| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
| * All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
| * |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
| * the code are not to be removed. |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
| * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
| * distribution. |
| * |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
| * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
| * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
| * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
| * openssl-core@openssl.org. |
| * |
| * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
| * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
| * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
| * |
| * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
| * acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
| * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
| * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
| * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
| * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
| * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
| * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
| * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
| * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * ==================================================================== |
| * |
| * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
| * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
| * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. |
| * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by |
| * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ |
| |
| #include <openssl/ssl.h> |
| |
| #include <assert.h> |
| #include <limits.h> |
| #include <string.h> |
| |
| #include <openssl/buf.h> |
| #include <openssl/bytestring.h> |
| #include <openssl/err.h> |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> |
| #include <openssl/md5.h> |
| #include <openssl/nid.h> |
| #include <openssl/rand.h> |
| #include <openssl/sha.h> |
| |
| #include "../crypto/internal.h" |
| #include "internal.h" |
| |
| |
| namespace bssl { |
| |
| SSL_HANDSHAKE::SSL_HANDSHAKE(SSL *ssl_arg) |
| : ssl(ssl_arg), |
| scts_requested(0), |
| needs_psk_binder(0), |
| received_hello_retry_request(0), |
| accept_psk_mode(0), |
| cert_request(0), |
| certificate_status_expected(0), |
| ocsp_stapling_requested(0), |
| should_ack_sni(0), |
| in_false_start(0), |
| in_early_data(0), |
| early_data_offered(0), |
| can_early_read(0), |
| can_early_write(0), |
| next_proto_neg_seen(0), |
| ticket_expected(0), |
| extended_master_secret(0), |
| pending_private_key_op(0) { |
| } |
| |
| SSL_HANDSHAKE::~SSL_HANDSHAKE() { |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(secret, sizeof(secret)); |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(early_traffic_secret, sizeof(early_traffic_secret)); |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(client_handshake_secret, sizeof(client_handshake_secret)); |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(server_handshake_secret, sizeof(server_handshake_secret)); |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(client_traffic_secret_0, sizeof(client_traffic_secret_0)); |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(server_traffic_secret_0, sizeof(server_traffic_secret_0)); |
| OPENSSL_free(cookie); |
| OPENSSL_free(key_share_bytes); |
| OPENSSL_free(ecdh_public_key); |
| OPENSSL_free(peer_sigalgs); |
| OPENSSL_free(peer_supported_group_list); |
| OPENSSL_free(peer_key); |
| OPENSSL_free(server_params); |
| ssl->ctx->x509_method->hs_flush_cached_ca_names(this); |
| OPENSSL_free(certificate_types); |
| |
| if (key_block != NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(key_block, key_block_len); |
| OPENSSL_free(key_block); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| SSL_HANDSHAKE *ssl_handshake_new(SSL *ssl) { |
| UniquePtr<SSL_HANDSHAKE> hs = MakeUnique<SSL_HANDSHAKE>(ssl); |
| if (!hs || |
| !hs->transcript.Init()) { |
| return nullptr; |
| } |
| return hs.release(); |
| } |
| |
| void ssl_handshake_free(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { Delete(hs); } |
| |
| int ssl_check_message_type(SSL *ssl, int type) { |
| if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != type) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
| ERR_add_error_dataf("got type %d, wanted type %d", |
| ssl->s3->tmp.message_type, type); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int add_record_to_flight(SSL *ssl, uint8_t type, const uint8_t *in, |
| size_t in_len) { |
| /* We'll never add a flight while in the process of writing it out. */ |
| assert(ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset == 0); |
| |
| if (ssl->s3->pending_flight == NULL) { |
| ssl->s3->pending_flight = BUF_MEM_new(); |
| if (ssl->s3->pending_flight == NULL) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| size_t max_out = in_len + SSL_max_seal_overhead(ssl); |
| size_t new_cap = ssl->s3->pending_flight->length + max_out; |
| if (max_out < in_len || new_cap < max_out) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| size_t len; |
| if (!BUF_MEM_reserve(ssl->s3->pending_flight, new_cap) || |
| !tls_seal_record(ssl, (uint8_t *)ssl->s3->pending_flight->data + |
| ssl->s3->pending_flight->length, |
