Remove variable shadowing.
Bruce Dawson pointed out that the shadowing of |ret| in |s3_srvr.c|
looked dodgy. It was actually deliberate (we don't want to reset the
default value of the function's |ret| variable with a successful return
from the callback) but it does look dodgy.
This change adds -Wshadow to ban variable shadowing and fixes all
current instances.
Change-Id: I1268f88b9f26245c7d16d6ead5bb9014ea471c01
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2520
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
diff --git a/CMakeLists.txt b/CMakeLists.txt
index d4c7a6e..40a3465 100644
--- a/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
project (BoringSSL)
if(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_GNUCXX OR "${CMAKE_CXX_COMPILER_ID}" STREQUAL "Clang")
- set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wall -Werror -ggdb -std=c89")
- set(CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS "${CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS} -Wall -Werror -ggdb -std=c++0x")
+ set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -ggdb -std=c89")
+ set(CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS "${CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS} -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -ggdb -std=c++0x")
elseif(MSVC)
# Disable warnings for implicit integer narrowing.
set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "/wd4267")
diff --git a/crypto/bytestring/ber.c b/crypto/bytestring/ber.c
index c96c200..b5b373d 100644
--- a/crypto/bytestring/ber.c
+++ b/crypto/bytestring/ber.c
@@ -122,15 +122,17 @@
* implicit and the tags within are fragments of a primitive type that
* need to be concatenated. */
if (context_specific && (tag & CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)) {
- CBS in_copy, contents;
- unsigned tag;
- size_t header_len;
+ CBS in_copy, inner_contents;
+ unsigned inner_tag;
+ size_t inner_header_len;
CBS_init(&in_copy, CBS_data(in), CBS_len(in));
- if (!CBS_get_any_asn1_element(&in_copy, &contents, &tag, &header_len)) {
+ if (!CBS_get_any_asn1_element(&in_copy, &inner_contents, &inner_tag,
+ &inner_header_len)) {
return 0;
}
- if (CBS_len(&contents) > header_len && is_primitive_type(tag)) {
+ if (CBS_len(&inner_contents) > inner_header_len &&
+ is_primitive_type(inner_tag)) {
squash_child_headers = 1;
}
}
diff --git a/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
index a7b5aed..0a0c01b 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
@@ -1083,12 +1083,12 @@
{
const size_t size = sizeof(s->s3->handshake_fragment);
const size_t avail = size - s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
- const size_t len = (rr->length < avail) ? rr->length : avail;
+ const size_t todo = (rr->length < avail) ? rr->length : avail;
memcpy(s->s3->handshake_fragment + s->s3->handshake_fragment_len,
- &rr->data[rr->off], len);
- rr->off += len;
- rr->length -= len;
- s->s3->handshake_fragment_len += len;
+ &rr->data[rr->off], todo);
+ rr->off += todo;
+ rr->length -= todo;
+ s->s3->handshake_fragment_len += todo;
if (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len < size)
{
goto start; /* fragment was too small */
@@ -1096,7 +1096,6 @@
}
else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
{
- const size_t len = sizeof(alert_buffer);
/* Note that this will still allow multiple alerts to
* be processed in the same record */
if (rr->length < sizeof(alert_buffer))
@@ -1105,9 +1104,9 @@
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_BAD_ALERT);
goto f_err;
}
- memcpy(alert_buffer, &rr->data[rr->off], len);
- rr->off += len;
- rr->length -= len;
+ memcpy(alert_buffer, &rr->data[rr->off], sizeof(alert_buffer));
+ rr->off += sizeof(alert_buffer);
+ rr->length -= sizeof(alert_buffer);
}
/* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index a513b73..2a380a9 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -725,7 +725,6 @@
*/
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
{
- CBS session_id;
uint8_t cookie_length;
CBS_init(&client_hello, s->init_msg, n);
@@ -764,18 +763,18 @@
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C &&
s->ctx->select_certificate_cb != NULL)
{
- int ret;
-
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
- ret = s->ctx->select_certificate_cb(&early_ctx);
- if (ret == 0)
- return CERTIFICATE_SELECTION_PENDING;
- else if (ret == -1)
+ switch (s->ctx->select_certificate_cb(&early_ctx))
{
- /* Connection rejected. */
- al = SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_CONNECTION_REJECTED);
- goto f_err;
+ case 0:
+ return CERTIFICATE_SELECTION_PENDING;
+ case -1:
+ /* Connection rejected. */
+ al = SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_CONNECTION_REJECTED);
+ goto f_err;
+ default:
+ /* fallthrough */;
}
}
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
