blob: ec6aa06dab43de818a3abae0cfa13338c0ee0cf1 [file]
// Copyright 2020 The BoringSSL Authors
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/digest.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/hkdf.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/nid.h>
#include <openssl/span.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include "../fipsmodule/bn/internal.h"
#include "../fipsmodule/ec/internal.h"
#include "../internal.h"
#include "internal.h"
using namespace bssl;
namespace {
// This file implements hash-to-curve, as described in RFC 9380.
//
// This hash-to-curve implementation is written generically with the
// expectation that we will eventually wish to support other curves. If it
// becomes a performance bottleneck, some possible optimizations by
// specializing it to the curve:
//
// - Rather than using a generic `ec_felem_exp`, specialize the exponentiation
// to c2 with a faster addition chain.
//
// - `ec_felem_mul` and `ec_felem_sqr` are generic Montgomery code. Given the
// few curves, we could specialize `map_to_curve_simple_swu`. But doing this
// reasonably without duplicating code in C is difficult. (C++ templates
// would be useful here.)
//
// - P-521's Z and c2 have small power-of-two absolute values. We could save
// two multiplications in SSWU. (Other curves have reasonable values of Z
// and inconvenient c2.) This is unlikely to be worthwhile without C++
// templates to make specializing more convenient.
// expand_message_xmd implements the operation described in section 5.3.1 of
// RFC 9380. It returns one on success and zero on error.
int expand_message_xmd(const EVP_MD *md, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len, const uint8_t *dst,
size_t dst_len) {
// See https://github.com/cfrg/draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve/issues/352
if (dst_len == 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;
}
const size_t block_size = EVP_MD_block_size(md);
const size_t md_size = EVP_MD_size(md);
ScopedEVP_MD_CTX ctx;
// Long DSTs are hashed down to size. See section 5.3.3.
static_assert(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE < 256, "hashed DST still too large");
uint8_t dst_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
if (dst_len >= 256) {
static const char kPrefix[] = "H2C-OVERSIZE-DST-";
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx.get(), md, nullptr) ||
!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx.get(), kPrefix, sizeof(kPrefix) - 1) ||
!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx.get(), dst, dst_len) ||
!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx.get(), dst_buf, nullptr)) {
return 0;
}
dst = dst_buf;
dst_len = md_size;
}
uint8_t dst_len_u8 = (uint8_t)dst_len;
// Compute b_0.
static const uint8_t kZeros[EVP_MAX_MD_BLOCK_SIZE] = {0};
// If `out_len` exceeds 16 bits then `i` will wrap below causing an error to
// be returned. This depends on the static assert above.
uint8_t l_i_b_str_zero[3] = {static_cast<uint8_t>(out_len >> 8),
static_cast<uint8_t>(out_len), 0};
uint8_t b_0[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx.get(), md, nullptr) ||
!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx.get(), kZeros, block_size) ||
!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx.get(), msg, msg_len) ||
!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx.get(), l_i_b_str_zero, sizeof(l_i_b_str_zero)) ||
!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx.get(), dst, dst_len) ||
!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx.get(), &dst_len_u8, 1) ||
!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx.get(), b_0, nullptr)) {
return 0;
}
uint8_t b_i[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
uint8_t i = 1;
while (out_len > 0) {
if (i == 0) {
// Input was too large.
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (i > 1) {
for (size_t j = 0; j < md_size; j++) {
b_i[j] ^= b_0[j];
}
} else {
OPENSSL_memcpy(b_i, b_0, md_size);
}
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx.get(), md, nullptr) ||
!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx.get(), b_i, md_size) ||
!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx.get(), &i, 1) ||
!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx.get(), dst, dst_len) ||
!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx.get(), &dst_len_u8, 1) ||
!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx.get(), b_i, nullptr)) {
return 0;
}
size_t todo = out_len >= md_size ? md_size : out_len;
OPENSSL_memcpy(out, b_i, todo);
out += todo;
out_len -= todo;
i++;
}
return 1;
}
// num_bytes_to_derive determines the number of bytes to derive when hashing to
// a number modulo `modulus`. See the hash_to_field operation defined in
// section 5.2 of RFC 9380.
