Running spelling and grammar checks over comments. ... and then run clang-format on the changed files to reflow any comment blocks that exceeded line lengths. (Which generated a bunch of noise formatting changes, but probably that reduces noise in future CLs.) No semantic change to the code. Change-Id: I455da9faaaedda3e751ac91b5eb43cbc662d68a6 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/97367 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
diff --git a/.clang-format b/.clang-format index 91a1e29..2485c9b 100644 --- a/.clang-format +++ b/.clang-format
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Priority: 5 # Headers from our dependencies # - # TODO(davidben): A strict reading of the the style guide would suggest these + # TODO(davidben): A strict reading of the style guide would suggest these # should be grouped with C system headers. Previously we grouped them as if # they were "Other libraries' .h files.". Should we switch? - Regex: '^<(gtest|gmock|benchmark)/.*\.h>'
diff --git a/API-CONVENTIONS.md b/API-CONVENTIONS.md index 14a08ea..7d9b8d1 100644 --- a/API-CONVENTIONS.md +++ b/API-CONVENTIONS.md
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ and returned from BoringSSL's APIs. It is an error to instantiate a heap- allocated type on the stack or embedded within another object. -Heap-allocated types may have functioned named like `RSA_new` which allocates a +Heap-allocated types may have functions named like `RSA_new` which allocates a fresh blank `RSA`. Other functions may also return newly-allocated instances. For example, `RSA_parse_public_key` is documented to return a newly-allocated `RSA` object.
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.cc b/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.cc index 22c52d1..e41e43e 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.cc +++ b/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.cc
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ return constructed; } -// class 0 is constructed constructed == 2 for indefinite length constructed +// class 0 is constructed, constructed == 2 for indefinite length constructed void ASN1_put_object(unsigned char **pp, int constructed, int length, int tag, int xclass) { unsigned char *p = *pp;
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/asn1_test.cc b/crypto/asn1/asn1_test.cc index 38cd456..fd4e6cf 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/asn1_test.cc +++ b/crypto/asn1/asn1_test.cc
@@ -976,8 +976,7 @@ UniquePtr<ASN1_BIT_STRING> val(ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()); ASSERT_TRUE(val); const uint8_t kBytesf000[] = {0xf0, 0x00}; - ASSERT_TRUE( - ASN1_STRING_set(val.get(), kBytesf000, sizeof(kBytesf000))); + ASSERT_TRUE(ASN1_STRING_set(val.get(), kBytesf000, sizeof(kBytesf000))); static const uint8_t kBitStringf000[] = {0x03, 0x03, 0x00, 0xf0, 0x00}; TestSerialize(val.get(), i2d_ASN1_BIT_STRING, kBitStringf000); @@ -1052,7 +1051,7 @@ {{0, 0, 0, 88, 0, 0, 0xfe, 0xff}, V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING, "X\xef\xbb\xbf"}, - // The maximum code-point should pass though. + // The maximum code-point should pass through. {{0, 16, 0xff, 0xfd}, V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING, "\xf4\x8f\xbf\xbd"}, // Values outside the Unicode space should not. {{0, 17, 0, 0}, V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING, nullptr}, @@ -3087,7 +3086,7 @@ EXPECT_EQ(obj->default_true, ASN1_BOOLEAN_TRUE); EXPECT_EQ(obj->default_false, ASN1_BOOLEAN_FALSE); - // Include the optinonal fields instead. + // Include the optional fields instead. static const uint8_t kFieldsIncluded[] = {0x30, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, 0x81, 0x01, 0x00, 0x82, 0x01, 0x00, 0x83, 0x01, 0xff};
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/internal.h b/crypto/asn1/internal.h index b471b2f..76badb2 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/internal.h +++ b/crypto/asn1/internal.h
@@ -192,11 +192,11 @@ int asn1_parse_any_as_string(CBS *cbs, ASN1_STRING *out); // asn1_marshal_any marshals `in` as a DER-encoded ASN.1 value and writes the -// result to `out`. It returns one on success and zeron on error. +// result to `out`. It returns one on success and zero on error. int asn1_marshal_any(CBB *out, const ASN1_TYPE *in); // asn1_marshal_any_string marshals `in` as a DER-encoded ASN.1 value and writes -// the result to `out`. It returns one on success and zeron on error. +// the result to `out`. It returns one on success and zero on error. int asn1_marshal_any_string(CBB *out, const ASN1_STRING *in);
diff --git a/crypto/bio/bio_test.cc b/crypto/bio/bio_test.cc index d6942c7..8c05f81 100644 --- a/crypto/bio/bio_test.cc +++ b/crypto/bio/bio_test.cc
@@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ bytes_read += ret; } - // `connect_bio` should become writeable again. + // `connect_bio` should become writable again. ASSERT_TRUE(WaitForSocket(accept_sock.get(), WaitType::kWrite)) << LastSocketError(); ret = BIO_write(connect_bio.get(), kTestMessage, sizeof(kTestMessage));
diff --git a/crypto/bio/internal.h b/crypto/bio/internal.h index 18a13a3..ed00e25 100644 --- a/crypto/bio/internal.h +++ b/crypto/bio/internal.h
@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ // newlib uses u_short in socket.h without defining it. typedef unsigned short u_short; #endif -#include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/socket.h> +#include <sys/types.h> #else #include <winsock2.h> typedef int socklen_t; @@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ // bio_socket_finish_connect attempts to complete an in-progress, non-blocking // connect operation on `sock`. It returns one if the connect operation -// suceeded. Otherwise, it returns zero and sets the last socket error to the +// succeeded. Otherwise, it returns zero and sets the last socket error to the // reason it failed. int bio_socket_finish_connect(int sock);
diff --git a/crypto/bytestring/cbs.cc b/crypto/bytestring/cbs.cc index 64d2f4a..82f74af 100644 --- a/crypto/bytestring/cbs.cc +++ b/crypto/bytestring/cbs.cc
@@ -942,7 +942,7 @@ // If allow_timezone_offset is non-zero, allow for a four digit timezone // offset to be specified even though this is not allowed by RFC 5280. We are // permissive of this for UTCTimes due to the unfortunate existence of - // artisinally rolled long lived certificates that were baked into places that + // artisanally rolled long lived certificates that were baked into places that // are now difficult to change. These certificates were generated with the // 'openssl' command that permissively allowed the creation of certificates // with notBefore and notAfter times specified as strings for direct
diff --git a/crypto/cipher/asm/aes128gcmsiv-x86_64.pl b/crypto/cipher/asm/aes128gcmsiv-x86_64.pl index a759d4e..66a4c7e 100644 --- a/crypto/cipher/asm/aes128gcmsiv-x86_64.pl +++ b/crypto/cipher/asm/aes128gcmsiv-x86_64.pl
@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ jnz .Lhtable_polyval_prefix_loop jmp .Lhtable_polyval_prefix_complete - # hash remaining prefix bocks (up to 7 total prefix blocks) + # hash remaining prefix blocks (up to 7 total prefix blocks) .align 64 .Lhtable_polyval_prefix_loop: sub \$16, $hlp0
diff --git a/crypto/cipher/e_aesgcmsiv.cc b/crypto/cipher/e_aesgcmsiv.cc index 35f71cf..1e90af4 100644 --- a/crypto/cipher/e_aesgcmsiv.cc +++ b/crypto/cipher/e_aesgcmsiv.cc
@@ -271,11 +271,11 @@ return true; }; - bssl::iovec::ForEachBlockRange<AES_BLOCK_SIZE, /*WriteOut=*/false>(aadvecs, f_whole, - f_final); + bssl::iovec::ForEachBlockRange<AES_BLOCK_SIZE, /*WriteOut=*/false>( + aadvecs, f_whole, f_final); - bssl::iovec::ForEachBlockRange<AES_BLOCK_SIZE, /*WriteOut=*/false>(iovecs, f_whole, - f_final); + bssl::iovec::ForEachBlockRange<AES_BLOCK_SIZE, /*WriteOut=*/false>( + iovecs, f_whole, f_final); uint8_t length_block[16]; CRYPTO_store_u64_le(length_block, ad_len * 8); @@ -847,8 +847,8 @@ return true; }; - bssl::iovec::ForEachBlockRange<AES_BLOCK_SIZE, /*WriteOut=*/false>(aadvecs, f_whole, - f_final); + bssl::iovec::ForEachBlockRange<AES_BLOCK_SIZE, /*WriteOut=*/false>( + aadvecs, f_whole, f_final); if (encrypt) { bssl::iovec::ForEachBlockRange<AES_BLOCK_SIZE, /*WriteOut=*/false>( @@ -904,7 +904,7 @@ } OPENSSL_memcpy(out_keys->auth_key, key_material, 16); - // Note the `ctr128_f` function uses a big-endian couner, while AES-GCM-SIV + // Note the `ctr128_f` function uses a big-endian counter, while AES-GCM-SIV // uses a little-endian counter. We ignore the return value and only use // `block128_f`. This has a significant performance cost for the fallback // bitsliced AES implementations (bsaes and aes_nohw).