| &len, max_out, type, in, in_len)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| ssl->s3->pending_flight->length += len; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_init_message(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb, CBB *body, uint8_t type) { |
| /* Pick a modest size hint to save most of the |realloc| calls. */ |
| if (!CBB_init(cbb, 64) || |
| !CBB_add_u8(cbb, type) || |
| !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(cbb, body)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| CBB_cleanup(cbb); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_finish_message(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb, uint8_t **out_msg, |
| size_t *out_len) { |
| if (!CBB_finish(cbb, out_msg, out_len)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_add_message(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *msg, size_t len) { |
| /* Add the message to the current flight, splitting into several records if |
| * needed. */ |
| int ret = 0; |
| size_t added = 0; |
| do { |
| size_t todo = len - added; |
| if (todo > ssl->max_send_fragment) { |
| todo = ssl->max_send_fragment; |
| } |
| |
| uint8_t type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; |
| if (ssl->server && |
| ssl->s3->have_version && |
| ssl->version == TLS1_3_RECORD_TYPE_EXPERIMENT_VERSION && |
| ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->is_null_cipher()) { |
| type = SSL3_RT_PLAINTEXT_HANDSHAKE; |
| } |
| |
| if (!add_record_to_flight(ssl, type, msg + added, todo)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| added += todo; |
| } while (added < len); |
| |
| ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, msg, len); |
| /* TODO(svaldez): Move this up a layer to fix abstraction for SSLTranscript on |
| * hs. */ |
| if (ssl->s3->hs != NULL && |
| !ssl->s3->hs->transcript.Update(msg, len)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| ret = 1; |
| |
| err: |
| OPENSSL_free(msg); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_add_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl) { |
| static const uint8_t kChangeCipherSpec[1] = {SSL3_MT_CCS}; |
| |
| if (!add_record_to_flight(ssl, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, kChangeCipherSpec, |
| sizeof(kChangeCipherSpec))) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, |
| kChangeCipherSpec, sizeof(kChangeCipherSpec)); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_add_alert(SSL *ssl, uint8_t level, uint8_t desc) { |
| uint8_t alert[2] = {level, desc}; |
| if (!add_record_to_flight(ssl, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert, sizeof(alert))) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert, sizeof(alert)); |
| ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, ((int)level << 8) | desc); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_add_message_cbb(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb) { |
| uint8_t *msg; |
| size_t len; |
| if (!ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, cbb, &msg, &len) || |
| !ssl->method->add_message(ssl, msg, len)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_flush_flight(SSL *ssl) { |
| if (ssl->s3->pending_flight == NULL) { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl->s3->pending_flight->length > 0xffffffff || |
| ssl->s3->pending_flight->length > INT_MAX) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* If there is pending data in the write buffer, it must be flushed out before |
| * any new data in pending_flight. */ |
| if (ssl_write_buffer_is_pending(ssl)) { |
| int ret = ssl_write_buffer_flush(ssl); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| ssl->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; |
| return ret; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Write the pending flight. */ |
| while (ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset < ssl->s3->pending_flight->length) { |
| int ret = BIO_write( |
| ssl->wbio, |
| ssl->s3->pending_flight->data + ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset, |
| ssl->s3->pending_flight->length - ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| ssl->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset += ret; |
| } |
| |
| if (BIO_flush(ssl->wbio) <= 0) { |
| ssl->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| BUF_MEM_free(ssl->s3->pending_flight); |
| ssl->s3->pending_flight = NULL; |
| ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset = 0; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_send_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { |
| SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; |
| const SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl); |
| |
| uint8_t finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| size_t finished_len; |
| if (!hs->transcript.GetFinishedMAC(finished, &finished_len, session, |
| ssl->server, ssl3_protocol_version(ssl))) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. */ |
| if (!ssl_log_secret(ssl, "CLIENT_RANDOM", |
| session->master_key, |
| session->master_key_length)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Copy the Finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks. */ |
| if (ssl->version != SSL3_VERSION) { |
| if (finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished) || |
| finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl->server) { |
| OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished, finished, finished_len); |
| ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finished_len; |
| } else { |
| OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, finished, finished_len); |
| ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finished_len; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| ScopedCBB cbb; |
| CBB body; |
| if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_FINISHED) || |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&body, finished, finished_len) || |
| !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_get_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { |
| SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; |
| int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, SSL3_MT_FINISHED)) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* Snapshot the finished hash before incorporating the new message. */ |
| uint8_t finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| size_t finished_len; |
| if (!hs->transcript.GetFinishedMAC(finished, &finished_len, |
| SSL_get_session(ssl), !ssl->server, |
| ssl3_protocol_version(ssl)) || |
| !ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| int finished_ok = ssl->init_num == finished_len && |
| CRYPTO_memcmp(ssl->init_msg, finished, finished_len) == 0; |
| #if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE) |
| finished_ok = 1; |
| #endif |
| if (!finished_ok) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* Copy the Finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks. */ |
| if (ssl->version != SSL3_VERSION) { |
| if (finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished) || |
| finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl->server) { |
| OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, finished, finished_len); |
| ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finished_len; |
| } else { |
| OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished, finished, finished_len); |
| ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finished_len; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *ssl) { |
| ScopedCBB cbb; |
| CBB body; |
| if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) || |
| !ssl_add_cert_chain(ssl, &body) || |
| !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| size_t ssl_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *ssl) { |
| /* kMaxMessageLen is the default maximum message size for handshakes which do |
| * not accept peer certificate chains. */ |
| static const size_t kMaxMessageLen = 16384; |
| |
| if (SSL_in_init(ssl)) { |
| if ((!ssl->server || (ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) && |
| kMaxMessageLen < ssl->max_cert_list) { |
| return ssl->max_cert_list; |
| } |
| return kMaxMessageLen; |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) { |
| /* In TLS 1.2 and below, the largest acceptable post-handshake message is |
| * a HelloRequest. */ |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl->server) { |
| /* The largest acceptable post-handshake message for a server is a |
| * KeyUpdate. We will never initiate post-handshake auth. */ |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* Clients must accept NewSessionTicket and CertificateRequest, so allow the |
| * default size. */ |
| return kMaxMessageLen; |
| } |
| |
| static int extend_handshake_buffer(SSL *ssl, size_t length) { |
| if (!BUF_MEM_reserve(ssl->init_buf, length)) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| while (ssl->init_buf->length < length) { |
| int ret = ssl3_read_handshake_bytes( |
| ssl, (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data + ssl->init_buf->length, |
| length - ssl->init_buf->length); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| ssl->init_buf->length += (size_t)ret; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int read_v2_client_hello(SSL *ssl) { |
| /* Read the first 5 bytes, the size of the TLS record header. This is |
| * sufficient to detect a V2ClientHello and ensures that we never read beyond |
| * the first record. */ |
| int ret = ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(ssl, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| const uint8_t *p = ssl_read_buffer(ssl); |
| |
| /* Some dedicated error codes for protocol mixups should the application wish |
| * to interpret them differently. (These do not overlap with ClientHello or |
| * V2ClientHello.) */ |
| if (strncmp("GET ", (const char *)p, 4) == 0 || |
| strncmp("POST ", (const char *)p, 5) == 0 || |
| strncmp("HEAD ", (const char *)p, 5) == 0 || |
| strncmp("PUT ", (const char *)p, 4) == 0) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| if (strncmp("CONNE", (const char *)p, 5) == 0) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if ((p[0] & 0x80) == 0 || p[2] != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO || |
| p[3] != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { |
| /* Not a V2ClientHello. */ |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* Determine the length of the V2ClientHello. */ |
| size_t msg_length = ((p[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | p[1]; |
| if (msg_length > (1024 * 4)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| if (msg_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - 2) { |
| /* Reject lengths that are too short early. We have already read |
| * |SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH| bytes, so we should not attempt to process an |
| * (invalid) V2ClientHello which would be shorter than that. */ |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* Read the remainder of the V2ClientHello. */ |
