| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | |
| * All rights reserved. | |
| * | |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
| * | |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
| * | |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | |
| * the code are not to be removed. | |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
| * | |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
| * are met: | |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
| * | |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
| * | |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | |
| */ | |
| /* ==================================================================== | |
| * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. | |
| * | |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
| * are met: | |
| * | |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
| * | |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in | |
| * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the | |
| * distribution. | |
| * | |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this | |
| * software must display the following acknowledgment: | |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
| * | |
| * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to | |
| * endorse or promote products derived from this software without | |
| * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact | |
| * openssl-core@openssl.org. | |
| * | |
| * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" | |
| * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written | |
| * permission of the OpenSSL Project. | |
| * | |
| * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following | |
| * acknowledgment: | |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
| * | |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY | |
| * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR | |
| * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR | |
| * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, | |
| * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT | |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; | |
| * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, | |
| * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) | |
| * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED | |
| * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | |
| * ==================================================================== | |
| * | |
| * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young | |
| * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim | |
| * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */ | |
| #include <openssl/ssl.h> | |
| #include <assert.h> | |
| #include <limits.h> | |
| #include <stdlib.h> | |
| #include <string.h> | |
| #include <openssl/bytestring.h> | |
| #include <openssl/digest.h> | |
| #include <openssl/err.h> | |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
| #include <openssl/hmac.h> | |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> | |
| #include <openssl/nid.h> | |
| #include <openssl/rand.h> | |
| #include <openssl/type_check.h> | |
| #include "internal.h" | |
| #include "../crypto/internal.h" | |
| static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *ssl); | |
| static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *ssl); | |
| static int compare_uint16_t(const void *p1, const void *p2) { | |
| uint16_t u1 = *((const uint16_t *)p1); | |
| uint16_t u2 = *((const uint16_t *)p2); | |
| if (u1 < u2) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } else if (u1 > u2) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } else { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be | |
| * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello. | |
| * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those | |
| * out. */ | |
| static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const CBS *cbs) { | |
| CBS extensions = *cbs; | |
| size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0; | |
| uint16_t *extension_types = NULL; | |
| int ret = 0; | |
| /* First pass: count the extensions. */ | |
| while (CBS_len(&extensions) > 0) { | |
| uint16_t type; | |
| CBS extension; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) || | |
| !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) { | |
| goto done; | |
| } | |
| num_extensions++; | |
| } | |
| if (num_extensions == 0) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * num_extensions); | |
| if (extension_types == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| goto done; | |
| } | |
| /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */ | |
| extensions = *cbs; | |
| for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) { | |
| CBS extension; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) || | |
| !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) { | |
| /* This should not happen. */ | |
| goto done; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| assert(CBS_len(&extensions) == 0); | |
| /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */ | |
| qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(uint16_t), compare_uint16_t); | |
| for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) { | |
| if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i]) { | |
| goto done; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| ret = 1; | |
| done: | |
| OPENSSL_free(extension_types); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int ssl_early_callback_init(SSL *ssl, struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx, | |
| const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) { | |
| memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); | |
| ctx->ssl = ssl; | |
| ctx->client_hello = in; | |
| ctx->client_hello_len = in_len; | |
| CBS client_hello, random, session_id; | |
| CBS_init(&client_hello, ctx->client_hello, ctx->client_hello_len); | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16(&client_hello, &ctx->version) || | |
| !CBS_get_bytes(&client_hello, &random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || | |
| !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &session_id) || | |
| CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ctx->random = CBS_data(&random); | |
| ctx->random_len = CBS_len(&random); | |
| ctx->session_id = CBS_data(&session_id); | |
| ctx->session_id_len = CBS_len(&session_id); | |
| /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ | |
| if (SSL_is_dtls(ctx->ssl)) { | |
| CBS cookie; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cookie) || | |
| CBS_len(&cookie) > DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| CBS cipher_suites, compression_methods; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cipher_suites) || | |
| CBS_len(&cipher_suites) < 2 || (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) & 1) != 0 || | |
| !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &compression_methods) || | |
| CBS_len(&compression_methods) < 1) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ctx->cipher_suites = CBS_data(&cipher_suites); | |
| ctx->cipher_suites_len = CBS_len(&cipher_suites); | |
| ctx->compression_methods = CBS_data(&compression_methods); | |
| ctx->compression_methods_len = CBS_len(&compression_methods); | |
| /* If the ClientHello ends here then it's valid, but doesn't have any | |
| * extensions. (E.g. SSLv3.) */ | |
| if (CBS_len(&client_hello) == 0) { | |
| ctx->extensions = NULL; | |
| ctx->extensions_len = 0; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* Extract extensions and check it is valid. */ | |
| CBS extensions; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &extensions) || | |
| !tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions) || | |
| CBS_len(&client_hello) != 0) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ctx->extensions = CBS_data(&extensions); | |
| ctx->extensions_len = CBS_len(&extensions); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int ssl_early_callback_get_extension(const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx, | |
| CBS *out, uint16_t extension_type) { | |
| CBS extensions; | |
| CBS_init(&extensions, ctx->extensions, ctx->extensions_len); | |
| while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0) { | |
| /* Decode the next extension. */ | |
| uint16_t type; | |
| CBS extension; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) || | |
| !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (type == extension_type) { | |
| *out = extension; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get( | |
| const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx, uint16_t extension_type, | |
| const uint8_t **out_data, size_t *out_len) { | |
| CBS cbs; | |
| if (!ssl_early_callback_get_extension(ctx, &cbs, extension_type)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| *out_data = CBS_data(&cbs); | |
| *out_len = CBS_len(&cbs); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static const uint16_t kDefaultGroups[] = { | |
| SSL_CURVE_X25519, | |
| SSL_CURVE_SECP256R1, | |
| SSL_CURVE_SECP384R1, | |
| #if defined(BORINGSSL_ANDROID_SYSTEM) | |
| SSL_CURVE_SECP521R1, | |
| #endif | |
| }; | |
| void tls1_get_grouplist(SSL *ssl, const uint16_t **out_group_ids, | |
| size_t *out_group_ids_len) { | |
| *out_group_ids = ssl->supported_group_list; | |
| *out_group_ids_len = ssl->supported_group_list_len; | |
| if (!*out_group_ids) { | |
| *out_group_ids = kDefaultGroups; | |
| *out_group_ids_len = OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kDefaultGroups); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| int tls1_get_shared_group(SSL *ssl, uint16_t *out_group_id) { | |
| assert(ssl->server); | |
| const uint16_t *groups, *pref, *supp; | |
| size_t groups_len, pref_len, supp_len; | |
| tls1_get_grouplist(ssl, &groups, &groups_len); | |
| /* Clients are not required to send a supported_groups extension. In this | |
| * case, the server is free to pick any group it likes. See RFC 4492, | |
| * section 4, paragraph 3. | |
| * | |
| * However, in the interests of compatibility, we will skip ECDH if the | |
| * client didn't send an extension because we can't be sure that they'll | |
| * support our favoured group. Thus we do not special-case an emtpy | |
| * |peer_supported_group_list|. */ | |
| if (ssl->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) { | |
| pref = groups; | |
| pref_len = groups_len; | |
| supp = ssl->s3->hs->peer_supported_group_list; | |
| supp_len = ssl->s3->hs->peer_supported_group_list_len; | |
| } else { | |
| pref = ssl->s3->hs->peer_supported_group_list; | |
| pref_len = ssl->s3->hs->peer_supported_group_list_len; | |
| supp = groups; | |
| supp_len = groups_len; | |
| } | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < pref_len; i++) { | |
| for (size_t j = 0; j < supp_len; j++) { | |
| if (pref[i] == supp[j]) { | |
| *out_group_id = pref[i]; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int tls1_set_curves(uint16_t **out_group_ids, size_t *out_group_ids_len, | |
| const int *curves, size_t ncurves) { | |
| uint16_t *group_ids; | |
| group_ids = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * sizeof(uint16_t)); | |
| if (group_ids == NULL) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < ncurves; i++) { | |
| if (!ssl_nid_to_group_id(&group_ids[i], curves[i])) { | |
| OPENSSL_free(group_ids); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| OPENSSL_free(*out_group_ids); | |
| *out_group_ids = group_ids; | |
| *out_group_ids_len = ncurves; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int tls1_set_curves_list(uint16_t **out_group_ids, size_t *out_group_ids_len, | |
| const char *curves) { | |
| uint16_t *group_ids = NULL; | |
| size_t ncurves = 0; | |
| const char *col; | |
| const char *ptr = curves; | |
| do { | |
| col = strchr(ptr, ':'); | |
| uint16_t group_id; | |
| if (!ssl_name_to_group_id(&group_id, ptr, | |
| col ? (size_t)(col - ptr) : strlen(ptr))) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| uint16_t *new_group_ids = OPENSSL_realloc(group_ids, | |
| (ncurves + 1) * sizeof(uint16_t)); | |
| if (new_group_ids == NULL) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| group_ids = new_group_ids; | |
| group_ids[ncurves] = group_id; | |
| ncurves++; | |
| if (col) { | |
| ptr = col + 1; | |
| } | |
| } while (col); | |
| OPENSSL_free(*out_group_ids); | |
| *out_group_ids = group_ids; | |
| *out_group_ids_len = ncurves; | |
| return 1; | |
| err: | |
| OPENSSL_free(group_ids); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int tls1_check_group_id(SSL *ssl, uint16_t group_id) { | |
| const uint16_t *groups; | |
| size_t groups_len; | |
| tls1_get_grouplist(ssl, &groups, &groups_len); | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < groups_len; i++) { | |
| if (groups[i] == group_id) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* kVerifySignatureAlgorithms is the default list of accepted signature | |
| * algorithms for verifying. | |
| * | |
| * For now, RSA-PSS signature algorithms are not enabled on Android's system | |
| * BoringSSL. Once the change in Chrome has stuck and the values are finalized, | |
