| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | |
| * All rights reserved. | |
| * | |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
| * | |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
| * | |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | |
| * the code are not to be removed. | |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
| * | |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
| * are met: | |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
| * | |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
| * | |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ | |
| #include <openssl/ssl.h> | |
| #include <limits.h> | |
| #include <openssl/ec.h> | |
| #include <openssl/ec_key.h> | |
| #include <openssl/err.h> | |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> | |
| #include <openssl/type_check.h> | |
| #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
| #include <openssl/x509v3.h> | |
| #include "internal.h" | |
| static int ssl_set_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x509); | |
| static int ssl_set_pkey(CERT *c, EVP_PKEY *pkey); | |
| static int is_key_type_supported(int key_type) { | |
| return key_type == EVP_PKEY_RSA || key_type == EVP_PKEY_EC; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_use_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509 *x) { | |
| if (x == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return ssl_set_cert(ssl->cert, x); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *der, size_t der_len) { | |
| if (der_len > LONG_MAX) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| const uint8_t *p = der; | |
| X509 *x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, (long)der_len); | |
| if (x509 == NULL || p != der + der_len) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); | |
| X509_free(x509); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int ret = SSL_use_certificate(ssl, x509); | |
| X509_free(x509); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL *ssl, RSA *rsa) { | |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey; | |
| int ret; | |
| if (rsa == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| pkey = EVP_PKEY_new(); | |
| if (pkey == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| RSA_up_ref(rsa); | |
| EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa); | |
| ret = ssl_set_pkey(ssl->cert, pkey); | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| static int ssl_set_pkey(CERT *c, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { | |
| if (!is_key_type_supported(pkey->type)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (c->x509 != NULL) { | |
| /* Sanity-check that the private key and the certificate match, unless the | |
| * key is opaque (in case of, say, a smartcard). */ | |
| if (!EVP_PKEY_is_opaque(pkey) && | |
| !X509_check_private_key(c->x509, pkey)) { | |
| X509_free(c->x509); | |
| c->x509 = NULL; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(c->privatekey); | |
| EVP_PKEY_up_ref(pkey); | |
| c->privatekey = pkey; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *der, size_t der_len) { | |
| RSA *rsa = RSA_private_key_from_bytes(der, der_len); | |
| if (rsa == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int ret = SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(ssl, rsa); | |
| RSA_free(rsa); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_use_PrivateKey(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { | |
| int ret; | |
| if (pkey == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ret = ssl_set_pkey(ssl->cert, pkey); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int type, SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *der, | |
| size_t der_len) { | |
| if (der_len > LONG_MAX) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| const uint8_t *p = der; | |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey = d2i_PrivateKey(type, NULL, &p, (long)der_len); | |
| if (pkey == NULL || p != der + der_len) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int ret = SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, pkey); | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_use_certificate(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { | |
| if (x == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return ssl_set_cert(ctx->cert, x); | |
| } | |
| static int ssl_set_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x) { | |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); | |
| if (pkey == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_X509_LIB); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (!is_key_type_supported(pkey->type)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH or ECDSA. We only support ECDSA | |
| * certificates, so sanity-check the key usage extension. */ | |
| if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { | |
| /* This call populates extension flags (ex_flags). */ | |
| X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); | |
| if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && | |
| !(x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (c->privatekey != NULL) { | |
| /* Sanity-check that the private key and the certificate match, unless the | |
| * key is opaque (in case of, say, a smartcard). */ | |
| if (!EVP_PKEY_is_opaque(c->privatekey) && | |
| !X509_check_private_key(x, c->privatekey)) { | |
| /* don't fail for a cert/key mismatch, just free current private key | |
| * (when switching to a different cert & key, first this function should | |
| * be used, then ssl_set_pkey */ | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(c->privatekey); | |
| c->privatekey = NULL; | |
| /* clear error queue */ | |
| ERR_clear_error(); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
| X509_free(c->x509); | |
| X509_up_ref(x); | |
| c->x509 = x; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t der_len, | |
| const uint8_t *der) { | |
| if (der_len > LONG_MAX) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| const uint8_t *p = der; | |
| X509 *x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, (long)der_len); | |
| if (x509 == NULL || p != der + der_len) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); | |
| X509_free(x509); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int ret = SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x509); | |
| X509_free(x509); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *rsa) { | |
| int ret; | |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey; | |
| if (rsa == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| pkey = EVP_PKEY_new(); | |
| if (pkey == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| RSA_up_ref(rsa); | |
| EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa); | |
| ret = ssl_set_pkey(ctx->cert, pkey); | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *der, | |
| size_t der_len) { | |
| RSA *rsa = RSA_private_key_from_bytes(der, der_len); | |
| if (rsa == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int ret = SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(ctx, rsa); | |
| RSA_free(rsa); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { | |
| if (pkey == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return ssl_set_pkey(ctx->cert, pkey); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int type, SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *der, | |
| size_t der_len) { | |
| if (der_len > LONG_MAX) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| const uint8_t *p = der; | |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey = d2i_PrivateKey(type, NULL, &p, (long)der_len); | |
| if (pkey == NULL || p != der + der_len) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int ret = SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, pkey); | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_private_key_method(SSL *ssl, | |
| const SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD *key_method) { | |
| ssl->cert->key_method = key_method; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_private_key_method(SSL_CTX *ctx, | |
| const SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD *key_method) { | |
| ctx->cert->key_method = key_method; | |
| } | |
| static int set_signing_algorithm_prefs(CERT *cert, const uint16_t *prefs, | |
| size_t num_prefs) { | |
| OPENSSL_free(cert->sigalgs); | |
| cert->num_sigalgs = 0; | |
| cert->sigalgs = BUF_memdup(prefs, num_prefs * sizeof(prefs[0])); | |
| if (cert->sigalgs == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| cert->num_sigalgs = num_prefs; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_signing_algorithm_prefs(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint16_t *prefs, | |
| size_t num_prefs) { | |
| return set_signing_algorithm_prefs(ctx->cert, prefs, num_prefs); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set_signing_algorithm_prefs(SSL *ssl, const uint16_t *prefs, | |
| size_t num_prefs) { | |
| return set_signing_algorithm_prefs(ssl->cert, prefs, num_prefs); | |
| } | |
| OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(int) >= 2 * sizeof(uint16_t), | |
| digest_list_conversion_cannot_overflow); | |
| int SSL_set_private_key_digest_prefs(SSL *ssl, const int *digest_nids, | |
| size_t num_digests) { | |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl->cert->sigalgs); | |
| ssl->cert->num_sigalgs = 0; | |
| ssl->cert->sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * 2 * num_digests); | |
| if (ssl->cert->sigalgs == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Convert the digest list to a signature algorithms list. | |
| * | |
| * TODO(davidben): Replace this API with one that can express RSA-PSS, etc. */ | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < num_digests; i++) { | |
| switch (digest_nids[i]) { | |
| case NID_sha1: | |
| ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->num_sigalgs] = SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1; | |
| ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->num_sigalgs + 1] = SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1; | |
| ssl->cert->num_sigalgs += 2; | |