int num_bytes_to_derive(size_t *out, const BIGNUM *modulus, unsigned k) {
size_t bits = BN_num_bits(modulus);
size_t L = (bits + k + 7) / 8;
// We require 2^(8*L) < 2^(2*bits - 2) <= n^2 so to fit in bounds for
// `felem_reduce` and `ec_scalar_reduce`. All defined hash-to-curve suites
// define `k` to be well under this bound. (`k` is usually around half of
// `p_bits`.)
if (L * 8 >= 2 * bits - 2 || L > 2 * EC_MAX_BYTES) {
assert(0);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
*out = L;
return 1;
}
// big_endian_to_words decodes `in` as a big-endian integer and writes the
// result to `out`. `out` must be large enough to contain the output.
void big_endian_to_words(Span<BN_ULONG> out, Span<const uint8_t> in) {
BSSL_CHECK(in.size() <= out.size() * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
// Ensure any excess bytes are zeroed.
OPENSSL_memset(out.data(), 0, out.size() * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
uint8_t *out_u8 = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(out.data());
for (size_t i = 0; i < in.size(); i++) {
out_u8[in.size() - 1 - i] = in[i];
}
}
void big_endian_reduce_to_felem(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_FELEM *out,
Span<const uint8_t> in) {
BN_ULONG words_buf[2 * EC_MAX_WORDS];
auto words = Span(words_buf).first(2 * group->field.N.width);
big_endian_to_words(words, in);
ec_felem_reduce(group, out, words.data(), words.size());
}
// hash_to_field implements the operation described in section 5.2
// of RFC 9380, with count = 2. `k` is the security factor.
int hash_to_field2(const EC_GROUP *group, const EVP_MD *md, EC_FELEM *out1,
EC_FELEM *out2, const uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len,
unsigned k, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len) {
size_t L;
uint8_t buf[4 * EC_MAX_BYTES];
if (!num_bytes_to_derive(&L, &group->field.N, k) ||
!expand_message_xmd(md, buf, 2 * L, msg, msg_len, dst, dst_len)) {
return 0;
}
big_endian_reduce_to_felem(group, out1, Span(buf).first(L));
big_endian_reduce_to_felem(group, out2, Span(buf).subspan(L, L));
return 1;
}
// hash_to_field1 implements the operation described in section 5.2
// of RFC 9380, with count = 1. `k` is the security factor.
int hash_to_field1(const EC_GROUP *group, const EVP_MD *md, EC_FELEM *out,
const uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len, unsigned k,
const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len) {
size_t L;
uint8_t buf[2 * EC_MAX_BYTES];
if (!num_bytes_to_derive(&L, &group->field.N, k) ||
!expand_message_xmd(md, buf, L, msg, msg_len, dst, dst_len)) {
return 0;
}
big_endian_reduce_to_felem(group, out, Span(buf).first(L));
return 1;
}
// hash_to_scalar behaves like `hash_to_field2` but returns a value modulo the
// group order rather than a field element. `k` is the security factor.
int hash_to_scalar(const EC_GROUP *group, const EVP_MD *md, EC_SCALAR *out,
const uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len, unsigned k,
const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len) {
const BIGNUM *order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group);
size_t L;
uint8_t buf[EC_MAX_BYTES * 2];
if (!num_bytes_to_derive(&L, order, k) ||
!expand_message_xmd(md, buf, L, msg, msg_len, dst, dst_len)) {
return 0;
}
BN_ULONG words[2 * EC_MAX_WORDS];
size_t num_words = 2 * order->width;
big_endian_to_words(Span(words).first(num_words), Span(buf).first(L));
ec_scalar_reduce(group, out, words, num_words);
return 1;
}
void mul_A(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_FELEM *out, const EC_FELEM *in) {
assert(group->a_is_minus3);
EC_FELEM tmp;
ec_felem_add(group, &tmp, in, in); // tmp = 2*in
ec_felem_add(group, &tmp, &tmp, &tmp); // tmp = 4*in
ec_felem_sub(group, out, in, &tmp); // out = -3*in
}
// sgn0 implements the operation described in section 4.1.2 of RFC 9380.
