12_parse(p12, password, &pkey, &cert, nullptr)) { | |
| ERR_clear_error(); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
| X509_free(cert); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| // add_bag_attributes adds the bagAttributes field of a SafeBag structure, | |
| // containing the specified friendlyName and localKeyId attributes. | |
| static int add_bag_attributes(CBB *bag, const char *name, size_t name_len, | |
| const uint8_t *key_id, size_t key_id_len) { | |
| if (name == nullptr && key_id_len == 0) { | |
| return 1; // Omit the OPTIONAL SET. | |
| } | |
| // See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7292#section-4.2. | |
| CBB attrs, attr, values, value; | |
| if (!CBB_add_asn1(bag, &attrs, CBS_ASN1_SET)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (name_len != 0) { | |
| // See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2985, section 5.5.1. | |
| if (!CBB_add_asn1(&attrs, &attr, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || | |
| !CBB_add_asn1_element(&attr, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT, kFriendlyName, | |
| sizeof(kFriendlyName)) || | |
| !CBB_add_asn1(&attr, &values, CBS_ASN1_SET) || | |
| !CBB_add_asn1(&values, &value, CBS_ASN1_BMPSTRING)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| // Convert the friendly name to a BMPString. | |
| CBS name_cbs; | |
| CBS_init(&name_cbs, (const uint8_t *)name, name_len); | |
| while (CBS_len(&name_cbs) != 0) { | |
| uint32_t c; | |
| if (!CBS_get_utf8(&name_cbs, &c) || !CBB_add_ucs2_be(&value, c)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_INVALID_CHARACTERS); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (key_id_len != 0) { | |
| // See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2985, section 5.5.2. | |
| if (!CBB_add_asn1(&attrs, &attr, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || | |
| !CBB_add_asn1_element(&attr, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT, kLocalKeyID, | |
| sizeof(kLocalKeyID)) || | |
| !CBB_add_asn1(&attr, &values, CBS_ASN1_SET) || | |
| !CBB_add_asn1_octet_string(&values, key_id, key_id_len)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return CBB_flush_asn1_set_of(&attrs) && CBB_flush(bag); | |
| } | |
| static int add_cert_bag(CBB *cbb, X509 *cert, const char *name, | |
| const uint8_t *key_id, size_t key_id_len) { | |
| CBB bag, bag_contents, cert_bag, wrapped_cert, cert_value; | |
| if ( // See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7292#section-4.2. | |
| !CBB_add_asn1(cbb, &bag, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || | |
| !CBB_add_asn1_element(&bag, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT, kCertBag, | |
| sizeof(kCertBag)) || | |
| !CBB_add_asn1(&bag, &bag_contents, | |
| CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0) || | |
| // See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7292#section-4.2.3. | |
| !CBB_add_asn1(&bag_contents, &cert_bag, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || | |
| !CBB_add_asn1_element(&cert_bag, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT, kX509Certificate, | |
| sizeof(kX509Certificate)) || | |
| !CBB_add_asn1(&cert_bag, &wrapped_cert, | |
| CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0) || | |
| !CBB_add_asn1(&wrapped_cert, &cert_value, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| uint8_t *buf; | |
| int len = i2d_X509(cert, nullptr); | |
| int int_name_len = 0; | |
| const char *cert_name = (const char *)X509_alias_get0(cert, &int_name_len); | |
| size_t name_len = int_name_len; | |
| if (name) { | |
| if (name_len != 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_AMBIGUOUS_FRIENDLY_NAME); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| name_len = strlen(name); | |
| } else { | |
| name = cert_name; | |
| } | |
| if (len < 0 || !CBB_add_space(&cert_value, &buf, (size_t)len) || | |
| i2d_X509(cert, &buf) < 0 || | |
| !add_bag_attributes(&bag, name, name_len, key_id, key_id_len) || | |