| break; | |
| case NID_sha256: | |
| ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->num_sigalgs] = SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256; | |
| ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->num_sigalgs + 1] = | |
| SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256; | |
| ssl->cert->num_sigalgs += 2; | |
| break; | |
| case NID_sha384: | |
| ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->num_sigalgs] = SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384; | |
| ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->num_sigalgs + 1] = | |
| SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384; | |
| ssl->cert->num_sigalgs += 2; | |
| break; | |
| case NID_sha512: | |
| ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->num_sigalgs] = SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512; | |
| ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->num_sigalgs + 1] = | |
| SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512; | |
| ssl->cert->num_sigalgs += 2; | |
| break; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int ssl_has_private_key(const SSL *ssl) { | |
| return ssl->cert->privatekey != NULL || ssl->cert->key_method != NULL; | |
| } | |
| int ssl_is_ecdsa_key_type(int type) { | |
| switch (type) { | |
| /* TODO(davidben): Remove support for |EVP_PKEY_EC| key types. */ | |
| case EVP_PKEY_EC: | |
| case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: | |
| case NID_secp384r1: | |
| case NID_secp521r1: | |
| return 1; | |
| default: | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| int ssl_private_key_type(SSL *ssl) { | |
| if (ssl->cert->key_method != NULL) { | |
| return ssl->cert->key_method->type(ssl); | |
| } | |
| switch (EVP_PKEY_id(ssl->cert->privatekey)) { | |
| case EVP_PKEY_RSA: | |
| return NID_rsaEncryption; | |
| case EVP_PKEY_EC: | |
| return EC_GROUP_get_curve_name( | |
| EC_KEY_get0_group(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ssl->cert->privatekey))); | |
| default: | |
| return NID_undef; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| size_t ssl_private_key_max_signature_len(SSL *ssl) { | |
| if (ssl->cert->key_method != NULL) { | |
| return ssl->cert->key_method->max_signature_len(ssl); | |
| } | |
| return EVP_PKEY_size(ssl->cert->privatekey); | |
| } | |
| /* TODO(davidben): Forbid RSA-PKCS1 in TLS 1.3. For now we allow it because NSS | |
| * has yet to start doing RSA-PSS, so enforcing it would complicate interop | |
| * testing. */ | |
| static int is_rsa_pkcs1(const EVP_MD **out_md, uint16_t sigalg) { | |
| switch (sigalg) { | |
| case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1: | |
| *out_md = EVP_md5_sha1(); | |
| return 1; | |
| case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1: | |
| *out_md = EVP_sha1(); | |
| return 1; | |
| case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256: | |
| *out_md = EVP_sha256(); | |
| return 1; | |
| case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384: | |
| *out_md = EVP_sha384(); | |
| return 1; | |
| case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512: | |
| *out_md = EVP_sha512(); | |
| return 1; | |
| default: | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| static int ssl_sign_rsa_pkcs1(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, | |
| size_t max_out, const EVP_MD *md, | |
| const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) { | |
| EVP_MD_CTX ctx; | |
| EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); | |
| *out_len = max_out; | |
| int ret = EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, ssl->cert->privatekey) && | |
| EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, in, in_len) && | |
| EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, out, out_len); | |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| static int ssl_verify_rsa_pkcs1(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *signature, | |
| size_t signature_len, const EVP_MD *md, | |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey, const uint8_t *in, | |
| size_t in_len) { | |
| if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; | |
| EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); | |
| int ret = EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&md_ctx, NULL, md, NULL, pkey) && | |
| EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, in, in_len) && | |
| EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&md_ctx, signature, signature_len); | |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| static int is_ecdsa(int *out_curve, const EVP_MD **out_md, uint16_t sigalg) { | |
| switch (sigalg) { | |
| case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1: | |
| *out_curve = NID_undef; | |
| *out_md = EVP_sha1(); | |
| return 1; | |
| case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256: | |
| *out_curve = NID_X9_62_prime256v1; | |
| *out_md = EVP_sha256(); | |
| return 1; | |
| case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384: | |
| *out_curve = NID_secp384r1; | |
| *out_md = EVP_sha384(); | |
