| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | |
| * All rights reserved. | |
| * | |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
| * | |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
| * | |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | |
| * the code are not to be removed. | |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
| * | |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
| * are met: | |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
| * | |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
| * | |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | |
| */ | |
| /* ==================================================================== | |
| * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. | |
| * | |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
| * are met: | |
| * | |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
| * | |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in | |
| * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the | |
| * distribution. | |
| * | |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this | |
| * software must display the following acknowledgment: | |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
| * | |
| * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to | |
| * endorse or promote products derived from this software without | |
| * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact | |
| * openssl-core@openssl.org. | |
| * | |
| * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" | |
| * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written | |
| * permission of the OpenSSL Project. | |
| * | |
| * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following | |
| * acknowledgment: | |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
| * | |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY | |
| * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR | |
| * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR | |
| * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, | |
| * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT | |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; | |
| * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, | |
| * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) | |
| * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED | |
| * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | |
| * ==================================================================== | |
| * | |
| * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young | |
| * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim | |
| * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */ | |
| /* ==================================================================== | |
| * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. | |
| * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by | |
| * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ | |
| #include <openssl/ssl.h> | |
| #include <assert.h> | |
| #include <limits.h> | |
| #include <string.h> | |
| #include <openssl/buf.h> | |
| #include <openssl/bytestring.h> | |
| #include <openssl/err.h> | |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> | |
| #include <openssl/md5.h> | |
| #include <openssl/nid.h> | |
| #include <openssl/rand.h> | |
| #include <openssl/sha.h> | |
| #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
| #include "internal.h" | |
| SSL_HANDSHAKE *ssl_handshake_new(enum ssl_hs_wait_t (*do_handshake)(SSL *ssl)) { | |
| SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_HANDSHAKE)); | |
| if (hs == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| memset(hs, 0, sizeof(SSL_HANDSHAKE)); | |
| hs->do_handshake = do_handshake; | |
| hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok; | |
| return hs; | |
| } | |
| void ssl_handshake_free(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { | |
| if (hs == NULL) { | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(hs->secret, sizeof(hs->secret)); | |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(hs->client_traffic_secret_0, | |
| sizeof(hs->client_traffic_secret_0)); | |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(hs->server_traffic_secret_0, | |
| sizeof(hs->server_traffic_secret_0)); | |
| SSL_ECDH_CTX_cleanup(&hs->ecdh_ctx); | |
| OPENSSL_free(hs->cookie); | |
| OPENSSL_free(hs->key_share_bytes); | |
| OPENSSL_free(hs->public_key); | |
| OPENSSL_free(hs->peer_sigalgs); | |
| OPENSSL_free(hs->peer_supported_group_list); | |
| OPENSSL_free(hs->peer_key); | |
| OPENSSL_free(hs->server_params); | |
| OPENSSL_free(hs->peer_psk_identity_hint); | |
| sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(hs->ca_names, X509_NAME_free); | |
| OPENSSL_free(hs->certificate_types); | |
| OPENSSL_free(hs); | |
| } | |
| /* ssl3_do_write sends |ssl->init_buf| in records of type 'type' | |
| * (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC). It returns 1 on success | |
| * and <= 0 on error. */ | |
| static int ssl3_do_write(SSL *ssl, int type, const uint8_t *data, size_t len) { | |
| int ret = ssl3_write_bytes(ssl, type, data, len); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| /* ssl3_write_bytes writes the data in its entirety. */ | |
| assert((size_t)ret == len); | |
| ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, type, data, len); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int ssl3_init_message(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb, CBB *body, uint8_t type) { | |
| CBB_zero(cbb); | |
| if (ssl->s3->pending_message != NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Pick a modest size hint to save most of the |realloc| calls. */ | |
| if (!CBB_init(cbb, 64) || | |
| !CBB_add_u8(cbb, type) || | |
| !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(cbb, body)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int ssl3_finish_message(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb) { | |
| if (ssl->s3->pending_message != NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| uint8_t *msg = NULL; | |
| size_t len; | |
| if (!CBB_finish(cbb, &msg, &len) || | |
| len > 0xffffffffu) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| OPENSSL_free(msg); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ssl3_update_handshake_hash(ssl, msg, len); | |
| ssl->s3->pending_message = msg; | |
| ssl->s3->pending_message_len = (uint32_t)len; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int ssl3_write_message(SSL *ssl) { | |