| !CBB_flush(cbb)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int add_cert_safe_contents(CBB *cbb, X509 *cert, | |
| const STACK_OF(X509) *chain, const char *name, | |
| const uint8_t *key_id, size_t key_id_len) { | |
| CBB safe_contents; | |
| if (!CBB_add_asn1(cbb, &safe_contents, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || | |
| (cert != nullptr && | |
| !add_cert_bag(&safe_contents, cert, name, key_id, key_id_len))) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { | |
| // Only the leaf certificate gets attributes. | |
| if (!add_cert_bag(&safe_contents, sk_X509_value(chain, i), nullptr, nullptr, | |
| 0)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return CBB_flush(cbb); | |
| } | |
| // add_encrypted_data encrypts `in` with `pbe_nid` and `pbe_cipher`, writing the | |
| // result to `out`. It returns one on success and zero on error. `pbe_nid` and | |
| // `pbe_cipher` are interpreted as in `PKCS8_encrypt`. | |
| static int add_encrypted_data(CBB *out, int pbe_nid, | |
| const EVP_CIPHER *pbe_cipher, | |
| const char *password, size_t password_len, | |
| uint32_t iterations, const uint8_t *in, | |
| size_t in_len) { | |
| uint8_t salt[PKCS5_SALT_LEN]; | |
| if (!RAND_bytes(salt, sizeof(salt))) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ScopedEVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; | |
| CBB content_info, wrapper, encrypted_data, encrypted_content_info, | |
| encrypted_content; | |
| if ( // Add the ContentInfo wrapping. | |
| !CBB_add_asn1(out, &content_info, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || | |
| !CBB_add_asn1_element(&content_info, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT, kPKCS7EncryptedData, | |
| sizeof(kPKCS7EncryptedData)) || | |
| !CBB_add_asn1(&content_info, &wrapper, | |
| CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0) || | |
| // See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315#section-13. | |
| !CBB_add_asn1(&wrapper, &encrypted_data, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || | |
| !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&encrypted_data, 0 /* version */) || | |
| // See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315#section-10.1. | |
| !CBB_add_asn1(&encrypted_data, &encrypted_content_info, | |
| CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || | |
| !CBB_add_asn1_element(&encrypted_content_info, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT, | |
| kPKCS7Data, sizeof(kPKCS7Data)) || | |
| // Set up encryption and fill in contentEncryptionAlgorithm. | |
| !pkcs12_pbe_encrypt_init(&encrypted_content_info, ctx.get(), pbe_nid, | |
| pbe_cipher, iterations, password, password_len, | |
| salt, sizeof(salt)) || | |
| // Note this tag is primitive. It is an implicitly-tagged OCTET_STRING, so | |
| // it inherits the inner tag's constructed bit. | |
| !CBB_add_asn1(&encrypted_content_info, &encrypted_content, | |
| CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| size_t max_out = in_len + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx.get()); | |
| if (max_out < in_len) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_TOO_LONG); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| uint8_t *ptr; | |
| size_t n1, n2; | |
| if (!CBB_reserve(&encrypted_content, &ptr, max_out) || | |
| !EVP_CipherUpdate_ex(ctx.get(), ptr, &n1, max_out, in, in_len) || | |
| !EVP_CipherFinal_ex2(ctx.get(), ptr + n1, &n2, max_out - n1) || | |
| !CBB_did_write(&encrypted_content, n1 + n2) || !CBB_flush(out)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| PKCS12 *PKCS12_create(const char *password, const char *name, | |
| const EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert, | |
| const STACK_OF(X509) *chain, int key_nid, int cert_nid, | |
| int iterations, int mac_iterations, int key_type) { | |
| if (key_nid == 0) { | |
| key_nid = NID_aes_256_cbc; | |
| } | |
| if (cert_nid == 0) { | |
| cert_nid = NID_aes_256_cbc; | |
| } | |
| if (iterations == 0) { | |