| return 1; | |
| case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512: | |
| *out_curve = NID_secp521r1; | |
| *out_md = EVP_sha512(); | |
| return 1; | |
| default: | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| static int ssl_sign_ecdsa(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, | |
| size_t max_out, int curve, const EVP_MD *md, | |
| const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) { | |
| EC_KEY *ec_key = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ssl->cert->privatekey); | |
| if (ec_key == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* In TLS 1.3, the curve is also specified by the signature algorithm. */ | |
| if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION && | |
| (curve == NID_undef || | |
| EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key)) != curve)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| EVP_MD_CTX ctx; | |
| EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); | |
| *out_len = max_out; | |
| int ret = EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, ssl->cert->privatekey) && | |
| EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, in, in_len) && | |
| EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, out, out_len); | |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| static int ssl_verify_ecdsa(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *signature, | |
| size_t signature_len, int curve, const EVP_MD *md, | |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) { | |
| EC_KEY *ec_key = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey); | |
| if (ec_key == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* In TLS 1.3, the curve is also specified by the signature algorithm. */ | |
| if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION && | |
| (curve == NID_undef || | |
| EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key)) != curve)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; | |
| EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); | |
| int ret = EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&md_ctx, NULL, md, NULL, pkey) && | |
| EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, in, in_len) && | |
| EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&md_ctx, signature, signature_len); | |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| static int is_rsa_pss(const EVP_MD **out_md, uint16_t sigalg) { | |
| switch (sigalg) { | |
| case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA256: | |
| *out_md = EVP_sha256(); | |
| return 1; | |
| case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA384: | |
| *out_md = EVP_sha384(); | |
| return 1; | |
| case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA512: | |
| *out_md = EVP_sha512(); | |
| return 1; | |
| default: | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| static int ssl_sign_rsa_pss(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, | |
| size_t max_out, const EVP_MD *md, | |
| const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) { | |
| EVP_MD_CTX ctx; | |
| EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); | |
| *out_len = max_out; | |
| EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; | |
| int ret = | |
| EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, ssl->cert->privatekey) && | |
| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) && | |
| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1 /* salt len = hash len */) && | |
| EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, in, in_len) && | |
| EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, out, out_len); | |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| static int ssl_verify_rsa_pss(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *signature, | |
| size_t signature_len, const EVP_MD *md, | |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey, const uint8_t *in, | |
| size_t in_len) { | |
| if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; | |
| EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); | |
| EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; | |
| int ret = | |
| EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) && | |
| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) && | |
| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1 /* salt len = hash len */) && | |
| EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, in, in_len) && | |
| EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&md_ctx, signature, signature_len); | |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| enum ssl_private_key_result_t ssl_private_key_sign( | |
| SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_out, | |
| uint16_t signature_algorithm, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) { | |
| if (ssl->cert->key_method != NULL) { | |
| if (ssl->cert->key_method->sign != NULL) { | |
| return ssl->cert->key_method->sign(ssl, out, out_len, max_out, | |
| signature_algorithm, in, in_len); | |
| } | |
| /* TODO(davidben): Remove support for |sign_digest|-only | |