| * restore them. */ | |
| static const uint16_t kVerifySignatureAlgorithms[] = { | |
| /* Prefer SHA-256 algorithms. */ | |
| SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256, | |
| #if !defined(BORINGSSL_ANDROID_SYSTEM) | |
| SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA256, | |
| #endif | |
| SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256, | |
| /* Larger hashes are acceptable. */ | |
| SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384, | |
| #if !defined(BORINGSSL_ANDROID_SYSTEM) | |
| SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA384, | |
| #endif | |
| SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384, | |
| /* TODO(davidben): Remove this entry and SSL_CURVE_SECP521R1 from | |
| * kDefaultGroups. */ | |
| #if defined(BORINGSSL_ANDROID_SYSTEM) | |
| SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512, | |
| #endif | |
| #if !defined(BORINGSSL_ANDROID_SYSTEM) | |
| SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA512, | |
| #endif | |
| SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512, | |
| /* For now, SHA-1 is still accepted but least preferable. */ | |
| SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1, | |
| }; | |
| /* kSignSignatureAlgorithms is the default list of supported signature | |
| * algorithms for signing. | |
| * | |
| * For now, RSA-PSS signature algorithms are not enabled on Android's system | |
| * BoringSSL. Once the change in Chrome has stuck and the values are finalized, | |
| * restore them. */ | |
| static const uint16_t kSignSignatureAlgorithms[] = { | |
| /* Prefer SHA-256 algorithms. */ | |
| SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256, | |
| #if !defined(BORINGSSL_ANDROID_SYSTEM) | |
| SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA256, | |
| #endif | |
| SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256, | |
| /* If needed, sign larger hashes. | |
| * | |
| * TODO(davidben): Determine which of these may be pruned. */ | |
| SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384, | |
| #if !defined(BORINGSSL_ANDROID_SYSTEM) | |
| SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA384, | |
| #endif | |
| SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384, | |
| SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512, | |
| #if !defined(BORINGSSL_ANDROID_SYSTEM) | |
| SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA512, | |
| #endif | |
| SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512, | |
| /* If the peer supports nothing else, sign with SHA-1. */ | |
| SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1, | |
| SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1, | |
| }; | |
| size_t tls12_get_verify_sigalgs(const SSL *ssl, const uint16_t **out) { | |
| *out = kVerifySignatureAlgorithms; | |
| return OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kVerifySignatureAlgorithms); | |
| } | |
| int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *ssl, int *out_alert, uint16_t sigalg) { | |
| const uint16_t *verify_sigalgs; | |
| size_t num_verify_sigalgs = tls12_get_verify_sigalgs(ssl, &verify_sigalgs); | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < num_verify_sigalgs; i++) { | |
| if (sigalg == verify_sigalgs[i]) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't | |
| * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike | |
| * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global | |
| * settings. */ | |
| void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *ssl) { | |
| CERT *c = ssl->cert; | |
| int have_rsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0; | |
| c->mask_a = 0; | |
| c->mask_k = 0; | |
| /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for RSA or | |
| * ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. */ | |
| const uint16_t *sigalgs; | |
| size_t num_sigalgs = tls12_get_verify_sigalgs(ssl, &sigalgs); | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < num_sigalgs; i++) { | |
| switch (sigalgs[i]) { | |
| case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA512: | |
| case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA384: | |
| case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA256: | |
| case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512: | |
| case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384: | |
| case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256: | |
| case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1: | |
| have_rsa = 1; | |
| break; | |
| case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512: | |
| case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384: | |
| case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256: | |
| case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1: | |
| have_ecdsa = 1; | |
| break; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* Disable auth if we don't include any appropriate signature algorithms. */ | |
| if (!have_rsa) { | |
| c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA; | |
| } | |
| if (!have_ecdsa) { | |
| c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA; | |
| } | |
| /* with PSK there must be client callback set */ | |
| if (!ssl->psk_client_callback) { | |
| c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK; | |
| c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* tls_extension represents a TLS extension that is handled internally. The | |
| * |init| function is called for each handshake, before any other functions of | |
| * the extension. Then the add and parse callbacks are called as needed. | |
| * | |
| * The parse callbacks receive a |CBS| that contains the contents of the | |
| * extension (i.e. not including the type and length bytes). If an extension is | |
| * not received then the parse callbacks will be called with a NULL CBS so that | |
| * they can do any processing needed to handle the absence of an extension. | |
| * | |
| * The add callbacks receive a |CBB| to which the extension can be appended but | |
| * the function is responsible for appending the type and length bytes too. | |
| * | |
| * All callbacks return one for success and zero for error. If a parse function | |
| * returns zero then a fatal alert with value |*out_alert| will be sent. If | |
| * |*out_alert| isn't set, then a |decode_error| alert will be sent. */ | |
| struct tls_extension { | |
| uint16_t value; | |
| void (*init)(SSL *ssl); | |
| int (*add_clienthello)(SSL *ssl, CBB *out); | |
| int (*parse_serverhello)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *contents); | |
| int (*parse_clienthello)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *contents); | |
| int (*add_serverhello)(SSL *ssl, CBB *out); | |
| }; | |
| static int forbid_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *contents) { | |
| if (contents != NULL) { | |
| /* Servers MUST NOT send this extension. */ | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int ignore_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *contents) { | |
| /* This extension from the client is handled elsewhere. */ | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int dont_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* Server name indication (SNI). | |
| * | |
| * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6066#section-3. */ | |
| static int ext_sni_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { | |
| if (ssl->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| CBB contents, server_name_list, name; | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &server_name_list) || | |
| !CBB_add_u8(&server_name_list, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&server_name_list, &name) || | |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&name, (const uint8_t *)ssl->tlsext_hostname, | |
| strlen(ssl->tlsext_hostname)) || | |
| !CBB_flush(out)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int ext_sni_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, | |
| CBS *contents) { | |
| if (contents == NULL) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| assert(ssl->tlsext_hostname != NULL); | |
| if (ssl->session == NULL) { | |
| assert(ssl->s3->new_session->tlsext_hostname == NULL); | |
| ssl->s3->new_session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(ssl->tlsext_hostname); | |
| if (!ssl->s3->new_session->tlsext_hostname) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int ext_sni_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, | |
| CBS *contents) { | |
| if (contents == NULL) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| CBS server_name_list, host_name; | |
| uint8_t name_type; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &server_name_list) || | |
| !CBS_get_u8(&server_name_list, &name_type) || | |
| /* Although the server_name extension was intended to be extensible to | |
| * new name types and multiple names, OpenSSL 1.0.x had a bug which meant | |
| * different name types will cause an error. Further, RFC 4366 originally | |
| * defined syntax inextensibly. RFC 6066 corrected this mistake, but | |
| * adding new name types is no longer feasible. | |
| * | |
| * Act as if the extensibility does not exist to simplify parsing. */ | |
| !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_name_list, &host_name) || | |
| CBS_len(&server_name_list) != 0 || | |
| CBS_len(contents) != 0) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (name_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name || | |
| CBS_len(&host_name) == 0 || | |
| CBS_len(&host_name) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name || | |
| CBS_contains_zero_byte(&host_name)) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* TODO(davidben): SNI should be resolved before resumption. We have the | |
| * early callback as a replacement, but we should fix the current callback | |
| * and avoid the need for |SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context|. */ | |
| if (ssl->session == NULL) { | |
| assert(ssl->s3->new_session->tlsext_hostname == NULL); | |
| /* Copy the hostname as a string. */ | |
| if (!CBS_strdup(&host_name, &ssl->s3->new_session->tlsext_hostname)) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ssl->s3->hs->should_ack_sni = 1; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int ext_sni_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { | |
| if (ssl->session != NULL || | |
| !ssl->s3->hs->should_ack_sni || | |
| ssl->s3->new_session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* Renegotiation indication. | |
| * | |
| * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5746 */ | |
| static int ext_ri_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { | |
| uint16_t min_version, max_version; | |
| if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &min_version, &max_version)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Renegotiation indication is not necessary in TLS 1.3. */ | |
| if (min_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| assert(ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete == | |
| (ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len != 0)); | |
| CBB contents, prev_finished; | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) || | |
| !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&contents, &prev_finished) || | |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&prev_finished, ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, | |
| ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len) || | |
| !CBB_flush(out)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int ext_ri_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, | |
| CBS *contents) { | |
| if (contents != NULL && ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Servers may not switch between omitting the extension and supporting it. | |
| * See RFC 5746, sections 3.5 and 4.2. */ | |
| if (ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete && | |
| (contents != NULL) != ssl->s3->send_connection_binding) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (contents == NULL) { | |
| /* Strictly speaking, if we want to avoid an attack we should *always* see | |
| * RI even on initial ServerHello because the client doesn't see any | |
| * renegotiation during an attack. However this would mean we could not | |
| * connect to any server which doesn't support RI. | |
| * | |
| * OpenSSL has |SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT| to control this, but in | |
| * practical terms every client sets it so it's just assumed here. */ | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| const size_t expected_len = ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len + | |
| ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len; | |
| /* Check for logic errors */ | |
| assert(!expected_len || ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len); | |
| assert(!expected_len || ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len); | |
| assert(ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete == | |
| (ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len != 0)); | |
| assert(ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete == | |
| (ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len != 0)); | |
| /* Parse out the extension contents. */ | |
| CBS renegotiated_connection; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &renegotiated_connection) || | |
| CBS_len(contents) != 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR); | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Check that the extension matches. */ | |
| if (CBS_len(&renegotiated_connection) != expected_len) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| const uint8_t *d = CBS_data(&renegotiated_connection); | |
| if (CRYPTO_memcmp(d, ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, | |
| ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| d += ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len; | |
| if (CRYPTO_memcmp(d, ssl->s3->previous_server_finished, | |
| ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ssl->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int ext_ri_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, | |
| CBS *contents) { | |
| /* Renegotiation isn't supported as a server so this function should never be | |
| * called after the initial handshake. */ | |
| assert(!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete); | |
| if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| if (contents == NULL) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| CBS renegotiated_connection; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &renegotiated_connection) || | |
| CBS_len(contents) != 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Check that the extension matches. We do not support renegotiation as a | |
| * server, so this must be empty. */ | |
| if (CBS_len(&renegotiated_connection) != 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ssl->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int ext_ri_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { | |
| /* Renegotiation isn't supported as a server so this function should never be | |
| * called after the initial handshake. */ | |
| assert(!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete); | |
| if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16(out, 1 /* length */) || | |
| !CBB_add_u8(out, 0 /* empty renegotiation info */)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* Extended Master Secret. | |
| * | |
| * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7627 */ | |
| static int ext_ems_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { | |
| uint16_t min_version, max_version; | |
| if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &min_version, &max_version)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Extended master secret is not necessary in TLS 1.3. */ | |
| if (min_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION || max_version <= SSL3_VERSION) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int ext_ems_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, | |
| CBS *contents) { | |
| /* Whether EMS is negotiated may not change on renegotation. */ | |
| if (ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete) { | |
| if ((contents != NULL) != ssl->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_EMS_MISMATCH); | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| if (contents == NULL) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION || | |
| ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ssl->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret = 1; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int ext_ems_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, | |
| CBS *contents) { | |
| if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION || | |
| ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| if (contents == NULL) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ssl->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret = 1; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int ext_ems_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { | |
| if (!ssl->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* Session tickets. | |
| * | |
| * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5077 */ | |
| static int ext_ticket_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { | |
| uint16_t min_version, max_version; | |
| if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &min_version, &max_version)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* TLS 1.3 uses a different ticket extension. */ | |
| if (min_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION || | |
| SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| const uint8_t *ticket_data = NULL; | |
| int ticket_len = 0; | |
| /* Renegotiation does not participate in session resumption. However, still | |
| * advertise the extension to avoid potentially breaking servers which carry | |
| * over the state from the previous handshake, such as OpenSSL servers | |
| * without upstream's 3c3f0259238594d77264a78944d409f2127642c4. */ | |
| uint16_t session_version; | |
| if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete && | |
| ssl->session != NULL && | |
| ssl->session->tlsext_tick != NULL && | |
| /* Don't send TLS 1.3 session tickets in the ticket extension. */ | |
| ssl->method->version_from_wire(&session_version, | |
| ssl->session->ssl_version) && | |
| session_version < TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
| ticket_data = ssl->session->tlsext_tick; | |
| ticket_len = ssl->session->tlsext_ticklen; | |
| } | |
| CBB ticket; | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &ticket) || | |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&ticket, ticket_data, ticket_len) || | |
| !CBB_flush(out)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int ext_ticket_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, | |
| CBS *contents) { | |
| ssl->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; | |
| if (contents == NULL) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* If |SSL_OP_NO_TICKET| is set then no extension will have been sent and | |
| * this function should never be called, even if the server tries to send the | |
| * extension. */ | |
| assert((SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) == 0); | |
| if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ssl->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int ext_ticket_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { | |
| if (!ssl->tlsext_ticket_expected) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* If |SSL_OP_NO_TICKET| is set, |tlsext_ticket_expected| should never be | |
| * true. */ | |
| assert((SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) == 0); | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* Signature Algorithms. | |
| * | |
| * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */ | |
| static int ext_sigalgs_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { | |
| uint16_t min_version, max_version; | |
| if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &min_version, &max_version)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (max_version < TLS1_2_VERSION) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| const uint16_t *sigalgs; | |
| const size_t num_sigalgs = tls12_get_verify_sigalgs(ssl, &sigalgs); | |
| CBB contents, sigalgs_cbb; | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &sigalgs_cbb)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < num_sigalgs; i++) { | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(&sigalgs_cbb, sigalgs[i])) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (!CBB_flush(out)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int ext_sigalgs_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, | |
| CBS *contents) { | |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->hs->peer_sigalgs); | |
| ssl->s3->hs->peer_sigalgs = NULL; | |
| ssl->s3->hs->num_peer_sigalgs = 0; | |
| if (contents == NULL) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| CBS supported_signature_algorithms; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &supported_signature_algorithms) || | |
| CBS_len(contents) != 0 || | |
| CBS_len(&supported_signature_algorithms) == 0 || | |
| !tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(ssl, &supported_signature_algorithms)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* OCSP Stapling. | |
| * | |
| * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6066#section-8 */ | |
| static void ext_ocsp_init(SSL *ssl) { | |
| ssl->tlsext_status_type = -1; | |
| } | |
| static int ext_ocsp_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { | |
| if (!ssl->ocsp_stapling_enabled) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| CBB contents; | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) || | |
| !CBB_add_u8(&contents, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16(&contents, 0 /* empty responder ID list */) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16(&contents, 0 /* empty request extensions */) || | |
| !CBB_flush(out)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ssl->tlsext_status_type = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int ext_ocsp_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, | |
| CBS *contents) { | |
| if (contents == NULL) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
| /* OCSP stapling is forbidden on non-certificate ciphers. */ | |
| if (CBS_len(contents) != 0 || | |
| !ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Note this does not check for resumption in TLS 1.2. Sending | |
| * status_request here does not make sense, but OpenSSL does so and the | |
| * specification does not say anything. Tolerate it but ignore it. */ | |
| ssl->s3->hs->certificate_status_expected = 1; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* In TLS 1.3, OCSP stapling is forbidden on resumption. */ | |
| if (ssl->s3->session_reused) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| uint8_t status_type; | |
| CBS ocsp_response; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u8(contents, &status_type) || | |
| status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp || | |
| !CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(contents, &ocsp_response) || | |
| CBS_len(&ocsp_response) == 0 || | |
| CBS_len(contents) != 0) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (!CBS_stow(&ocsp_response, &ssl->s3->new_session->ocsp_response, | |
| &ssl->s3->new_session->ocsp_response_length)) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int ext_ocsp_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, | |
| CBS *contents) { | |
| if (contents == NULL) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| uint8_t status_type; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u8(contents, &status_type)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* We cannot decide whether OCSP stapling will occur yet because the correct | |
| * SSL_CTX might not have been selected. */ | |
| ssl->s3->hs->ocsp_stapling_requested = status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int ext_ocsp_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { | |
| if (!ssl->s3->hs->ocsp_stapling_requested || | |
| ssl->ctx->ocsp_response_length == 0 || | |
| ssl->s3->session_reused || | |
| (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION && | |
| !ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher))) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
| /* The extension shouldn't be sent when resuming sessions. */ | |
| if (ssl->session != NULL) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| ssl->s3->hs->certificate_status_expected = 1; | |
| return CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) && | |
| CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */); | |
| } | |
| CBB body, ocsp_response; | |
| return CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) && | |
| CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &body) && | |
| CBB_add_u8(&body, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) && | |
| CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&body, &ocsp_response) && | |
| CBB_add_bytes(&ocsp_response, ssl->ctx->ocsp_response, | |
| ssl->ctx->ocsp_response_length) && | |
| CBB_flush(out); | |
| } | |
| /* Next protocol negotiation. | |
| * | |
| * https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/agl/technotes/blob/master/nextprotoneg.html */ | |
| static int ext_npn_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { | |
| if (ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete || | |
| ssl->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL || | |
| (ssl->options & SSL_OP_DISABLE_NPN) || | |
| SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int ext_npn_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, | |
| CBS *contents) { | |
| if (contents == NULL) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* If any of these are false then we should never have sent the NPN | |
| * extension in the ClientHello and thus this function should never have been | |
| * called. */ | |
| assert(!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete); | |
| assert(!SSL_is_dtls(ssl)); | |
| assert(ssl->ctx->next_proto_select_cb != NULL); | |
