| // Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
| // Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. | |
| // | |
| // Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); | |
| // you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. | |
| // You may obtain a copy of the License at | |
| // | |
| // https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 | |
| // | |
| // Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software | |
| // distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, | |
| // WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. | |
| // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and | |
| // limitations under the License. | |
| #include <openssl/ssl.h> | |
| #include <assert.h> | |
| #include <limits.h> | |
| #include <string.h> | |
| #include <algorithm> | |
| #include <tuple> | |
| #include <openssl/buf.h> | |
| #include <openssl/bytestring.h> | |
| #include <openssl/err.h> | |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
| #include <openssl/md5.h> | |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> | |
| #include <openssl/nid.h> | |
| #include <openssl/rand.h> | |
| #include <openssl/sha2.h> | |
| #include "../crypto/bytestring/internal.h" | |
| #include "../crypto/internal.h" | |
| #include "internal.h" | |
| BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN | |
| static bool add_record_to_flight(SSLImpl *ssl, uint8_t type, | |
| Span<const uint8_t> in) { | |
| // The caller should have flushed `pending_hs_data` first. | |
| assert(!ssl->s3->pending_hs_data); | |
| // We'll never add a flight while in the process of writing it out. | |
| assert(ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset == 0); | |
| if (ssl->s3->pending_flight == nullptr) { | |
| ssl->s3->pending_flight.reset(BUF_MEM_new()); | |
| if (ssl->s3->pending_flight == nullptr) { | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| size_t max_out = in.size() + SSL_max_seal_overhead(ssl); | |
| size_t new_cap = ssl->s3->pending_flight->length + max_out; | |
| if (max_out < in.size() || new_cap < max_out) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW); | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| size_t len; | |
| if (!BUF_MEM_reserve(ssl->s3->pending_flight.get(), new_cap) || | |
| !tls_seal_record(ssl, | |
| (uint8_t *)ssl->s3->pending_flight->data + | |
| ssl->s3->pending_flight->length, | |
| &len, max_out, type, in.data(), in.size())) { | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| ssl->s3->pending_flight->length += len; | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| bool tls_init_message(const SSLImpl *ssl, CBB *cbb, CBB *body, uint8_t type) { | |
| // Pick a modest size hint to save most of the `realloc` calls. | |
| if (!CBB_init(cbb, 64) || // | |
| !CBB_add_u8(cbb, type) || // | |
| !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(cbb, body)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| CBB_cleanup(cbb); | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| bool tls_finish_message(const SSLImpl *ssl, CBB *cbb, Array<uint8_t> *out_msg) { | |
| return CBBFinishArray(cbb, out_msg); | |
| } | |
| bool tls_add_message(SSLImpl *ssl, Array<uint8_t> msg) { | |
| // Pack handshake data into the minimal number of records. This avoids | |
| // unnecessary encryption overhead, notably in TLS 1.3 where we send several | |
| // encrypted messages in a row. For now, we do not do this for the null | |
| // cipher. The benefit is smaller and there is a risk of breaking buggy | |
| // implementations. | |
| // | |
| // TODO(crbug.com/374991962): See if we can do this uniformly. | |
| Span<const uint8_t> rest = msg; | |
| if (!SSL_is_quic(ssl) && ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->is_null_cipher()) { | |
| while (!rest.empty()) { | |
| Span<const uint8_t> chunk = | |
| rest.first(std::min(size_t{ssl->max_send_fragment}, rest.size())); | |
| rest = rest.subspan(chunk.size()); | |
| if (!add_record_to_flight(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, chunk)) { | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } else { | |
| while (!rest.empty()) { | |
| // Flush if `pending_hs_data` is full. | |
| if (ssl->s3->pending_hs_data && | |
| ssl->s3->pending_hs_data->length >= ssl->max_send_fragment && | |
| !tls_flush_pending_hs_data(ssl)) { | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| size_t pending_len = | |
| ssl->s3->pending_hs_data ? ssl->s3->pending_hs_data->length : 0; | |
| Span<const uint8_t> chunk = rest.first( | |
| std::min(ssl->max_send_fragment - pending_len, rest.size())); | |
| assert(!chunk.empty()); | |
| rest = rest.subspan(chunk.size()); | |
| if (!ssl->s3->pending_hs_data) { | |
| ssl->s3->pending_hs_data.reset(BUF_MEM_new()); | |
| } | |
| if (!ssl->s3->pending_hs_data || | |
| !BUF_MEM_append(ssl->s3->pending_hs_data.get(), chunk.data(), | |
| chunk.size())) { | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, msg); | |