BN_ULONG sgn0(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_FELEM *a) {
uint8_t buf[EC_MAX_BYTES];
size_t len;
ec_felem_to_bytes(group, buf, &len, a);
return buf[len - 1] & 1;
}
// sqrt_ratio_3mod4 implements the operation described in appendix F.2.1.2
// of RFC 9380.
BN_ULONG sqrt_ratio_3mod4(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_FELEM *Z,
const BN_ULONG *c1, size_t num_c1, const EC_FELEM *c2,
EC_FELEM *out_y, const EC_FELEM *u,
const EC_FELEM *v) {
assert(group->field_is_3_mod_4);
EC_FELEM tv1, tv2, tv3, y1, y2;
ec_felem_sqr(group, &tv1, v); // 1. tv1 = v^2
ec_felem_mul(group, &tv2, u, v); // 2. tv2 = u * v
ec_felem_mul(group, &tv1, &tv1, &tv2); // 3. tv1 = tv1 * tv2
ec_felem_exp(group, &y1, &tv1, c1, num_c1); // 4. y1 = tv1^c1
ec_felem_mul(group, &y1, &y1, &tv2); // 5. y1 = y1 * tv2
ec_felem_mul(group, &y2, &y1, c2); // 6. y2 = y1 * c2
ec_felem_sqr(group, &tv3, &y1); // 7. tv3 = y1^2
ec_felem_mul(group, &tv3, &tv3, v); // 8. tv3 = tv3 * v
// 9. isQR = tv3 == u
// 10. y = CMOV(y2, y1, isQR)
// 11. return (isQR, y)
//
// Note the specification's CMOV function and our `ec_felem_select` have the
// opposite argument order.
ec_felem_sub(group, &tv1, &tv3, u);
const BN_ULONG isQR = ~ec_felem_non_zero_mask(group, &tv1);
ec_felem_select(group, out_y, isQR, &y1, &y2);
return isQR;
}
// map_to_curve_simple_swu implements the operation described in section 6.6.2
// of RFC 9380, using the straight-line implementation in appendix F.2.
void map_to_curve_simple_swu(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_FELEM *Z,
const BN_ULONG *c1, size_t num_c1,
const EC_FELEM *c2, EC_JACOBIAN *out,
const EC_FELEM *u) {
// This function requires the prime be 3 mod 4, and that A = -3.
assert(group->field_is_3_mod_4);
assert(group->a_is_minus3);
EC_FELEM tv1, tv2, tv3, tv4, tv5, tv6, x, y, y1;
ec_felem_sqr(group, &tv1, u); // 1. tv1 = u^2
ec_felem_mul(group, &tv1, Z, &tv1); // 2. tv1 = Z * tv1
ec_felem_sqr(group, &tv2, &tv1); // 3. tv2 = tv1^2
ec_felem_add(group, &tv2, &tv2, &tv1); // 4. tv2 = tv2 + tv1
ec_felem_add(group, &tv3, &tv2, ec_felem_one(group)); // 5. tv3 = tv2 + 1
ec_felem_mul(group, &tv3, &group->b, &tv3); // 6. tv3 = B * tv3
// 7. tv4 = CMOV(Z, -tv2, tv2 != 0)
const BN_ULONG tv2_non_zero = ec_felem_non_zero_mask(group, &tv2);
ec_felem_neg(group, &tv4, &tv2);
ec_felem_select(group, &tv4, tv2_non_zero, &tv4, Z);
mul_A(group, &tv4, &tv4); // 8. tv4 = A * tv4
ec_felem_sqr(group, &tv2, &tv3); // 9. tv2 = tv3^2
ec_felem_sqr(group, &tv6, &tv4); // 10. tv6 = tv4^2
mul_A(group, &tv5, &tv6); // 11. tv5 = A * tv6
ec_felem_add(group, &tv2, &tv2, &tv5); // 12. tv2 = tv2 + tv5
ec_felem_mul(group, &tv2, &tv2, &tv3); // 13. tv2 = tv2 * tv3
ec_felem_mul(group, &tv6, &tv6, &tv4); // 14. tv6 = tv6 * tv4