| assert(!(ssl->options & SSL_OP_DISABLE_NPN)); | |
| if (ssl->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) { | |
| /* NPN and ALPN may not be negotiated in the same connection. */ | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NEGOTIATED_BOTH_NPN_AND_ALPN); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| const uint8_t *const orig_contents = CBS_data(contents); | |
| const size_t orig_len = CBS_len(contents); | |
| while (CBS_len(contents) != 0) { | |
| CBS proto; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &proto) || | |
| CBS_len(&proto) == 0) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| uint8_t *selected; | |
| uint8_t selected_len; | |
| if (ssl->ctx->next_proto_select_cb( | |
| ssl, &selected, &selected_len, orig_contents, orig_len, | |
| ssl->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated); | |
| ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated = BUF_memdup(selected, selected_len); | |
| if (ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len; | |
| ssl->s3->hs->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int ext_npn_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, | |
| CBS *contents) { | |
| if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| if (contents != NULL && CBS_len(contents) != 0) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (contents == NULL || | |
| ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete || | |
| ssl->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb == NULL || | |
| SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| ssl->s3->hs->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int ext_npn_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { | |
| /* |next_proto_neg_seen| might have been cleared when an ALPN extension was | |
| * parsed. */ | |
| if (!ssl->s3->hs->next_proto_neg_seen) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| const uint8_t *npa; | |
| unsigned npa_len; | |
| if (ssl->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb( | |
| ssl, &npa, &npa_len, ssl->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg) != | |
| SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { | |
| ssl->s3->hs->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| CBB contents; | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) || | |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&contents, npa, npa_len) || | |
| !CBB_flush(out)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* Signed certificate timestamps. | |
| * | |
| * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#section-3.3.1 */ | |
| static int ext_sct_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { | |
| if (!ssl->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int ext_sct_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, | |
| CBS *contents) { | |
| if (contents == NULL) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* If this is false then we should never have sent the SCT extension in the | |
| * ClientHello and thus this function should never have been called. */ | |
| assert(ssl->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled); | |
| if (CBS_len(contents) == 0) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Session resumption uses the original session information. The extension | |
| * should not be sent on resumption, but RFC 6962 did not make it a | |
| * requirement, so tolerate this. | |
| * | |
| * TODO(davidben): Enforce this anyway. */ | |
| if (!ssl->s3->session_reused && | |
| !CBS_stow( | |
| contents, | |
| &ssl->s3->new_session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list, | |
| &ssl->s3->new_session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length)) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int ext_sct_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, | |
| CBS *contents) { | |
| return contents == NULL || CBS_len(contents) == 0; | |
| } | |
| static int ext_sct_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { | |
| /* The extension shouldn't be sent when resuming sessions. */ | |
| if (ssl->s3->session_reused || | |
| ssl->ctx->signed_cert_timestamp_list_length == 0) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| CBB contents; | |
| return CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp) && | |
| CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) && | |
| CBB_add_bytes(&contents, ssl->ctx->signed_cert_timestamp_list, | |
| ssl->ctx->signed_cert_timestamp_list_length) && | |
| CBB_flush(out); | |
| } | |
| /* Application-level Protocol Negotiation. | |
| * | |
| * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7301 */ | |
| static void ext_alpn_init(SSL *ssl) { | |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->alpn_selected); | |
| ssl->s3->alpn_selected = NULL; | |
| } | |
| static int ext_alpn_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { | |
| if (ssl->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL || | |
| ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| CBB contents, proto_list; | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &proto_list) || | |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&proto_list, ssl->alpn_client_proto_list, | |
| ssl->alpn_client_proto_list_len) || | |
| !CBB_flush(out)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int ext_alpn_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, | |
| CBS *contents) { | |
| if (contents == NULL) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| assert(!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete); | |
| assert(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list != NULL); | |
| if (ssl->s3->hs->next_proto_neg_seen) { | |
| /* NPN and ALPN may not be negotiated in the same connection. */ | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NEGOTIATED_BOTH_NPN_AND_ALPN); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* The extension data consists of a ProtocolNameList which must have | |
| * exactly one ProtocolName. Each of these is length-prefixed. */ | |
| CBS protocol_name_list, protocol_name; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &protocol_name_list) || | |
| CBS_len(contents) != 0 || | |
| !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&protocol_name_list, &protocol_name) || | |
| /* Empty protocol names are forbidden. */ | |
| CBS_len(&protocol_name) == 0 || | |
| CBS_len(&protocol_name_list) != 0) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Check that the protcol name is one of the ones we advertised. */ | |
| int protocol_ok = 0; | |
| CBS client_protocol_name_list, client_protocol_name; | |
| CBS_init(&client_protocol_name_list, ssl->alpn_client_proto_list, | |
| ssl->alpn_client_proto_list_len); | |
| while (CBS_len(&client_protocol_name_list) > 0) { | |
| if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_protocol_name_list, | |
| &client_protocol_name)) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (CBS_len(&client_protocol_name) == CBS_len(&protocol_name) && | |
| memcmp(CBS_data(&client_protocol_name), CBS_data(&protocol_name), | |
| CBS_len(&protocol_name)) == 0) { | |
| protocol_ok = 1; | |
| break; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (!protocol_ok) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_ALPN_PROTOCOL); | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (!CBS_stow(&protocol_name, &ssl->s3->alpn_selected, | |
| &ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len)) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int ssl_negotiate_alpn(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, | |
| const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *client_hello) { | |
| CBS contents; | |
| if (ssl->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL || | |
| !ssl_early_callback_get_extension( | |
| client_hello, &contents, | |
| TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)) { | |
| /* Ignore ALPN if not configured or no extension was supplied. */ | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */ | |
| ssl->s3->hs->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; | |
| CBS protocol_name_list; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &protocol_name_list) || | |
| CBS_len(&contents) != 0 || | |
| CBS_len(&protocol_name_list) < 2) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Validate the protocol list. */ | |
| CBS protocol_name_list_copy = protocol_name_list; | |
| while (CBS_len(&protocol_name_list_copy) > 0) { | |
| CBS protocol_name; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&protocol_name_list_copy, &protocol_name) || | |
| /* Empty protocol names are forbidden. */ | |
| CBS_len(&protocol_name) == 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| const uint8_t *selected; | |
| uint8_t selected_len; | |
| if (ssl->ctx->alpn_select_cb( | |
| ssl, &selected, &selected_len, CBS_data(&protocol_name_list), | |
| CBS_len(&protocol_name_list), | |
| ssl->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg) == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { | |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->alpn_selected); | |
| ssl->s3->alpn_selected = BUF_memdup(selected, selected_len); | |
| if (ssl->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int ext_alpn_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { | |
| if (ssl->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| CBB contents, proto_list, proto; | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &proto_list) || | |
| !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&proto_list, &proto) || | |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&proto, ssl->s3->alpn_selected, | |
| ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len) || | |
| !CBB_flush(out)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* Channel ID. | |
| * | |
| * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-balfanz-tls-channelid-01 */ | |
| static void ext_channel_id_init(SSL *ssl) { | |
| ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0; | |
| } | |
| static int ext_channel_id_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { | |
| if (!ssl->tlsext_channel_id_enabled || | |
| SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int ext_channel_id_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, | |
| CBS *contents) { | |
| if (contents == NULL) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| assert(!SSL_is_dtls(ssl)); | |
| assert(ssl->tlsext_channel_id_enabled); | |
| if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int ext_channel_id_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, | |
| CBS *contents) { | |
| if (contents == NULL || | |
| !ssl->tlsext_channel_id_enabled || | |
| SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int ext_channel_id_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { | |
| if (!ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) extension. | |
| * | |
| * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5764 */ | |
| static void ext_srtp_init(SSL *ssl) { | |
| ssl->srtp_profile = NULL; | |
| } | |
| static int ext_srtp_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { | |
| STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *profiles = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(ssl); | |
| if (profiles == NULL) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| const size_t num_profiles = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(profiles); | |
| if (num_profiles == 0) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| CBB contents, profile_ids; | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_srtp) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &profile_ids)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < num_profiles; i++) { | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(&profile_ids, | |
| sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(profiles, i)->id)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (!CBB_add_u8(&contents, 0 /* empty use_mki value */) || | |
| !CBB_flush(out)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int ext_srtp_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, | |
| CBS *contents) { | |
| if (contents == NULL) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* The extension consists of a u16-prefixed profile ID list containing a | |
| * single uint16_t profile ID, then followed by a u8-prefixed srtp_mki field. | |
| * | |
| * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5764#section-4.1.1 */ | |
| CBS profile_ids, srtp_mki; | |
| uint16_t profile_id; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &profile_ids) || | |
| !CBS_get_u16(&profile_ids, &profile_id) || | |
| CBS_len(&profile_ids) != 0 || | |
| !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &srtp_mki) || | |
| CBS_len(contents) != 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (CBS_len(&srtp_mki) != 0) { | |
| /* Must be no MKI, since we never offer one. */ | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE); | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *profiles = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(ssl); | |
| /* Check to see if the server gave us something we support (and presumably | |
| * offered). */ | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(profiles); i++) { | |