| ret = ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(ssl, 2 + msg_length); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| CBS v2_client_hello; |
| CBS_init(&v2_client_hello, ssl_read_buffer(ssl) + 2, msg_length); |
| |
| /* The V2ClientHello without the length is incorporated into the handshake |
| * hash. This is only ever called at the start of the handshake, so hs is |
| * guaranteed to be non-NULL. */ |
| if (!ssl->s3->hs->transcript.Update(CBS_data(&v2_client_hello), |
| CBS_len(&v2_client_hello))) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, 0 /* V2ClientHello */, |
| CBS_data(&v2_client_hello), CBS_len(&v2_client_hello)); |
| |
| uint8_t msg_type; |
| uint16_t version, cipher_spec_length, session_id_length, challenge_length; |
| CBS cipher_specs, session_id, challenge; |
| if (!CBS_get_u8(&v2_client_hello, &msg_type) || |
| !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &version) || |
| !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &cipher_spec_length) || |
| !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &session_id_length) || |
| !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &challenge_length) || |
| !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &cipher_specs, cipher_spec_length) || |
| !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &session_id, session_id_length) || |
| !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &challenge, challenge_length) || |
| CBS_len(&v2_client_hello) != 0) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* msg_type has already been checked. */ |
| assert(msg_type == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO); |
| |
| /* The client_random is the V2ClientHello challenge. Truncate or |
| * left-pad with zeros as needed. */ |
| size_t rand_len = CBS_len(&challenge); |
| if (rand_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) { |
| rand_len = SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; |
| } |
| uint8_t random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE]; |
| OPENSSL_memset(random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
| OPENSSL_memcpy(random + (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - rand_len), CBS_data(&challenge), |
| rand_len); |
| |
| /* Write out an equivalent SSLv3 ClientHello. */ |
| size_t max_v3_client_hello = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2 /* version */ + |
| SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 /* session ID length */ + |
| 2 /* cipher list length */ + |
| CBS_len(&cipher_specs) / 3 * 2 + |
| 1 /* compression length */ + 1 /* compression */; |
| ScopedCBB client_hello; |
| CBB hello_body, cipher_suites; |
| if (!BUF_MEM_reserve(ssl->init_buf, max_v3_client_hello) || |
| !CBB_init_fixed(client_hello.get(), (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data, |
| ssl->init_buf->max) || |
| !CBB_add_u8(client_hello.get(), SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) || |
| !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(client_hello.get(), &hello_body) || |
| !CBB_add_u16(&hello_body, version) || |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&hello_body, random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || |
| /* No session id. */ |
| !CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) || |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&hello_body, &cipher_suites)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* Copy the cipher suites. */ |
| while (CBS_len(&cipher_specs) > 0) { |
| uint32_t cipher_spec; |
| if (!CBS_get_u24(&cipher_specs, &cipher_spec)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* Skip SSLv2 ciphers. */ |
| if ((cipher_spec & 0xff0000) != 0) { |
| continue; |
| } |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(&cipher_suites, cipher_spec)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Add the null compression scheme and finish. */ |
| if (!CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 1) || |
| !CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) || |
| !CBB_finish(client_hello.get(), NULL, &ssl->init_buf->length)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* Consume and discard the V2ClientHello. */ |
| ssl_read_buffer_consume(ssl, 2 + msg_length); |
| ssl_read_buffer_discard(ssl); |
| |
| ssl->s3->is_v2_hello = 1; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_get_message(SSL *ssl) { |
| if (ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message) { |
| /* There must be a current message. */ |
| assert(ssl->init_msg != NULL); |
| ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 0; |
| } else { |
| ssl3_release_current_message(ssl); |
| } |
| |
| /* Re-create the handshake buffer if needed. */ |
| if (ssl->init_buf == NULL) { |
| ssl->init_buf = BUF_MEM_new(); |
| if (ssl->init_buf == NULL) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl->server && !ssl->s3->v2_hello_done) { |
| /* Bypass the record layer for the first message to handle V2ClientHello. */ |
| int ret = read_v2_client_hello(ssl); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| ssl->s3->v2_hello_done = 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* Read the message header, if we haven't yet. */ |
| int ret = extend_handshake_buffer(ssl, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* Parse out the length. Cap it so the peer cannot force us to buffer up to |
| * 2^24 bytes. */ |