ec_felem_mul(group, &tv5, &group->b, &tv6); // 15. tv5 = B * tv6
ec_felem_add(group, &tv2, &tv2, &tv5); // 16. tv2 = tv2 + tv5
ec_felem_mul(group, &x, &tv1, &tv3); // 17. x = tv1 * tv3
// 18. (is_gx1_square, y1) = sqrt_ratio(tv2, tv6)
const BN_ULONG is_gx1_square =
sqrt_ratio_3mod4(group, Z, c1, num_c1, c2, &y1, &tv2, &tv6);
ec_felem_mul(group, &y, &tv1, u); // 19. y = tv1 * u
ec_felem_mul(group, &y, &y, &y1); // 20. y = y * y1
// 21. x = CMOV(x, tv3, is_gx1_square)
ec_felem_select(group, &x, is_gx1_square, &tv3, &x);
// 22. y = CMOV(y, y1, is_gx1_square)
ec_felem_select(group, &y, is_gx1_square, &y1, &y);
// 23. e1 = sgn0(u) == sgn0(y)
BN_ULONG sgn0_u = sgn0(group, u);
BN_ULONG sgn0_y = sgn0(group, &y);
BN_ULONG not_e1 = sgn0_u ^ sgn0_y;
not_e1 = ((BN_ULONG)0) - not_e1;
// 24. y = CMOV(-y, y, e1)
ec_felem_neg(group, &tv1, &y);
ec_felem_select(group, &y, not_e1, &tv1, &y);
// 25. x = x / tv4
//
// Our output is in projective coordinates, so rather than inverting `tv4`
// now, represent (x / tv4, y) as (x * tv4, y * tv4^3, tv4). This is much more
// efficient if the caller will do further computation on the output. (If the
// caller will immediately convert to affine coordinates, it is slightly less
// efficient, but only by a few field multiplications.)
ec_felem_mul(group, &out->X, &x, &tv4);
ec_felem_mul(group, &out->Y, &y, &tv6);
out->Z = tv4;
}
int sswu_and_add(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_FELEM *Z, const EC_FELEM *c2,
EC_JACOBIAN *out, const EC_FELEM *u0, const EC_FELEM *u1) {
// Compute `c1` = (p - 3) / 4.
BN_ULONG c1[EC_MAX_WORDS];
size_t num_c1 = group->field.N.width;
if (!bn_copy_words(c1, num_c1, &group->field.N)) {
return 0;
}
bn_rshift_words(c1, c1, /*shift=*/2, /*num=*/num_c1);
EC_JACOBIAN Q0, Q1;
map_to_curve_simple_swu(group, Z, c1, num_c1, c2, &Q0, u0);
map_to_curve_simple_swu(group, Z, c1, num_c1, c2, &Q1, u1);
group->meth->add(group, out, &Q0, &Q1); // R = Q0 + Q1
// All our curves have cofactor one, so `clear_cofactor` is a no-op.
return 1;
}
int hash_to_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EVP_MD *md, const EC_FELEM *Z,
const EC_FELEM *c2, unsigned k, EC_JACOBIAN *out,
const uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len, const uint8_t *msg,
size_t msg_len) {
EC_FELEM u0, u1;
return hash_to_field2(group, md, &u0, &u1, dst, dst_len, k, msg, msg_len) &&
sswu_and_add(group, Z, c2, out, &u0, &u1);
}
int encode_to_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EVP_MD *md, const EC_FELEM *Z,
const EC_FELEM *c2, unsigned k, EC_JACOBIAN *out,
const uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len, const uint8_t *msg,
size_t msg_len) {
EC_FELEM u;
if (!hash_to_field1(group, md, &u, dst, dst_len, k, msg, msg_len)) {
return 0;
}
// Compute `c1` = (p - 3) / 4.
