| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | |
| * All rights reserved. | |
| * | |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
| * | |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
| * | |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | |
| * the code are not to be removed. | |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
| * | |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
| * are met: | |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
| * | |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
| * | |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | |
| */ | |
| /* ==================================================================== | |
| * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. | |
| * | |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
| * are met: | |
| * | |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
| * | |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in | |
| * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the | |
| * distribution. | |
| * | |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this | |
| * software must display the following acknowledgment: | |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
| * | |
| * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to | |
| * endorse or promote products derived from this software without | |
| * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact | |
| * openssl-core@openssl.org. | |
| * | |
| * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" | |
| * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written | |
| * permission of the OpenSSL Project. | |
| * | |
| * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following | |
| * acknowledgment: | |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
| * | |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY | |
| * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR | |
| * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR | |
| * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, | |
| * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT | |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; | |
| * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, | |
| * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) | |
| * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED | |
| * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | |
| * ==================================================================== | |
| * | |
| * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young | |
| * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim | |
| * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
| * | |
| */ | |
| /* ==================================================================== | |
| * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. | |
| * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by | |
| * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ | |
| #include <openssl/ssl.h> | |
| #include <assert.h> | |
| #include <string.h> | |
| #include <openssl/bn.h> | |
| #include <openssl/buf.h> | |
| #include <openssl/ec_key.h> | |
| #include <openssl/dh.h> | |
| #include <openssl/err.h> | |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> | |
| #include <openssl/sha.h> | |
| #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
| #include <openssl/x509v3.h> | |
| #include "../crypto/internal.h" | |
| #include "internal.h" | |
| int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void) { | |
| /* The ex_data index to go from |X509_STORE_CTX| to |SSL| always uses the | |
| * reserved app_data slot. Before ex_data was introduced, app_data was used. | |
| * Avoid breaking any software which assumes |X509_STORE_CTX_get_app_data| | |
| * works. */ | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| CERT *ssl_cert_new(void) { | |
| CERT *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT)); | |
| if (ret == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT)); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) { | |
| CERT *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT)); | |
| if (ret == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT)); | |
| if (cert->x509 != NULL) { | |
| X509_up_ref(cert->x509); | |
| ret->x509 = cert->x509; | |
| } | |
| if (cert->privatekey != NULL) { | |
| EVP_PKEY_up_ref(cert->privatekey); | |
| ret->privatekey = cert->privatekey; | |
| } | |
| if (cert->chain) { | |
| ret->chain = X509_chain_up_ref(cert->chain); | |
| if (!ret->chain) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| ret->key_method = cert->key_method; | |
| ret->mask_k = cert->mask_k; | |
| ret->mask_a = cert->mask_a; | |
| if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL) { | |
| ret->dh_tmp = DHparams_dup(cert->dh_tmp); | |
| if (ret->dh_tmp == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_DH_LIB); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb; | |
| if (cert->sigalgs != NULL) { | |
| ret->sigalgs = | |
| BUF_memdup(cert->sigalgs, cert->num_sigalgs * sizeof(cert->sigalgs[0])); | |
| if (ret->sigalgs == NULL) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| ret->num_sigalgs = cert->num_sigalgs; | |
| ret->cert_cb = cert->cert_cb; | |
| ret->cert_cb_arg = cert->cert_cb_arg; | |
| if (cert->verify_store != NULL) { | |
| X509_STORE_up_ref(cert->verify_store); | |
| ret->verify_store = cert->verify_store; | |
| } | |
| return ret; | |
| err: | |
| ssl_cert_free(ret); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| /* Free up and clear all certificates and chains */ | |
| void ssl_cert_clear_certs(CERT *cert) { | |
| if (cert == NULL) { | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| X509_free(cert->x509); | |
| cert->x509 = NULL; | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(cert->privatekey); | |
| cert->privatekey = NULL; | |
| sk_X509_pop_free(cert->chain, X509_free); | |
