| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
| * All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
| * |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
| * the code are not to be removed. |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
| * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
| * distribution. |
| * |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
| * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
| * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
| * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
| * openssl-core@openssl.org. |
| * |
| * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
| * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
| * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
| * |
| * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
| * acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
| * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
| * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
| * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
| * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
| * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
| * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
| * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
| * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * ==================================================================== |
| * |
| * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
| * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
| * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */ |
| |
| #include <assert.h> |
| #include <errno.h> |
| #include <limits.h> |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| |
| #include <openssl/buf.h> |
| #include <openssl/err.h> |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> |
| #include <openssl/rand.h> |
| |
| #include "ssl_locl.h" |
| |
| static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, |
| unsigned int len, char fragment, char is_fragment); |
| static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s); |
| |
| int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend) |
| { |
| /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase |
| * packet by another n bytes. |
| * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified |
| * by s->packet and s->packet_length. |
| * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf |
| * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].) |
| */ |
| int i,len,left; |
| long align=0; |
| unsigned char *pkt; |
| SSL3_BUFFER *rb; |
| |
| if (n <= 0) return n; |
| |
| rb = &(s->s3->rbuf); |
| if (rb->buf == NULL) |
| if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) |
| return -1; |
| |
| left = rb->left; |
| #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 |
| align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; |
| align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1); |
| #endif |
| |
| if (!extend) |
| { |
| /* start with empty packet ... */ |
| if (left == 0) |
| rb->offset = align; |
| else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) |
| { |
| /* check if next packet length is large |
| * enough to justify payload alignment... */ |
| pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset; |
| if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA |
| && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128) |
| { |
| /* Note that even if packet is corrupted |
| * and its length field is insane, we can |
| * only be led to wrong decision about |
| * whether memmove will occur or not. |
| * Header values has no effect on memmove |
| * arguments and therefore no buffer |
| * overrun can be triggered. */ |
| memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left); |
| rb->offset = align; |
| } |
| } |
| s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset; |
| s->packet_length = 0; |
| /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */ |
| } |
| |
| /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets |
| * because the read operation returns the whole packet |
| * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */ |
| if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
| { |
| if (left > 0 && n > left) |
| n = left; |
| } |
| |
| /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */ |
| if (left >= n) |
| { |
| s->packet_length+=n; |
| rb->left=left-n; |
| rb->offset+=n; |
| return(n); |
| } |
| |
| /* else we need to read more data */ |
| |
| len = s->packet_length; |
| pkt = rb->buf+align; |
| /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer: |
| * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet', |
| * 'left' extra ones at the end */ |
| if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */ |
| { |
| memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left); |
| s->packet = pkt; |
| rb->offset = len + align; |
| } |
| |
| if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */ |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_n, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (!s->read_ahead) |
| /* ignore max parameter */ |
| max = n; |
| else |
| { |
| if (max < n) |
| max = n; |
| if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) |
| max = rb->len - rb->offset; |
| } |
| |
| while (left < n) |
| { |
| /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf |
| * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to |
| * len+max if possible) */ |
| |
| ERR_clear_system_error(); |
| if (s->rbio != NULL) |
| { |
| s->rwstate=SSL_READING; |
| i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_n, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET); |
| i = -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (i <= 0) |
| { |
| rb->left = left; |
| if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && |
| !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
| if (len+left == 0) |
| ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); |
| return(i); |
| } |
| left+=i; |
| /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because |
| * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed |
| * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */ |
| if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
| { |
| if (n > left) |
| n = left; /* makes the while condition false */ |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* done reading, now the book-keeping */ |
| rb->offset += n; |
| rb->left = left - n; |
| s->packet_length += n; |
| s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
| return(n); |
| } |
| |
| /* MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that will |
| * be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an attacker |
| * could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and cause |
| * ssl3_get_record to loop forever. */ |
