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boringssl / boringssl / e2e13265ff9cb637f8d0cdefc27b13370848472f / . / ssl / ssl_sess.c
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license.
*
* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
*
* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
*
* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
* to make use of the Contribution.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
* OTHERWISE. */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <openssl/engine.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/lhash.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
/* The address of this is a magic value, a pointer to which is returned by
* SSL_magic_pending_session_ptr(). It allows a session callback to indicate
* that it needs to asynchronously fetch session information. */
static const char g_pending_session_magic = 0;
static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s);
static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s);
static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck);
SSL_SESSION *SSL_magic_pending_session_ptr(void) {
return (SSL_SESSION *)&g_pending_session_magic;
}
SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl)
{
/* aka SSL_get0_session; gets 0 objects, just returns a copy of the pointer */
return ssl->session;
}
SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl) {
/* variant of SSL_get_session: caller really gets something */
return SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ssl->session);
}
int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, argl, argp,
new_func, dup_func, free_func);
}
int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *s, int idx, void *arg) {
return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg);
}
void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *s, int idx) {
return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx);
}
SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void) {
SSL_SESSION *ss;
ss = (SSL_SESSION *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
if (ss == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_SESSION_new, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
memset(ss, 0, sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
ss->verify_result = 1; /* avoid 0 (= X509_V_OK) just in case */
ss->references = 1;
ss->timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT;
ss->time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data);
return ss;
}
const uint8_t *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len) {
if (len) {
*len = s->session_id_length;
}
return s->session_id;
}
/* Even with SSLv2, we have 16 bytes (128 bits) of session ID space.
* SSLv3/TLSv1 has 32 bytes (256 bits). As such, filling the ID with random
* gunk repeatedly until we have no conflict is going to complete in one
* iteration pretty much "most" of the time (btw: understatement). So, if it
* takes us 10 iterations and we still can't avoid a conflict - well that's a
* reasonable point to call it quits. Either the RAND code is broken or someone
* is trying to open roughly very close to 2^128 (or 2^256) SSL sessions to our
* server. How you might store that many sessions is perhaps a more interesting
* question ... */
static int def_generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *id,
unsigned int *id_len) {
static const unsigned kMaxAttempts = 10;
unsigned int retry = 0;
do {
if (!RAND_bytes(id, *id_len)) {
return 0;
}
} while (SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) &&
(++retry < kMaxAttempts));
if (retry < kMaxAttempts) {
return 1;
}
/* else - woops a session_id match */
/* XXX We should also check the external cache -- but the probability of a
* collision is negligible, and we could not prevent the concurrent creation
* of sessions with identical IDs since we currently don't have means to
* atomically check whether a session ID already exists and make a
* reservation for it if it does not (this problem applies to the internal
* cache as well). */
return 0;
}
int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session) {
/* This gets used by clients and servers. */
unsigned int tmp;
SSL_SESSION *ss = NULL;
GEN_SESSION_CB cb = def_generate_session_id;
if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_SESSION_CREATION) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_new_session,
SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
return 0;
}
ss = SSL_SESSION_new();
if (ss == NULL) {
return 0;
}
/* If the context has a default timeout, use it over the default. */
if (s->initial_ctx->session_timeout != 0) {
ss->timeout = s->initial_ctx->session_timeout;
}
if (s->session != NULL) {
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session = NULL;
}
if (session) {
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == TLS1_VERSION ||
s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION || s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION ||
s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_2_VERSION) {
ss->ssl_version = s->version;
ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
} else {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_new_session,
SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION);
SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
return 0;
}
/* If RFC4507 ticket use empty session ID */
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
ss->session_id_length = 0;
goto sess_id_done;
}
/* Choose which callback will set the session ID */
CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
if (s->generate_session_id) {
cb = s->generate_session_id;
} else if (s->initial_ctx->generate_session_id) {
cb = s->initial_ctx->generate_session_id;
}
CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
/* Choose a session ID */
tmp = ss->session_id_length;
if (!cb(s, ss->session_id, &tmp)) {
/* The callback failed */
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_new_session,
SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED);
SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
return 0;
}
/* Don't allow the callback to set the session length to zero. nor set it
* higher than it was. */
if (!tmp || tmp > ss->session_id_length) {
/* The callback set an illegal length */
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_new_session,
SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH);
SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
return 0;
}
ss->session_id_length = tmp;
/* Finally, check for a conflict */
if (SSL_has_matching_session_id(s, ss->session_id, ss->session_id_length)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_new_session,
SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT);
SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
return 0;
}
sess_id_done:
if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
ss->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
if (ss->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_new_session, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
return 0;
}
}
} else {
ss->session_id_length = 0;
}
if (s->sid_ctx_length > sizeof(ss->sid_ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_new_session, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
return 0;
}
memcpy(ss->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
ss->sid_ctx_length = s->sid_ctx_length;
s->session = ss;
ss->ssl_version = s->version;
ss->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
return 1;
}
/* ssl_get_prev attempts to find an SSL_SESSION to be used to resume this
* connection. It is only called by servers.
*
* ctx: contains the early callback context, which is the result of a
* shallow parse of the ClientHello.
*
* Returns:
* -1: error
* 0: a session may have been found.
*
* Side effects:
* - If a session is found then s->session is pointed at it (after freeing an
* existing session if need be) and s->verify_result is set from the session.
* - Both for new and resumed sessions, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 1
* if the server should issue a new session ticket (to 0 otherwise). */
int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx) {
/* This is used only by servers. */
SSL_SESSION *ret = NULL;
int fatal = 0;
int try_session_cache = 1;
int r;
if (ctx->session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
goto err;
}
if (ctx->session_id_len == 0) {
try_session_cache = 0;
}
r = tls1_process_ticket(s, ctx, &ret); /* sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected */
switch (r) {
case -1: /* Error during processing */
fatal = 1;
goto err;
case 0: /* No ticket found */
case 1: /* Zero length ticket found */
break; /* Ok to carry on processing session id. */
case 2: /* Ticket found but not decrypted. */
case 3: /* Ticket decrypted, *ret has been set. */
try_session_cache = 0;
break;
default:
abort();
}
if (try_session_cache && ret == NULL &&
!(s->initial_ctx->session_cache_mode &
SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP)) {
SSL_SESSION data;
data.ssl_version = s->version;
data.session_id_length = ctx->session_id_len;
if (ctx->session_id_len == 0) {
return 0;
}
memcpy(data.session_id, ctx->session_id, ctx->session_id_len);
CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
ret = SSL_SESSION_up_ref(lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(s->initial_ctx->sessions,
&data));
CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
}
if (try_session_cache && ret == NULL &&
s->initial_ctx->get_session_cb != NULL) {
int copy = 1;
ret = s->initial_ctx->get_session_cb(s, (uint8_t *)ctx->session_id,
ctx->session_id_len, &copy);
if (ret != NULL) {
if (ret == SSL_magic_pending_session_ptr()) {
/* This is a magic value which indicates that the callback needs to
* unwind the stack and figure out the session asynchronously. */
return PENDING_SESSION;
}
/* Increment reference count now if the session callback asks us to do so
* (note that if the session structures returned by the callback are
* shared between threads, it must handle the reference count itself
* [i.e. copy == 0], or things won't be thread-safe). */
if (copy) {
SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ret);
}
/* Add the externally cached session to the internal cache as well if and
* only if we are supposed to. */
if (!(s->initial_ctx->session_cache_mode &
SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)) {
/* The following should not return 1, otherwise, things are very
* strange */
SSL_CTX_add_session(s->initial_ctx, ret);
}
}
}
if (ret == NULL) {
goto err;
}
/* Now ret is non-NULL and we own one of its reference counts. */
if (ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length ||
memcmp(ret->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, ret->sid_ctx_length)) {
/* We have the session requested by the client, but we don't want to use it
* in this context. */
goto err; /* treat like cache miss */
}
if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && s->sid_ctx_length == 0) {
/* We can't be sure if this session is being used out of context, which is
* especially important for SSL_VERIFY_PEER. The application should have
* used SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context.