| cert->chain = NULL; | |
| cert->key_method = NULL; | |
| } | |
| void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c) { | |
| if (c == NULL) { | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| DH_free(c->dh_tmp); | |
| ssl_cert_clear_certs(c); | |
| OPENSSL_free(c->sigalgs); | |
| X509_STORE_free(c->verify_store); | |
| OPENSSL_free(c); | |
| } | |
| int ssl_cert_set0_chain(CERT *cert, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { | |
| sk_X509_pop_free(cert->chain, X509_free); | |
| cert->chain = chain; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int ssl_cert_set1_chain(CERT *cert, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { | |
| STACK_OF(X509) *dchain; | |
| if (chain == NULL) { | |
| return ssl_cert_set0_chain(cert, NULL); | |
| } | |
| dchain = X509_chain_up_ref(chain); | |
| if (dchain == NULL) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (!ssl_cert_set0_chain(cert, dchain)) { | |
| sk_X509_pop_free(dchain, X509_free); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(CERT *cert, X509 *x509) { | |
| if (cert->chain == NULL) { | |
| cert->chain = sk_X509_new_null(); | |
| } | |
| if (cert->chain == NULL || !sk_X509_push(cert->chain, x509)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(CERT *cert, X509 *x509) { | |
| if (!ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(cert, x509)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| X509_up_ref(x509); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| void ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(CERT *c, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) { | |
| c->cert_cb = cb; | |
| c->cert_cb_arg = arg; | |
| } | |
| int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *ssl, long *out_verify_result, | |
| STACK_OF(X509) *cert_chain) { | |
| if (cert_chain == NULL || sk_X509_num(cert_chain) == 0) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| X509_STORE *verify_store = ssl->ctx->cert_store; | |
| if (ssl->cert->verify_store != NULL) { | |
| verify_store = ssl->cert->verify_store; | |
| } | |
| X509 *leaf = sk_X509_value(cert_chain, 0); | |
| int ret = 0; | |
| X509_STORE_CTX ctx; | |
| if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, verify_store, leaf, cert_chain)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (!X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), | |
| ssl)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* We need to inherit the verify parameters. These can be determined by the | |
| * context: if its a server it will verify SSL client certificates or vice | |
| * versa. */ | |
| X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&ctx, ssl->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server"); | |
| /* Anything non-default in "param" should overwrite anything in the ctx. */ | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx), ssl->param); | |
| if (ssl->verify_callback) { | |
| X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, ssl->verify_callback); | |
| } | |
| int verify_ret; | |
| if (ssl->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL) { | |
| verify_ret = ssl->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, ssl->ctx->app_verify_arg); | |
| } else { | |
| verify_ret = X509_verify_cert(&ctx); | |
| } | |
| *out_verify_result = ctx.error; | |
| /* If |SSL_VERIFY_NONE|, the error is non-fatal, but we keep the result. */ | |
| if (verify_ret <= 0 && ssl->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) { | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, ssl_verify_alarm_type(ctx.error)); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| ERR_clear_error(); | |
| ret = 1; | |
| err: | |
| X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list, | |
| STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) { | |
| sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list, X509_NAME_free); | |
| *ca_list = name_list; | |
| } | |
| STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *list) { | |
| STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null(); | |
| if (ret == NULL) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(list); i++) { | |
| X509_NAME *name = X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(list, i)); | |
| if (name == NULL || !sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, name)) { | |
| X509_NAME_free(name); | |
| sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) { | |
| set_client_CA_list(&ssl->client_CA, name_list); | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) { | |
| set_client_CA_list(&ctx->client_CA, name_list); | |
| } | |
| STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { | |
| return ctx->client_CA; | |
| } | |
| STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *ssl) { | |
| /* For historical reasons, this function is used both to query configuration | |
| * state on a server as well as handshake state on a client. However, whether | |
| * |ssl| is a client or server is not known until explicitly configured with | |
| * |SSL_set_connect_state|. If |handshake_func| is NULL, |ssl| is in an | |
| * indeterminate mode and |ssl->server| is unset. */ | |
| if (ssl->handshake_func != NULL && !ssl->server) { | |
| if (ssl->s3->hs != NULL) { | |
| return ssl->s3->hs->ca_names; | |
| } | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl->client_CA != NULL) { | |
| return ssl->client_CA; | |
| } | |
| return ssl->ctx->client_CA; | |
| } | |
| static int add_client_CA(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **sk, X509 *x509) { | |
| X509_NAME *name; | |
| if (x509 == NULL) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (*sk == NULL) { | |
| *sk = sk_X509_NAME_new_null(); | |
| if (*sk == NULL) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| name = X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(x509)); | |