diff --git a/crypto/compiler_test.cc b/crypto/compiler_test.cc index 193d585..682a1e2 100644 --- a/crypto/compiler_test.cc +++ b/crypto/compiler_test.cc
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ TEST(CompilerTest, NoStrictAliasing) { // Sequential memory access must be sequentially consistent across types. // Compilers such as clang and gcc need to be passed -fno-strict-aliasing - // for this to remain true at at higher optimization levels. Use with the + // for this to remain true at higher optimization levels. Use with the // opposite configuration, -fstrict-aliasing, is not supported. // Even though some subset of type punning through memory is considered // undefined behavior, the subtlety of exactly which subset that is and the
diff --git a/crypto/conf/conf_test.cc b/crypto/conf/conf_test.cc index 8b77de3..c347fd6 100644 --- a/crypto/conf/conf_test.cc +++ b/crypto/conf/conf_test.cc
@@ -13,9 +13,9 @@ // limitations under the License. #include <algorithm> +#include <map> #include <string> #include <vector> -#include <map> #include <openssl/bio.h> #include <openssl/conf.h> @@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ }, }, - // Trailing backslashes are line continations. + // Trailing backslashes are line continuations. { "key=\\\nvalue\nkey2=foo\\\nbar=baz", { @@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ /*remove_whitespace=*/1, {"ab cd", "", "ef gh"}}, }; - for (const auto& t : kTests) { + for (const auto &t : kTests) { SCOPED_TRACE(t.list); SCOPED_TRACE(t.sep); SCOPED_TRACE(t.remove_whitespace);
diff --git a/crypto/dh/params.cc b/crypto/dh/params.cc index 29a0874..b981157 100644 --- a/crypto/dh/params.cc +++ b/crypto/dh/params.cc
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ // // I've implemented the second simple method :-). // Since DH should be using a safe prime (both p and q are prime), - // this generator function can take a very very long time to run. + // this generator function can take a very, very long time to run. // Actually there is no reason to insist that 'generator' be a generator. // It's just as OK (and in some sense better) to use a generator of the
diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_test.cc b/crypto/evp/evp_test.cc index 0a1c008..d19aa6f 100644 --- a/crypto/evp/evp_test.cc +++ b/crypto/evp/evp_test.cc
@@ -849,7 +849,7 @@ return; } EXPECT_EQ(result, 1); - // The correct output size was writen out. + // The correct output size was written out. EXPECT_EQ(secret_size, expected_secret_len); decapsulated_secret.resize(secret_size); EXPECT_EQ(secret, decapsulated_secret);
diff --git a/crypto/ex_data.cc b/crypto/ex_data.cc index c3ea1f5..4614065 100644 --- a/crypto/ex_data.cc +++ b/crypto/ex_data.cc
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ int CRYPTO_set_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int index, void *val) { if (index < 0) { // A caller that can accidentally pass in an invalid index into this - // function will hit an memory error if `index` happened to be valid, and + // function will hit a memory error if `index` happened to be valid, and // expected `val` to be of a different type. abort(); }
diff --git a/crypto/fipsmodule/aes/asm/ghash-x86.pl b/crypto/fipsmodule/aes/asm/ghash-x86.pl index 6458dfb..8fb96a8 100644 --- a/crypto/fipsmodule/aes/asm/ghash-x86.pl +++ b/crypto/fipsmodule/aes/asm/ghash-x86.pl
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ # 1.91 and 2.16. As already mentioned, this implementation processes # one byte out of 8KB buffer in 2.10 cycles, while x86_64 counterpart # - in 2.02. x86_64 performance is better, because larger register -# bank allows to interleave reduction and multiplication better. +# bank allows interleaving reduction and multiplication better. # # Does it make sense to increase Naggr? To start with it's virtually # impossible in 32-bit mode, because of limited register bank
diff --git a/crypto/fipsmodule/cipher/internal.h b/crypto/fipsmodule/cipher/internal.h index 105ae43..a8316dd 100644 --- a/crypto/fipsmodule/cipher/internal.h +++ b/crypto/fipsmodule/cipher/internal.h
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ // AEADs need to provide one of the following sets of methods: // - // - openv + sealv: variable tag lenght AEAD. + // - openv + sealv: variable tag length AEAD. // - openv_detached + sealv: fixed tag length AEAD. int (*openv)(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, bssl::Span<const CRYPTO_IOVEC> iovecs,
diff --git a/crypto/fipsmodule/fips_shared_support.cc b/crypto/fipsmodule/fips_shared_support.cc index f1f9d99..ebc64ef 100644 --- a/crypto/fipsmodule/fips_shared_support.cc +++ b/crypto/fipsmodule/fips_shared_support.cc
@@ -16,10 +16,10 @@ #if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS) && defined(BORINGSSL_SHARED_LIBRARY) -// BORINGSSL_bcm_text_hash is is default hash value for the FIPS integrity check -// that must be replaced with the real value during the build process. This -// value need only be distinct, i.e. so that we can safely search-and-replace it -// in an object file. +// BORINGSSL_bcm_text_hash is the default hash value for the FIPS integrity +// check that must be replaced with the real value during the build process. +// This value need only be distinct, i.e. so that we can safely +// search-and-replace it in an object file. extern const uint8_t BORINGSSL_bcm_text_hash[32] = { 0xae, 0x2c, 0xea, 0x2a, 0xbd, 0xa6, 0xf3, 0xec, 0x97, 0x7f, 0x9b, 0xf6, 0x94, 0x9a, 0xfc, 0x83, 0x68, 0x27, 0xcb, 0xa0, 0xa0, 0x9f,
diff --git a/crypto/fipsmodule/keccak/keccak.cc.inc b/crypto/fipsmodule/keccak/keccak.cc.inc index 264c741..eef7e65 100644 --- a/crypto/fipsmodule/keccak/keccak.cc.inc +++ b/crypto/fipsmodule/keccak/keccak.cc.inc
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ // // From https://keccak.team/files/Keccak-reference-3.0.pdf, section // 1.2, the round constants are based on the output of a LFSR. Thus, as - // suggested in the appendix of of + // suggested in the appendix of // https://keccak.team/keccak_specs_summary.html, the values are // simply encoded here. static const uint64_t kRoundConstants[24] = {
diff --git a/crypto/fipsmodule/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl b/crypto/fipsmodule/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl index 0dbd3c3..9e8a5a2 100644 --- a/crypto/fipsmodule/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl +++ b/crypto/fipsmodule/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ # August 2009. # # George Spelvin has tipped that F_40_59(b,c,d) can be rewritten as -# '(c&d) + (b&(c^d))', which allows to accumulate partial results +# '(c&d) + (b&(c^d))', which allows accumulating partial results # and lighten "pressure" on scratch registers. This resulted in # >12% performance improvement on contemporary AMD cores (with no # degradation on other CPUs:-). Also, the code was revised to maximize
diff --git a/crypto/fipsmodule/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl b/crypto/fipsmodule/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl index faa9d22..59d9106 100644 --- a/crypto/fipsmodule/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl +++ b/crypto/fipsmodule/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ $A="mm0"; # B-D and $E="mm4"; # F-H are commonly loaded to respectively mm1-mm3 and - # mm5-mm7, but it's done on on-demand basis... + # mm5-mm7, but it's done on an on-demand basis... $BxC="mm2"; # ... except for B^C sub BODY_00_15_sse2 {
diff --git a/crypto/mem_internal.h b/crypto/mem_internal.h index 7b28cca..d58b7f3 100644 --- a/crypto/mem_internal.h +++ b/crypto/mem_internal.h
@@ -45,9 +45,9 @@ // allocation and not new T[n]. // // When called with no arguments, it performs value-initialization, not -// default-initialization. This means that, if selects a non-user-provided +// default-initialization. This means that, if it selects a non-user-provided // constructor, the object will be zero-initialized. (As in any C++ type, once -// `T` gains a user-provided constructors, it is responsible for initializing +// `T` gains a user-provided constructor, it is responsible for initializing // all fields explicitly.) // // Note: unlike `new`, this does not support non-public constructors. @@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ // should call these. `DecRefInternal` returns true if the object was freed // and false if there are still references. void UpRefInternal() const { - // Safety: the folowing call does not mutate anything other than the atomic + // Safety: the following call does not mutate anything other than the atomic // ref-count variable. CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&references_); }
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7.cc b/crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7.cc index 6ae6a08..b1c2139 100644 --- a/crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7.cc +++ b/crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7.cc
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ } } - // `certificates` is a implicitly-tagged SET OF. + // `certificates` is an implicitly-tagged SET OF. return CBB_flush_asn1_set_of(&certificates) && CBB_flush(out); }
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7_x509.cc b/crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7_x509.cc index f639215..cb9a725 100644 --- a/crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7_x509.cc +++ b/crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7_x509.cc
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ } } - // `certificates` is a implicitly-tagged SET OF. + // `certificates` is an implicitly-tagged SET OF. return CBB_flush_asn1_set_of(&certificates) && CBB_flush(out); } @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ } } - // `crl_data` is a implicitly-tagged SET OF. + // `crl_data` is an implicitly-tagged SET OF. return CBB_flush_asn1_set_of(&crl_data) && CBB_flush(out); }
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs8/pkcs8_x509.cc b/crypto/pkcs8/pkcs8_x509.cc index a8625a5..2c0f3b6 100644 --- a/crypto/pkcs8/pkcs8_x509.cc +++ b/crypto/pkcs8/pkcs8_x509.cc
@@ -1103,7 +1103,7 @@ // recursive data format. Section 5.1 of RFC 7292 describes the encoding // algorithm, but there is no clear overview. A quick summary: // - // PKCS#7 defines a ContentInfo structure, which is a overgeneralized typed + // PKCS#7 defines a ContentInfo structure, which is an overgeneralized typed // combinator structure for applying cryptography. We care about two types. A // data ContentInfo contains an OCTET STRING and is a leaf node of the // combinator tree. An encrypted-data ContentInfo contains encryption
diff --git a/crypto/rand/urandom_test.cc b/crypto/rand/urandom_test.cc index 41469af..da4864b 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/urandom_test.cc +++ b/crypto/rand/urandom_test.cc
@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and // limitations under the License. -#include <gtest/gtest.h> #include <stdlib.h> +#include <gtest/gtest.h> #include <optional> @@ -694,8 +694,7 @@ if (!sysrand(kAdditionalDataLength)) { return ret; } - if (kUsesDaemon && !AppendDaemonEvents(&ret, flags) && - !sysrand(48)) { + if (kUsesDaemon && !AppendDaemonEvents(&ret, flags) && !sysrand(48)) { return ret; } } @@ -725,7 +724,7 @@ } // Tests that `TestFunctionPRNGModel` is a correct model for the code in -// urandom.c, at least to the limits of the the `Event` type. +// urandom.c, at least to the limits of the `Event` type. TEST(URandomTest, Test) { char buf[256];
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_test.cc b/crypto/rsa/rsa_test.cc index 311dbf7..0abda23 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_test.cc +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_test.cc
@@ -738,7 +738,7 @@ ERR_clear_error(); } -// Attempting to generate an funny RSA key length should round down. +// Attempting to generate a funny RSA key length should round down. TEST(RSATest, RoundKeyLengths) { UniquePtr<BIGNUM> e(BN_new()); ASSERT_TRUE(e); @@ -1392,8 +1392,9 @@ static const uint8_t kDigest[32] = {0}; std::vector<uint8_t> sig(RSA_size(priv.get())); size_t len; - EXPECT_FALSE(RSA_sign_pss_mgf1(priv.get(), &len, sig.data(), sig.size(), kDigest, - sizeof(kDigest), EVP_sha256(), EVP_sha256(), + EXPECT_FALSE(RSA_sign_pss_mgf1(priv.get(), &len, sig.data(), sig.size(), + kDigest, sizeof(kDigest), EVP_sha256(), + EVP_sha256(), /*salt_len=*/32)); // But the "large e" APIs tolerate it.