| // TODO(svaldez): Move this up a layer to fix abstraction for SSLTranscript on | |
| // hs. | |
| if (ssl->s3->hs != nullptr && // | |
| !ssl->s3->hs->transcript.Update(msg)) { | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| bool tls_flush_pending_hs_data(SSLImpl *ssl) { | |
| if (!ssl->s3->pending_hs_data || ssl->s3->pending_hs_data->length == 0) { | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| UniquePtr<BUF_MEM> pending_hs_data = std::move(ssl->s3->pending_hs_data); | |
| auto data = Span(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(pending_hs_data->data), | |
| pending_hs_data->length); | |
| if (SSL_is_quic(ssl)) { | |
| if ((ssl->s3->hs == nullptr || ssl->s3->hs->pending_hints == nullptr) && | |
| !ssl->quic_method->add_handshake_data(ssl, ssl->s3->quic_write_level, | |
| data.data(), data.size())) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_QUIC_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| return add_record_to_flight(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, data); | |
| } | |
| bool tls_add_change_cipher_spec(SSLImpl *ssl) { | |
| if (SSL_is_quic(ssl)) { | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| static const uint8_t kChangeCipherSpec[1] = {SSL3_MT_CCS}; | |
| if (!tls_flush_pending_hs_data(ssl) || | |
| !add_record_to_flight(ssl, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, | |
| kChangeCipherSpec)) { | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, | |
| kChangeCipherSpec); | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| int tls_flush(SSLImpl *ssl) { | |
| if (!tls_flush_pending_hs_data(ssl)) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| if (SSL_is_quic(ssl)) { | |
| if (ssl->s3->write_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_none) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| if (!ssl->quic_method->flush_flight(ssl)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_QUIC_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (ssl->s3->pending_flight == nullptr) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl->s3->write_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_none) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl->s3->pending_flight->length > UINT32_MAX) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| // If there is pending data in the write buffer, it must be flushed out before | |
| // any new data in pending_flight. | |
| if (!ssl->s3->write_buffer.empty()) { | |
| int ret = ssl_write_buffer_flush(ssl); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE; | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (ssl->wbio == nullptr) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| // Write the pending flight. | |
| while (ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset < ssl->s3->pending_flight->length) { | |
| size_t written; | |
| if (!BIO_write_ex( | |
| ssl->wbio.get(), | |
| ssl->s3->pending_flight->data + ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset, | |
| ssl->s3->pending_flight->length - ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset, | |
| &written)) { | |
| ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE; | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset += static_cast<uint32_t>(written); | |
| } | |
| if (BIO_flush(ssl->wbio.get()) <= 0) { | |
| ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE; | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| ssl->s3->pending_flight.reset(); | |
| ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset = 0; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static ssl_open_record_t read_v2_client_hello(SSLImpl *ssl, | |
| size_t *out_consumed, | |
| Span<const uint8_t> in) { | |
| *out_consumed = 0; | |
| assert(in.size() >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH); | |
| // Determine the length of the V2ClientHello. | |
| size_t msg_length = ((in[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | in[1]; | |
| if (msg_length > (1024 * 4)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE); | |
| return ssl_open_record_error; | |
| } | |
| if (msg_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - 2) { | |
| // Reject lengths that are too short early. We have already read | |
| // `SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH` bytes, so we should not attempt to process an | |
| // (invalid) V2ClientHello which would be shorter than that. | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
| return ssl_open_record_error; | |
| } | |
| // Ask for the remainder of the V2ClientHello. | |
| if (in.size() < 2 + msg_length) { | |
| *out_consumed = 2 + msg_length; | |
| return ssl_open_record_partial; | |
| } | |
| CBS v2_client_hello = CBS(in.subspan(2, msg_length)); | |
| // The V2ClientHello without the length is incorporated into the handshake | |
| // hash. This is only ever called at the start of the handshake, so hs is | |
| // guaranteed to be non-NULL. | |
| if (!ssl->s3->hs->transcript.Update(v2_client_hello)) { | |
| return ssl_open_record_error; | |