| const uint8_t *p = (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data; |
| size_t msg_len = (((uint32_t)p[1]) << 16) | (((uint32_t)p[2]) << 8) | p[3]; |
| if (msg_len > ssl_max_handshake_message_len(ssl)) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* Read the message body, if we haven't yet. */ |
| ret = extend_handshake_buffer(ssl, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + msg_len); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* We have now received a complete message. */ |
| if (ssl->init_msg == NULL && !ssl->s3->is_v2_hello) { |
| ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, |
| ssl->init_buf->data, ssl->init_buf->length); |
| } |
| |
| ssl->s3->tmp.message_type = ((const uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data)[0]; |
| ssl->init_msg = (uint8_t*)ssl->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; |
| ssl->init_num = ssl->init_buf->length - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| void ssl3_get_current_message(const SSL *ssl, CBS *out) { |
| CBS_init(out, (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data, ssl->init_buf->length); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_hash_current_message(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { |
| /* V2ClientHellos are hashed implicitly. */ |
| if (hs->ssl->s3->is_v2_hello) { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| CBS cbs; |
| hs->ssl->method->get_current_message(hs->ssl, &cbs); |
| return hs->transcript.Update(CBS_data(&cbs), CBS_len(&cbs)); |
| } |
| |
| void ssl3_release_current_message(SSL *ssl) { |
| if (ssl->init_msg == NULL) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| /* |init_buf| never contains data beyond the current message. */ |
| assert(SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + ssl->init_num == ssl->init_buf->length); |
| |
| /* Clear the current message. */ |
| ssl->init_msg = NULL; |
| ssl->init_num = 0; |
| ssl->init_buf->length = 0; |
| ssl->s3->is_v2_hello = 0; |
| |
| /* Post-handshake messages are rare, so release the buffer after every |
| * message. During the handshake, |on_handshake_complete| will release it. */ |
| if (!SSL_in_init(ssl)) { |
| BUF_MEM_free(ssl->init_buf); |
| ssl->init_buf = NULL; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_parse_extensions(const CBS *cbs, uint8_t *out_alert, |
| const SSL_EXTENSION_TYPE *ext_types, |
| size_t num_ext_types, int ignore_unknown) { |
| /* Reset everything. */ |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < num_ext_types; i++) { |
| *ext_types[i].out_present = 0; |
| CBS_init(ext_types[i].out_data, NULL, 0); |
| } |
| |
| CBS copy = *cbs; |
| while (CBS_len(©) != 0) { |
| uint16_t type; |
| CBS data; |
| if (!CBS_get_u16(©, &type) || |
| !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(©, &data)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| const SSL_EXTENSION_TYPE *ext_type = NULL; |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < num_ext_types; i++) { |
| if (type == ext_types[i].type) { |
| ext_type = &ext_types[i]; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (ext_type == NULL) { |
| if (ignore_unknown) { |
| continue; |
| } |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION); |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Duplicate ext_types are forbidden. */ |
| if (*ext_type->out_present) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DUPLICATE_EXTENSION); |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| *ext_type->out_present = 1; |
| *ext_type->out_data = data; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| enum ssl_verify_result_t ssl_verify_peer_cert(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { |
| SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; |
| uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN; |
| enum ssl_verify_result_t ret; |
| if (ssl->custom_verify_callback != nullptr) { |
| ret = ssl->custom_verify_callback(ssl, &alert); |
| switch (ret) { |
| case ssl_verify_ok: |
| hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_OK; |
| break; |
| case ssl_verify_invalid: |
| hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION; |
| break; |
| case ssl_verify_retry: |
| break; |
| } |
| } else { |
| ret = ssl->ctx->x509_method->session_verify_cert_chain( |
| hs->new_session.get(), ssl, &alert) |
| ? ssl_verify_ok |
| : ssl_verify_invalid; |
| } |
| |
| if (ret == ssl_verify_invalid) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert); |
| } |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| uint16_t ssl_get_grease_value(const SSL *ssl, enum ssl_grease_index_t index) { |
| /* Use the client_random or server_random for entropy. This both avoids |
| * calling |RAND_bytes| on a single byte repeatedly and ensures the values are |
| * deterministic. This allows the same ClientHello be sent twice for a |
| * HelloRetryRequest or the same group be advertised in both supported_groups |
| * and key_shares. */ |
| uint16_t ret = ssl->server ? ssl->s3->server_random[index] |
| : ssl->s3->client_random[index]; |
| /* The first four bytes of server_random are a timestamp prior to TLS 1.3, but |
| * servers have no fields to GREASE until TLS 1.3. */ |
| assert(!ssl->server || ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION); |
| /* This generates a random value of the form 0xωaωa, for all 0 ≤ ω < 16. */ |
| ret = (ret & 0xf0) | 0x0a; |
| ret |= ret << 8; |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| } // namespace bssl |