| if (ssl->s3->pending_message == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int ret = ssl3_do_write(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, ssl->s3->pending_message, | |
| ssl->s3->pending_message_len); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->pending_message); | |
| ssl->s3->pending_message = NULL; | |
| ssl->s3->pending_message_len = 0; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *ssl, int a, int b) { | |
| if (ssl->state == b) { | |
| return ssl->method->write_message(ssl); | |
| } | |
| uint8_t finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
| size_t finished_len = | |
| ssl->s3->enc_method->final_finish_mac(ssl, ssl->server, finished); | |
| if (finished_len == 0) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. */ | |
| if (!ssl_log_secret(ssl, "CLIENT_RANDOM", | |
| SSL_get_session(ssl)->master_key, | |
| SSL_get_session(ssl)->master_key_length)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Copy the Finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks. */ | |
| if (ssl->version != SSL3_VERSION) { | |
| if (finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished) || | |
| finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl->server) { | |
| memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished, finished, finished_len); | |
| ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finished_len; | |
| } else { | |
| memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, finished, finished_len); | |
| ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finished_len; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| CBB cbb, body; | |
| if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, SSL3_MT_FINISHED) || | |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&body, finished, finished_len) || | |
| !ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, &cbb)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| CBB_cleanup(&cbb); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| ssl->state = b; | |
| return ssl->method->write_message(ssl); | |
| } | |
| int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *ssl) { | |
| int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, | |
| ssl_dont_hash_message); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| /* Snapshot the finished hash before incorporating the new message. */ | |
| uint8_t finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
| size_t finished_len = | |
| ssl->s3->enc_method->final_finish_mac(ssl, !ssl->server, finished); | |
| if (finished_len == 0 || | |
| !ssl->method->hash_current_message(ssl)) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| int finished_ok = ssl->init_num == finished_len && | |
| CRYPTO_memcmp(ssl->init_msg, finished, finished_len) == 0; | |
| #if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE) | |
| finished_ok = 1; | |
| #endif | |
| if (!finished_ok) { | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| /* Copy the Finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks. */ | |
| if (ssl->version != SSL3_VERSION) { | |
| if (finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished) || | |
| finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl->server) { | |
| memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, finished, finished_len); | |
| ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finished_len; | |
| } else { | |
| memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished, finished, finished_len); | |
| ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finished_len; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl) { | |
| static const uint8_t kChangeCipherSpec[1] = {SSL3_MT_CCS}; | |
| return ssl3_do_write(ssl, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, kChangeCipherSpec, | |
| sizeof(kChangeCipherSpec)); | |
| } | |
| int ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *ssl) { | |
| CBB cbb, body; | |
| if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) || | |
| !ssl_add_cert_chain(ssl, &body) || | |
| !ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, &cbb)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| CBB_cleanup(&cbb); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| size_t ssl_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *ssl) { | |
| /* kMaxMessageLen is the default maximum message size for handshakes which do | |
| * not accept peer certificate chains. */ | |
| static const size_t kMaxMessageLen = 16384; | |
| if (SSL_in_init(ssl)) { | |
| if ((!ssl->server || (ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) && | |
| kMaxMessageLen < ssl->max_cert_list) { | |
| return ssl->max_cert_list; | |
| } | |
| return kMaxMessageLen; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
| /* In TLS 1.2 and below, the largest acceptable post-handshake message is | |
| * a HelloRequest. */ | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl->server) { | |
| /* The largest acceptable post-handshake message for a server is a | |
| * KeyUpdate. We will never initiate post-handshake auth. */ | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Clients must accept NewSessionTicket and CertificateRequest, so allow the | |
| * default size. */ | |
| return kMaxMessageLen; | |
| } | |
| static int extend_handshake_buffer(SSL *ssl, size_t length) { | |
| if (!BUF_MEM_reserve(ssl->init_buf, length)) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| while (ssl->init_buf->length < length) { | |
| int ret = ssl3_read_handshake_bytes( | |
| ssl, (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data + ssl->init_buf->length, | |
| length - ssl->init_buf->length); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| ssl->init_buf->length += (size_t)ret; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int read_v2_client_hello(SSL *ssl, int *out_is_v2_client_hello) { | |
| /* Read the first 5 bytes, the size of the TLS record header. This is | |
| * sufficient to detect a V2ClientHello and ensures that we never read beyond | |
| * the first record. */ | |
| int ret = ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(ssl, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| const uint8_t *p = ssl_read_buffer(ssl); | |
| /* Some dedicated error codes for protocol mixups should the application wish | |
| * to interpret them differently. (These do not overlap with ClientHello or | |