diff --git a/crypto/test/abi_test.h b/crypto/test/abi_test.h index 15ae8d2..56be916 100644 --- a/crypto/test/abi_test.h +++ b/crypto/test/abi_test.h
@@ -153,8 +153,8 @@ // In aarch64, r18 (accessed as w18 or x18 in a 64-bit context) is the platform // register. iOS says user code may not touch it. We found no clear reference // for Linux. The iOS behavior implies portable assembly cannot use it, and -// aarch64 has many registers. Thus this framework ignores register's existence. -// We test r18 violations in arm-xlate.pl. +// aarch64 has many registers. Thus this framework ignores the register's +// existence. We test r18 violations in arm-xlate.pl. #define LOOP_CALLER_STATE_REGISTERS() \ /* Per AAPCS64, section 5.1.2, only the bottom 64 bits of v8-v15 */ \ /* are preserved. These are accessed as dN. */ \ @@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ static_assert(sizeof(T) == 4, "parameter types must be word-sized"); return (crypto_word_t)t; #elif defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) || defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64) - // AAPCS64, section 5.4.2, clauses C.7 and C.14 says any remaining bits in + // AAPCS64, section 5.4.2, clauses C.7 and C.14 say any remaining bits in // aarch are unspecified. iOS64 contradicts this and says the callee extends // arguments up to 32 bits, and only the upper 32 bits are unspecified. //
diff --git a/crypto/trust_token/internal.h b/crypto/trust_token/internal.h index cb3aed5..600681b 100644 --- a/crypto/trust_token/internal.h +++ b/crypto/trust_token/internal.h
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ int (*client_key_from_bytes)(bssl::TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key, const uint8_t *in, size_t len); - // issuer_key_from_bytes decodes a issuer key from `in` and sets `key` + // issuer_key_from_bytes decodes an issuer key from `in` and sets `key` // to the resulting key. It returns one on success and zero // on failure. int (*issuer_key_from_bytes)(bssl::TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
diff --git a/crypto/x509/internal.h b/crypto/x509/internal.h index c1a9dc4..d97396c 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/internal.h +++ b/crypto/x509/internal.h
@@ -21,8 +21,8 @@ #include <openssl/x509.h> #include "../asn1/internal.h" -#include "../mem_internal.h" #include "../internal.h" +#include "../mem_internal.h" // Internal structures. @@ -356,12 +356,12 @@ // This is the functions plus an instance of the local variables. struct x509_lookup_st { const X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *method; // the functions - void *method_data; // method data + void *method_data; // method data X509_STORE *store_ctx; // who owns us } /* X509_LOOKUP */; -// This is a used when verifying cert chains. Since the +// This is used when verifying cert chains. Since the // gathering of the cert chain can take some time (and have to be // 'retried', this needs to be kept and passed around. struct x509_store_ctx_st { @@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ STACK_OF(X509) *trusted_stack; // Callbacks for various operations - X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb; // error callback + X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb; // error callback // The following is built up int last_untrusted; // index of last untrusted cert
diff --git a/crypto/x509/name_print.cc b/crypto/x509/name_print.cc index 758a9fb..568b474 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/name_print.cc +++ b/crypto/x509/name_print.cc
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ const ASN1_OBJECT *fn = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(ent); const ASN1_STRING *val = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(ent); assert((flags & XN_FLAG_FN_MASK) == XN_FLAG_FN_SN); - // Print the short name if available, othewise serialize the OID. + // Print the short name if available, otherwise serialize the OID. char objtmp[80]; const char *objbuf = nullptr; int fn_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(fn);
diff --git a/crypto/x509/v3_ncons.cc b/crypto/x509/v3_ncons.cc index 2a7c267..2a04719 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/v3_ncons.cc +++ b/crypto/x509/v3_ncons.cc
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ } // Wildcard partial-match handling ("*.bar.com" matching name constraint - // "foo.bar.com"). This only handles the case where the the dnsname and the + // "foo.bar.com"). This only handles the case where the dnsname and the // constraint match after removing the leftmost label, otherwise it is handled // by falling through to the check of whether the dnsname is fully within or // fully outside of the constraint.
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.cc b/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.cc index d385a0e..b544351 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.cc +++ b/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.cc
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ const auto *b_impl = FromOpaque(b); // Fill in the `cert_hash` fields. // - // TODO(davidben): This may fail, in which case the the hash will be all + // TODO(davidben): This may fail, in which case the hash will be all // zeros. This produces a consistent comparison (failures are sticky), but // not a good one. OpenSSL now returns -2, but this is not a consistent // comparison and may cause misbehaving sorts by transitivity. For now, we
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_extension_test.cc b/crypto/x509/x509_extension_test.cc index ea1299c..7ca4db4 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/x509_extension_test.cc +++ b/crypto/x509/x509_extension_test.cc
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ "1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.1"); EXPECT_EQ(policy->qualifiers, nullptr); - // The second policy has a wide range of qualfiers, to exercise the encoding. + // The second policy has a wide range of qualifiers, to exercise the encoding. policy = sk_POLICYINFO_value(policies.get(), 1); EXPECT_EQ(ASN1ObjectToString(policy->policyid), "1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.2");
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_test.cc b/crypto/x509/x509_test.cc index 9c2d67c..2401c45 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/x509_test.cc +++ b/crypto/x509/x509_test.cc
@@ -2037,8 +2037,8 @@ } static bssl::UniquePtr<X509> MakeTestCert(std::string_view issuer, - std::string_view subject, EVP_PKEY *key, - bool is_ca) { + std::string_view subject, + EVP_PKEY *key, bool is_ca) { UniquePtr<X509_NAME> issuer_name = MakeTestName(issuer); UniquePtr<X509_NAME> subject_name = MakeTestName(subject); UniquePtr<X509> cert(X509_new()); @@ -6421,7 +6421,7 @@ /*crit=*/1, X509V3_ADD_REPLACE_EXISTING)); expect_extensions({{NID_subject_key_identifier, true, skid2_der}}); - // `X509V3_ADD_REPLACE` adds a new extension if not preseent. + // `X509V3_ADD_REPLACE` adds a new extension if not present. EXPECT_EQ( 1, X509_add1_ext_i2d(x509.get(), NID_basic_constraints, basic1_obj.get(), /*crit=*/1, X509V3_ADD_REPLACE)); @@ -6433,7 +6433,7 @@ X509V3_ADD_DELETE)); expect_extensions({{NID_subject_key_identifier, true, skid2_der}}); - // `X509V3_ADD_KEEP_EXISTING` adds a new extension if not preseent. + // `X509V3_ADD_KEEP_EXISTING` adds a new extension if not present. EXPECT_EQ( 1, X509_add1_ext_i2d(x509.get(), NID_basic_constraints, basic1_obj.get(), /*crit=*/1, X509V3_ADD_KEEP_EXISTING));
diff --git a/decrepit/des/cfb64ede.cc b/decrepit/des/cfb64ede.cc index e9ad51a..8d3686c 100644 --- a/decrepit/des/cfb64ede.cc +++ b/decrepit/des/cfb64ede.cc
@@ -25,10 +25,10 @@ // The input and output encrypted as though 64bit cfb mode is being used. The // extra state information to record how much of the 64bit block we have used // is contained in *num; -void DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, - long length, DES_key_schedule *ks1, - DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_key_schedule *ks3, - DES_cblock *ivec, int *num, int enc) { +void DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, long length, + DES_key_schedule *ks1, DES_key_schedule *ks2, + DES_key_schedule *ks3, DES_cblock *ivec, int *num, + int enc) { uint32_t v0, v1; long l = length; int n = *num; @@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ *num = n; } -// This is compatible with the single key CFB-r for DES, even thought that's +// This is compatible with the single key CFB-r for DES, even though that's // not what EVP needs. void DES_ede3_cfb_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, int numbits,
diff --git a/docs/releasing.md b/docs/releasing.md index 5da2dfd..8b4234b 100644 --- a/docs/releasing.md +++ b/docs/releasing.md
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ 2. Update `MODULE.bazel` with the new version and upload to Gerrit. -3. Once that CL lands, make a annotated git tag at the revision. This can be +3. Once that CL lands, make an annotated git tag at the revision. This can be [done from Gerrit](https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/admin/repos/boringssl,tags). The "Annotation" field must be non-empty. (Just using the name of the tag again is fine.)
