| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | |
| * All rights reserved. | |
| * | |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
| * | |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
| * | |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | |
| * the code are not to be removed. | |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
| * | |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
| * are met: | |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
| * | |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
| * | |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ | |
| #include <string.h> | |
| #include <openssl/asn1.h> | |
| #include <openssl/digest.h> | |
| #include <openssl/err.h> | |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> | |
| #include <openssl/md5.h> | |
| #include <openssl/obj.h> | |
| #include <openssl/sha.h> | |
| #include <openssl/stack.h> | |
| #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
| #include "../internal.h" | |
| #include "internal.h" | |
| int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) { | |
| return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer, b->cert_info->issuer)); | |
| } | |
| int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) { | |
| return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject, b->cert_info->subject)); | |
| } | |
| int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) { | |
| return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer, b->crl->issuer)); | |
| } | |
| int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) { | |
| return OPENSSL_memcmp(a->crl_hash, b->crl_hash, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH); | |
| } | |
| X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a) { | |
| return a->cert_info->issuer; | |
| } | |
| uint32_t X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x) { | |
| return X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer); | |
| } | |
| uint32_t X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x) { | |
| return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer)); | |
| } | |
| X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a) { | |
| return a->cert_info->subject; | |
| } | |
| ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a) { | |
| return a->cert_info->serialNumber; | |
| } | |
| const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *x509) { | |
| return x509->cert_info->serialNumber; | |
| } | |
| uint32_t X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x) { | |
| return X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject); | |
| } | |
| uint32_t X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x) { | |
| return X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject); | |
| } | |
| // Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB: | |
| // Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const" | |
| // arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these | |
| // operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring | |
| // certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the | |
| // "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast. | |
| int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) { | |
| // Fill in the |cert_hash| fields. | |
| // | |
| // TODO(davidben): This may fail, in which case the the hash will be all | |
| // zeros. This produces a consistent comparison (failures are sticky), but | |
| // not a good one. OpenSSL now returns -2, but this is not a consistent | |
| // comparison and may cause misbehaving sorts by transitivity. For now, we | |
| // retain the old OpenSSL behavior, which was to ignore the error. See | |
| // https://crbug.com/boringssl/355. | |
| x509v3_cache_extensions((X509 *)a); | |
| x509v3_cache_extensions((X509 *)b); | |
| return OPENSSL_memcmp(a->cert_hash, b->cert_hash, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH); | |
| } | |
| int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b) { | |
| int ret; | |
| // Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date | |
| if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) { | |
| ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL); | |
| if (ret < 0) { | |
| return -2; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) { | |
| ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL); | |
| if (ret < 0) { | |
| return -2; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen; | |
| if (ret) { | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| return OPENSSL_memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen); | |
| } | |
| uint32_t X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x) { | |
| // Make sure the X509_NAME structure contains a valid cached encoding. | |
| if (i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL) < 0) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| uint8_t md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; | |
| SHA1(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md); | |
| return CRYPTO_load_u32_le(md); | |
| } | |
| // I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding, | |
| // this is reasonably efficient. | |
| uint32_t X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x) { | |
| // Make sure the X509_NAME structure contains a valid cached encoding. | |
| if (i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL) < 0) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| uint8_t md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; | |
| MD5((const uint8_t *)x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length, md); | |
| return CRYPTO_load_u32_le(md); | |
| } | |
| X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(const STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name, | |
| const ASN1_INTEGER *serial) { | |
| if (serial->type != V_ASN1_INTEGER && serial->type != V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { | |
| X509 *x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); | |
| if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get0_serialNumber(x509), serial) == 0 && | |
| X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x509), name) == 0) { | |
| return x509; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| X509 *X509_find_by_subject(const STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name) { | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { | |
| X509 *x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); | |
| if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0) { | |
| return x509; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| EVP_PKEY *X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 *x) { | |
| if (x == NULL) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| return X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info->key); | |
| } | |
| EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(const X509 *x) { | |
| if (x == NULL) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| return X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key); | |
| } | |
| ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x) { | |
| if (!x) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| return x->cert_info->key->public_key; | |
| } | |
| int X509_check_private_key(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *k) { | |
| const EVP_PKEY *xk = X509_get0_pubkey(x); | |
| if (xk == NULL) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k); | |
| if (ret > 0) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| switch (ret) { | |
| case 0: | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH); | |
| return 0; | |
| case -1: | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH); | |
| return 0; | |
| case -2: | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| // Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference | |
| // count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of | |
| // each X509 structure. | |
| STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { | |
| STACK_OF(X509) *ret = sk_X509_dup(chain); | |
| if (ret == NULL) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) { | |
| X509_up_ref(sk_X509_value(ret, i)); | |
| } | |
| return ret; | |
| } |