| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
| * All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
| * |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
| * the code are not to be removed. |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
| * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
| * distribution. |
| * |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
| * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
| * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
| * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
| * openssl-core@openssl.org. |
| * |
| * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
| * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
| * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
| * |
| * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
| * acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
| * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
| * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
| * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
| * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
| * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
| * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
| * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
| * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * ==================================================================== |
| * |
| * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
| * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
| * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. |
| * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by |
| * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ |
| |
| #include <assert.h> |
| #include <limits.h> |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| #include <string.h> |
| |
| #include <openssl/buf.h> |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> |
| #include <openssl/md5.h> |
| #include <openssl/obj.h> |
| #include <openssl/rand.h> |
| #include <openssl/sha.h> |
| #include <openssl/x509.h> |
| |
| #include "ssl_locl.h" |
| |
| /* send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) */ |
| int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type, enum should_add_to_finished_hash should_add_to_finished_hash) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| |
| ret=ssl3_write_bytes(s,type,&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], |
| s->init_num); |
| if (ret < 0) return(-1); |
| if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && should_add_to_finished_hash == add_to_finished_hash) |
| { |
| /* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case |
| * we'll ignore the result anyway */ |
| ssl3_finish_mac(s,(unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],ret); |
| } |
| |
| if (ret == s->init_num) |
| { |
| if (s->msg_callback) |
| s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
| return(1); |
| } |
| s->init_off+=ret; |
| s->init_num-=ret; |
| return(0); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen) |
| { |
| unsigned char *p; |
| int i; |
| unsigned long l; |
| |
| if (s->state == a) |
| { |
| p = ssl_handshake_start(s); |
| |
| i=s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, |
| sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.finish_md); |
| if (i == 0) |
| return 0; |
| s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i; |
| memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); |
| l=i; |
| |
| /* Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. */ |
| if (!ssl_ctx_log_master_secret(s->ctx, |
| s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, |
| s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length)) |
| { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Copy the finished so we can use it for |
| renegotiation checks */ |
| if(s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT) |
| { |
| assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
| memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, |
| s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); |
| s->s3->previous_client_finished_len=i; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
| memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, |
| s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); |
| s->s3->previous_server_finished_len=i; |
| } |
| |
| ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, l); |
| s->state=b; |
| } |
| |
| /* SSL3_ST_SEND_xxxxxx_HELLO_B */ |
| return ssl_do_write(s); |
| } |
| |
| /* ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen to far. */ |
| static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) |
| { |
| const char *sender; |
| int slen; |
| /* If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will |
| * set the appropriate error. |
| */ |
| if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) |
| return; |
| if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) |
| { |
| sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; |
| slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; |
| slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; |
| } |
| |
| s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, |
| sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b) |
| { |
| int al,i,ok; |
| long n; |
| unsigned char *p; |
| |
| n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, |
| a, |
| b, |
| SSL3_MT_FINISHED, |
| 64, /* should actually be 36+4 :-) */ |
| SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE, |
| &ok); |
| |
| if (!ok) return((int)n); |
| |
| /* Snapshot the finished hash before incorporating the new message. */ |
| ssl3_take_mac(s); |
| ssl3_hash_current_message(s); |
| |
| /* If this occurs, we have missed a message. |
| * TODO(davidben): Is this check now redundant with |
| * SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS? */ |
| if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_finished, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0; |
| |
| p = s->init_msg; |
| i = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; |
| |
| if (i != n) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_finished, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (CRYPTO_memcmp(p, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i) != 0) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_finished, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Copy the finished so we can use it for |
| renegotiation checks */ |
| if(s->type == SSL_ST_ACCEPT) |
| { |
| assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
| memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, |
| s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i); |
| s->s3->previous_client_finished_len=i; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
| memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, |
| s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i); |
| s->s3->previous_server_finished_len=i; |
| } |
| |
| return(1); |
