| /* crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c */ |
| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
| * All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
| * |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
| * the code are not to be removed. |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ |
| |
| #include <string.h> |
| |
| #include <openssl/asn1.h> |
| #include <openssl/digest.h> |
| #include <openssl/err.h> |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> |
| #include <openssl/obj.h> |
| #include <openssl/stack.h> |
| #include <openssl/x509.h> |
| #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
| |
| #include "../internal.h" |
| #include "../x509v3/internal.h" |
| |
| |
| int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) |
| { |
| int i; |
| X509_CINF *ai, *bi; |
| |
| ai = a->cert_info; |
| bi = b->cert_info; |
| i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber, bi->serialNumber); |
| if (i) |
| return (i); |
| return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer)); |
| } |
| |
| int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) |
| { |
| return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer, b->cert_info->issuer)); |
| } |
| |
| int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) |
| { |
| return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject, b->cert_info->subject)); |
| } |
| |
| int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) |
| { |
| return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer, b->crl->issuer)); |
| } |
| |
| int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) |
| { |
| return OPENSSL_memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20); |
| } |
| |
| X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a) |
| { |
| return (a->cert_info->issuer); |
| } |
| |
| unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x) |
| { |
| return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer)); |
| } |
| |
| unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x) |
| { |
| return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer)); |
| } |
| |
| X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a) |
| { |
| return (a->cert_info->subject); |
| } |
| |
| ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a) |
| { |
| return (a->cert_info->serialNumber); |
| } |
| |
| const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *x509) |
| { |
| return x509->cert_info->serialNumber; |
| } |
| |
| unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x) |
| { |
| return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject)); |
| } |
| |
| unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x) |
| { |
| return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject)); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB: |
| * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const" |
| * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these |
| * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring |
| * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the |
| * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast. |
| */ |
| int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) |
| { |
| /* Fill in the |sha1_hash| fields. |
| * |
| * TODO(davidben): This may fail, in which case the the hash will be all |
| * zeros. This produces a consistent comparison (failures are sticky), but |
| * not a good one. OpenSSL now returns -2, but this is not a consistent |
| * comparison and may cause misbehaving sorts by transitivity. For now, we |
| * retain the old OpenSSL behavior, which was to ignore the error. See |
| * https://crbug.com/boringssl/355. */ |
| x509v3_cache_extensions((X509 *)a); |
| x509v3_cache_extensions((X509 *)b); |
| |
| int rv = OPENSSL_memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
| if (rv) |
| return rv; |
| /* Check for match against stored encoding too */ |
| if (!a->cert_info->enc.modified && !b->cert_info->enc.modified) { |
| rv = (int)(a->cert_info->enc.len - b->cert_info->enc.len); |
| if (rv) |
| return rv; |
| return OPENSSL_memcmp(a->cert_info->enc.enc, b->cert_info->enc.enc, |
| a->cert_info->enc.len); |
| } |
| return rv; |
| } |
| |
| int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| |
| /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */ |
| |
| if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) { |
| ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL); |
| if (ret < 0) |
| return -2; |
| } |
| |
| if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) { |
| ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL); |
| if (ret < 0) |
| return -2; |
| } |
| |
| ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen; |
| |
| if (ret) |
| return ret; |
| |
| return OPENSSL_memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen); |
| |
| } |
| |
| unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x) |
| { |
| unsigned long ret = 0; |
| unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
| |
| /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ |
| i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); |
| if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(), |
| NULL)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | |
| ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) |
| ) & 0xffffffffL; |
| return (ret); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding, |
| * this is reasonably efficient. |
| */ |
| |
| unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x) |
| { |
| EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; |
| unsigned long ret = 0; |
| unsigned char md[16]; |
| |
| /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ |
| i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); |
| EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); |
| /* EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); */ |
| if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL) |
| && EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length) |
| && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL)) |
| ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | |
| ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) |
| ) & 0xffffffffL; |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); |
| |
| return (ret); |
| } |
| |
| /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */ |
| X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name, |
| ASN1_INTEGER *serial) |
| { |
| size_t i; |
| X509_CINF cinf; |
| X509 x, *x509 = NULL; |
| |
| if (!sk) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| x.cert_info = &cinf; |
| cinf.serialNumber = serial; |
| cinf.issuer = name; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { |
| x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); |
| if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0) |
| return (x509); |
| } |
| return (NULL); |
| } |
| |
| X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name) |
| { |
| X509 *x509; |
| size_t i; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { |
| x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); |
| if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0) |
| return (x509); |
| } |
| return (NULL); |
| } |
| |
| EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x) |
| { |
| if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL)) |
| return (NULL); |
| return (X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key)); |
| } |
| |
| ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x) |
| { |
| if (!x) |
| return NULL; |
| return x->cert_info->key->public_key; |
| } |
| |
| int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *k) |
| { |
| EVP_PKEY *xk; |
| int ret; |
| |
| xk = X509_get_pubkey(x); |
| |
| if (xk) |
| ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k); |
| else |
| ret = -2; |
| |
| switch (ret) { |
| case 1: |
| break; |
| case 0: |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH); |
| break; |
| case -1: |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH); |
| break; |
| case -2: |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE); |
| } |
| if (xk) |
| EVP_PKEY_free(xk); |
| if (ret > 0) |
| return 1; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID |
| * of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a |
| * flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags. |
| */ |
| |
| static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags) |
| { |
| const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL; |
| int curve_nid; |
| if (pkey && pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) |
| grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec); |
| if (!grp) |
| return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM; |
| curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp); |
| /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */ |
| if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */ |
| /* |
| * Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve. |
| */ |
| if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384) |
| return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; |
| if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS)) |
| return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; |
| /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */ |
| *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY; |
| } else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */ |
| if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256) |
| return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; |
| if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY)) |
| return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; |
| } else |
| return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE; |
| |
| return X509_V_OK; |
| } |
| |
| int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, |
| unsigned long flags) |
| { |
| int rv, sign_nid; |
| size_t i; |
| EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL; |
| unsigned long tflags; |
| if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) |
| return X509_V_OK; |
| tflags = flags; |
| /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */ |
| if (x == NULL) { |
| x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0); |
| i = 1; |
| } else |
| i = 0; |
| |
| if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) { |
| rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; |
| /* Correct error depth */ |
| i = 0; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| pk = X509_get_pubkey(x); |
| /* Check EE key only */ |
| rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags); |
| if (rv != X509_V_OK) { |
| /* Correct error depth */ |
| i = 0; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { |
| sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x); |
| x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); |
| if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) { |
| rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pk); |
| pk = X509_get_pubkey(x); |
| rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags); |
| if (rv != X509_V_OK) |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| /* Final check: root CA signature */ |
| rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags); |
| end: |
| if (pk) |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pk); |
| if (rv != X509_V_OK) { |
| /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */ |
| if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM |
| || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i) |
| i--; |
| /* |
| * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384 |
| * with P-256. Use more meaninggul error. |
| */ |
| if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags) |
| rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256; |
| if (perror_depth) |
| *perror_depth = i; |
| } |
| return rv; |
| } |
| |
| int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags) |
| { |
| int sign_nid; |
| if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) |
| return X509_V_OK; |
| sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl->sig_alg->algorithm); |
| return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference |
| * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of |
| * each X509 structure. |
| */ |
| STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain) |
| { |
| STACK_OF(X509) *ret; |
| size_t i; |
| ret = sk_X509_dup(chain); |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) { |
| X509_up_ref(sk_X509_value(ret, i)); |
| } |
| return ret; |
| } |