| * V2ClientHello.) */ | |
| if (strncmp("GET ", (const char *)p, 4) == 0 || | |
| strncmp("POST ", (const char *)p, 5) == 0 || | |
| strncmp("HEAD ", (const char *)p, 5) == 0 || | |
| strncmp("PUT ", (const char *)p, 4) == 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| if (strncmp("CONNE", (const char *)p, 5) == 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| if ((p[0] & 0x80) == 0 || p[2] != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO || | |
| p[3] != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { | |
| /* Not a V2ClientHello. */ | |
| *out_is_v2_client_hello = 0; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* Determine the length of the V2ClientHello. */ | |
| size_t msg_length = ((p[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | p[1]; | |
| if (msg_length > (1024 * 4)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| if (msg_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - 2) { | |
| /* Reject lengths that are too short early. We have already read | |
| * |SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH| bytes, so we should not attempt to process an | |
| * (invalid) V2ClientHello which would be shorter than that. */ | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| /* Read the remainder of the V2ClientHello. */ | |
| ret = ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(ssl, 2 + msg_length); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| CBS v2_client_hello; | |
| CBS_init(&v2_client_hello, ssl_read_buffer(ssl) + 2, msg_length); | |
| /* The V2ClientHello without the length is incorporated into the handshake | |
| * hash. */ | |
| if (!ssl3_update_handshake_hash(ssl, CBS_data(&v2_client_hello), | |
| CBS_len(&v2_client_hello))) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, 0 /* V2ClientHello */, | |
| CBS_data(&v2_client_hello), CBS_len(&v2_client_hello)); | |
| uint8_t msg_type; | |
| uint16_t version, cipher_spec_length, session_id_length, challenge_length; | |
| CBS cipher_specs, session_id, challenge; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u8(&v2_client_hello, &msg_type) || | |
| !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &version) || | |
| !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &cipher_spec_length) || | |
| !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &session_id_length) || | |
| !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &challenge_length) || | |
| !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &cipher_specs, cipher_spec_length) || | |
| !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &session_id, session_id_length) || | |
| !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &challenge, challenge_length) || | |
| CBS_len(&v2_client_hello) != 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| /* msg_type has already been checked. */ | |
| assert(msg_type == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO); | |
| /* The client_random is the V2ClientHello challenge. Truncate or | |
| * left-pad with zeros as needed. */ | |
| size_t rand_len = CBS_len(&challenge); | |
| if (rand_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) { | |
| rand_len = SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; | |
| } | |
| uint8_t random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE]; | |
| memset(random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
| memcpy(random + (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - rand_len), CBS_data(&challenge), | |
| rand_len); | |
| /* Write out an equivalent SSLv3 ClientHello. */ | |
| size_t max_v3_client_hello = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2 /* version */ + | |
| SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 /* session ID length */ + | |
| 2 /* cipher list length */ + | |
| CBS_len(&cipher_specs) / 3 * 2 + | |
| 1 /* compression length */ + 1 /* compression */; | |
| CBB client_hello, hello_body, cipher_suites; | |
| CBB_zero(&client_hello); | |
| if (!BUF_MEM_reserve(ssl->init_buf, max_v3_client_hello) || | |
| !CBB_init_fixed(&client_hello, (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data, | |
| ssl->init_buf->max) || | |
| !CBB_add_u8(&client_hello, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) || | |
| !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &hello_body) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16(&hello_body, version) || | |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&hello_body, random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || | |
| /* No session id. */ | |
| !CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&hello_body, &cipher_suites)) { | |
| CBB_cleanup(&client_hello); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| /* Copy the cipher suites. */ | |
| while (CBS_len(&cipher_specs) > 0) { | |
| uint32_t cipher_spec; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u24(&cipher_specs, &cipher_spec)) { | |
| CBB_cleanup(&client_hello); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| /* Skip SSLv2 ciphers. */ | |
| if ((cipher_spec & 0xff0000) != 0) { | |
| continue; | |
| } | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(&cipher_suites, cipher_spec)) { | |
| CBB_cleanup(&client_hello); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* Add the null compression scheme and finish. */ | |
| if (!CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 1) || !CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) || | |
| !CBB_finish(&client_hello, NULL, &ssl->init_buf->length)) { | |
| CBB_cleanup(&client_hello); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| /* Consume and discard the V2ClientHello. */ | |
| ssl_read_buffer_consume(ssl, 2 + msg_length); | |
| ssl_read_buffer_discard(ssl); | |
| *out_is_v2_client_hello = 1; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int ssl3_get_message(SSL *ssl, int msg_type, | |
| enum ssl_hash_message_t hash_message) { | |
| again: | |
| /* Re-create the handshake buffer if needed. */ | |
| if (ssl->init_buf == NULL) { | |
| ssl->init_buf = BUF_MEM_new(); | |
| if (ssl->init_buf == NULL) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (ssl->server && !ssl->s3->v2_hello_done) { | |
| /* Bypass the record layer for the first message to handle V2ClientHello. */ | |
| assert(hash_message == ssl_hash_message); | |
| int is_v2_client_hello = 0; | |
| int ret = read_v2_client_hello(ssl, &is_v2_client_hello); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| if (is_v2_client_hello) { | |