| const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *profile = | |
| sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(profiles, i); | |
| if (profile->id == profile_id) { | |
| ssl->srtp_profile = profile; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| static int ext_srtp_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, | |
| CBS *contents) { | |
| if (contents == NULL) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| CBS profile_ids, srtp_mki; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &profile_ids) || | |
| CBS_len(&profile_ids) < 2 || | |
| !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &srtp_mki) || | |
| CBS_len(contents) != 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Discard the MKI value for now. */ | |
| const STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *server_profiles = | |
| SSL_get_srtp_profiles(ssl); | |
| /* Pick the server's most preferred profile. */ | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(server_profiles); i++) { | |
| const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *server_profile = | |
| sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(server_profiles, i); | |
| CBS profile_ids_tmp; | |
| CBS_init(&profile_ids_tmp, CBS_data(&profile_ids), CBS_len(&profile_ids)); | |
| while (CBS_len(&profile_ids_tmp) > 0) { | |
| uint16_t profile_id; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16(&profile_ids_tmp, &profile_id)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (server_profile->id == profile_id) { | |
| ssl->srtp_profile = server_profile; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int ext_srtp_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { | |
| if (ssl->srtp_profile == NULL) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| CBB contents, profile_ids; | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_srtp) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &profile_ids) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16(&profile_ids, ssl->srtp_profile->id) || | |
| !CBB_add_u8(&contents, 0 /* empty MKI */) || | |
| !CBB_flush(out)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* EC point formats. | |
| * | |
| * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492#section-5.1.2 */ | |
| static int ext_ec_point_add_extension(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { | |
| CBB contents, formats; | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) || | |
| !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&contents, &formats) || | |
| !CBB_add_u8(&formats, TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) || | |
| !CBB_flush(out)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int ext_ec_point_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { | |
| uint16_t min_version, max_version; | |
| if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &min_version, &max_version)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* The point format extension is unneccessary in TLS 1.3. */ | |
| if (min_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| return ext_ec_point_add_extension(ssl, out); | |
| } | |
| static int ext_ec_point_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, | |
| CBS *contents) { | |
| if (contents == NULL) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| CBS ec_point_format_list; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &ec_point_format_list) || | |
| CBS_len(contents) != 0) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Per RFC 4492, section 5.1.2, implementations MUST support the uncompressed | |
| * point format. */ | |
| if (memchr(CBS_data(&ec_point_format_list), TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed, | |
| CBS_len(&ec_point_format_list)) == NULL) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int ext_ec_point_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, | |
| CBS *contents) { | |
| if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| return ext_ec_point_parse_serverhello(ssl, out_alert, contents); | |
| } | |
| static int ext_ec_point_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { | |
| if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| const uint32_t alg_k = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; | |
| const uint32_t alg_a = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; | |
| const int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA); | |
| if (!using_ecc) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| return ext_ec_point_add_extension(ssl, out); | |
| } | |
| /* Pre Shared Key | |
| * | |
| * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16#section-4.2.6 */ | |
| static int ext_pre_shared_key_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { | |
| uint16_t min_version, max_version; | |
| if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &min_version, &max_version)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| uint16_t session_version; | |
| if (max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION || ssl->session == NULL || | |
| !ssl->method->version_from_wire(&session_version, | |
| ssl->session->ssl_version) || | |
| session_version < TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| CBB contents, identity, ke_modes, auth_modes, ticket; | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_pre_shared_key) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &identity) || | |
| !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&identity, &ke_modes) || | |
| !CBB_add_u8(&ke_modes, SSL_PSK_DHE_KE) || | |
| !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&identity, &auth_modes) || | |
| !CBB_add_u8(&auth_modes, SSL_PSK_AUTH) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&identity, &ticket) || | |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&ticket, ssl->session->tlsext_tick, | |
| ssl->session->tlsext_ticklen)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return CBB_flush(out); | |
| } | |
| int ssl_ext_pre_shared_key_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, | |
| CBS *contents) { | |
| uint16_t psk_id; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16(contents, &psk_id) || | |
| CBS_len(contents) != 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (psk_id != 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int ssl_ext_pre_shared_key_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, | |
| SSL_SESSION **out_session, | |
| uint8_t *out_alert, | |
| CBS *contents) { | |
| /* We only process the first PSK identity since we don't support pure PSK. */ | |
| CBS identity, ke_modes, auth_modes, ticket; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &identity) || | |
| !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&identity, &ke_modes) || | |
| !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&identity, &auth_modes) || | |
| !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&identity, &ticket) || | |
| CBS_len(contents) != 0) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* We only support tickets with PSK_DHE_KE and PSK_AUTH. */ | |
| if (memchr(CBS_data(&ke_modes), SSL_PSK_DHE_KE, CBS_len(&ke_modes)) == NULL || | |
| memchr(CBS_data(&auth_modes), SSL_PSK_AUTH, CBS_len(&auth_modes)) == | |
| NULL) { | |
| *out_session = NULL; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* TLS 1.3 session tickets are renewed separately as part of the | |
| * NewSessionTicket. */ | |
| int renew; | |
| return tls_process_ticket(ssl, out_session, &renew, CBS_data(&ticket), | |
| CBS_len(&ticket), NULL, 0); | |
| } | |
| int ssl_ext_pre_shared_key_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { | |
| if (!ssl->s3->session_reused) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| CBB contents; | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_pre_shared_key) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) || | |
| /* We only consider the first identity for resumption */ | |
| !CBB_add_u16(&contents, 0) || | |
| !CBB_flush(out)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* Key Share | |
| * | |
| * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16#section-4.2.5 */ | |
| static int ext_key_share_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { | |
| uint16_t min_version, max_version; | |
| if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &min_version, &max_version)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| CBB contents, kse_bytes; | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &kse_bytes)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| uint16_t group_id; | |
| if (ssl->s3->hs->received_hello_retry_request) { | |
| /* Replay the old key shares. */ | |
| if (!CBB_add_bytes(&kse_bytes, ssl->s3->hs->key_share_bytes, | |
| ssl->s3->hs->key_share_bytes_len)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->hs->key_share_bytes); | |
| ssl->s3->hs->key_share_bytes = NULL; | |
| ssl->s3->hs->key_share_bytes_len = 0; | |
| group_id = ssl->s3->hs->retry_group; | |
| /* We received a HelloRetryRequest without a new curve, so there is no new | |
| * share to append. Leave |ecdh_ctx| as-is. */ | |
| if (group_id == 0) { | |
| return CBB_flush(out); | |
| } | |
| } else { | |
| /* Add a fake group. See draft-davidben-tls-grease-01. */ | |
| if (ssl->ctx->grease_enabled && | |
| (!CBB_add_u16(&kse_bytes, | |
| ssl_get_grease_value(ssl, ssl_grease_group)) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16(&kse_bytes, 1 /* length */) || | |
| !CBB_add_u8(&kse_bytes, 0 /* one byte key share */))) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Predict the most preferred group. */ | |
| const uint16_t *groups; | |
| size_t groups_len; | |
| tls1_get_grouplist(ssl, &groups, &groups_len); | |
| if (groups_len == 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_GROUPS_SPECIFIED); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| group_id = groups[0]; | |
| } | |
| CBB key_exchange; | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(&kse_bytes, group_id) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&kse_bytes, &key_exchange) || | |
| !SSL_ECDH_CTX_init(&ssl->s3->hs->ecdh_ctx, group_id) || | |
| !SSL_ECDH_CTX_offer(&ssl->s3->hs->ecdh_ctx, &key_exchange) || | |
| !CBB_flush(&kse_bytes)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (!ssl->s3->hs->received_hello_retry_request) { | |
| /* Save the contents of the extension to repeat it in the second | |
| * ClientHello. */ | |
| ssl->s3->hs->key_share_bytes_len = CBB_len(&kse_bytes); | |
| ssl->s3->hs->key_share_bytes = BUF_memdup(CBB_data(&kse_bytes), | |
| CBB_len(&kse_bytes)); | |
| if (ssl->s3->hs->key_share_bytes == NULL) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return CBB_flush(out); | |
| } | |
| int ssl_ext_key_share_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t **out_secret, | |
| size_t *out_secret_len, | |
| uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *contents) { | |
| CBS peer_key; | |
| uint16_t group_id; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16(contents, &group_id) || | |
| !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &peer_key) || | |
| CBS_len(contents) != 0) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (SSL_ECDH_CTX_get_id(&ssl->s3->hs->ecdh_ctx) != group_id) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_finish(&ssl->s3->hs->ecdh_ctx, out_secret, out_secret_len, | |
| out_alert, CBS_data(&peer_key), | |
| CBS_len(&peer_key))) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ssl->s3->new_session->key_exchange_info = group_id; | |
| SSL_ECDH_CTX_cleanup(&ssl->s3->hs->ecdh_ctx); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int ssl_ext_key_share_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, int *out_found, | |
| uint8_t **out_secret, | |
| size_t *out_secret_len, | |
| uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *contents) { | |
| uint16_t group_id; | |
| CBS key_shares; | |
| if (!tls1_get_shared_group(ssl, &group_id)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_GROUP); | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &key_shares) || | |
| CBS_len(contents) != 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Find the corresponding key share. */ | |
| int found = 0; | |
| CBS peer_key; | |
| while (CBS_len(&key_shares) > 0) { | |
| uint16_t id; | |
| CBS peer_key_tmp; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16(&key_shares, &id) || | |
| !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&key_shares, &peer_key_tmp)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (id == group_id) { | |
| if (found) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DUPLICATE_KEY_SHARE); | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| found = 1; | |
| peer_key = peer_key_tmp; | |
| /* Continue parsing the structure to keep peers honest. */ | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (!found) { | |
| *out_found = 0; | |
| *out_secret = NULL; | |
| *out_secret_len = 0; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* Compute the DH secret. */ | |
| uint8_t *secret = NULL; | |
| size_t secret_len; | |
| SSL_ECDH_CTX group; | |
| memset(&group, 0, sizeof(SSL_ECDH_CTX)); | |
| CBB public_key; | |
