|  | /* | 
|  | * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use | 
|  | * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy | 
|  | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | 
|  | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | 
|  | */ | 
|  |  | 
|  | #include <openssl/evp.h> | 
|  |  | 
|  | #include <string.h> | 
|  |  | 
|  | #include <openssl/hmac.h> | 
|  |  | 
|  | #include "../internal.h" | 
|  |  | 
|  |  | 
|  | int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(const char *password, size_t password_len, | 
|  | const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_len, uint32_t iterations, | 
|  | const EVP_MD *digest, size_t key_len, uint8_t *out_key) { | 
|  | // See RFC 8018, section 5.2. | 
|  | bssl::ScopedHMAC_CTX hctx; | 
|  | if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx.get(), password, password_len, digest, NULL)) { | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | uint32_t i = 1; | 
|  | size_t md_len = EVP_MD_size(digest); | 
|  | while (key_len > 0) { | 
|  | size_t todo = md_len; | 
|  | if (todo > key_len) { | 
|  | todo = key_len; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | uint8_t i_buf[4]; | 
|  | i_buf[0] = (uint8_t)((i >> 24) & 0xff); | 
|  | i_buf[1] = (uint8_t)((i >> 16) & 0xff); | 
|  | i_buf[2] = (uint8_t)((i >> 8) & 0xff); | 
|  | i_buf[3] = (uint8_t)(i & 0xff); | 
|  |  | 
|  | // Compute U_1. | 
|  | uint8_t digest_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | 
|  | if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx.get(), NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) || | 
|  | !HMAC_Update(hctx.get(), salt, salt_len) || | 
|  | !HMAC_Update(hctx.get(), i_buf, 4) || | 
|  | !HMAC_Final(hctx.get(), digest_tmp, NULL)) { | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | OPENSSL_memcpy(out_key, digest_tmp, todo); | 
|  | for (uint32_t j = 1; j < iterations; j++) { | 
|  | // Compute the remaining U_* values and XOR. | 
|  | if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx.get(), NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) || | 
|  | !HMAC_Update(hctx.get(), digest_tmp, md_len) || | 
|  | !HMAC_Final(hctx.get(), digest_tmp, NULL)) { | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  | } | 
|  | for (size_t k = 0; k < todo; k++) { | 
|  | out_key[k] ^= digest_tmp[k]; | 
|  | } | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | key_len -= todo; | 
|  | out_key += todo; | 
|  | i++; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | // RFC 8018 describes iterations (c) as being a "positive integer", so a | 
|  | // value of 0 is an error. | 
|  | // | 
|  | // Unfortunately not all consumers of PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC() check their return | 
|  | // value, expecting it to succeed and unconditionally using |out_key|.  As a | 
|  | // precaution for such callsites in external code, the old behavior of | 
|  | // iterations < 1 being treated as iterations == 1 is preserved, but | 
|  | // additionally an error result is returned. | 
|  | // | 
|  | // TODO(eroman): Figure out how to remove this compatibility hack, or change | 
|  | // the default to something more sensible like 2048. | 
|  | if (iterations == 0) { | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | return 1; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(const char *password, size_t password_len, | 
|  | const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_len, | 
|  | uint32_t iterations, size_t key_len, | 
|  | uint8_t *out_key) { | 
|  | return PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(password, password_len, salt, salt_len, iterations, | 
|  | EVP_sha1(), key_len, out_key); | 
|  | } |