| #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32 |
| |
| /* Call this to get a new input record. |
| * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error |
| * or non-blocking IO. |
| * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in |
| * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record |
| * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data |
| * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes |
| */ |
| /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */ |
| static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) |
| { |
| int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al; |
| int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1; |
| SSL3_RECORD *rr; |
| SSL_SESSION *sess; |
| unsigned char *p; |
| unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| short version; |
| unsigned mac_size, orig_len; |
| size_t extra; |
| unsigned empty_record_count = 0; |
| |
| rr= &(s->s3->rrec); |
| sess=s->session; |
| |
| if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER) |
| extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA; |
| else |
| extra=0; |
| if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra) |
| { |
| /* An application error: SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER |
| * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */ |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_record, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| again: |
| /* check if we have the header */ |
| if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || |
| (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) |
| { |
| n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0); |
| if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */ |
| s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY; |
| |
| p=s->packet; |
| if (s->msg_callback) |
| s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
| |
| /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */ |
| rr->type= *(p++); |
| ssl_major= *(p++); |
| ssl_minor= *(p++); |
| version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor; |
| n2s(p,rr->length); |
| #if 0 |
| fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length); |
| #endif |
| |
| /* Lets check version */ |
| if (!s->first_packet) |
| { |
| if (version != s->version) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_record, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); |
| if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) |
| /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */ |
| s->version = (unsigned short)version; |
| al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_record, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_record, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ |
| } |
| |
| /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */ |
| |
| if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) |
| { |
| /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ |
| i=rr->length; |
| n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1); |
| if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */ |
| /* now n == rr->length, |
| * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */ |
| } |
| |
| s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */ |
| |
| /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length, |
| * and we have that many bytes in s->packet |
| */ |
| rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); |
| |
| /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' |
| * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which |
| * need to be copied into rr->data by either |
| * the decryption or by the decompression |
| * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer, |
| * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */ |
| |
| /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] |
| * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */ |
| |
| /* check is not needed I believe */ |
| if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_record, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ |
| rr->data=rr->input; |
| |
| enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0); |
| /* enc_err is: |
| * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. |
| * 1: if the padding is valid |
| * -1: if the padding is invalid */ |
| if (enc_err == 0) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_record, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef TLS_DEBUG |
| printf("dec %d\n",rr->length); |
| { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } |
| printf("\n"); |
| #endif |
| |
| /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ |
| if ((sess != NULL) && |
| (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && |
| (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) |
| { |
| /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ |
| unsigned char *mac = NULL; |
| unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); |
| assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
| |
| /* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */ |
| orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8); |
| |
| /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was |
| * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, |
| * therefore we can safely process the record in a different |
| * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. |
| */ |
| if (orig_len < mac_size || |
| /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ |
| (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && |
| orig_len < mac_size+1)) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_record, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) |
| { |
| /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes |
| * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract |
| * the MAC in constant time from within the record, |
| * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes. |
| * */ |
| mac = mac_tmp; |
| ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len); |
| rr->length -= mac_size; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| |
| * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's |
| * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */ |
| rr->length -= mac_size; |
| mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; |
| } |
| |
| i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */); |
| if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) |
| enc_err = -1; |
| if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size) |
| enc_err = -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (enc_err < 0) |
| { |
| /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0, |
| * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption |
| * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, |
| * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this |
| * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */ |
| al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_record, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_record, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| rr->off=0; |
| /* So at this point the following is true |
| * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record |
| * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record |
| * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte |
| * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment |
| * after use :-). |
| */ |
| |
| /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ |
| s->packet_length=0; |
| |
| /* just read a 0 length packet */ |
| if (rr->length == 0) |
| { |
| empty_record_count++; |
| if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_record, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| goto again; |
| } |
| |
| #if 0 |
| fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length); |
| #endif |
| |
| return(1); |
| |
| f_err: |
| ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
| err: |
| return(ret); |
| } |
| |
| /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type' |
| * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. |
| */ |
| int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) |
| { |
| const unsigned char *buf=buf_; |
| unsigned int tot,n,nw; |
| int i; |
| |
| s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
| assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX); |
| tot=s->s3->wnum; |
| s->s3->wnum=0; |
| |
| if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) |
| { |
| i=s->handshake_func(s); |
| if (i < 0) return(i); |
| if (i == 0) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_write_bytes, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write |
| * out than the the original len from a write which didn't complete |
| * for non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding |
| * the check for this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as |
| * it must never be possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large |
| * number that will then promptly send beyond the end of the users |
| * buffer ... so we trap and report the error in a way the user |
| * will notice |
| */ |
| if (len < 0 || (size_t)len < tot) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_write_bytes, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); |
| return(-1); |
| } |
| |
| n=(len-tot); |
| for (;;) |
| { |
| /* max contains the maximum number of bytes that we can put |
| * into a record. */ |
| unsigned max = s->max_send_fragment; |
| /* fragment is true if do_ssl3_write should send the first byte |
| * in its own record in order to randomise a CBC IV. */ |
| int fragment = 0; |
| |
| if (n > 1 && |
| s->s3->need_record_splitting && |
| type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && |
| !s->s3->record_split_done) |
| { |
| fragment = 1; |
| /* record_split_done records that the splitting has |
| * been done in case we hit an SSL_WANT_WRITE condition. |
| * In that case, we don't need to do the split again. */ |
| s->s3->record_split_done = 1; |
| } |
| |
| if (n > max) |
| nw=max; |
| else |
| nw=n; |
| |
| i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, fragment, 0); |
| if (i <= 0) |
| { |
| s->s3->wnum=tot; |
| s->s3->record_split_done = 0; |
| return i; |
| } |
| |
| if ((i == (int)n) || |
| (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && |
| (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) |
| { |
| /* next chunk of data should get another prepended, |
| * one-byte fragment in ciphersuites with known-IV |
| * weakness. */ |
| s->s3->record_split_done = 0; |
| return tot+i; |
| } |
| |
| n-=i; |
| tot+=i; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* do_ssl3_write writes an SSL record of the given type. If |fragment| is 1 |
| * then it splits the record into a one byte record and a record with the rest |
| * of the data in order to randomise a CBC IV. If |is_fragment| is true then |
| * this call resulted from do_ssl3_write calling itself in order to create that |
| * one byte fragment. */ |
| static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, |
| unsigned int len, char fragment, char is_fragment) |
| { |
| unsigned char *p,*plen; |
| int i,mac_size; |
| int prefix_len=0; |
| int eivlen; |
| long align=0; |
| SSL3_RECORD *wr; |
| SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf); |
| SSL_SESSION *sess; |
| |
| /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written |
| * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */ |
| if (wb->left != 0) |
| return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len)); |
| |
| /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ |
| if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) |
| { |
| i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); |
| if (i <= 0) |
| return(i); |
| /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ |
| } |
| |
| if (wb->buf == NULL) |
| if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s)) |
| return -1; |
| |
| if (len == 0) |
| return 0; |
| |
| wr= &(s->s3->wrec); |
| sess=s->session; |
| |
| if ( (sess == NULL) || |
| (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || |
| (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) |
| { |
| mac_size=0; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); |
| if (mac_size < 0) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (fragment) |
| { |
| /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites |
| * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */ |
| prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 1 /* length */, |
| 0 /* fragment */, |
| 1 /* is_fragment */); |
| if (prefix_len <= 0) |
| goto err; |
| |
| if (prefix_len > (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + |
| SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) |
| { |
| /* insufficient space */ |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, do_ssl3_write, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (is_fragment) |
| { |
| #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 |
| /* The extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, and |
| * that will be a multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD. So, if we |
| * want to align the real payload, we can just pretend that we |
| * have two headers and a byte. */ |
| align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + 1; |
| align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1); |
| #endif |
| p = wb->buf + align; |
| wb->offset = align; |
| } |
| else if (prefix_len) |
| { |
| p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 |
| align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; |
| align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1); |