| iterations = PKCS12_DEFAULT_ITER; | |
| } | |
| if (mac_iterations == 0) { | |
| mac_iterations = PKCS12_DEFAULT_ITER; | |
| } | |
| if ( // In OpenSSL, this specifies a non-standard Microsoft key usage | |
| // extension which we do not currently support. | |
| key_type != 0 || | |
| // In OpenSSL, -1 here means to omit the MAC, which we do not | |
| // currently support. Omitting it is also invalid for a password-based | |
| // PKCS#12 file. | |
| mac_iterations < 0 || | |
| // Don't encode empty objects. | |
| (pkey == nullptr && cert == nullptr && sk_X509_num(chain) == 0)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_UNSUPPORTED_OPTIONS); | |
| return nullptr; | |
| } | |
| // PKCS#12 is a very confusing recursive data format, built out of another | |
| // recursive data format. Section 5.1 of RFC 7292 describes the encoding | |
| // algorithm, but there is no clear overview. A quick summary: | |
| // | |
| // PKCS#7 defines a ContentInfo structure, which is an overgeneralized typed | |
| // combinator structure for applying cryptography. We care about two types. A | |
| // data ContentInfo contains an OCTET STRING and is a leaf node of the | |
| // combinator tree. An encrypted-data ContentInfo contains encryption | |
| // parameters (key derivation and encryption) and wraps another ContentInfo, | |
| // usually data. | |
| // | |
| // A PKCS#12 file is a PFX structure (section 4), which contains a single data | |
| // ContentInfo and a MAC over it. This root ContentInfo is the | |
| // AuthenticatedSafe and its payload is a SEQUENCE of other ContentInfos, so | |
| // that different parts of the PKCS#12 file can by differently protected. | |
| // | |
| // Each ContentInfo in the AuthenticatedSafe, after undoing all the PKCS#7 | |
| // combinators, has SafeContents payload. A SafeContents is a SEQUENCE of | |
| // SafeBag. SafeBag is PKCS#12's typed structure, with subtypes such as KeyBag | |
| // and CertBag. Confusingly, there is a SafeContents bag type which itself | |
| // recursively contains more SafeBags, but we do not implement this. Bags also | |
| // can have attributes. | |
| // | |
| // The grouping of SafeBags into intermediate ContentInfos does not appear to | |
| // be significant, except that all SafeBags sharing a ContentInfo have the | |
| // same level of protection. Additionally, while keys may be encrypted by | |
| // placing a KeyBag in an encrypted-data ContentInfo, PKCS#12 also defines a | |
| // key-specific encryption container, PKCS8ShroudedKeyBag, which is used | |
| // instead. | |
| // Note that `password` may be NULL to specify no password, rather than the | |
| // empty string. They are encoded differently in PKCS#12. (One is the empty | |
| // byte array and the other is NUL-terminated UCS-2.) | |
| size_t password_len = password != nullptr ? strlen(password) : 0; | |
| uint8_t key_id[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
| unsigned key_id_len = 0; | |
| if (cert != nullptr && pkey != nullptr) { | |
| if (!X509_check_private_key(cert, pkey) || | |
| // Matching OpenSSL, use the SHA-1 hash of the certificate as the local | |
| // key ID. Some PKCS#12 consumers require one to connect the private key | |
| // and certificate. | |
| !X509_digest(cert, EVP_sha1(), key_id, &key_id_len)) { | |
| return nullptr; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| // See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7292#section-4. | |
| PKCS12 *ret = nullptr; | |
| CBB cbb, pfx, auth_safe, auth_safe_wrapper, auth_safe_data, content_infos; | |
| uint8_t mac_key[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
| if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0) || !CBB_add_asn1(&cbb, &pfx, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || | |
| !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&pfx, 3) || | |
| // auth_safe is a data ContentInfo. | |
| !CBB_add_asn1(&pfx, &auth_safe, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || | |
| !CBB_add_asn1_element(&auth_safe, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT, kPKCS7Data, | |
| sizeof(kPKCS7Data)) || | |
| !CBB_add_asn1(&auth_safe, &auth_safe_wrapper, | |
| CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0) || | |
| !CBB_add_asn1(&auth_safe_wrapper, &auth_safe_data, | |
| CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) || | |
| // See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7292#section-4.1. `auth_safe`'s | |
| // contains a SEQUENCE of ContentInfos. | |
| !CBB_add_asn1(&auth_safe_data, &content_infos, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| // If there are any certificates, place them in CertBags wrapped in a single | |
| // encrypted ContentInfo. | |
| if (cert != nullptr || sk_X509_num(chain) > 0) { | |
| if (cert_nid < 0) { | |
| // Place the certificates in an unencrypted ContentInfo. This could be | |
| // more compactly-encoded by reusing the same ContentInfo as the key, but | |
| // OpenSSL does not do this. We keep them separate for consistency. (Keys, | |
| // even when encrypted, are always placed in unencrypted ContentInfos. | |
| // PKCS#12 defines bag-level encryption for keys.) | |
| CBB content_info, wrapper, data; | |
| if (!CBB_add_asn1(&content_infos, &content_info, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || | |
| !CBB_add_asn1_element(&content_info, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT, kPKCS7Data, | |
| sizeof(kPKCS7Data)) || | |
| !CBB_add_asn1(&content_info, &wrapper, | |
| CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0) || | |
| !CBB_add_asn1(&wrapper, &data, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) || | |
| !add_cert_safe_contents(&data, cert, chain, name, key_id, | |
| key_id_len) || | |
| !CBB_flush(&content_infos)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } else { | |
| // This function differs from other OpenSSL functions in how PBES1 and | |
| // PBES2 schemes are selected. If the NID matches a cipher, treat this as | |
| // PBES2 instead. Convert to the other convention. | |
| const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = pkcs5_pbe2_nid_to_cipher(cert_nid); | |
| if (cipher != nullptr) { | |
| cert_nid = -1; | |
| } | |
| CBB plaintext_cbb; | |
| int ok = | |
| CBB_init(&plaintext_cbb, 0) && | |
| add_cert_safe_contents(&plaintext_cbb, cert, chain, name, key_id, | |
| key_id_len) && | |
| add_encrypted_data(&content_infos, cert_nid, cipher, password, | |
| password_len, iterations, CBB_data(&plaintext_cbb), | |
| CBB_len(&plaintext_cbb)); | |
| CBB_cleanup(&plaintext_cbb); | |
| if (!ok) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| // If there is a key, place it in a single KeyBag or PKCS8ShroudedKeyBag | |
| // wrapped in an unencrypted ContentInfo. (One could also place it in a KeyBag | |
| // inside an encrypted ContentInfo, but OpenSSL does not do this and some | |
| // PKCS#12 consumers do not support KeyBags.) | |
| if (pkey != nullptr) { | |
| CBB content_info, wrapper, data, safe_contents, bag, bag_contents; | |
| if ( // Add another data ContentInfo. | |
| !CBB_add_asn1(&content_infos, &content_info, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || | |
| !CBB_add_asn1_element(&content_info, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT, kPKCS7Data, | |
| sizeof(kPKCS7Data)) || | |
| !CBB_add_asn1(&content_info, &wrapper, | |
| CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0) || | |
| !CBB_add_asn1(&wrapper, &data, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) || | |
| !CBB_add_asn1(&data, &safe_contents, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || | |
| // Add a SafeBag containing a PKCS8ShroudedKeyBag. | |
| !CBB_add_asn1(&safe_contents, &bag, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (key_nid < 0) { | |
| if (!CBB_add_asn1_element(&bag, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT, kKeyBag, | |
| sizeof(kKeyBag)) || | |
| !CBB_add_asn1(&bag, &bag_contents, | |
| CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0) || | |