| if (name == NULL) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(*sk, name)) { | |
| X509_NAME_free(name); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl, X509 *x509) { | |
| return add_client_CA(&ssl->client_CA, x509); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509) { | |
| return add_client_CA(&ctx->client_CA, x509); | |
| } | |
| int ssl_has_certificate(const SSL *ssl) { | |
| return ssl->cert->x509 != NULL && ssl_has_private_key(ssl); | |
| } | |
| STACK_OF(X509) *ssl_parse_cert_chain(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, | |
| uint8_t *out_leaf_sha256, CBS *cbs) { | |
| STACK_OF(X509) *ret = sk_X509_new_null(); | |
| if (ret == NULL) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| X509 *x = NULL; | |
| CBS certificate_list; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(cbs, &certificate_list)) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| while (CBS_len(&certificate_list) > 0) { | |
| CBS certificate; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &certificate)) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* Retain the hash of the leaf certificate if requested. */ | |
| if (sk_X509_num(ret) == 0 && out_leaf_sha256 != NULL) { | |
| SHA256(CBS_data(&certificate), CBS_len(&certificate), out_leaf_sha256); | |
| } | |
| /* A u24 length cannot overflow a long. */ | |
| const uint8_t *data = CBS_data(&certificate); | |
| x = d2i_X509(NULL, &data, (long)CBS_len(&certificate)); | |
| if (x == NULL || data != CBS_data(&certificate) + CBS_len(&certificate)) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (!sk_X509_push(ret, x)) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| x = NULL; | |
| } | |
| return ret; | |
| err: | |
| X509_free(x); | |
| sk_X509_pop_free(ret, X509_free); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| int ssl_add_cert_to_cbb(CBB *cbb, X509 *x509) { | |
| int len = i2d_X509(x509, NULL); | |
| if (len < 0) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| uint8_t *buf; | |
| if (!CBB_add_space(cbb, &buf, len)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (buf != NULL && i2d_X509(x509, &buf) < 0) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int ssl_add_cert_with_length(CBB *cbb, X509 *x509) { | |
| CBB child; | |
| return CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(cbb, &child) && | |
| ssl_add_cert_to_cbb(&child, x509) && | |
| CBB_flush(cbb); | |
| } | |
| int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb) { | |
| if (!ssl_has_certificate(ssl)) { | |
| return CBB_add_u24(cbb, 0); | |
| } | |
| CERT *cert = ssl->cert; | |
| X509 *x = cert->x509; | |
| CBB child; | |
| if (!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(cbb, &child)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int no_chain = 0; | |
| STACK_OF(X509) *chain = cert->chain; | |
| if ((ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || chain != NULL) { | |
| no_chain = 1; | |
| } | |
| if (no_chain) { | |
| if (!ssl_add_cert_with_length(&child, x)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { | |
| x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); | |
| if (!ssl_add_cert_with_length(&child, x)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } else { | |
| X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx; | |
| if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx, ssl->ctx->cert_store, x, NULL)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx); | |
| /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ | |
| ERR_clear_error(); | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++) { | |
| x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i); | |
| if (!ssl_add_cert_with_length(&child, x)) { | |
| X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx); | |
| } | |
| return CBB_flush(cbb); | |
| } | |
| static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME **a, const X509_NAME **b) { | |
| return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b); | |
| } | |
| STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * | |
| ssl_parse_client_CA_list(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *cbs) { | |
| STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp); | |
| X509_NAME *name = NULL; | |
| if (ret == NULL) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| CBS child; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &child)) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| while (CBS_len(&child) > 0) { | |
| CBS distinguished_name; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&child, &distinguished_name)) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| const uint8_t *ptr = CBS_data(&distinguished_name); | |
| /* A u16 length cannot overflow a long. */ | |
| name = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &ptr, (long)CBS_len(&distinguished_name)); | |
| if (name == NULL || | |
| ptr != CBS_data(&distinguished_name) + CBS_len(&distinguished_name)) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, name)) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| name = NULL; | |
| } | |
| return ret; | |
| err: | |
| X509_NAME_free(name); | |
| sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| int ssl_add_client_CA_list(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb) { | |
| CBB child, name_cbb; | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &child)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(ssl); | |
| if (sk == NULL) { | |
| return CBB_flush(cbb); | |
| } | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { | |
| X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); | |
| int len = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL); | |
| if (len < 0) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| uint8_t *ptr; | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&child, &name_cbb) || | |
| !CBB_add_space(&name_cbb, &ptr, (size_t)len) || | |