BN_ULONG c1[EC_MAX_WORDS];
size_t num_c1 = group->field.N.width;
if (!bn_copy_words(c1, num_c1, &group->field.N)) {
return 0;
}
bn_rshift_words(c1, c1, /*shift=*/2, /*num=*/num_c1);
map_to_curve_simple_swu(group, Z, c1, num_c1, c2, out, &u);
// All our curves have cofactor one, so `clear_cofactor` is a no-op.
return 1;
}
int felem_from_u8(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_FELEM *out, uint8_t a) {
uint8_t bytes[EC_MAX_BYTES] = {0};
size_t len = BN_num_bytes(&group->field.N);
bytes[len - 1] = a;
return ec_felem_from_bytes(group, out, bytes, len);
}
// kP256Sqrt10 is sqrt(10) in P-256's field. It was computed as follows in
// python3:
//
// p = 2**256 - 2**224 + 2**192 + 2**96 - 1
// c2 = pow(10, (p+1)//4, p)
// assert pow(c2, 2, p) == 10
// ", ".join("0x%02x" % b for b in c2.to_bytes(256//8, 'big'))
const uint8_t kP256Sqrt10[] = {0xda, 0x53, 0x8e, 0x3b, 0xe1, 0xd8, 0x9b, 0x99,
0xc9, 0x78, 0xfc, 0x67, 0x51, 0x80, 0xaa, 0xb2,
0x7b, 0x8d, 0x1f, 0xf8, 0x4c, 0x55, 0xd5, 0xb6,
0x2c, 0xcd, 0x34, 0x27, 0xe4, 0x33, 0xc4, 0x7f};
// kP384Sqrt12 is sqrt(12) in P-384's field. It was computed as follows in
// python3:
//
// p = 2**384 - 2**128 - 2**96 + 2**32 - 1
// c2 = pow(12, (p+1)//4, p)
// assert pow(c2, 2, p) == 12
// ", ".join("0x%02x" % b for b in c2.to_bytes(384//8, 'big'))
const uint8_t kP384Sqrt12[] = {
0x2a, 0xcc, 0xb4, 0xa6, 0x56, 0xb0, 0x24, 0x9c, 0x71, 0xf0, 0x50, 0x0e,
0x83, 0xda, 0x2f, 0xdd, 0x7f, 0x98, 0xe3, 0x83, 0xd6, 0x8b, 0x53, 0x87,
0x1f, 0x87, 0x2f, 0xcb, 0x9c, 0xcb, 0x80, 0xc5, 0x3c, 0x0d, 0xe1, 0xf8,
0xa8, 0x0f, 0x7e, 0x19, 0x14, 0xe2, 0xec, 0x69, 0xf5, 0xa6, 0x26, 0xb3};
} // namespace
int bssl::ec_hash_to_curve_p256_xmd_sha256_sswu(
const EC_GROUP *group, EC_JACOBIAN *out, const uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len,
const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len) {
// See section 8.3 of RFC 9380.
if (EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group) != NID_X9_62_prime256v1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_GROUP_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
// Z = -10, c2 = sqrt(10)
EC_FELEM Z, c2;
if (!felem_from_u8(group, &Z, 10) ||
!ec_felem_from_bytes(group, &c2, kP256Sqrt10, sizeof(kP256Sqrt10))) {
return 0;
}
ec_felem_neg(group, &Z, &Z);
return hash_to_curve(group, EVP_sha256(), &Z, &c2, /*k=*/128, out, dst,
dst_len, msg, msg_len);
}
int EC_hash_to_curve_p256_xmd_sha256_sswu(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *out,
const uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len,
const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len) {
if (EC_GROUP_cmp(group, out->group, nullptr) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
}
return ec_hash_to_curve_p256_xmd_sha256_sswu(group, &out->raw, dst, dst_len,
msg, msg_len);
}
int bssl::ec_hash_to_curve_p384_xmd_sha384_sswu(
const EC_GROUP *group, EC_JACOBIAN *out, const uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len,
const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len) {
// See section 8.3 of RFC 9380.