| f_err: |
| ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
| return(0); |
| } |
| |
| /* for these 2 messages, we need to |
| * ssl->enc_read_ctx re-init |
| * ssl->s3->read_sequence zero |
| * ssl->s3->read_mac_secret re-init |
| * ssl->session->read_sym_enc assign |
| * ssl->session->read_compression assign |
| * ssl->session->read_hash assign |
| */ |
| int ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b) |
| { |
| unsigned char *p; |
| |
| if (s->state == a) |
| { |
| p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; |
| *p=SSL3_MT_CCS; |
| s->init_num=1; |
| s->init_off=0; |
| |
| s->state=b; |
| } |
| |
| /* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */ |
| return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, dont_add_to_finished_hash)); |
| } |
| |
| unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk) |
| { |
| unsigned char *p; |
| unsigned long l = 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s); |
| |
| if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, cpk, &l)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| l -= 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s); |
| p = ssl_handshake_start(s); |
| l2n3(l,p); |
| l += 3; |
| ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, l); |
| return l + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s); |
| } |
| |
| /* Obtain handshake message of message type 'mt' (any if mt == -1), |
| * maximum acceptable body length 'max'. |
| * The first four bytes (msg_type and length) are read in state 'st1', |
| * the body is read in state 'stn'. |
| */ |
| long ssl3_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int hash_message, int *ok) |
| { |
| unsigned char *p; |
| unsigned long l; |
| long n; |
| int i,al; |
| |
| if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message) |
| { |
| /* A SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE call cannot be combined |
| * with reuse_message; the SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE |
| * would have to have been applied to the previous call. */ |
| assert(hash_message != SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE); |
| s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=0; |
| if ((mt >= 0) && (s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt)) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_message, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| *ok=1; |
| s->init_msg = (uint8_t*)s->init_buf->data + 4; |
| s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size; |
| return s->init_num; |
| } |
| |
| p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; |
| |
| if (s->state == st1) /* s->init_num < 4 */ |
| { |
| int skip_message; |
| |
| do |
| { |
| while (s->init_num < 4) |
| { |
| i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, |
| &p[s->init_num],4 - s->init_num, 0); |
| if (i <= 0) |
| { |
| s->rwstate=SSL_READING; |
| *ok = 0; |
| return i; |
| } |
| s->init_num+=i; |
| } |
| |
| skip_message = 0; |
| if (!s->server) |
| if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) |
| /* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- |
| * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them |
| * if their format is correct. Does not count for |
| * 'Finished' MAC. */ |
| if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 &&p[3] == 0) |
| { |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| skip_message = 1; |
| |
| if (s->msg_callback) |
| s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, p, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
| } |
| } |
| while (skip_message); |
| |
| /* s->init_num == 4 */ |
| |
| if ((mt >= 0) && (*p != mt)) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_message, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| s->s3->tmp.message_type= *(p++); |
| |
| n2l3(p,l); |
| if (l > (unsigned long)max) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_message, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| if (l > (INT_MAX-4)) /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */ |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_message, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,(int)l+4)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_message, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| s->s3->tmp.message_size=l; |
| s->state=stn; |
| |
| s->init_msg = (uint8_t*)s->init_buf->data + 4; |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* next state (stn) */ |
| p = s->init_msg; |
| n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num; |
| while (n > 0) |
| { |
| i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,&p[s->init_num],n,0); |
| if (i <= 0) |
| { |
| s->rwstate=SSL_READING; |
| *ok = 0; |
| return i; |
| } |
| s->init_num += i; |
| n -= i; |
| } |
| |
| /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ |
| if (hash_message != SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE) |
| ssl3_hash_current_message(s); |
| if (s->msg_callback) |
| s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)s->init_num + 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
| *ok=1; |
| return s->init_num; |
| f_err: |
| ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
| err: |
| *ok=0; |
| return(-1); |
| } |
| |
| void ssl3_hash_current_message(SSL *s) |
| { |
| /* The handshake header (different size between DTLS and TLS) is included in the hash. */ |
| size_t header_len = s->init_msg - (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data; |
| ssl3_finish_mac(s, (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + header_len); |
| } |
| |
| /* ssl3_cert_verify_hash is documented as needing EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE because that |
| * is sufficient pre-TLS1.2 as well. */ |
| OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE > MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, |
| combined_tls_hash_fits_in_max); |
| |
| int ssl3_cert_verify_hash(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, const EVP_MD **out_md, EVP_PKEY *pkey) |
| { |
| /* For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using |
| * agreed digest and cached handshake records. Otherwise, use |
| * SHA1 or MD5 + SHA1 depending on key type. */ |
| if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) |
| { |
| const uint8_t *hdata; |
| size_t hdatalen; |
| EVP_MD_CTX mctx; |
| unsigned len; |
| |
| if (!BIO_mem_contents(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata, &hdatalen)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_cert_verify_hash, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); |
| if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&mctx, *out_md, NULL) |
| || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen) |
| || !EVP_DigestFinal(&mctx, out, &len)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_cert_verify_hash, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| *out_len = len; |
| } |
| else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) |