| if (!CBB_init(&public_key, 32) || | |
| !SSL_ECDH_CTX_init(&group, group_id) || | |
| !SSL_ECDH_CTX_accept(&group, &public_key, &secret, &secret_len, | |
| out_alert, CBS_data(&peer_key), | |
| CBS_len(&peer_key)) || | |
| !CBB_finish(&public_key, &ssl->s3->hs->public_key, | |
| &ssl->s3->hs->public_key_len)) { | |
| OPENSSL_free(secret); | |
| SSL_ECDH_CTX_cleanup(&group); | |
| CBB_cleanup(&public_key); | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| SSL_ECDH_CTX_cleanup(&group); | |
| *out_secret = secret; | |
| *out_secret_len = secret_len; | |
| *out_found = 1; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int ssl_ext_key_share_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { | |
| uint16_t group_id; | |
| CBB kse_bytes, public_key; | |
| if (!tls1_get_shared_group(ssl, &group_id) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &kse_bytes) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16(&kse_bytes, group_id) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&kse_bytes, &public_key) || | |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&public_key, ssl->s3->hs->public_key, | |
| ssl->s3->hs->public_key_len) || | |
| !CBB_flush(out)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->hs->public_key); | |
| ssl->s3->hs->public_key = NULL; | |
| ssl->s3->hs->public_key_len = 0; | |
| ssl->s3->new_session->key_exchange_info = group_id; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* Supported Versions | |
| * | |
| * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16#section-4.2.1 */ | |
| static int ext_supported_versions_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { | |
| uint16_t min_version, max_version; | |
| if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &min_version, &max_version)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (max_version <= TLS1_2_VERSION) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| CBB contents, versions; | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) || | |
| !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&contents, &versions)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Add a fake version. See draft-davidben-tls-grease-01. */ | |
| if (ssl->ctx->grease_enabled && | |
| !CBB_add_u16(&versions, ssl_get_grease_value(ssl, ssl_grease_version))) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| for (uint16_t version = max_version; version >= min_version; version--) { | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(&versions, ssl->method->version_to_wire(version))) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (!CBB_flush(out)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* Cookie | |
| * | |
| * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16#section-4.2.2 */ | |
| static int ext_cookie_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { | |
| if (ssl->s3->hs->cookie == NULL) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| CBB contents, cookie; | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &cookie) || | |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&cookie, ssl->s3->hs->cookie, ssl->s3->hs->cookie_len) || | |
| !CBB_flush(out)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* The cookie is no longer needed in memory. */ | |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->hs->cookie); | |
| ssl->s3->hs->cookie = NULL; | |
| ssl->s3->hs->cookie_len = 0; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* Negotiated Groups | |
| * | |
| * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492#section-5.1.2 | |
| * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16#section-4.2.4 */ | |
| static int ext_supported_groups_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { | |
| CBB contents, groups_bytes; | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &groups_bytes)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Add a fake group. See draft-davidben-tls-grease-01. */ | |
| if (ssl->ctx->grease_enabled && | |
| !CBB_add_u16(&groups_bytes, | |
| ssl_get_grease_value(ssl, ssl_grease_group))) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| const uint16_t *groups; | |
| size_t groups_len; | |
| tls1_get_grouplist(ssl, &groups, &groups_len); | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < groups_len; i++) { | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(&groups_bytes, groups[i])) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return CBB_flush(out); | |
| } | |
| static int ext_supported_groups_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, | |
| CBS *contents) { | |
| /* This extension is not expected to be echoed by servers in TLS 1.2, but some | |
| * BigIP servers send it nonetheless, so do not enforce this. */ | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int ext_supported_groups_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, | |
| CBS *contents) { | |
| if (contents == NULL) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| CBS supported_group_list; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &supported_group_list) || | |
| CBS_len(&supported_group_list) == 0 || | |
| (CBS_len(&supported_group_list) & 1) != 0 || | |
| CBS_len(contents) != 0) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ssl->s3->hs->peer_supported_group_list = OPENSSL_malloc( | |
| CBS_len(&supported_group_list)); | |
| if (ssl->s3->hs->peer_supported_group_list == NULL) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| const size_t num_groups = CBS_len(&supported_group_list) / 2; | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) { | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16(&supported_group_list, | |
| &ssl->s3->hs->peer_supported_group_list[i])) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| assert(CBS_len(&supported_group_list) == 0); | |
| ssl->s3->hs->peer_supported_group_list_len = num_groups; | |
| return 1; | |
| err: | |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->hs->peer_supported_group_list); | |
| ssl->s3->hs->peer_supported_group_list = NULL; | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| static int ext_supported_groups_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { | |
| /* Servers don't echo this extension. */ | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* kExtensions contains all the supported extensions. */ | |
| static const struct tls_extension kExtensions[] = { | |
| { | |
| TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, | |
| NULL, | |
| ext_ri_add_clienthello, | |
| ext_ri_parse_serverhello, | |
| ext_ri_parse_clienthello, | |
| ext_ri_add_serverhello, | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, | |
| NULL, | |
| ext_sni_add_clienthello, | |
| ext_sni_parse_serverhello, | |
| ext_sni_parse_clienthello, | |
| ext_sni_add_serverhello, | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, | |
| NULL, | |
| ext_ems_add_clienthello, | |
| ext_ems_parse_serverhello, | |
| ext_ems_parse_clienthello, | |
| ext_ems_add_serverhello, | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, | |
| NULL, | |
| ext_ticket_add_clienthello, | |
| ext_ticket_parse_serverhello, | |
| /* Ticket extension client parsing is handled in ssl_session.c */ | |
| ignore_parse_clienthello, | |
| ext_ticket_add_serverhello, | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, | |
| NULL, | |
| ext_sigalgs_add_clienthello, | |
| forbid_parse_serverhello, | |
| ext_sigalgs_parse_clienthello, | |
| dont_add_serverhello, | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, | |
| ext_ocsp_init, | |
| ext_ocsp_add_clienthello, | |
| ext_ocsp_parse_serverhello, | |
| ext_ocsp_parse_clienthello, | |
| ext_ocsp_add_serverhello, | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, | |
| NULL, | |
| ext_npn_add_clienthello, | |
| ext_npn_parse_serverhello, | |
| ext_npn_parse_clienthello, | |
| ext_npn_add_serverhello, | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp, | |
| NULL, | |
| ext_sct_add_clienthello, | |
| ext_sct_parse_serverhello, | |
| ext_sct_parse_clienthello, | |
| ext_sct_add_serverhello, | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, | |
| ext_alpn_init, | |
| ext_alpn_add_clienthello, | |
| ext_alpn_parse_serverhello, | |
| /* ALPN is negotiated late in |ssl_negotiate_alpn|. */ | |
| ignore_parse_clienthello, | |
| ext_alpn_add_serverhello, | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id, | |
| ext_channel_id_init, | |
| ext_channel_id_add_clienthello, | |
| ext_channel_id_parse_serverhello, | |
| ext_channel_id_parse_clienthello, | |
| ext_channel_id_add_serverhello, | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| TLSEXT_TYPE_srtp, | |
| ext_srtp_init, | |
| ext_srtp_add_clienthello, | |
| ext_srtp_parse_serverhello, | |
| ext_srtp_parse_clienthello, | |
| ext_srtp_add_serverhello, | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, | |
| NULL, | |
| ext_ec_point_add_clienthello, | |
| ext_ec_point_parse_serverhello, | |
| ext_ec_point_parse_clienthello, | |
| ext_ec_point_add_serverhello, | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share, | |
| NULL, | |
| ext_key_share_add_clienthello, | |
| forbid_parse_serverhello, | |
| ignore_parse_clienthello, | |
| dont_add_serverhello, | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| TLSEXT_TYPE_pre_shared_key, | |
| NULL, | |
| ext_pre_shared_key_add_clienthello, | |
| forbid_parse_serverhello, | |
| ignore_parse_clienthello, | |
| dont_add_serverhello, | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions, | |
| NULL, | |
| ext_supported_versions_add_clienthello, | |
| forbid_parse_serverhello, | |
| ignore_parse_clienthello, | |
| dont_add_serverhello, | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie, | |
| NULL, | |
| ext_cookie_add_clienthello, | |
| forbid_parse_serverhello, | |
| ignore_parse_clienthello, | |
| dont_add_serverhello, | |
| }, | |
| /* The final extension must be non-empty. WebSphere Application Server 7.0 is | |
| * intolerant to the last extension being zero-length. See | |
| * https://crbug.com/363583. */ | |
| { | |
| TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups, | |
| NULL, | |
| ext_supported_groups_add_clienthello, | |
| ext_supported_groups_parse_serverhello, | |
| ext_supported_groups_parse_clienthello, | |
| ext_supported_groups_add_serverhello, | |
| }, | |
| }; | |
| #define kNumExtensions (sizeof(kExtensions) / sizeof(struct tls_extension)) | |
| OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(kNumExtensions <= | |
| sizeof(((SSL_HANDSHAKE *)NULL)->extensions.sent) * 8, | |
| too_many_extensions_for_sent_bitset); | |
| OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT( | |
| kNumExtensions <= sizeof(((SSL_HANDSHAKE *)NULL)->extensions.received) * 8, | |
| too_many_extensions_for_received_bitset); | |
| static const struct tls_extension *tls_extension_find(uint32_t *out_index, | |
| uint16_t value) { | |
| unsigned i; | |
| for (i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) { | |
| if (kExtensions[i].value == value) { | |
| *out_index = i; | |
| return &kExtensions[i]; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_extension_supported(unsigned extension_value) { | |
| uint32_t index; | |
| return extension_value == TLSEXT_TYPE_padding || | |
| tls_extension_find(&index, extension_value) != NULL; | |
| } | |
| int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *ssl, CBB *out, size_t header_len) { | |
| /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */ | |
| if (ssl->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && | |
| !ssl->s3->send_connection_binding) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| CBB extensions; | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &extensions)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| ssl->s3->hs->extensions.sent = 0; | |
| ssl->s3->hs->custom_extensions.sent = 0; | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) { | |
| if (kExtensions[i].init != NULL) { | |
| kExtensions[i].init(ssl); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| uint16_t grease_ext1 = 0; | |
| if (ssl->ctx->grease_enabled) { | |
| /* Add a fake empty extension. See draft-davidben-tls-grease-01. */ | |
| grease_ext1 = ssl_get_grease_value(ssl, ssl_grease_extension1); | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(&extensions, grease_ext1) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16(&extensions, 0 /* zero length */)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) { | |
| const size_t len_before = CBB_len(&extensions); | |
| if (!kExtensions[i].add_clienthello(ssl, &extensions)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_ADDING_EXTENSION); | |
| ERR_add_error_dataf("extension: %u", (unsigned)kExtensions[i].value); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (CBB_len(&extensions) != len_before) { | |
| ssl->s3->hs->extensions.sent |= (1u << i); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (!custom_ext_add_clienthello(ssl, &extensions)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl->ctx->grease_enabled) { | |
| /* Add a fake non-empty extension. See draft-davidben-tls-grease-01. */ | |
| uint16_t grease_ext2 = ssl_get_grease_value(ssl, ssl_grease_extension2); | |
| /* The two fake extensions must not have the same value. GREASE values are | |