| * |SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD|s. */ | |
| const EVP_MD *md; | |
| int curve; | |
| if (!is_rsa_pkcs1(&md, signature_algorithm) && | |
| !is_ecdsa(&curve, &md, signature_algorithm)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL_FOR_CUSTOM_KEY); | |
| return ssl_private_key_failure; | |
| } | |
| uint8_t hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
| unsigned hash_len; | |
| if (!EVP_Digest(in, in_len, hash, &hash_len, md, NULL)) { | |
| return ssl_private_key_failure; | |
| } | |
| return ssl->cert->key_method->sign_digest(ssl, out, out_len, max_out, md, | |
| hash, hash_len); | |
| } | |
| const EVP_MD *md; | |
| if (is_rsa_pkcs1(&md, signature_algorithm) && | |
| ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
| return ssl_sign_rsa_pkcs1(ssl, out, out_len, max_out, md, in, in_len) | |
| ? ssl_private_key_success | |
| : ssl_private_key_failure; | |
| } | |
| int curve; | |
| if (is_ecdsa(&curve, &md, signature_algorithm)) { | |
| return ssl_sign_ecdsa(ssl, out, out_len, max_out, curve, md, in, in_len) | |
| ? ssl_private_key_success | |
| : ssl_private_key_failure; | |
| } | |
| if (is_rsa_pss(&md, signature_algorithm)) { | |
| return ssl_sign_rsa_pss(ssl, out, out_len, max_out, md, in, in_len) | |
| ? ssl_private_key_success | |
| : ssl_private_key_failure; | |
| } | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); | |
| return ssl_private_key_failure; | |
| } | |
| int ssl_public_key_verify(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *signature, | |
| size_t signature_len, uint16_t signature_algorithm, | |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) { | |
| const EVP_MD *md; | |
| if (is_rsa_pkcs1(&md, signature_algorithm) && | |
| ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
| return ssl_verify_rsa_pkcs1(ssl, signature, signature_len, md, pkey, in, | |
| in_len); | |
| } | |
| int curve; | |
| if (is_ecdsa(&curve, &md, signature_algorithm)) { | |
| return ssl_verify_ecdsa(ssl, signature, signature_len, curve, md, pkey, in, | |
| in_len); | |
| } | |
| if (is_rsa_pss(&md, signature_algorithm)) { | |
| return ssl_verify_rsa_pss(ssl, signature, signature_len, md, pkey, in, | |
| in_len); | |
| } | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| enum ssl_private_key_result_t ssl_private_key_decrypt( | |
| SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_out, | |
| const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) { | |
| if (ssl->cert->key_method != NULL) { | |
| return ssl->cert->key_method->decrypt(ssl, out, out_len, max_out, in, | |
| in_len); | |
| } | |
| RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ssl->cert->privatekey); | |
| if (rsa == NULL) { | |
| /* Decrypt operations are only supported for RSA keys. */ | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return ssl_private_key_failure; | |
| } | |
| /* Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part | |
| * of the timing-sensitive code by the caller. */ | |
| if (!RSA_decrypt(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len, RSA_NO_PADDING)) { | |
| return ssl_private_key_failure; | |
| } | |
| return ssl_private_key_success; | |
| } | |
| enum ssl_private_key_result_t ssl_private_key_complete(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, | |
| size_t *out_len, | |
| size_t max_out) { | |
| /* Only custom keys may be asynchronous. */ | |
| return ssl->cert->key_method->complete(ssl, out, out_len, max_out); | |
| } | |
| int ssl_private_key_supports_signature_algorithm(SSL *ssl, | |
| uint16_t signature_algorithm) { | |
| const EVP_MD *md; | |
| if (is_rsa_pkcs1(&md, signature_algorithm) && | |
| ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
| return ssl_private_key_type(ssl) == NID_rsaEncryption; | |
| } | |
| int curve; | |
| if (is_ecdsa(&curve, &md, signature_algorithm)) { | |
| int type = ssl_private_key_type(ssl); | |
| if (!ssl_is_ecdsa_key_type(type)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Prior to TLS 1.3, ECDSA curves did not match the signature algorithm. */ | |
| if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| return curve != NID_undef && type == curve; | |
| } | |
| if (is_rsa_pss(&md, signature_algorithm)) { | |
| if (ssl_private_key_type(ssl) != NID_rsaEncryption) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Ensure the RSA key is large enough for the hash. RSASSA-PSS requires that | |
| * emLen be at least hLen + sLen + 2. Both hLen and sLen are the size of the | |
| * hash in TLS. Reasonable RSA key sizes are large enough for the largest | |
| * defined RSASSA-PSS algorithm, but 1024-bit RSA is slightly too large for | |
| * SHA-512. 1024-bit RSA is sometimes used for test credentials, so check | |
| * the size to fall back to another algorithm. */ | |
| if (ssl_private_key_max_signature_len(ssl) < 2 * EVP_MD_size(md) + 2) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* RSA-PSS is only supported by message-based private keys. */ | |
| if (ssl->cert->key_method != NULL && ssl->cert->key_method->sign == NULL) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| return 0; | |
| } |