| #endif |
| p = wb->buf + align; |
| wb->offset = align; |
| } |
| |
| /* write the header */ |
| |
| *(p++)=type&0xff; |
| wr->type=type; |
| |
| *(p++)=(s->version>>8); |
| /* Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256 |
| * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0 |
| */ |
| if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B |
| && !s->renegotiate |
| && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION) |
| *(p++) = 0x1; |
| else |
| *(p++)=s->version&0xff; |
| |
| /* field where we are to write out packet length */ |
| plen=p; |
| p+=2; |
| /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */ |
| if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) |
| { |
| int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx); |
| if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) |
| { |
| eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx); |
| if (eivlen <= 1) |
| eivlen = 0; |
| } |
| else |
| eivlen = 0; |
| } |
| else if (s->aead_write_ctx != NULL && |
| s->aead_write_ctx->variable_nonce_included_in_record) |
| { |
| eivlen = s->aead_write_ctx->variable_nonce_len; |
| } |
| else |
| eivlen = 0; |
| |
| /* lets setup the record stuff. */ |
| wr->data=p + eivlen; |
| wr->length=(int)(len - (fragment != 0)); |
| wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf + (fragment != 0); |
| |
| /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into |
| * wr->data */ |
| |
| memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length); |
| wr->input=wr->data; |
| |
| /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input |
| * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length. |
| * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */ |
| |
| if (mac_size != 0) |
| { |
| if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen]),1) < 0) |
| goto err; |
| wr->length+=mac_size; |
| } |
| |
| wr->input=p; |
| wr->data=p; |
| |
| if (eivlen) |
| { |
| /* if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) |
| goto err; */ |
| wr->length += eivlen; |
| } |
| |
| /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */ |
| s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1); |
| |
| /* record length after mac and block padding */ |
| s2n(wr->length,plen); |
| |
| if (s->msg_callback) |
| s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen - 5, 5, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
| |
| /* we should now have |
| * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is |
| * wr->length long */ |
| wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */ |
| wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; |
| |
| if (is_fragment) |
| { |
| /* we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't |
| * write out anything. */ |
| return wr->length; |
| } |
| |
| /* now let's set up wb */ |
| wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length; |
| |
| /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */ |
| s->s3->wpend_tot=len; |
| s->s3->wpend_buf=buf; |
| s->s3->wpend_type=type; |
| s->s3->wpend_ret=len; |
| |
| /* we now just need to write the buffer */ |
| return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len); |
| err: |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */ |
| int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, |
| unsigned int len) |
| { |
| int i; |
| SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf); |
| |
| /* XXXX */ |
| if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len) |
| || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) && |
| !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)) |
| || (s->s3->wpend_type != type)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_write_pending, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY); |
| return(-1); |
| } |
| |
| for (;;) |
| { |
| ERR_clear_system_error(); |
| if (s->wbio != NULL) |
| { |
| s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; |
| i=BIO_write(s->wbio, |
| (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]), |
| (unsigned int)wb->left); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_write_pending, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); |
| i= -1; |
| } |
| if (i == wb->left) |
| { |
| wb->left=0; |
| wb->offset+=i; |
| if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && |
| !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
| ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); |
| s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
| return(s->s3->wpend_ret); |
| } |
| else if (i <= 0) { |
| if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
| /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole |
| point in using a datagram service */ |
| wb->left = 0; |
| } |
| return(i); |
| } |
| wb->offset+=i; |
| wb->left-=i; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* ssl3_expect_change_cipher_spec informs the record layer that a |
| * ChangeCipherSpec record is required at this point. If a Handshake record is |
| * received before ChangeCipherSpec, the connection will fail. Moreover, if |
| * there are unprocessed handshake bytes, the handshake will also fail and the |
| * function returns zero. Otherwise, the function returns one. */ |
| int ssl3_expect_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) |
| { |
| if (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0 || s->s3->tmp.reuse_message) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_expect_change_cipher_spec, SSL_R_UNPROCESSED_HANDSHAKE_DATA); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. |
| * 'type' is one of the following: |
| * |
| * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) |
| * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) |
| * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) |
| * |
| * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first |
| * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). |
| * |
| * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as |
| * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really |
| * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests. |
| * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store |
| * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol |
| * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): |
| * Change cipher spec protocol |
| * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored |
| * Alert protocol |
| * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) |
| * Handshake protocol |
| * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have |
| * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages |
| * here, anything else is handled by higher layers |
| * Application data protocol |
| * none of our business |
| */ |
| int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) |
| { |
| int al,i,j,ret; |
| unsigned int n; |