if (EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group) != NID_secp384r1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_GROUP_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
// Z = -12, c2 = sqrt(12)
EC_FELEM Z, c2;
if (!felem_from_u8(group, &Z, 12) ||
!ec_felem_from_bytes(group, &c2, kP384Sqrt12, sizeof(kP384Sqrt12))) {
return 0;
}
ec_felem_neg(group, &Z, &Z);
return hash_to_curve(group, EVP_sha384(), &Z, &c2, /*k=*/192, out, dst,
dst_len, msg, msg_len);
}
int EC_hash_to_curve_p384_xmd_sha384_sswu(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *out,
const uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len,
const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len) {
if (EC_GROUP_cmp(group, out->group, nullptr) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
}
return ec_hash_to_curve_p384_xmd_sha384_sswu(group, &out->raw, dst, dst_len,
msg, msg_len);
}
int bssl::ec_encode_to_curve_p256_xmd_sha256_sswu(
const EC_GROUP *group, EC_JACOBIAN *out, const uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len,
const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len) {
// See section 8.3 of RFC 9380.
if (EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group) != NID_X9_62_prime256v1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_GROUP_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
// Z = -10, c2 = sqrt(10)
EC_FELEM Z, c2;
if (!felem_from_u8(group, &Z, 10) ||
!ec_felem_from_bytes(group, &c2, kP256Sqrt10, sizeof(kP256Sqrt10))) {
return 0;
}
ec_felem_neg(group, &Z, &Z);
return encode_to_curve(group, EVP_sha256(), &Z, &c2, /*k=*/128, out, dst,
dst_len, msg, msg_len);
}
int EC_encode_to_curve_p256_xmd_sha256_sswu(const EC_GROUP *group,
EC_POINT *out, const uint8_t *dst,
size_t dst_len, const uint8_t *msg,
size_t msg_len) {
if (EC_GROUP_cmp(group, out->group, nullptr) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
}
return ec_encode_to_curve_p256_xmd_sha256_sswu(group, &out->raw, dst, dst_len,
msg, msg_len);
}
int bssl::ec_encode_to_curve_p384_xmd_sha384_sswu(
const EC_GROUP *group, EC_JACOBIAN *out, const uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len,
const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len) {
// See section 8.3 of RFC 9380.
if (EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group) != NID_secp384r1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_GROUP_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
// Z = -12, c2 = sqrt(12)
EC_FELEM Z, c2;
if (!felem_from_u8(group, &Z, 12) ||
!ec_felem_from_bytes(group, &c2, kP384Sqrt12, sizeof(kP384Sqrt12))) {
return 0;
}
ec_felem_neg(group, &Z, &Z);
return encode_to_curve(group, EVP_sha384(), &Z, &c2, /*k=*/192, out, dst,
dst_len, msg, msg_len);
}
int EC_encode_to_curve_p384_xmd_sha384_sswu(const EC_GROUP *group,
EC_POINT *out, const uint8_t *dst,
size_t dst_len, const uint8_t *msg,
size_t msg_len) {
if (EC_GROUP_cmp(group, out->group, nullptr) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
}
return ec_encode_to_curve_p384_xmd_sha384_sswu(group, &out->raw, dst, dst_len,
msg, msg_len);
}
int EC_wpa3_sae_hash_to_curve_p256(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *out,
const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_len,
const uint8_t *ikm, size_t ikm_len) {
if (EC_GROUP_cmp(group, out->group, nullptr) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
}
if (EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group) != NID_X9_62_prime256v1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_GROUP_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
// WPA3 uses a different process for computing `u0` and `u1` (called `u1` and
// `u2` in 802.11) than RFC 9380.