diff --git a/include/openssl/aead.h b/include/openssl/aead.h index 82523f1..6b8ad57 100644 --- a/include/openssl/aead.h +++ b/include/openssl/aead.h
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ #ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_AEAD_H #define OPENSSL_HEADER_AEAD_H -#include <openssl/base.h> // IWYU pragma: export +#include <openssl/base.h> // IWYU pragma: export #if defined(__cplusplus) extern "C" { @@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ // // At most `in_len` bytes are written to `out`. In order to ensure success, // `max_out_len` should be at least `in_len`. On successful return, `*out_len` -// is set to the the actual number of bytes written. +// is set to the actual number of bytes written. // // The length of `nonce`, `nonce_len`, must be equal to the result of // `EVP_AEAD_nonce_length` for this AEAD.
diff --git a/include/openssl/asm_base.h b/include/openssl/asm_base.h index ce19034..4cea0d1 100644 --- a/include/openssl/asm_base.h +++ b/include/openssl/asm_base.h
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ // when included in assembly, adds that metadata. It also makes defines like // `OPENSSL_X86_64` available and includes the prefixing macros. // -// Including this header in an assembly file imples: +// Including this header in an assembly file implies: // // - The file does not require an executable stack. //
diff --git a/include/openssl/asn1.h b/include/openssl/asn1.h index e599b54..d88ae82 100644 --- a/include/openssl/asn1.h +++ b/include/openssl/asn1.h
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ #ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_ASN1_H #define OPENSSL_HEADER_ASN1_H -#include <openssl/base.h> // IWYU pragma: export +#include <openssl/base.h> // IWYU pragma: export #include <time.h> @@ -916,7 +916,8 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT uint8_t ASN1_BIT_STRING_unused_bits(const ASN1_BIT_STRING *str); // ASN1_BIT_STRING_set calls `ASN1_STRING_set`. -OPENSSL_EXPORT int ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(ASN1_BIT_STRING *str, const uint8_t *data, +OPENSSL_EXPORT int ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(ASN1_BIT_STRING *str, + const uint8_t *data, ossl_ssize_t length); // ASN1_BIT_STRING_set1 sets `str` to a BIT STRING containing `length` bytes @@ -1324,8 +1325,8 @@ // non-standard four-digit timezone offsets on UTC times. On success, one is // returned. On failure, zero is returned. `ASN1_TIME_to_posix` should normally // be used instead of this function. -OPENSSL_EXPORT int ASN1_TIME_to_posix_nonstandard( - const ASN1_TIME *t, int64_t *out); +OPENSSL_EXPORT int ASN1_TIME_to_posix_nonstandard(const ASN1_TIME *t, + int64_t *out); // TODO(davidben): Expand and document function prototypes generated in macros. @@ -1359,7 +1360,7 @@ // Object identifiers. // -// An `ASN1_OBJECT` represents a ASN.1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER. See also obj.h for +// An `ASN1_OBJECT` represents an ASN.1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER. See also obj.h for // additional functions relating to `ASN1_OBJECT`. // // TODO(davidben): What's the relationship between asn1.h and obj.h? Most of
diff --git a/include/openssl/bio.h b/include/openssl/bio.h index dc4bca2..8d532d2 100644 --- a/include/openssl/bio.h +++ b/include/openssl/bio.h
@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ #define BIO_NOCLOSE 0 #define BIO_CLOSE 1 -// BIO_s_mem returns a `BIO_METHOD` that uses a in-memory buffer. +// BIO_s_mem returns a `BIO_METHOD` that uses an in-memory buffer. OPENSSL_EXPORT const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_mem(void); // BIO_new_mem_buf creates read-only BIO that reads from `len` bytes at `buf`. @@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ // File descriptor BIOs. // // File descriptor BIOs are wrappers around the system's `read` and `write` -// functions. If the close flag is set then then `close` is called on the +// functions. If the close flag is set then `close` is called on the // underlying file descriptor when the BIO is freed. // // `BIO_reset` attempts to seek the file pointer to the start of file using
diff --git a/include/openssl/cipher.h b/include/openssl/cipher.h index 0b27aa8..324033d 100644 --- a/include/openssl/cipher.h +++ b/include/openssl/cipher.h
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ #ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_CIPHER_H #define OPENSSL_HEADER_CIPHER_H -#include <openssl/base.h> // IWYU pragma: export +#include <openssl/base.h> // IWYU pragma: export #if defined(__cplusplus) extern "C" { @@ -459,7 +459,7 @@ // EVP_CIPH_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW is meaningless. In OpenSSL it permits non-FIPS // algorithms in FIPS mode. But BoringSSL FIPS mode doesn't prohibit algorithms -// (it's up the the caller to use the FIPS module in a fashion compliant with +// (it's up to the caller to use the FIPS module in a fashion compliant with // their needs). Thus this exists only to allow code to compile. #define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW 0 @@ -718,7 +718,7 @@ const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; // app_data is a pointer to opaque, user data. - void *app_data; // application stuff + void *app_data; // application stuff // cipher_data points to the `cipher` specific state. void *cipher_data;
diff --git a/include/openssl/digest.h b/include/openssl/digest.h index a81c2a4..d9f46d6 100644 --- a/include/openssl/digest.h +++ b/include/openssl/digest.h
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ // EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW is meaningless. In OpenSSL it permits non-FIPS // algorithms in FIPS mode. But BoringSSL FIPS mode doesn't prohibit algorithms -// (it's up the the caller to use the FIPS module in a fashion compliant with +// (it's up to the caller to use the FIPS module in a fashion compliant with // their needs). Thus this exists only to allow code to compile. #define EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW 0
diff --git a/include/openssl/ec.h b/include/openssl/ec.h index e9ed971..5dfc88a 100644 --- a/include/openssl/ec.h +++ b/include/openssl/ec.h
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ // point_conversion_form_t enumerates forms, as defined in X9.62 (ECDSA), for -// the encoding of a elliptic curve point (x,y) +// the encoding of an elliptic curve point (x,y) typedef enum { // POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED indicates that the point is encoded as z||x, // where the octet z specifies which solution of the quadratic equation y
diff --git a/include/openssl/ec_key.h b/include/openssl/ec_key.h index 2ab696c..1480520 100644 --- a/include/openssl/ec_key.h +++ b/include/openssl/ec_key.h
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ #ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_EC_KEY_H #define OPENSSL_HEADER_EC_KEY_H -#include <openssl/base.h> // IWYU pragma: export +#include <openssl/base.h> // IWYU pragma: export #include <openssl/ec.h> #include <openssl/engine.h> @@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ // bitwise-OR of `EC_PKEY_*` values. OPENSSL_EXPORT void EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(EC_KEY *key, unsigned flags); -// EC_KEY_get_conv_form returns the conversation form that will be used by +// EC_KEY_get_conv_form returns the conversion form that will be used by // `key`. OPENSSL_EXPORT point_conversion_form_t EC_KEY_get_conv_form(const EC_KEY *key);
diff --git a/include/openssl/evp.h b/include/openssl/evp.h index 45fef4a..8f523ac 100644 --- a/include/openssl/evp.h +++ b/include/openssl/evp.h
@@ -1136,7 +1136,7 @@ // Diffie-Hellman-specific control functions. -// EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_pad configures configures whether `ctx`, which must be an +// EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_pad configures whether `ctx`, which must be an // `EVP_PKEY_derive` operation, configures the handling of leading zeros in the // Diffie-Hellman shared secret. If `pad` is zero, leading zeros are removed // from the secret. If `pad` is non-zero, the fixed-width shared secret is used
diff --git a/include/openssl/mem.h b/include/openssl/mem.h index 2b580c0..ca265d0 100644 --- a/include/openssl/mem.h +++ b/include/openssl/mem.h
@@ -15,10 +15,10 @@ #ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_MEM_H #define OPENSSL_HEADER_MEM_H -#include <openssl/base.h> // IWYU pragma: export +#include <openssl/base.h> // IWYU pragma: export -#include <stdlib.h> #include <stdarg.h> +#include <stdlib.h> #if defined(__cplusplus) extern "C" { @@ -54,11 +54,11 @@ // allocated and the data at `ptr` is always wiped and freed. Memory is // allocated with `OPENSSL_malloc` and must be freed with `OPENSSL_free`. OPENSSL_EXPORT void *OPENSSL_realloc(void *ptr, size_t new_size); -#endif // !_BORINGSSL_PROHIBIT_OPENSSL_MALLOC +#endif // !_BORINGSSL_PROHIBIT_OPENSSL_MALLOC // OPENSSL_free does nothing if `ptr` is NULL. Otherwise it zeros out the // memory allocated at `ptr` and frees it along with the private data. -// It must only be used on on `ptr` values obtained from `OPENSSL_malloc` +// It must only be used on `ptr` values obtained from `OPENSSL_malloc` OPENSSL_EXPORT void OPENSSL_free(void *ptr); // OPENSSL_cleanse zeros out `len` bytes of memory at `ptr`. This is similar to @@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ // DECIMAL_SIZE returns an upper bound for the length of the decimal // representation of the given type. -#define DECIMAL_SIZE(type) ((sizeof(type)*8+2)/3+1) +#define DECIMAL_SIZE(type) ((sizeof(type) * 8 + 2) / 3 + 1) // BIO_snprintf has the same behavior as snprintf(3). OPENSSL_EXPORT int BIO_snprintf(char *buf, size_t n, const char *format, ...)