| SSL3_RECORD *rr; |
| void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL; |
| |
| if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */ |
| if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) |
| return(-1); |
| |
| if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || |
| (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) |
| /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ |
| { |
| unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment; |
| unsigned char *dst = buf; |
| unsigned int k; |
| |
| /* peek == 0 */ |
| n = 0; |
| while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) |
| { |
| *dst++ = *src++; |
| len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--; |
| n++; |
| } |
| /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ |
| for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++) |
| s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; |
| return n; |
| } |
| |
| /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */ |
| |
| if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) |
| { |
| /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ |
| i=s->handshake_func(s); |
| if (i < 0) return(i); |
| if (i == 0) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| return(-1); |
| } |
| } |
| start: |
| s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
| |
| /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record |
| * s->s3->rrec.data, - data |
| * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read |
| * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */ |
| rr = &(s->s3->rrec); |
| |
| /* get new packet if necessary */ |
| if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) |
| { |
| ret=ssl3_get_record(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) return(ret); |
| } |
| |
| /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ |
| |
| if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, |
| * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ |
| && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* If we are expecting a ChangeCipherSpec, it is illegal to receive a |
| * Handshake record. */ |
| if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS)) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_HANDSHAKE_RECORD_BEFORE_CCS); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away |
| * (even in 'peek' mode) */ |
| if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) |
| { |
| rr->length=0; |
| s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
| return(0); |
| } |
| |
| if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */ |
| { |
| /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we |
| * are doing a handshake for the first time */ |
| if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && |
| (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (len <= 0) return(len); |
| |
| if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length) |
| n = rr->length; |
| else |
| n = (unsigned int)len; |
| |
| memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n); |
| if (!peek) |
| { |
| rr->length-=n; |
| rr->off+=n; |
| if (rr->length == 0) |
| { |
| s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; |
| rr->off=0; |
| if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) |
| ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); |
| } |
| } |
| return(n); |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake |
| * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */ |
| |
| /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, |
| * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place. |
| */ |
| { |
| unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0; |
| unsigned char *dest = NULL; |
| unsigned int *dest_len = NULL; |
| |
| if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) |
| { |
| dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment; |
| dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment; |
| dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; |
| } |
| else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) |
| { |
| dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment; |
| dest = s->s3->alert_fragment; |
| dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len; |
| } |
| |
| if (dest_maxlen > 0) |
| { |
| n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */ |
| if (rr->length < n) |
| n = rr->length; /* available bytes */ |
| |
| /* now move 'n' bytes: */ |
| while (n-- > 0) |
| { |
| dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++]; |
| rr->length--; |
| } |
| |
| if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) |
| goto start; /* fragment was too small */ |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; |
| * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT. |
| * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */ |
| |
| /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */ |
| if ((!s->server) && |
| (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && |
| (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) && |
| (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) |
| { |
| s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0; |
| |
| if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) || |
| (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) || |
| (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->msg_callback) |
| s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
| |
| if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && |
| !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) && |
| !s->s3->renegotiate) |
| { |
| ssl3_renegotiate(s); |
| if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) |
| { |
| i=s->handshake_func(s); |
| if (i < 0) return(i); |
| if (i == 0) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| return(-1); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, |
| * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */ |
| goto start; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2) |
| { |
| int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0]; |
| int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1]; |
| |
| s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0; |
| |
| if (s->msg_callback) |
| s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
| |
| if (s->info_callback != NULL) |
| cb=s->info_callback; |
| else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) |
| cb=s->ctx->info_callback; |
| |
| if (cb != NULL) |
| { |
| j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; |
| cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); |
| } |
| |
| if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */ |
| { |
| s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; |
| if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) |
| { |
| s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; |