| } | |
| ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, 0 /* V2ClientHello */, | |
| v2_client_hello); | |
| uint8_t msg_type; | |
| uint16_t version, cipher_spec_length, session_id_length, challenge_length; | |
| CBS cipher_specs, session_id, challenge; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u8(&v2_client_hello, &msg_type) || | |
| !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &version) || | |
| !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &cipher_spec_length) || | |
| !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &session_id_length) || | |
| !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &challenge_length) || | |
| !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &cipher_specs, cipher_spec_length) || | |
| !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &session_id, session_id_length) || | |
| !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &challenge, challenge_length) || | |
| CBS_len(&v2_client_hello) != 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| return ssl_open_record_error; | |
| } | |
| // msg_type has already been checked. | |
| assert(msg_type == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO); | |
| // The client_random is the V2ClientHello challenge. Truncate or left-pad with | |
| // zeros as needed. | |
| size_t rand_len = CBS_len(&challenge); | |
| if (rand_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) { | |
| rand_len = SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; | |
| } | |
| uint8_t random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE]; | |
| OPENSSL_memset(random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
| OPENSSL_memcpy(random + (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - rand_len), CBS_data(&challenge), | |
| rand_len); | |
| // Write out an equivalent TLS ClientHello directly to the handshake buffer. | |
| size_t max_v3_client_hello = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2 /* version */ + | |
| SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 /* session ID length */ + | |
| 2 /* cipher list length */ + | |
| CBS_len(&cipher_specs) / 3 * 2 + | |
| 1 /* compression length */ + 1 /* compression */; | |
| ScopedCBB client_hello; | |
| CBB hello_body, cipher_suites; | |
| if (!ssl->s3->hs_buf) { | |
| ssl->s3->hs_buf.reset(BUF_MEM_new()); | |
| } | |
| if (!ssl->s3->hs_buf || | |
| !BUF_MEM_reserve(ssl->s3->hs_buf.get(), max_v3_client_hello) || | |
| !CBB_init_fixed(client_hello.get(), (uint8_t *)ssl->s3->hs_buf->data, | |
| ssl->s3->hs_buf->max) || | |
| !CBB_add_u8(client_hello.get(), SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) || | |
| !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(client_hello.get(), &hello_body) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16(&hello_body, version) || | |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&hello_body, random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || | |
| // No session id. | |
| !CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&hello_body, &cipher_suites)) { | |
| return ssl_open_record_error; | |
| } | |
| // Copy the cipher suites. | |
| while (CBS_len(&cipher_specs) > 0) { | |
| uint32_t cipher_spec; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u24(&cipher_specs, &cipher_spec)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| return ssl_open_record_error; | |
| } | |
| // Skip SSLv2 ciphers. | |
| if ((cipher_spec & 0xff0000) != 0) { | |
| continue; | |
| } | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(&cipher_suites, cipher_spec)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return ssl_open_record_error; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| // Add the null compression scheme and finish. | |
| if (!CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 1) || // | |
| !CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) || // | |
| !CBB_finish(client_hello.get(), nullptr, &ssl->s3->hs_buf->length)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return ssl_open_record_error; | |
| } | |
| *out_consumed = 2 + msg_length; | |
| ssl->s3->is_v2_hello = true; | |
| return ssl_open_record_success; | |
| } | |
| static bool parse_message(const SSLImpl *ssl, SSLMessage *out, | |
| size_t *out_bytes_needed) { | |
| if (!ssl->s3->hs_buf) { | |
| *out_bytes_needed = 4; | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| CBS cbs; | |
| uint32_t len; | |
| CBS_init(&cbs, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(ssl->s3->hs_buf->data), | |
| ssl->s3->hs_buf->length); | |
| if (!CBS_get_u8(&cbs, &out->type) || // | |
| !CBS_get_u24(&cbs, &len)) { | |
| *out_bytes_needed = 4; | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| if (!CBS_get_bytes(&cbs, &out->body, len)) { | |
| *out_bytes_needed = 4 + len; | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| CBS_init(&out->raw, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(ssl->s3->hs_buf->data), | |
| 4 + len); | |