diff --git a/include/openssl/pki/certificate.h b/include/openssl/pki/certificate.h index d424735..beef271 100644 --- a/include/openssl/pki/certificate.h +++ b/include/openssl/pki/certificate.h
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ ~Certificate(); Certificate& operator=(const Certificate& other) = delete; - // FromDER returns a certificate from an DER-encoded X.509 object in `der`. + // FromDER returns a certificate from a DER-encoded X.509 object in `der`. // In the event of a failure, it will return no value, and `out_diagnostic` // may be set to a string of human readable debugging information if // information about the failure is available.
diff --git a/include/openssl/posix_time.h b/include/openssl/posix_time.h index 7a6afc6..0a4b6a5 100644 --- a/include/openssl/posix_time.h +++ b/include/openssl/posix_time.h
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ #ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_POSIX_TIME_H #define OPENSSL_HEADER_POSIX_TIME_H -#include <openssl/base.h> // IWYU pragma: export +#include <openssl/base.h> // IWYU pragma: export #include <time.h> @@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ // Time functions. -// OPENSSL_posix_to_tm converts a int64_t POSIX time value in `time`, which must -// be in the range of year 0000 to 9999, to a broken out time value in `tm`. It -// returns one on success and zero on error. +// OPENSSL_posix_to_tm converts an int64_t POSIX time value in `time`, which +// must be in the range of year 0000 to 9999, to a broken out time value in +// `tm`. It returns one on success and zero on error. OPENSSL_EXPORT int OPENSSL_posix_to_tm(int64_t time, struct tm *out_tm); // OPENSSL_tm_to_posix converts a time value between the years 0 and 9999 in
diff --git a/include/openssl/rsa.h b/include/openssl/rsa.h index 45858eb..6ff32e9 100644 --- a/include/openssl/rsa.h +++ b/include/openssl/rsa.h
@@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ // a DigestInfo structure. // // If `padding` is `RSA_NO_PADDING`, this function only performs the raw private -// key operation, interpreting `in` as a integer modulo n. The caller is +// key operation, interpreting `in` as an integer modulo n. The caller is // responsible for hashing the input and encoding it for the signature scheme // being implemented. //
diff --git a/include/openssl/ssl.h b/include/openssl/ssl.h index c70ba07..fca797c 100644 --- a/include/openssl/ssl.h +++ b/include/openssl/ssl.h
@@ -2636,7 +2636,7 @@ // SSL_set1_group_ids_with_flags sets the preferred groups for `ssl` to // `group_ids`, using the corresponding `flags` for each element, which is a set -// of SSL_GROUP_FLAG_* values ORed toegether. Each element of `group_ids` should +// of SSL_GROUP_FLAG_* values ORed together. Each element of `group_ids` should // be a unique one of the `SSL_GROUP_*` constants. If `group_ids` is empty, a // default list of groups and flags defaulting to zero will be set instead. // `group_ids` and `flags` should both have `num_group_ids` elements. It @@ -4294,7 +4294,7 @@ int (*send_alert)(SSL *ssl, enum ssl_encryption_level_t level, uint8_t alert); }; -// SSL_quic_max_handshake_flight_len returns returns the maximum number of bytes +// SSL_quic_max_handshake_flight_len returns the maximum number of bytes // that may be received at the given encryption level. This function should be // used to limit buffering in the QUIC implementation. // @@ -4889,7 +4889,7 @@ // retains its final flight for retransmission in case of loss. There is no // explicit protocol signal for when this completes, though after receiving // application data and/or a timeout it is likely that this is no longer needed. -// BoringSSL does not currently evaluate either condition and leaves it it to +// BoringSSL does not currently evaluate either condition and leaves it to // the caller to determine whether this is now unnecessary. This applies when // `ssl` is a server for full handshakes and when `ssl` is a client for full // handshakes.
diff --git a/include/openssl/x509.h b/include/openssl/x509.h index 6d997c1..d08e888 100644 --- a/include/openssl/x509.h +++ b/include/openssl/x509.h
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ // The caller must call `X509_free` on the result to release the reference. // // WARNING: Although the result is non-const for use with `X509_free`, it is -// still shared with other parts of the appplication for the same object. Avoid +// still shared with other parts of the application for the same object. Avoid // mutating shared `X509`s. OPENSSL_EXPORT X509 *X509_dup_ref(const X509 *x509); @@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ // X509_parse_with_algorithms parses an X.509 structure from `buf` and returns a // fresh X509 or NULL on error. There must not be any trailing data in `buf`. -// The returned structure (if any) increment's `buf`'s reference count and +// The returned structure (if any) increments `buf`'s reference count and // retains a reference to it. // // Only the `num_algs` algorithms from `algs` will be considered when parsing @@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ // X509_get0_authority_issuer returns the authorityCertIssuer of `x509`'s // authority key identifier, if the extension and field are present. (See // RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.1.) It returns NULL if the extension is not present, -// if it is present but lacks a authorityCertIssuer field, or if some extension +// if it is present but lacks an authorityCertIssuer field, or if some extension // in `x509` was invalid. // // TODO(crbug.com/boringssl/381): Decoding an `X509` object will not check for @@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ // X509_get0_authority_serial returns the authorityCertSerialNumber of `x509`'s // authority key identifier, if the extension and field are present. (See // RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.1.) It returns NULL if the extension is not present, -// if it is present but lacks a authorityCertSerialNumber field, or if some +// if it is present but lacks an authorityCertSerialNumber field, or if some // extension in `x509` was invalid. // // TODO(crbug.com/boringssl/381): Decoding an `X509` object will not check for @@ -1689,7 +1689,7 @@ // to non-critical if `crit` is zero. OPENSSL_EXPORT int X509_EXTENSION_set_critical(X509_EXTENSION *ex, int crit); -// X509_EXTENSION_set_data set's `ex`'s extension value to a copy of `data`. It +// X509_EXTENSION_set_data sets `ex`'s extension value to a copy of `data`. It // returns one on success and zero on error. OPENSSL_EXPORT int X509_EXTENSION_set_data(X509_EXTENSION *ex, const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data); @@ -1888,7 +1888,7 @@ #define X509V3_ADD_DEFAULT 0L // X509V3_ADD_APPEND causes the function to unconditionally appended the new -// extension to to the extensions list, even if there is a duplicate. +// extension to the extensions list, even if there is a duplicate. #define X509V3_ADD_APPEND 1L // X509V3_ADD_REPLACE causes the function to replace the existing extension, or @@ -3330,7 +3330,7 @@ // X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy adds `policy` to the user-initial-policy-set // (see Section 6.1.1 of RFC 5280). On success, it takes ownership of // `policy` and returns one. Otherwise, it returns zero and the caller retains -// owneship of `policy`. +// ownership of `policy`. OPENSSL_EXPORT int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, ASN1_OBJECT *policy); @@ -5031,7 +5031,7 @@ // decoded mask. IPv4 ranges are represented as 8-byte strings and IPv6 ranges // as 32-byte strings. On failure, it returns NULL. // -// The text format decoded by this function is not the standard CIDR notiation. +// The text format decoded by this function is not the standard CIDR notation. // Instead, the mask after the "/" is represented as another IP address. For // example, "192.168.0.0/16" would be written "192.168.0.0/255.255.0.0". OPENSSL_EXPORT ASN1_OCTET_STRING *a2i_IPADDRESS_NC(const char *ipasc); @@ -5333,7 +5333,7 @@ BSSL_NAMESPACE_END -} // extern C++ +} // extern C++ #endif // !BORINGSSL_NO_CXX #define X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH 100
diff --git a/pki/name_constraints.cc b/pki/name_constraints.cc index f85ba25..be1bade 100644 --- a/pki/name_constraints.cc +++ b/pki/name_constraints.cc
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ } // Wildcard partial-match handling ("*.bar.com" matching name constraint - // "foo.bar.com"). This only handles the case where the the dnsname and the + // "foo.bar.com"). This only handles the case where the dnsname and the // constraint match after removing the leftmost label, otherwise it is handled // by falling through to the check of whether the dnsname is fully within or // fully outside of the constraint.