| /* V2ClientHello is hashed separately. */ | |
| hash_message = ssl_dont_hash_message; | |
| } | |
| ssl->s3->v2_hello_done = 1; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message) { | |
| /* A ssl_dont_hash_message call cannot be combined with reuse_message; the | |
| * ssl_dont_hash_message would have to have been applied to the previous | |
| * call. */ | |
| assert(hash_message == ssl_hash_message); | |
| assert(ssl->init_msg != NULL); | |
| ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 0; | |
| hash_message = ssl_dont_hash_message; | |
| } else { | |
| ssl3_release_current_message(ssl, 0 /* don't free buffer */); | |
| } | |
| /* Read the message header, if we haven't yet. */ | |
| int ret = extend_handshake_buffer(ssl, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| /* Parse out the length. Cap it so the peer cannot force us to buffer up to | |
| * 2^24 bytes. */ | |
| const uint8_t *p = (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data; | |
| size_t msg_len = (((uint32_t)p[1]) << 16) | (((uint32_t)p[2]) << 8) | p[3]; | |
| if (msg_len > ssl_max_handshake_message_len(ssl)) { | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| /* Read the message body, if we haven't yet. */ | |
| ret = extend_handshake_buffer(ssl, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + msg_len); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| /* We have now received a complete message. */ | |
| ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, ssl->init_buf->data, | |
| ssl->init_buf->length); | |
| ssl->s3->tmp.message_type = ((const uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data)[0]; | |
| ssl->init_msg = (uint8_t*)ssl->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
| ssl->init_num = ssl->init_buf->length - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
| /* Ignore stray HelloRequest messages in the handshake before TLS 1.3. Per RFC | |
| * 5246, section 7.4.1.1, the server may send HelloRequest at any time. */ | |
| if (!ssl->server && SSL_in_init(ssl) && | |
| (!ssl->s3->have_version || ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) && | |
| ssl->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST && | |
| ssl->init_num == 0) { | |
| goto again; | |
| } | |
| if (msg_type >= 0 && ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != msg_type) { | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ | |
| if (hash_message == ssl_hash_message && !ssl3_hash_current_message(ssl)) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int ssl3_hash_current_message(SSL *ssl) { | |
| return ssl3_update_handshake_hash(ssl, (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data, | |
| ssl->init_buf->length); | |
| } | |
| void ssl3_release_current_message(SSL *ssl, int free_buffer) { | |
| if (ssl->init_msg != NULL) { | |
| /* |init_buf| never contains data beyond the current message. */ | |
| assert(SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + ssl->init_num == ssl->init_buf->length); | |
| /* Clear the current message. */ | |
| ssl->init_msg = NULL; | |
| ssl->init_num = 0; | |
| ssl->init_buf->length = 0; | |
| } | |
| if (free_buffer) { | |
| BUF_MEM_free(ssl->init_buf); | |
| ssl->init_buf = NULL; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) { | |
| int al; | |
| switch (type) { | |
| case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: | |
| case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL: | |
| case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER: | |
| al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; | |
| break; | |
| case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: | |
| case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: | |
| case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: | |
| case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: | |
| case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: | |
| case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: | |
| case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: | |
| case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: | |
| case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: | |
| case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: | |
| case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: | |
| case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH: | |
| case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH: | |
| case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH: | |
| al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; | |
| break; | |
| case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: | |
| case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: | |
| al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
| break; | |
| case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: | |
| case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: | |
| al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED; | |
| break; | |
| case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: | |
| al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED; | |
| break; | |
| case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED: | |
| case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: | |
| case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL: | |
| case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP: | |
| al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
| break; | |
| case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: | |
| case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: | |
| case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: | |
| case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: | |
| case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: | |
| case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: | |
| case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: | |
| al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; | |
| break; | |
| case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: | |
| al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
| break; | |
| case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: | |
| al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; | |
| break; | |
| default: | |
| al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN; | |
| break; | |
| } | |
| return al; | |
| } |