| * of the form 0x1a1a, 0x2a2a, 0x3a3a, etc., so XOR to generate a different | |
| * one. */ | |
| if (grease_ext1 == grease_ext2) { | |
| grease_ext2 ^= 0x1010; | |
| } | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(&extensions, grease_ext2) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16(&extensions, 1 /* one byte length */) || | |
| !CBB_add_u8(&extensions, 0 /* single zero byte as contents */)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (!SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) { | |
| header_len += 2 + CBB_len(&extensions); | |
| if (header_len > 0xff && header_len < 0x200) { | |
| /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See RFC 7685. | |
| * | |
| * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing extensions | |
| * it MUST always appear last. */ | |
| size_t padding_len = 0x200 - header_len; | |
| /* Extensions take at least four bytes to encode. Always include at least | |
| * one byte of data if including the extension. WebSphere Application | |
| * Server 7.0 is intolerant to the last extension being zero-length. See | |
| * https://crbug.com/363583. */ | |
| if (padding_len >= 4 + 1) { | |
| padding_len -= 4; | |
| } else { | |
| padding_len = 1; | |
| } | |
| uint8_t *padding_bytes; | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(&extensions, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16(&extensions, padding_len) || | |
| !CBB_add_space(&extensions, &padding_bytes, padding_len)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| memset(padding_bytes, 0, padding_len); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* Discard empty extensions blocks. */ | |
| if (CBB_len(&extensions) == 0) { | |
| CBB_discard_child(out); | |
| } | |
| return CBB_flush(out); | |
| err: | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { | |
| CBB extensions; | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &extensions)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| unsigned i; | |
| for (i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) { | |
| if (!(ssl->s3->hs->extensions.received & (1u << i))) { | |
| /* Don't send extensions that were not received. */ | |
| continue; | |
| } | |
| if (!kExtensions[i].add_serverhello(ssl, &extensions)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_ADDING_EXTENSION); | |
| ERR_add_error_dataf("extension: %u", (unsigned)kExtensions[i].value); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (!custom_ext_add_serverhello(ssl, &extensions)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* Discard empty extensions blocks before TLS 1.3. */ | |
| if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION && | |
| CBB_len(&extensions) == 0) { | |
| CBB_discard_child(out); | |
| } | |
| return CBB_flush(out); | |
| err: | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext( | |
| SSL *ssl, const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *client_hello, | |
| int *out_alert) { | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) { | |
| if (kExtensions[i].init != NULL) { | |
| kExtensions[i].init(ssl); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| ssl->s3->hs->extensions.received = 0; | |
| ssl->s3->hs->custom_extensions.received = 0; | |
| CBS extensions; | |
| CBS_init(&extensions, client_hello->extensions, client_hello->extensions_len); | |
| while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0) { | |
| uint16_t type; | |
| CBS extension; | |
| /* Decode the next extension. */ | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) || | |
| !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* RFC 5746 made the existence of extensions in SSL 3.0 somewhat | |
| * ambiguous. Ignore all but the renegotiation_info extension. */ | |
| if (ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION && type != TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { | |
| continue; | |
| } | |
| unsigned ext_index; | |
| const struct tls_extension *const ext = | |
| tls_extension_find(&ext_index, type); | |
| if (ext == NULL) { | |
| if (!custom_ext_parse_clienthello(ssl, out_alert, type, &extension)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_PARSING_EXTENSION); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| continue; | |
| } | |
| ssl->s3->hs->extensions.received |= (1u << ext_index); | |
| uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| if (!ext->parse_clienthello(ssl, &alert, &extension)) { | |
| *out_alert = alert; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_PARSING_EXTENSION); | |
| ERR_add_error_dataf("extension: %u", (unsigned)type); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) { | |
| if (ssl->s3->hs->extensions.received & (1u << i)) { | |
| continue; | |
| } | |
| CBS *contents = NULL, fake_contents; | |
| static const uint8_t kFakeRenegotiateExtension[] = {0}; | |
| if (kExtensions[i].value == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate && | |
| ssl_client_cipher_list_contains_cipher(client_hello, | |
| SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xffff)) { | |
| /* The renegotiation SCSV was received so pretend that we received a | |
| * renegotiation extension. */ | |
| CBS_init(&fake_contents, kFakeRenegotiateExtension, | |
| sizeof(kFakeRenegotiateExtension)); | |
| contents = &fake_contents; | |
| ssl->s3->hs->extensions.received |= (1u << i); | |
| } | |
| /* Extension wasn't observed so call the callback with a NULL | |
| * parameter. */ | |
| uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| if (!kExtensions[i].parse_clienthello(ssl, &alert, contents)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_EXTENSION); | |
| ERR_add_error_dataf("extension: %u", (unsigned)kExtensions[i].value); | |
| *out_alert = alert; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext( | |
| SSL *ssl, const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *client_hello) { | |
| int alert = -1; | |
| if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(ssl, client_hello, &alert) <= 0) { | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(ssl) <= 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(kNumExtensions <= sizeof(uint32_t) * 8, too_many_bits); | |
| static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *ssl, CBS *cbs, int *out_alert) { | |
| /* Before TLS 1.3, ServerHello extensions blocks may be omitted if empty. */ | |
| if (CBS_len(cbs) == 0 && ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* Decode the extensions block and check it is valid. */ | |
| CBS extensions; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &extensions) || | |
| !tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions)) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| uint32_t received = 0; | |
| while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0) { | |
| uint16_t type; | |
| CBS extension; | |
| /* Decode the next extension. */ | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) || | |
| !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| unsigned ext_index; | |
| const struct tls_extension *const ext = | |
| tls_extension_find(&ext_index, type); | |
| if (ext == NULL) { | |
| if (!custom_ext_parse_serverhello(ssl, out_alert, type, &extension)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| continue; | |
| } | |
| if (!(ssl->s3->hs->extensions.sent & (1u << ext_index)) && | |
| type != TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { | |
| /* If the extension was never sent then it is illegal, except for the | |
| * renegotiation extension which, in SSL 3.0, is signaled via SCSV. */ | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION); | |
| ERR_add_error_dataf("extension :%u", (unsigned)type); | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| received |= (1u << ext_index); | |
| uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| if (!ext->parse_serverhello(ssl, &alert, &extension)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_PARSING_EXTENSION); | |
| ERR_add_error_dataf("extension: %u", (unsigned)type); | |
| *out_alert = alert; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) { | |
| if (!(received & (1u << i))) { | |
| /* Extension wasn't observed so call the callback with a NULL | |
| * parameter. */ | |
| uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| if (!kExtensions[i].parse_serverhello(ssl, &alert, NULL)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_EXTENSION); | |
| ERR_add_error_dataf("extension: %u", (unsigned)kExtensions[i].value); | |
| *out_alert = alert; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *ssl) { | |
| int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; | |
| int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
| if (ssl->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) { | |
| ret = ssl->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(ssl, &al, | |
| ssl->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); | |
| } else if (ssl->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) { | |
| ret = ssl->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback( | |
| ssl, &al, ssl->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); | |
| } | |
| switch (ret) { | |
| case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
| return -1; | |
| case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); | |
| return 1; | |
| case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: | |
| ssl->s3->hs->should_ack_sni = 0; | |
| return 1; | |
| default: | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *ssl) { | |
| int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; | |
| int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
| if (ssl->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) { | |
| ret = ssl->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(ssl, &al, | |
| ssl->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); | |
| } else if (ssl->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) { | |
| ret = ssl->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback( | |
| ssl, &al, ssl->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); | |
| } | |
| switch (ret) { | |
| case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
| return -1; | |
| case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); | |
| return 1; | |
| default: | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *ssl, CBS *cbs) { | |
| int alert = -1; | |
| if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(ssl, cbs, &alert) <= 0) { | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(ssl) <= 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int tls_process_ticket(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION **out_session, | |
| int *out_renew_ticket, const uint8_t *ticket, | |
| size_t ticket_len, const uint8_t *session_id, | |
| size_t session_id_len) { | |
| int ret = 1; /* Most errors are non-fatal. */ | |
| SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx = ssl->initial_ctx; | |
| uint8_t *plaintext = NULL; | |
| HMAC_CTX hmac_ctx; | |
| HMAC_CTX_init(&hmac_ctx); | |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX cipher_ctx; | |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&cipher_ctx); | |
| *out_renew_ticket = 0; | |
| *out_session = NULL; | |
| if (SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) { | |
| goto done; | |
| } | |
| if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) { | |
| goto done; | |
| } | |
| /* Ensure there is room for the key name and the largest IV | |
| * |tlsext_ticket_key_cb| may try to consume. The real limit may be lower, but | |
| * the maximum IV length should be well under the minimum size for the | |
| * session material and HMAC. */ | |
| if (ticket_len < SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) { | |
| goto done; | |
| } | |
| const uint8_t *iv = ticket + SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN; | |
| if (ssl_ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb != NULL) { | |
| int cb_ret = ssl_ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb( | |
| ssl, (uint8_t *)ticket /* name */, (uint8_t *)iv, &cipher_ctx, | |
| &hmac_ctx, 0 /* decrypt */); | |
| if (cb_ret < 0) { | |
| ret = 0; | |
| goto done; | |
| } | |
| if (cb_ret == 0) { | |
| goto done; | |
| } | |
| if (cb_ret == 2) { | |
| *out_renew_ticket = 1; | |
| } | |
| } else { | |
| /* Check the key name matches. */ | |
| if (memcmp(ticket, ssl_ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, | |
| SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN) != 0) { | |
| goto done; | |
| } | |
| if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hmac_ctx, ssl_ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, | |
| sizeof(ssl_ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key), tlsext_tick_md(), | |
| NULL) || | |
| !EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&cipher_ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, | |
| ssl_ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv)) { | |
| ret = 0; | |
| goto done; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| size_t iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&cipher_ctx); | |
| /* Check the MAC at the end of the ticket. */ | |
| uint8_t mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