diff --git a/pki/name_constraints.h b/pki/name_constraints.h index 06f9409..817b8c5 100644 --- a/pki/name_constraints.h +++ b/pki/name_constraints.h
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ // Parses a DER-encoded NameConstraints extension and initializes this object. // `extension_value` should be the extnValue from the extension (not including // the OCTET STRING tag). `is_critical` should be true if the extension was - // marked critical. Returns nullptr if parsing the the extension failed. + // marked critical. Returns nullptr if parsing the extension failed. // The object may reference data from `extension_value`, so is only valid as // long as `extension_value` is. static std::unique_ptr<NameConstraints> Create(der::Input extension_value,
diff --git a/pki/parse_certificate_unittest.cc b/pki/parse_certificate_unittest.cc index 3c307bd..d405f0a 100644 --- a/pki/parse_certificate_unittest.cc +++ b/pki/parse_certificate_unittest.cc
@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ CertificateVersion::V2); } -// A version 2 certificate with both a issuer and subject unique ID field. +// A version 2 certificate with both an issuer and subject unique ID field. TEST(ParseTbsCertificateTest, Version2IssuerAndSubjectUniqueId) { RunTbsCertificateTestGivenVersion("tbs_v2_issuer_and_subject_unique_id.pem", CertificateVersion::V2);
diff --git a/pki/path_builder.cc b/pki/path_builder.cc index 8a36f16..1baaa9d 100644 --- a/pki/path_builder.cc +++ b/pki/path_builder.cc
@@ -752,7 +752,8 @@ // Diagnostic string is always "everything" about the path. std::string diagnostic = errors.ToDebugString(certs); if (!errors.ContainsHighSeverityErrors()) { - // TODO(bbe3): Having to check this after seems awkward: crbug.com/boringssl/713 + // TODO(bbe3): Having to check this after seems awkward: + // crbug.com/boringssl/713 if (GetTrustedCert()) { return VerifyError(VerifyError::StatusCode::PATH_VERIFIED, 0, std::move(diagnostic)); @@ -888,7 +889,7 @@ return GetBestValidPath()->GetVerifyError(); } // We can only return one error. Returning the errors corresponding to the - // limits if they they appear on any path will make this error prominent even + // limits if they appear on any path will make this error prominent even // if there are other paths with different or multiple errors. if (exceeded_iteration_limit) { return VerifyError(
diff --git a/pki/path_builder_unittest.cc b/pki/path_builder_unittest.cc index 026ce8b..c85bc9e 100644 --- a/pki/path_builder_unittest.cc +++ b/pki/path_builder_unittest.cc
@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ #include <openssl/base.h> #include <openssl/bytestring.h> -#include <openssl/pool.h> #include <openssl/pki/verify.h> +#include <openssl/pool.h> #include "cert_error_params.h" #include "cert_issuer_source.h" @@ -78,11 +78,9 @@ void DisallowPrecert() { allow_precertificate_ = false; } - bool AcceptPreCertificates() override { - return allow_precertificate_; - } + bool AcceptPreCertificates() override { return allow_precertificate_; } -private: + private: bool deadline_is_expired_ = false; bool use_signature_cache_ = false; bool allow_precertificate_ = false; @@ -1010,9 +1008,7 @@ } TEST_F(PathBuilderMultiRootTest, TestPreCertificate) { - - std::string test_dir = - "testdata/path_builder_unittest/precertificate/"; + std::string test_dir = "testdata/path_builder_unittest/precertificate/"; std::shared_ptr<const ParsedCertificate> root1 = ReadCertFromFile(test_dir + "root.pem"); ASSERT_TRUE(root1); @@ -1472,7 +1468,8 @@ ASSERT_EQ(error.Code(), VerifyError::StatusCode::PATH_VERIFIED) << error.DiagnosticString(); } else { - ASSERT_EQ(error.Code(), VerifyError::StatusCode::PATH_ITERATION_COUNT_EXCEEDED) + ASSERT_EQ(error.Code(), + VerifyError::StatusCode::PATH_ITERATION_COUNT_EXCEEDED) << error.DiagnosticString(); } @@ -2136,7 +2133,7 @@ CertPathBuilder::Result result = RunPathBuilderWithDistrustedCert(nullptr); { ASSERT_TRUE(result.HasValidPath()); - // The built path should be identical the the one read from disk. + // The built path should be identical to the one read from disk. const auto &path = *result.GetBestValidPath(); ASSERT_EQ(test_.chain.size(), path.certs.size()); for (size_t i = 0; i < test_.chain.size(); ++i) { @@ -2330,8 +2327,7 @@ errors->AddError(mapping.internal_error, nullptr); VerifyError error = result.GetBestPathVerifyError(); - ASSERT_EQ(error.Code(), mapping.code) - << error.DiagnosticString(); + ASSERT_EQ(error.Code(), mapping.code) << error.DiagnosticString(); } } @@ -2635,44 +2631,42 @@ EXPECT_FALSE(result.HasValidPath()); // Cert with multiple cosigners (including valid CA cosigner) should validate - // succesfully, ignoring the unknown cosigners. + // successfully, ignoring the unknown cosigners. std::shared_ptr<const ParsedCertificate> standalone_leaf_3_cosigners; - ASSERT_TRUE( - ReadTestCert("mtc_plants04/mtc-leaf-standalone-3cosigners.pem", - &standalone_leaf_3_cosigners)); - result = RunPathBuilder(standalone_leaf_3_cosigners, - &trust_store_no_subtrees, nullptr, nullptr); + ASSERT_TRUE(ReadTestCert("mtc_plants04/mtc-leaf-standalone-3cosigners.pem", + &standalone_leaf_3_cosigners)); + result = RunPathBuilder(standalone_leaf_3_cosigners, &trust_store_no_subtrees, + nullptr, nullptr); EXPECT_TRUE(result.HasValidPath()); // but it should fail if the CA key is wrong: result = RunPathBuilder(standalone_leaf_3_cosigners, - &trust_store_no_subtrees_wrong_key, nullptr, nullptr); + &trust_store_no_subtrees_wrong_key, nullptr, nullptr); EXPECT_FALSE(result.HasValidPath()); // Cert with a cosigner but no CA cosigner should fail: std::shared_ptr<const ParsedCertificate> standalone_leaf_no_ca_signer; - ASSERT_TRUE( - ReadTestCert("mtc_plants04/mtc-leaf-standalone-no_ca_signer.pem", - &standalone_leaf_no_ca_signer)); + ASSERT_TRUE(ReadTestCert("mtc_plants04/mtc-leaf-standalone-no_ca_signer.pem", + &standalone_leaf_no_ca_signer)); result = RunPathBuilder(standalone_leaf_no_ca_signer, - &trust_store_no_subtrees, nullptr, nullptr); + &trust_store_no_subtrees, nullptr, nullptr); EXPECT_FALSE(result.HasValidPath()); // Cert with a duplicate CA cosigner should fail: std::shared_ptr<const ParsedCertificate> standalone_leaf_duplicate_ca_signer; ASSERT_TRUE( ReadTestCert("mtc_plants04/mtc-leaf-standalone-duplicate_ca_signer.pem", - &standalone_leaf_duplicate_ca_signer)); + &standalone_leaf_duplicate_ca_signer)); result = RunPathBuilder(standalone_leaf_duplicate_ca_signer, - &trust_store_no_subtrees, nullptr, nullptr); + &trust_store_no_subtrees, nullptr, nullptr); EXPECT_FALSE(result.HasValidPath()); // Cert with a cosigners in non-sorted order should fail: std::shared_ptr<const ParsedCertificate> standalone_leaf_cosigner_wrong_order; ASSERT_TRUE( ReadTestCert("mtc_plants04/mtc-leaf-standalone-cosigner_wrong_order.pem", - &standalone_leaf_cosigner_wrong_order)); + &standalone_leaf_cosigner_wrong_order)); result = RunPathBuilder(standalone_leaf_cosigner_wrong_order, - &trust_store_no_subtrees, nullptr, nullptr); + &trust_store_no_subtrees, nullptr, nullptr); EXPECT_FALSE(result.HasValidPath()); }
diff --git a/pki/signature_algorithm_unittest.cc b/pki/signature_algorithm_unittest.cc index b2bd098..e67cfa4 100644 --- a/pki/signature_algorithm_unittest.cc +++ b/pki/signature_algorithm_unittest.cc