uint8_t pwd_seed[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
size_t pwd_seed_len;
if (!HKDF_extract(pwd_seed, &pwd_seed_len, EVP_sha256(), ikm, ikm_len, salt,
salt_len)) {
return 0;
}
uint8_t pwd_value[48]; // `len` for P-256 is 32 + 32 / 2
auto label = StringAsBytes("SAE Hash to Element u1 P1");
if (!HKDF_expand(pwd_value, sizeof(pwd_value), EVP_sha256(), pwd_seed,
pwd_seed_len, label.data(), label.size())) {
return 0;
}
EC_FELEM u1;
big_endian_reduce_to_felem(group, &u1, pwd_value);
label = StringAsBytes("SAE Hash to Element u2 P2");
if (!HKDF_expand(pwd_value, sizeof(pwd_value), EVP_sha256(), pwd_seed,
pwd_seed_len, label.data(), label.size())) {
return 0;
}
EC_FELEM u2;
big_endian_reduce_to_felem(group, &u2, pwd_value);
// Z = -10, c2 = sqrt(10)
EC_FELEM Z, c2;
if (!felem_from_u8(group, &Z, 10) ||
!ec_felem_from_bytes(group, &c2, kP256Sqrt10, sizeof(kP256Sqrt10))) {
return 0;
}
ec_felem_neg(group, &Z, &Z);
return sswu_and_add(group, &Z, &c2, &out->raw, &u1, &u2);
}
// See IEEE Std 802.11-2020, Section 12.7.1.6.2.
static int kdf_hash_length(const EVP_MD *md, Span<uint8_t> out,
Span<const uint8_t> key, Span<const uint8_t> label,
Span<const uint8_t> context) {
ScopedHMAC_CTX hmac;
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hmac.get(), key.data(), key.size(), md, nullptr)) {
return 0;
}
assert(out.size() <= 0xffff);
uint8_t len_bytes[2];
CRYPTO_store_u16_le(len_bytes, static_cast<uint16_t>(out.size() * 8));
const size_t md_len = HMAC_size(hmac.get());
for (uint16_t i = 1; !out.empty(); i++) {
uint8_t i_bytes[2];
CRYPTO_store_u16_le(i_bytes, i);
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hmac.get(), nullptr, 0, nullptr, nullptr) || // Reset
!HMAC_Update(hmac.get(), i_bytes, sizeof(i_bytes)) ||
!HMAC_Update(hmac.get(), label.data(), label.size()) ||
!HMAC_Update(hmac.get(), context.data(), context.size()) ||
!HMAC_Update(hmac.get(), len_bytes, sizeof(len_bytes))) {
return 0;
}
if (out.size() < md_len) {
uint8_t tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
if (!HMAC_Final(hmac.get(), tmp, nullptr)) {
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_memcpy(out.data(), tmp, out.size());
break;
}
if (!HMAC_Final(hmac.get(), out.data(), nullptr)) {
return 0;
}
out = out.subspan(md_len);
}
return 1;
}
int EC_wpa3_sae_hunt_and_peck_p256(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *out,
const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_len,
const uint8_t *password, size_t password_len,
uint8_t min_iterations) {
if (EC_GROUP_cmp(group, out->group, nullptr) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
}
if (EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group) != NID_X9_62_prime256v1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_GROUP_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
static constexpr size_t kFieldBytes = 32;
static constexpr size_t kFieldWords = 32 / sizeof(BN_ULONG);
assert(static_cast<int>(kFieldBytes) == BN_num_bytes(&group->field.N));
assert(static_cast<int>(kFieldWords) == group->field.N.width);
const EVP_MD *md = EVP_sha256();
static const char kPWDValueLabel[] = "SAE Hunting and Pecking";
// The KDF uses the field as the context value.
uint8_t p_bytes[kFieldBytes];
BSSL_CHECK(BN_bn2bin_padded(p_bytes, kFieldBytes, &group->field.N));
crypto_word_t ok = CONSTTIME_FALSE_W;
EC_AFFINE affine = {};
for (uint8_t counter = 1; counter != 0; counter++) {
// Compute `pwd_seed`. This is an HKDF-Extract, or HMAC.