| size_t mac_len = HMAC_size(&hmac_ctx); | |
| if (ticket_len < SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN + iv_len + 1 + mac_len) { | |
| /* The ticket must be large enough for key name, IV, data, and MAC. */ | |
| goto done; | |
| } | |
| HMAC_Update(&hmac_ctx, ticket, ticket_len - mac_len); | |
| HMAC_Final(&hmac_ctx, mac, NULL); | |
| int mac_ok = | |
| CRYPTO_memcmp(mac, ticket + (ticket_len - mac_len), mac_len) == 0; | |
| #if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE) | |
| mac_ok = 1; | |
| #endif | |
| if (!mac_ok) { | |
| goto done; | |
| } | |
| /* Decrypt the session data. */ | |
| const uint8_t *ciphertext = ticket + SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN + iv_len; | |
| size_t ciphertext_len = ticket_len - SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN - iv_len - | |
| mac_len; | |
| plaintext = OPENSSL_malloc(ciphertext_len); | |
| if (plaintext == NULL) { | |
| ret = 0; | |
| goto done; | |
| } | |
| size_t plaintext_len; | |
| #if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE) | |
| memcpy(plaintext, ciphertext, ciphertext_len); | |
| plaintext_len = ciphertext_len; | |
| #else | |
| if (ciphertext_len >= INT_MAX) { | |
| goto done; | |
| } | |
| int len1, len2; | |
| if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&cipher_ctx, plaintext, &len1, ciphertext, | |
| (int)ciphertext_len) || | |
| !EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&cipher_ctx, plaintext + len1, &len2)) { | |
| ERR_clear_error(); /* Don't leave an error on the queue. */ | |
| goto done; | |
| } | |
| plaintext_len = (size_t)(len1 + len2); | |
| #endif | |
| /* Decode the session. */ | |
| SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_SESSION_from_bytes(plaintext, plaintext_len); | |
| if (session == NULL) { | |
| ERR_clear_error(); /* Don't leave an error on the queue. */ | |
| goto done; | |
| } | |
| /* Copy the client's session ID into the new session, to denote the ticket has | |
| * been accepted. */ | |
| memcpy(session->session_id, session_id, session_id_len); | |
| session->session_id_length = session_id_len; | |
| if (!ssl_session_is_context_valid(ssl, session) || | |
| !ssl_session_is_time_valid(ssl, session)) { | |
| SSL_SESSION_free(session); | |
| session = NULL; | |
| } | |
| *out_session = session; | |
| done: | |
| OPENSSL_free(plaintext); | |
| HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hmac_ctx); | |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cipher_ctx); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(SSL *ssl, const CBS *in_sigalgs) { | |
| /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */ | |
| if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_2_VERSION) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs; | |
| OPENSSL_free(hs->peer_sigalgs); | |
| hs->peer_sigalgs = NULL; | |
| hs->num_peer_sigalgs = 0; | |
| size_t num_sigalgs = CBS_len(in_sigalgs); | |
| if (num_sigalgs % 2 != 0) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| num_sigalgs /= 2; | |
| /* supported_signature_algorithms in the certificate request is | |
| * allowed to be empty. */ | |
| if (num_sigalgs == 0) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* This multiplication doesn't overflow because sizeof(uint16_t) is two | |
| * and we just divided |num_sigalgs| by two. */ | |
| hs->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(num_sigalgs * sizeof(uint16_t)); | |
| if (hs->peer_sigalgs == NULL) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| hs->num_peer_sigalgs = num_sigalgs; | |
| CBS sigalgs; | |
| CBS_init(&sigalgs, CBS_data(in_sigalgs), CBS_len(in_sigalgs)); | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < num_sigalgs; i++) { | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16(&sigalgs, &hs->peer_sigalgs[i])) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int tls1_choose_signature_algorithm(SSL *ssl, uint16_t *out) { | |
| CERT *cert = ssl->cert; | |
| SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs; | |
| /* Before TLS 1.2, the signature algorithm isn't negotiated as part of the | |
| * handshake. It is fixed at MD5-SHA1 for RSA and SHA1 for ECDSA. */ | |
| if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_2_VERSION) { | |
| int type = ssl_private_key_type(ssl); | |
| if (type == NID_rsaEncryption) { | |
| *out = SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl_is_ecdsa_key_type(type)) { | |
| *out = SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_COMMON_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| const uint16_t *sigalgs = cert->sigalgs; | |
| size_t num_sigalgs = cert->num_sigalgs; | |
| if (sigalgs == NULL) { | |
| sigalgs = kSignSignatureAlgorithms; | |
| num_sigalgs = OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kSignSignatureAlgorithms); | |
| } | |
| const uint16_t *peer_sigalgs = hs->peer_sigalgs; | |
| size_t num_peer_sigalgs = hs->num_peer_sigalgs; | |
| if (num_peer_sigalgs == 0 && ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
| /* If the client didn't specify any signature_algorithms extension then | |
| * we can assume that it supports SHA1. See | |
| * http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */ | |
| static const uint16_t kDefaultPeerAlgorithms[] = {SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1, | |
| SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1}; | |
| peer_sigalgs = kDefaultPeerAlgorithms; | |
| num_peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kDefaultPeerAlgorithms); | |
| } | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < num_sigalgs; i++) { | |
| uint16_t sigalg = sigalgs[i]; | |
| /* SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1 is an internal value and should never be | |
| * negotiated. */ | |
| if (sigalg == SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1 || | |
| !ssl_private_key_supports_signature_algorithm(ssl, sigalgs[i])) { | |
| continue; | |
| } | |
| for (size_t j = 0; j < num_peer_sigalgs; j++) { | |
| if (sigalg == peer_sigalgs[j]) { | |
| *out = sigalg; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_COMMON_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int tls1_verify_channel_id(SSL *ssl) { | |
| int ret = 0; | |
| uint16_t extension_type; | |
| CBS extension, channel_id; | |
| /* A Channel ID handshake message is structured to contain multiple | |
| * extensions, but the only one that can be present is Channel ID. */ | |
| CBS_init(&channel_id, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num); | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16(&channel_id, &extension_type) || | |
| !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&channel_id, &extension) || | |
| CBS_len(&channel_id) != 0 || | |
| extension_type != TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id || | |
| CBS_len(&extension) != TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| EC_GROUP *p256 = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1); | |
| if (!p256) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_P256_SUPPORT); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| EC_KEY *key = NULL; | |
| EC_POINT *point = NULL; | |
| BIGNUM x, y; | |
| ECDSA_SIG sig; | |
| BN_init(&x); | |
| BN_init(&y); | |
| sig.r = BN_new(); | |
| sig.s = BN_new(); | |
| if (sig.r == NULL || sig.s == NULL) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| const uint8_t *p = CBS_data(&extension); | |
| if (BN_bin2bn(p + 0, 32, &x) == NULL || | |
| BN_bin2bn(p + 32, 32, &y) == NULL || | |
| BN_bin2bn(p + 64, 32, sig.r) == NULL || | |
| BN_bin2bn(p + 96, 32, sig.s) == NULL) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| point = EC_POINT_new(p256); | |
| if (point == NULL || | |
| !EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(p256, point, &x, &y, NULL)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| key = EC_KEY_new(); | |
| if (key == NULL || | |
| !EC_KEY_set_group(key, p256) || | |
| !EC_KEY_set_public_key(key, point)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
| size_t digest_len; | |
| if (!tls1_channel_id_hash(ssl, digest, &digest_len)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| int sig_ok = ECDSA_do_verify(digest, digest_len, &sig, key); | |
| #if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE) | |
| sig_ok = 1; | |
| #endif | |
| if (!sig_ok) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_SIGNATURE_INVALID); | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR); | |
| ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0; | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| memcpy(ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id, p, 64); | |
| ret = 1; | |
| err: | |
| BN_free(&x); | |
| BN_free(&y); | |
| BN_free(sig.r); | |
| BN_free(sig.s); | |
| EC_KEY_free(key); | |
| EC_POINT_free(point); | |
| EC_GROUP_free(p256); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int tls1_write_channel_id(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb) { | |
| uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
| size_t digest_len; | |
| if (!tls1_channel_id_hash(ssl, digest, &digest_len)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| EC_KEY *ec_key = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private); | |
| if (ec_key == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int ret = 0; | |
| BIGNUM *x = BN_new(); | |
| BIGNUM *y = BN_new(); | |
| ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL; | |
| if (x == NULL || y == NULL || | |
| !EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key), | |
| EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec_key), | |
| x, y, NULL)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| sig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, digest_len, ec_key); | |
| if (sig == NULL) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| CBB child; | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(cbb, TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &child) || | |
| !BN_bn2cbb_padded(&child, 32, x) || | |
| !BN_bn2cbb_padded(&child, 32, y) || | |
| !BN_bn2cbb_padded(&child, 32, sig->r) || | |
| !BN_bn2cbb_padded(&child, 32, sig->s) || | |
| !CBB_flush(cbb)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| ret = 1; | |
| err: | |
| BN_free(x); | |
| BN_free(y); | |
| ECDSA_SIG_free(sig); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int tls1_channel_id_hash(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len) { | |
| if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
| uint8_t *msg; | |
| size_t msg_len; | |
| if (!tls13_get_cert_verify_signature_input(ssl, &msg, &msg_len, | |
| ssl_cert_verify_channel_id)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| SHA256(msg, msg_len, out); | |
| *out_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH; | |
| OPENSSL_free(msg); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| SHA256_CTX ctx; | |
| SHA256_Init(&ctx); | |
| static const char kClientIDMagic[] = "TLS Channel ID signature"; | |
| SHA256_Update(&ctx, kClientIDMagic, sizeof(kClientIDMagic)); | |
| if (ssl->session != NULL) { | |
| static const char kResumptionMagic[] = "Resumption"; | |
| SHA256_Update(&ctx, kResumptionMagic, sizeof(kResumptionMagic)); | |
| if (ssl->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| SHA256_Update(&ctx, ssl->session->original_handshake_hash, | |
| ssl->session->original_handshake_hash_len); | |
| } | |
| uint8_t handshake_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
| int handshake_hash_len = tls1_handshake_digest(ssl, handshake_hash, | |
| sizeof(handshake_hash)); | |
| if (handshake_hash_len < 0) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| SHA256_Update(&ctx, handshake_hash, (size_t)handshake_hash_len); | |
| SHA256_Final(out, &ctx); | |
| *out_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id records the current handshake | |
| * hashes in |ssl->s3->new_session| so that Channel ID resumptions can sign that | |
| * data. */ | |
| int tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(SSL *ssl) { | |
| int digest_len; | |
| /* This function should never be called for a resumed session because the | |
| * handshake hashes that we wish to record are for the original, full | |
| * handshake. */ | |
| if (ssl->session != NULL) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| digest_len = | |
| tls1_handshake_digest( | |
| ssl, ssl->s3->new_session->original_handshake_hash, | |
| sizeof(ssl->s3->new_session->original_handshake_hash)); | |
| if (digest_len < 0) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| ssl->s3->new_session->original_handshake_hash_len = digest_len; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int ssl_do_channel_id_callback(SSL *ssl) { | |
| if (ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private != NULL || | |
| ssl->ctx->channel_id_cb == NULL) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| EVP_PKEY *key = NULL; | |
| ssl->ctx->channel_id_cb(ssl, &key); | |
| if (key == NULL) { | |
| /* The caller should try again later. */ | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int ret = SSL_set1_tls_channel_id(ssl, key); | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(key); | |
| return ret; | |
| } |