@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ EXPECT_FALSE(ParseSignatureAlgorithm(der::Input(kData))); } -// Parses a ecdsa-with-SHA1 which contains no parameters field. +// Parses an ecdsa-with-SHA1 which contains no parameters field. // // SEQUENCE (1 elem) // OBJECT IDENTIFIER 1.2.840.10045.4.1 @@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ SignatureAlgorithm::kEcdsaSha1); } -// Parses a ecdsa-with-SHA1 which contains a NULL parameters field. +// Parses an ecdsa-with-SHA1 which contains a NULL parameters field. // // SEQUENCE (2 elem) // OBJECT IDENTIFIER 1.2.840.10045.4.1 @@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ EXPECT_FALSE(ParseSignatureAlgorithm(der::Input(kData))); } -// Parses a ecdsa-with-SHA256 which contains no parameters field. +// Parses an ecdsa-with-SHA256 which contains no parameters field. // // SEQUENCE (1 elem) // OBJECT IDENTIFIER 1.2.840.10045.4.3.2 @@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ SignatureAlgorithm::kEcdsaSha256); } -// Parses a ecdsa-with-SHA256 which contains a NULL parameters field. +// Parses an ecdsa-with-SHA256 which contains a NULL parameters field. // // SEQUENCE (2 elem) // OBJECT IDENTIFIER 1.2.840.10045.4.3.2 @@ -394,7 +394,7 @@ EXPECT_FALSE(ParseSignatureAlgorithm(der::Input(kData))); } -// Parses a ecdsa-with-SHA384 which contains no parameters field. +// Parses an ecdsa-with-SHA384 which contains no parameters field. // // SEQUENCE (1 elem) // OBJECT IDENTIFIER 1.2.840.10045.4.3.3 @@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ SignatureAlgorithm::kEcdsaSha384); } -// Parses a ecdsa-with-SHA384 which contains a NULL parameters field. +// Parses an ecdsa-with-SHA384 which contains a NULL parameters field. // // SEQUENCE (2 elem) // OBJECT IDENTIFIER 1.2.840.10045.4.3.3 @@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ EXPECT_FALSE(ParseSignatureAlgorithm(der::Input(kData))); } -// Parses a ecdsa-with-SHA512 which contains no parameters field. +// Parses an ecdsa-with-SHA512 which contains no parameters field. // // SEQUENCE (1 elem) // OBJECT IDENTIFIER 1.2.840.10045.4.3.4 @@ -443,7 +443,7 @@ SignatureAlgorithm::kEcdsaSha512); } -// Parses a ecdsa-with-SHA512 which contains a NULL parameters field. +// Parses an ecdsa-with-SHA512 which contains a NULL parameters field. // // SEQUENCE (2 elem) // OBJECT IDENTIFIER 1.2.840.10045.4.3.4
diff --git a/pki/verify_certificate_chain.cc b/pki/verify_certificate_chain.cc index f113bf7..6ff82cd 100644 --- a/pki/verify_certificate_chain.cc +++ b/pki/verify_certificate_chain.cc
@@ -394,7 +394,7 @@ // intermediates, there are a number of exceptions regarding CA ownership // and cross signing which are impossible for us to know or enforce here. // Therefore, we can only enforce at the level of the intermediate that - // issued our target certificate. This means we we differ in the following + // issued our target certificate. This means we differ in the following // ways: // - We only enforce at the issuer of the TLS certificate. // - We allow email protection to exist in the issuer, since without @@ -2152,21 +2152,21 @@ valid_policy_graph_.Init(); - // RFC 5280 section section 6.1.2: + // RFC 5280 section 6.1.2: // // If initial-explicit-policy is set, then the initial value // [of explicit_policy] is 0, otherwise the initial value is n+1. explicit_policy_ = initial_explicit_policy == InitialExplicitPolicy::kTrue ? 0 : n + 1; - // RFC 5280 section section 6.1.2: + // RFC 5280 section 6.1.2: // // If initial-any-policy-inhibit is set, then the initial value // [of inhibit_anyPolicy] is 0, otherwise the initial value is n+1. inhibit_any_policy_ = initial_any_policy_inhibit == InitialAnyPolicyInhibit::kTrue ? 0 : n + 1; - // RFC 5280 section section 6.1.2: + // RFC 5280 section 6.1.2: // // If initial-policy-mapping-inhibit is set, then the initial value // [of policy_mapping] is 0, otherwise the initial value is n+1. @@ -2175,7 +2175,7 @@ ? 0 : n + 1; - // RFC 5280 section section 6.1.2: + // RFC 5280 section 6.1.2: // // max_path_length: this integer is initialized to n, ... max_path_length_ = n;
diff --git a/pki/verify_name_match_unittest.cc b/pki/verify_name_match_unittest.cc index 8d1f462..c4da0f7 100644 --- a/pki/verify_name_match_unittest.cc +++ b/pki/verify_name_match_unittest.cc
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ SequenceValueFromString(der))); } -// Runs VerifyNameMatchSimpleTest for all combinations of value_type and and +// Runs VerifyNameMatchSimpleTest for all combinations of value_type and // suffix. INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(InstantiationName, VerifyNameMatchSimpleTest, ::testing::Combine(::testing::ValuesIn(kValueTypes),
diff --git a/rust/bssl-crypto/deny.toml b/rust/bssl-crypto/deny.toml index bfec2fe..5f9dc0a 100644 --- a/rust/bssl-crypto/deny.toml +++ b/rust/bssl-crypto/deny.toml
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ # Configuration file used for `cargo deny check`, which checks for licensing -# issues and security adviories. +# issues and security advisories. # # For a list of possible sections and their default values, see # https://github.com/EmbarkStudios/cargo-deny/blob/main/deny.template.toml
diff --git a/rust/bssl-crypto/src/ec.rs b/rust/bssl-crypto/src/ec.rs index 5c982c0..1c3fa1e 100644 --- a/rust/bssl-crypto/src/ec.rs +++ b/rust/bssl-crypto/src/ec.rs
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ } pub fn to_x962_uncompressed(&self) -> Buffer { - // Safety: arguments are valid, `EC_KEY` ensures that the the group is + // Safety: arguments are valid, `EC_KEY` ensures that the group is // correct for the point, and a `Point` is always finite. unsafe { to_x962( @@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ /// WARNING: compressed form is rarely used and is not as well supported as /// the uncompressed form. pub fn to_x962_compressed(&self) -> Buffer { - // Safety: arguments are valid, `EC_KEY` ensures that the the group is + // Safety: arguments are valid, `EC_KEY` ensures that the group is // correct for the point, and a `Point` is always finite. unsafe { to_x962( @@ -503,7 +503,7 @@ // Safety: `self.0` is valid by construction. let group = unsafe { bssl_sys::EC_KEY_get0_group(self.0) }; let point = unsafe { bssl_sys::EC_KEY_get0_public_key(self.0) }; - // Safety: arguments are valid, `EC_KEY` ensures that the the group is + // Safety: arguments are valid, `EC_KEY` ensures that the group is // correct for the point, and a `Key` always holds a finite public point. unsafe { to_x962( @@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ // Safety: `self.0` is valid by construction. let group = unsafe { bssl_sys::EC_KEY_get0_group(self.0) }; let point = unsafe { bssl_sys::EC_KEY_get0_public_key(self.0) }; - // Safety: arguments are valid, `EC_KEY` ensures that the the group is + // Safety: arguments are valid, `EC_KEY` ensures that the group is // correct for the point, and a `Key` always holds a finite public point. unsafe { to_x962(
diff --git a/rust/bssl-crypto/src/ecdh.rs b/rust/bssl-crypto/src/ecdh.rs index ea1ce93..15ace86 100644 --- a/rust/bssl-crypto/src/ecdh.rs +++ b/rust/bssl-crypto/src/ecdh.rs
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ } impl ParsedPrivateKey { - /// Parses an ECPrivateKey structure froma DER encoded structure per [RFC 5915], + /// Parses an ECPrivateKey structure from a DER encoded structure per [RFC 5915], /// whose curve is specified by the `ECParameters`. /// /// Unless the curve group is one of the variants of [`Group`], this method returns [`None`].
diff --git a/rust/bssl-crypto/src/ecdsa.rs b/rust/bssl-crypto/src/ecdsa.rs index cdb61d1..568db33 100644 --- a/rust/bssl-crypto/src/ecdsa.rs +++ b/rust/bssl-crypto/src/ecdsa.rs
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ } impl ParsedPrivateKey { - /// Parses an ECPrivateKey structure froma DER encoded structure per [RFC 5915], + /// Parses an ECPrivateKey structure from a DER encoded structure per [RFC 5915], /// whose curve is specified by the `ECParameters`. /// /// Unless the curve group is one of the variants of [`Group`], this method returns [`None`].