ScopedHMAC_CTX hmac;
uint8_t pwd_seed[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned pwd_seed_len;
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hmac.get(), salt, salt_len, md, nullptr) ||
!HMAC_Update(hmac.get(), password, password_len) ||
!HMAC_Update(hmac.get(), &counter, 1) ||
!HMAC_Final(hmac.get(), pwd_seed, &pwd_seed_len)) {
return 0;
}
// Compute `pwd_value`. This uses something custom instead of HKDF-Expand.
uint8_t pwd_value[kFieldBytes];
if (!kdf_hash_length(md, Span(pwd_value), Span(pwd_seed, pwd_seed_len),
StringAsBytes(kPWDValueLabel), p_bytes)) {
return 0;
}
// Try to import `pwd_value` as a compressed point.
// The parity of y is determined by the least significant bit of `pwd_seed`.
uint8_t y_bit = pwd_seed[pwd_seed_len - 1] & 1;
EC_FELEM x, y2, y;
crypto_word_t iter_ok =
ec_felem_from_bytes_or_placeholder(group, &x, pwd_value, kFieldBytes);
ec_y_sqr_from_x(group, &y2, &x);
iter_ok &= ec_felem_sqrt_secret(group, &y, &y2, y_bit);
// Save the first valid point.
crypto_word_t save = iter_ok & ~ok;
constant_time_conditional_memcpy(affine.X.words, x.words,
sizeof(BN_ULONG) * kFieldWords, save);
constant_time_conditional_memcpy(affine.Y.words, y.words,
sizeof(BN_ULONG) * kFieldWords, save);
ok |= save;
// Stop if we've found something and iterated at least `min_iterations`.
if (constant_time_declassify_int(
ok & constant_time_ge_8(counter, min_iterations))) {
break;
}
}
if (constant_time_declassify_w(ok) == 0) {
// This should be impossible. It can only fail with probabilty 2^-256.
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
ec_affine_to_jacobian(group, &out->raw, &affine);
return 1;
}
int bssl::ec_hash_to_scalar_p384_xmd_sha384(const EC_GROUP *group,
EC_SCALAR *out, const uint8_t *dst,
size_t dst_len, const uint8_t *msg,
size_t msg_len) {
if (EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group) != NID_secp384r1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_GROUP_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
return hash_to_scalar(group, EVP_sha384(), out, dst, dst_len, /*k=*/192, msg,
msg_len);
}
int bssl::ec_hash_to_curve_p384_xmd_sha512_sswu_draft07(
const EC_GROUP *group, EC_JACOBIAN *out, const uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len,
const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len) {
// See section 8.3 of draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-07.
if (EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group) != NID_secp384r1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_GROUP_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
// Z = -12, c2 = sqrt(12)
EC_FELEM Z, c2;
if (!felem_from_u8(group, &Z, 12) ||
!ec_felem_from_bytes(group, &c2, kP384Sqrt12, sizeof(kP384Sqrt12))) {
return 0;
}
ec_felem_neg(group, &Z, &Z);
return hash_to_curve(group, EVP_sha512(), &Z, &c2, /*k=*/192, out, dst,
dst_len, msg, msg_len);
}
int bssl::ec_hash_to_scalar_p384_xmd_sha512_draft07(
const EC_GROUP *group, EC_SCALAR *out, const uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len,
const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len) {
if (EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group) != NID_secp384r1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_GROUP_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
return hash_to_scalar(group, EVP_sha512(), out, dst, dst_len, /*k=*/192, msg,
msg_len);
}