| (len > 0 && i2d_X509_NAME(name, &ptr) < 0)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return CBB_flush(cbb); | |
| } | |
| int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *ssl, int *out_should_retry) { | |
| if (ssl_has_certificate(ssl) || ssl->ctx->client_cert_cb == NULL) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| X509 *x509 = NULL; | |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
| int ret = ssl->ctx->client_cert_cb(ssl, &x509, &pkey); | |
| if (ret < 0) { | |
| *out_should_retry = 1; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (ret != 0) { | |
| if (!SSL_use_certificate(ssl, x509) || | |
| !SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, pkey)) { | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| *out_should_retry = 0; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| X509_free(x509); | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int set_cert_store(X509_STORE **store_ptr, X509_STORE *new_store, int take_ref) { | |
| X509_STORE_free(*store_ptr); | |
| *store_ptr = new_store; | |
| if (new_store != NULL && take_ref) { | |
| X509_STORE_up_ref(new_store); | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set0_verify_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store) { | |
| return set_cert_store(&ctx->cert->verify_store, store, 0); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set1_verify_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store) { | |
| return set_cert_store(&ctx->cert->verify_store, store, 1); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set0_verify_cert_store(SSL *ssl, X509_STORE *store) { | |
| return set_cert_store(&ssl->cert->verify_store, store, 0); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set1_verify_cert_store(SSL *ssl, X509_STORE *store) { | |
| return set_cert_store(&ssl->cert->verify_store, store, 1); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set0_chain(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { | |
| return ssl_cert_set0_chain(ctx->cert, chain); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set1_chain(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { | |
| return ssl_cert_set1_chain(ctx->cert, chain); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set0_chain(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { | |
| return ssl_cert_set0_chain(ssl->cert, chain); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set1_chain(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { | |
| return ssl_cert_set1_chain(ssl->cert, chain); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_add0_chain_cert(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509) { | |
| return ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(ctx->cert, x509); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509) { | |
| return ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(ctx->cert, x509); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509) { | |
| return SSL_CTX_add0_chain_cert(ctx, x509); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_add0_chain_cert(SSL *ssl, X509 *x509) { | |
| return ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(ssl->cert, x509); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_add1_chain_cert(SSL *ssl, X509 *x509) { | |
| return ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(ssl->cert, x509); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_clear_chain_certs(SSL_CTX *ctx) { | |
| return SSL_CTX_set0_chain(ctx, NULL); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs(SSL_CTX *ctx) { | |
| return SSL_CTX_clear_chain_certs(ctx); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_clear_chain_certs(SSL *ssl) { | |
| return SSL_set0_chain(ssl, NULL); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_get0_chain_certs(const SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) **out_chain) { | |
| *out_chain = ctx->cert->chain; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs(const SSL_CTX *ctx, | |
| STACK_OF(X509) **out_chain) { | |
| return SSL_CTX_get0_chain_certs(ctx, out_chain); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get0_chain_certs(const SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) **out_chain) { | |
| *out_chain = ssl->cert->chain; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int ssl_check_leaf_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509 *leaf) { | |
| assert(ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION); | |
| int ret = 0; | |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(leaf); | |
| if (pkey == NULL) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* Check the certificate's type matches the cipher. */ | |
| const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher; | |
| int expected_type = ssl_cipher_get_key_type(cipher); | |
| assert(expected_type != EVP_PKEY_NONE); | |
| if (pkey->type != expected_type) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA) { | |
| /* TODO(davidben): This behavior is preserved from upstream. Should key | |
| * usages be checked in other cases as well? */ | |
| /* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */ | |
| X509_check_purpose(leaf, -1, 0); | |
| if ((leaf->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && | |
| !(leaf->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| EC_KEY *ec_key = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey); | |
| if (ec_key == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* Check the key's group and point format are acceptable. */ | |
| uint16_t group_id; | |
| if (!ssl_nid_to_group_id( | |
| &group_id, EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key))) || | |
| !tls1_check_group_id(ssl, group_id) || | |
| EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec_key) != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| ret = 1; | |
| err: | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
| return ret; | |
| } |