diff --git a/rust/bssl-crypto/src/rsa.rs b/rust/bssl-crypto/src/rsa.rs index 2d4407a..260c2cc 100644 --- a/rust/bssl-crypto/src/rsa.rs +++ b/rust/bssl-crypto/src/rsa.rs
@@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ /// Return the public key corresponding to this private key. pub fn as_public(&self) -> PublicKey { // Safety: `self.0` is valid by construction and `RSA_up_ref` means - // we we can pass an ownership reference to `PublicKey`. + // we can pass an ownership reference to `PublicKey`. unsafe { bssl_sys::RSA_up_ref(self.0) }; PublicKey(self.0) }
diff --git a/ssl/handoff.cc b/ssl/handoff.cc index a659ae8..5b87821 100644 --- a/ssl/handoff.cc +++ b/ssl/handoff.cc
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ // apply_remote_features reads a list of supported features from `in` and // (possibly) reconfigures `ssl` to disallow the negotiation of features whose -// support has not been indicated. (This prevents the the handshake from +// support has not been indicated. (This prevents the handshake from // committing to features that are not supported on the handoff/handback side.) static bool apply_remote_features(SSL *ssl, CBS *in) { CBS ciphers;
diff --git a/ssl/handshake_client.cc b/ssl/handshake_client.cc index ff9ace8..1a37903 100644 --- a/ssl/handshake_client.cc +++ b/ssl/handshake_client.cc
@@ -733,7 +733,7 @@ // the session was only offered in ECH ClientHelloInner), this was the // TLS 1.3 compatibility mode session ID. As we know this is not a session // the server knows about, any server resuming it is in error. Reject the - // first connection deterministicly, rather than installing an invalid + // first connection deterministically, rather than installing an invalid // session into the session cache. https://crbug.com/796910 if (ssl->session == nullptr || ssl->s3->ech_status == ssl_ech_rejected) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SERVER_ECHOED_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
diff --git a/ssl/internal.h b/ssl/internal.h index 70ff4f7..867d5c4 100644 --- a/ssl/internal.h +++ b/ssl/internal.h
@@ -4281,7 +4281,7 @@ // renegotiate_mode controls how peer renegotiation attempts are handled. ssl_renegotiate_mode_t renegotiate_mode = ssl_renegotiate_never; - // server is true iff the this SSL* is the server half. Note: before the SSL* + // server is true iff this SSL* is the server half. Note: before the SSL* // is initialized by either SSL_set_accept_state or SSL_set_connect_state, // the side is not determined. In this state, server is always false. bool server : 1;
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_test.cc b/ssl/ssl_test.cc index 0a7c900..7b7ce71 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_test.cc +++ b/ssl/ssl_test.cc
@@ -4851,7 +4851,7 @@ EXPECT_EQ(SSL_version(server_.get()), placeholder); } -// Tests that that `SSL_get_pending_cipher` is available during the ALPN +// Tests that `SSL_get_pending_cipher` is available during the ALPN // selection callback. TEST_P(SSLVersionTest, ALPNCipherAvailable) { ASSERT_TRUE(UseCertAndKey(client_ctx_.get())); @@ -5685,7 +5685,7 @@ bssl::UniquePtr<SSL_CTX> ctx(SSL_CTX_new(TLS_method())); ASSERT_TRUE(ctx); - // Configure one cert and key pair, then replace it with noather. + // Configure one cert and key pair, then replace it with another. std::vector<CRYPTO_BUFFER *> certs = {leaf1.get(), ca1.get()}; ASSERT_TRUE(SSL_CTX_set_chain_and_key(ctx.get(), certs.data(), certs.size(), key1.get(), nullptr)); @@ -11791,10 +11791,10 @@ // algorithm used. const uint16_t kPref = SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384; static const uint16_t kPrefs[] = {kPref}; - ASSERT_TRUE(SSL_CTX_set_signing_algorithm_prefs( - server_ctx.get(), kPrefs, std::size(kPrefs))); - ASSERT_TRUE(SSL_CTX_set_signing_algorithm_prefs( - client_ctx.get(), kPrefs, std::size(kPrefs))); + ASSERT_TRUE(SSL_CTX_set_signing_algorithm_prefs(server_ctx.get(), kPrefs, + std::size(kPrefs))); + ASSERT_TRUE(SSL_CTX_set_signing_algorithm_prefs(client_ctx.get(), kPrefs, + std::size(kPrefs))); SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(client_ctx.get(), SignatureAlgorithmUsedInfoCallback); @@ -11817,4 +11817,3 @@ } // namespace BSSL_NAMESPACE_END -
diff --git a/ssl/test/runner/common.go b/ssl/test/runner/common.go index c241c41..c5e3d6e 100644 --- a/ssl/test/runner/common.go +++ b/ssl/test/runner/common.go
@@ -1276,7 +1276,7 @@ EmptyTicketSessionID bool // NewSessionIDLength, if non-zero is the length of the session ID to use - // when issung new sessions. + // when issuing new sessions. NewSessionIDLength int // SendClientHelloSessionID, if not nil, is the session ID sent in the @@ -2042,7 +2042,7 @@ // extension to indicate a match. SendNonEmptyTrustAnchorMatch bool - // AlwaysSendAvailableTrustAnchors, if true, causese the server to always + // AlwaysSendAvailableTrustAnchors, if true, causes the server to always // send available trust anchors in EncryptedExtensions, even if unsolicited. AlwaysSendAvailableTrustAnchors bool
diff --git a/ssl/test/runner/key_agreement.go b/ssl/test/runner/key_agreement.go index a92df92..3b9a3b5 100644 --- a/ssl/test/runner/key_agreement.go +++ b/ssl/test/runner/key_agreement.go
@@ -707,7 +707,7 @@ } // ecdheKeyAgreement implements a TLS key agreement where the server -// generates a ephemeral EC public/private key pair and signs it. The +// generates an ephemeral EC public/private key pair and signs it. The // pre-master secret is then calculated using ECDH. The signature may // either be ECDSA or RSA. type ecdheKeyAgreement struct {
diff --git a/ssl/test/runner/packet_adapter.go b/ssl/test/runner/packet_adapter.go index 96240b2..70aa545 100644 --- a/ssl/test/runner/packet_adapter.go +++ b/ssl/test/runner/packet_adapter.go
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ return err } -// UpdatePeerTimeout instructs the peer to set the timeoput to the specified value. +// UpdatePeerTimeout instructs the peer to set the timeout to the specified value. func (p *packetAdaptor) SetPeerTimeout(d time.Duration) error { p.log(fmt.Sprintf("Setting timeout to to %d ms", d.Milliseconds()), nil)
diff --git a/ssl/test/runner/psk_tests.go b/ssl/test/runner/psk_tests.go index ada0a3b..b2bc901 100644 --- a/ssl/test/runner/psk_tests.go +++ b/ssl/test/runner/psk_tests.go
@@ -803,7 +803,7 @@ &rsaCertificate, &pskSHA256Credential, }, - // The ClientHello is not good for the certficate, so the + // The ClientHello is not good for the certificate, so the // shim should pick the PSK. flags: []string{"-expect-selected-credential", "1"}, expectations: connectionExpectations{
diff --git a/ssl/test/runner/runner.go b/ssl/test/runner/runner.go index f92e3b1..69ec526 100644 --- a/ssl/test/runner/runner.go +++ b/ssl/test/runner/runner.go
@@ -1365,7 +1365,7 @@ } // newShimProcess starts a new shim with the specified executable, flags, and -// environment. It internally creates a TCP listener and adds the the -port +// environment. It internally creates a TCP listener and adds the -port // flag. func newShimProcess(dispatcher *shimDispatcher, shimPath string, flags []string, env []string) (*shimProcess, error) { listener, err := dispatcher.NewShim()
diff --git a/ssl/tls13_client.cc b/ssl/tls13_client.cc index f6272c9..36bb436 100644 --- a/ssl/tls13_client.cc +++ b/ssl/tls13_client.cc
@@ -539,7 +539,7 @@ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION); return ssl_hs_error; } - // The above imples only one of three handshake forms will be allowed. The + // The above implies only one of three handshake forms will be allowed. The // checks for unsolicited extensions ensure the server did not select // something we cannot respond to. assert(
diff --git a/util/idextractor/clang_ast_parser.go b/util/idextractor/clang_ast_parser.go index 3fb584b..b7afc78 100644 --- a/util/idextractor/clang_ast_parser.go +++ b/util/idextractor/clang_ast_parser.go
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ len(n.Inner)) } - // Allow to ignore errors. + // Allow errors to be ignored. defer func() { if x.options.KeepGoing && err != nil { log.Printf("ERROR: %v", err)
diff --git a/util/idextractor/idextractor.go b/util/idextractor/idextractor.go index 85435cb..5241066 100644 --- a/util/idextractor/idextractor.go +++ b/util/idextractor/idextractor.go
@@ -29,11 +29,11 @@ DumpFullTree bool // KeepGoing does not bail out on parse errors. KeepGoing bool - // Language is the langauge to parse the AST as. + // Language is the language to parse the AST as. Language string } -// New creates a new identiifer extractor. +// New creates a new identifier extractor. func New(reporter func(IdentifierInfo) error, options Options) *extractor { x := &extractor{ extractorStatic: &extractorStatic{