| return(0); |
| } |
| /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested |
| * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with |
| * a fatal alert because if application tried to |
| * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and |
| * expects it to succeed. |
| * |
| * In future we might have a renegotiation where we |
| * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on. |
| */ |
| else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| } |
| else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */ |
| { |
| char tmp[16]; |
| |
| s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
| s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); |
| BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr); |
| ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp); |
| s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; |
| SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session); |
| return(0); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| goto start; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */ |
| { |
| s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
| rr->length=0; |
| return(0); |
| } |
| |
| if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) |
| { |
| /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know |
| * exactly what the record payload has to look like */ |
| if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) || |
| (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ |
| if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS)) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS; |
| |
| rr->length=0; |
| |
| if (s->msg_callback) |
| s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
| |
| s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1; |
| if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) |
| goto err; |
| else |
| goto start; |
| } |
| |
| /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */ |
| if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake) |
| { |
| if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) && |
| !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) |
| { |
| s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; |
| s->renegotiate=1; |
| s->new_session=1; |
| } |
| i=s->handshake_func(s); |
| if (i < 0) return(i); |
| if (i == 0) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| return(-1); |
| } |
| |
| goto start; |
| } |
| |
| switch (rr->type) |
| { |
| default: |
| /* TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types: |
| * TLS v1.2 give an unexpected message alert. |
| */ |
| if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) |
| { |
| rr->length = 0; |
| goto start; |
| } |
| al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); |
| goto f_err; |
| case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: |
| case SSL3_RT_ALERT: |
| case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: |
| /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception |
| * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that |
| * should not happen when type != rr->type */ |
| al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: |
| /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data, |
| * but have application data. If the library was |
| * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data |
| * is set) and it makes sense to read application data |
| * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started), |
| * we will indulge it. |
| */ |
| if (s->s3->in_read_app_data && |
| (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) && |
| (( |
| (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) && |
| (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) && |
| (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A) |
| ) || ( |
| (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) && |
| (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) && |
| (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) |
| ) |
| )) |
| { |
| s->s3->in_read_app_data=2; |
| return(-1); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| } |
| /* not reached */ |
| |
| f_err: |
| ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
| err: |
| return(-1); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) |
| { |
| int i; |
| |
| if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) |
| i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ; |
| else |
| i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ; |
| |
| if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) |
| { |
| if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) |
| { |
| /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */ |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); |
| return (0); |
| } |
| |
| s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; |
| if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0); |
| } |
| |
| if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i)) |
| return(0); |
| |
| return(1); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc) |
| { |
| /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */ |
| desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc); |
| if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION) |
| desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */ |
| if (desc < 0) return -1; |
| /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */ |
| if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL)) |
| SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session); |
| |
| s->s3->alert_dispatch=1; |
| s->s3->send_alert[0]=level; |
| s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc; |
| if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */ |
| return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); |
| /* else data is still being written out, we will get written |
| * some time in the future */ |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) |
| { |
| int i,j; |
| void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; |
| |
| s->s3->alert_dispatch=0; |
| i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0, 0); |
| if (i <= 0) |
| { |
| s->s3->alert_dispatch=1; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. |
| * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, |
| * we will not worry too much. */ |
| if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL) |
| (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio); |
| |
| if (s->msg_callback) |
| s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
| |
| if (s->info_callback != NULL) |
| cb=s->info_callback; |
| else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) |
| cb=s->ctx->info_callback; |
| |
| if (cb != NULL) |
| { |
| j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1]; |
| cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j); |
| } |
| } |
| return(i); |
| } |