*
* For this error case, we generate an error instead of treating the event
* like a cache miss (otherwise it would be easy for applications to
* effectively disable the session cache by accident without anyone
* noticing). */
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_prev_session,
SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED);
fatal = 1;
goto err;
}
if (ret->timeout < (long)(time(NULL) - ret->time)) {
/* timeout */
if (try_session_cache) {
/* session was from the cache, so remove it */
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->initial_ctx, ret);
}
goto err;
}
if (s->session != NULL) {
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
}
s->session = ret;
s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
return 1;
err:
if (ret != NULL) {
SSL_SESSION_free(ret);
if (!try_session_cache) {
/* The session was from a ticket, so we should
* issue a ticket for the new session */
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
}
}
if (fatal) {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c) {
int ret = 0;
SSL_SESSION *s;
/* add just 1 reference count for the SSL_CTX's session cache even though it
* has two ways of access: each session is in a doubly linked list and an
* lhash */
SSL_SESSION_up_ref(c);
/* if session c is in already in cache, we take back the increment later */
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
if (!lh_SSL_SESSION_insert(ctx->sessions, &s, c)) {
return 0;
}
/* s != NULL iff we already had a session with the given PID. In this case, s
* == c should hold (then we did not really modify ctx->sessions), or we're
* in trouble. */
if (s != NULL && s != c) {
/* We *are* in trouble ... */
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, s);
SSL_SESSION_free(s);
/* ... so pretend the other session did not exist in cache (we cannot
* handle two SSL_SESSION structures with identical session ID in the same
* cache, which could happen e.g. when two threads concurrently obtain the
* same session from an external cache) */
s = NULL;
}
/* Put at the head of the queue unless it is already in the cache */
if (s == NULL) {
SSL_SESSION_list_add(ctx, c);
}
if (s != NULL) {
/* existing cache entry -- decrement previously incremented reference count
* because it already takes into account the cache */
SSL_SESSION_free(s); /* s == c */
ret = 0;
} else {
/* new cache entry -- remove old ones if cache has become too large */
ret = 1;
if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0) {
while (SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) > SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx)) {
if (!remove_session_lock(ctx, ctx->session_cache_tail, 0)) {
break;
}
}
}
}
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
return ret;
}
int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c) {
return remove_session_lock(ctx, c, 1);
}
static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lock) {
SSL_SESSION *r;
int ret = 0;
if (c != NULL && c->session_id_length != 0) {
if (lock) {
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
}
r = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ctx->sessions, c);
if (r == c) {
ret = 1;
r = lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(ctx->sessions, c);
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, c);
}
if (lock) {
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
}
if (ret) {
r->not_resumable = 1;
if (ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL) {
ctx->remove_session_cb(ctx, r);
}
SSL_SESSION_free(r);
}
}
return ret;
}
SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_up_ref(SSL_SESSION *session) {
if (session) {
CRYPTO_add(&session->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
}
return session;
}
void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ss) {
int i;
if (ss == NULL) {
return;
}
i = CRYPTO_add(&ss->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
if (i > 0) {
return;
}
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data);
OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->master_key, sizeof ss->master_key);
OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->session_id, sizeof ss->session_id);
if (ss->sess_cert != NULL) {
ssl_sess_cert_free(ss->sess_cert);
}
if (ss->peer != NULL) {
X509_free(ss->peer);
}
if (ss->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_hostname);
}
if (ss->tlsext_tick != NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_tick);
}
if (ss->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list != NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list);
}
if (ss->ocsp_response != NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(ss->ocsp_response);
}
if (ss->psk_identity != NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(ss->psk_identity);
}
OPENSSL_cleanse(ss, sizeof(*ss));
OPENSSL_free(ss);
}
int SSL_set_session(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *session) {
if (s->session == session) {
return 1;
}
if (s->session != NULL) {
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
}
s->session = session;
if (session != NULL) {
SSL_SESSION_up_ref(session);
s->verify_result = session->verify_result;
}
return 1;
}
long SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long t) {
if (s == NULL) {
return 0;
}
s->timeout = t;
return 1;
}
long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s) {
if (s == NULL) {
return 0;
}
return s->timeout;
}
long SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *s) {
if (s == NULL) {
return 0;
}
return s->time;
}
long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long t) {
if (s == NULL) {
return 0;
}
s->time = t;
return t;
}
X509 *SSL_SESSION_get0_peer(SSL_SESSION *s) { return s->peer; }
int SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(SSL_SESSION *s, const uint8_t *sid_ctx,
unsigned int sid_ctx_len) {
if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context,
SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
}
s->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len;
memcpy(s->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
return 1;
}
long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *s, long t) {
long l;
if (s == NULL) {
return 0;
}
l = s->session_timeout;
s->session_timeout = t;
return l;
}
long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(const SSL_CTX *s) {
if (s == NULL) {
return 0;
}
return s->session_timeout;
}
typedef struct timeout_param_st {
SSL_CTX *ctx;
long time;
LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) * cache;
} TIMEOUT_PARAM;
static void timeout_doall_arg(SSL_SESSION *sess, void *void_param) {
TIMEOUT_PARAM *param = void_param;
if (param->time == 0 ||
param->time > (sess->time + sess->timeout)) {
/* timeout */
/* The reason we don't call SSL_CTX_remove_session() is to
* save on locking overhead */
(void) lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(param->cache, sess);
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(param->ctx, sess);
sess->not_resumable = 1;
if (param->ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL) {
param->ctx->remove_session_cb(param->ctx, sess);
}
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
}
}
void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *s, long t) {
TIMEOUT_PARAM tp;
tp.ctx = s;
tp.cache = s->sessions;
if (tp.cache == NULL) {
return;
}
tp.time = t;
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
lh_SSL_SESSION_doall_arg(tp.cache, timeout_doall_arg, &tp);
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
}
int ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s) {
if (s->session != NULL && !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) &&
!SSL_in_init(s)) {
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/* locked by SSL_CTX in the calling function */
static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s) {
if (s->next == NULL || s->prev == NULL) {
return;
}
if (s->next == (SSL_SESSION *)&ctx->session_cache_tail) {
/* last element in list */
if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&ctx->session_cache_head) {
/* only one element in list */
ctx->session_cache_head = NULL;
ctx->session_cache_tail = NULL;
} else {
ctx->session_cache_tail = s->prev;
s->prev->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
}
} else {
if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&ctx->session_cache_head) {
/* first element in list */
ctx->session_cache_head = s->next;
s->next->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
} else { /* middle of list */
s->next->prev = s->prev;
s->prev->next = s->next;
}
}
s->prev = s->next = NULL;
}
static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s) {
if (s->next != NULL && s->prev != NULL) {
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, s);
}
if (ctx->session_cache_head == NULL) {
ctx->session_cache_head = s;
ctx->session_cache_tail = s;
s->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
s->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
} else {
s->next = ctx->session_cache_head;
s->next->prev = s;
s->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
ctx->session_cache_head = s;
}
}
void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
int (*cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess)) {
ctx->new_session_cb = cb;
}
int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess) {
return ctx->new_session_cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
void (*cb)(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess)) {
ctx->remove_session_cb = cb;
}
void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL_CTX *ctx,
SSL_SESSION *sess) {
return ctx->remove_session_cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
SSL_SESSION *(*cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl,
uint8_t *data, int len,
int *copy)) {
ctx->get_session_cb = cb;
}
SSL_SESSION *(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *data,
int len, int *copy) {
return ctx->get_session_cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)) {
ctx->info_callback = cb;
}
void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx))(const SSL *ssl, int type,
int val) {
return ctx->info_callback;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509,
EVP_PKEY **pkey)) {
ctx->client_cert_cb = cb;
}
int (*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509,
EVP_PKEY **pkey) {
return ctx->client_cert_cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_channel_id_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
void (*cb)(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY **pkey)) {
ctx->channel_id_cb = cb;
}
void (*SSL_CTX_get_channel_id_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY **pkey) {
return ctx->channel_id_cb;
}
IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION, PEM_STRING_SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)