| out->is_v2_hello = ssl->s3->is_v2_hello; | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| bool tls_get_message(const SSLImpl *ssl, SSLMessage *out) { | |
| size_t unused; | |
| if (!parse_message(ssl, out, &unused)) { | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| if (!ssl->s3->has_message) { | |
| if (!out->is_v2_hello) { | |
| ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, out->raw); | |
| } | |
| ssl->s3->has_message = true; | |
| } | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| bool tls_can_accept_handshake_data(const SSLImpl *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert) { | |
| // If there is a complete message, the caller must have consumed it first. | |
| SSLMessage msg; | |
| size_t bytes_needed; | |
| if (parse_message(ssl, &msg, &bytes_needed)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| // Enforce the limit so the peer cannot force us to buffer 16MB. | |
| if (bytes_needed > 4 + ssl_max_handshake_message_len(ssl)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| bool tls_has_unprocessed_handshake_data(const SSLImpl *ssl) { | |
| size_t msg_len = 0; | |
| if (ssl->s3->has_message) { | |
| SSLMessage msg; | |
| size_t unused; | |
| if (parse_message(ssl, &msg, &unused)) { | |
| msg_len = CBS_len(&msg.raw); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return ssl->s3->hs_buf && ssl->s3->hs_buf->length > msg_len; | |
| } | |
| bool tls_append_handshake_data(SSLImpl *ssl, Span<const uint8_t> data) { | |
| // Re-create the handshake buffer if needed. | |
| if (!ssl->s3->hs_buf) { | |
| ssl->s3->hs_buf.reset(BUF_MEM_new()); | |
| } | |
| return ssl->s3->hs_buf && | |
| BUF_MEM_append(ssl->s3->hs_buf.get(), data.data(), data.size()); | |
| } | |
| ssl_open_record_t tls_open_handshake(SSLImpl *ssl, size_t *out_consumed, | |
| uint8_t *out_alert, Span<uint8_t> in) { | |
| *out_consumed = 0; | |
| // Bypass the record layer for the first message to handle V2ClientHello. | |
| if (ssl->server && !ssl->s3->v2_hello_done) { | |
| // Ask for the first 5 bytes, the size of the TLS record header. This is | |
| // sufficient to detect a V2ClientHello and ensures that we never read | |
| // beyond the first record. | |
| if (in.size() < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
| *out_consumed = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
| return ssl_open_record_partial; | |
| } | |
| // Some dedicated error codes for protocol mixups should the application | |
| // wish to interpret them differently. (These do not overlap with | |
| // ClientHello or V2ClientHello.) | |
| auto str = bssl::BytesAsStringView(in); | |
| if (str.substr(0, 4) == "GET " || // | |
| str.substr(0, 5) == "POST " || // | |
| str.substr(0, 5) == "HEAD " || // | |
| str.substr(0, 4) == "PUT ") { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST); | |
| *out_alert = 0; | |
| return ssl_open_record_error; | |
| } | |
| if (str.substr(0, 5) == "CONNE") { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST); | |
| *out_alert = 0; | |
| return ssl_open_record_error; | |
| } | |
| // Check for a V2ClientHello. | |
| if ((in[0] & 0x80) != 0 && in[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO && | |
| in[3] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { | |
| auto ret = read_v2_client_hello(ssl, out_consumed, in); | |
| if (ret == ssl_open_record_error) { | |
| *out_alert = 0; | |
| } else if (ret == ssl_open_record_success) { | |
| ssl->s3->v2_hello_done = true; | |
| } | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| ssl->s3->v2_hello_done = true; | |
| } | |
| uint8_t type; | |
| Span<uint8_t> body; | |
| auto ret = tls_open_record(ssl, &type, &body, out_consumed, out_alert, in); | |
| if (ret != ssl_open_record_success) { | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| if (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
| return ssl_open_record_error; | |
| } | |
| // Append the entire handshake record to the buffer. | |
| if (!tls_append_handshake_data(ssl, body)) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
| return ssl_open_record_error; | |
| } | |
| return ssl_open_record_success; | |
| } | |
| void tls_next_message(SSLImpl *ssl) { | |
| SSLMessage msg; | |
| if (!tls_get_message(ssl, &msg) || // | |
| !ssl->s3->hs_buf || // | |
| ssl->s3->hs_buf->length < CBS_len(&msg.raw)) { | |
| assert(0); | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| OPENSSL_memmove(ssl->s3->hs_buf->data, | |
| ssl->s3->hs_buf->data + CBS_len(&msg.raw), | |
| ssl->s3->hs_buf->length - CBS_len(&msg.raw)); | |
| ssl->s3->hs_buf->length -= CBS_len(&msg.raw); | |
| ssl->s3->is_v2_hello = false; | |
| ssl->s3->has_message = false; | |
| // Post-handshake messages are rare, so release the buffer after every | |
| // message. During the handshake, `on_handshake_complete` will release it. | |
| if (!SSL_in_init(ssl) && ssl->s3->hs_buf->length == 0) { | |
| ssl->s3->hs_buf.reset(); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| BSSL_NAMESPACE_END |