| !EVP_marshal_private_key(&bag_contents, pkey)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } else { | |
| // This function differs from other OpenSSL functions in how PBES1 and | |
| // PBES2 schemes are selected. If the NID matches a cipher, treat this as | |
| // PBES2 instead. Convert to the other convention. | |
| const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = pkcs5_pbe2_nid_to_cipher(key_nid); | |
| if (cipher != nullptr) { | |
| key_nid = -1; | |
| } | |
| if (!CBB_add_asn1_element(&bag, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT, kPKCS8ShroudedKeyBag, | |
| sizeof(kPKCS8ShroudedKeyBag)) || | |
| !CBB_add_asn1(&bag, &bag_contents, | |
| CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0) || | |
| !PKCS8_marshal_encrypted_private_key( | |
| &bag_contents, key_nid, cipher, password, password_len, | |
| nullptr /* generate a random salt */, | |
| 0 /* use default salt length */, iterations, pkey)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| size_t name_len = 0; | |
| if (name) { | |
| name_len = strlen(name); | |
| } | |
| if (!add_bag_attributes(&bag, name, name_len, key_id, key_id_len) || | |
| !CBB_flush(&content_infos)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| { | |
| // Compute the MAC. Match OpenSSL in using SHA-1 as the hash function. The | |
| // MAC covers `auth_safe_data`. | |
| const EVP_MD *mac_md = EVP_sha1(); | |
| uint8_t mac_salt[PKCS5_SALT_LEN]; | |
| uint8_t mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
| unsigned mac_len; | |
| if (!CBB_flush(&auth_safe_data) || | |
| !RAND_bytes(mac_salt, sizeof(mac_salt)) || | |
| !pkcs12_key_gen(password, password_len, mac_salt, sizeof(mac_salt), | |
| PKCS12_MAC_ID, mac_iterations, EVP_MD_size(mac_md), | |
| mac_key, mac_md) || | |
| !HMAC(mac_md, mac_key, EVP_MD_size(mac_md), CBB_data(&auth_safe_data), | |
| CBB_len(&auth_safe_data), mac, &mac_len)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| CBB mac_data, digest_info; | |
| if (!CBB_add_asn1(&pfx, &mac_data, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || | |
| !CBB_add_asn1(&mac_data, &digest_info, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || | |
| // OpenSSL and NSS always include a NULL parameter with the digest | |
| // algorithm. Windows does not. RFC 7292 imports DigestInfo from PKCS | |
| // #7. PKCS #7 does not actually use DigestInfo. It just describes | |
| // RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signing as encoding a DigestInfo and then | |
| // "encrypting" it with the private key. In that context, NULL should be | |
| // included. Confusingly, there is also a digestAlgorithm field in | |
| // SignerInfo. There, RFC 5754 says to omit the NULL. But that field | |
| // does not use DigestInfo per se. | |
| // | |
| // We match OpenSSL, NSS, and RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 in including the NULL. | |
| !EVP_marshal_digest_algorithm(&digest_info, mac_md) || | |
| !CBB_add_asn1_octet_string(&digest_info, mac, mac_len) || | |
| !CBB_add_asn1_octet_string(&mac_data, mac_salt, sizeof(mac_salt)) || | |
| // The iteration count has a DEFAULT of 1, but RFC 7292 says "The | |
| // default is for historical reasons and its use is deprecated." Thus we | |
| // explicitly encode the iteration count, though it is not valid DER. | |
| !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&mac_data, mac_iterations)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| ret = New<PKCS12>(); | |
| if (ret == nullptr || !CBB_finish(&cbb, &ret->ber_bytes, &ret->ber_len)) { | |
| Delete(ret); | |
| ret = nullptr; | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| err: | |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(mac_key, sizeof(mac_key)); | |
| CBB_cleanup(&cbb); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| void PKCS12_free(PKCS12 *p12) { | |
| if (p12 == nullptr) { | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| OPENSSL_free(p12->ber_bytes); | |
| Delete(p12); | |
| } |