| { |
| if (s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, out) == 0 || |
| s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, |
| NID_sha1, out + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) == 0) |
| return 0; |
| *out_len = MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; |
| /* Using a NULL signature MD makes EVP_PKEY_sign perform |
| * a raw RSA signature, rather than wrapping in a |
| * DigestInfo. */ |
| *out_md = NULL; |
| } |
| else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) |
| { |
| if (s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_sha1, out) == 0) |
| return 0; |
| *out_len = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; |
| *out_md = EVP_sha1(); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_cert_verify_hash, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_cert_type(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey) |
| { |
| EVP_PKEY *pk; |
| int ret= -1,i; |
| |
| if (pkey == NULL) |
| pk=X509_get_pubkey(x); |
| else |
| pk=pkey; |
| if (pk == NULL) goto err; |
| |
| i=pk->type; |
| if (i == EVP_PKEY_RSA) |
| { |
| ret=SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; |
| } |
| else if (i == EVP_PKEY_EC) |
| { |
| ret = SSL_PKEY_ECC; |
| } |
| |
| err: |
| if(!pkey) EVP_PKEY_free(pk); |
| return(ret); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) |
| { |
| int al; |
| |
| switch(type) |
| { |
| case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: |
| case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL: |
| case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER: |
| al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; |
| break; |
| case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: |
| case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: |
| case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: |
| case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: |
| case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: |
| case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: |
| case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: |
| case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: |
| case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: |
| case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: |
| case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: |
| al=SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; |
| break; |
| case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: |
| case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: |
| al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; |
| break; |
| case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: |
| case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: |
| al=SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED; |
| break; |
| case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: |
| al=SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED; |
| break; |
| case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: |
| al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| break; |
| case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: |
| case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: |
| case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: |
| case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: |
| case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: |
| case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: |
| case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: |
| al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; |
| break; |
| case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: |
| al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| break; |
| case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: |
| al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; |
| break; |
| default: |
| al=SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN; |
| break; |
| } |
| return(al); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_setup_read_buffer(SSL *s) |
| { |
| unsigned char *p; |
| size_t len,align=0,headerlen; |
| |
| if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
| headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; |
| else |
| headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; |
| |
| #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 |
| align = (-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1); |
| #endif |
| |
| if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) |
| { |
| len = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH |
| + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD |
| + headerlen + align; |
| if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER) |
| { |
| s->s3->init_extra = 1; |
| len += SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA; |
| } |
| if ((p=OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) |
| goto err; |
| s->s3->rbuf.buf = p; |
| s->s3->rbuf.len = len; |
| } |
| |
| s->packet= &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]); |
| return 1; |
| |
| err: |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_setup_read_buffer, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_setup_write_buffer(SSL *s) |
| { |
| unsigned char *p; |
| size_t len,align=0,headerlen; |
| |
| if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
| headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + 1; |
| else |
| headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; |
| |
| #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 |
| align = (-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1); |
| #endif |
| |
| if (s->s3->wbuf.buf == NULL) |
| { |
| len = s->max_send_fragment |
| + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD |
| + headerlen + align; |
| /* Account for 1/n-1 record splitting. */ |
| if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) |
| len += headerlen + align + 1 |
| + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD; |
| |
| if ((p=OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) |
| goto err; |
| s->s3->wbuf.buf = p; |
| s->s3->wbuf.len = len; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| |
| err: |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_setup_write_buffer, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| int ssl3_setup_buffers(SSL *s) |
| { |
| if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) |
| return 0; |
| if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s)) |
| return 0; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_release_write_buffer(SSL *s) |
| { |
| if (s->s3->wbuf.buf != NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_free(s->s3->wbuf.buf); |
| s->s3->wbuf.buf = NULL; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_release_read_buffer(SSL *s) |
| { |
| if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf); |
| s->s3->rbuf.buf = NULL; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |