crypto/cipher_extra/aead_test.cc

/* Copyright (c) 2014, Google Inc.
 *
 * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
 * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
 * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
 *
 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
 * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
 * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
 * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
 * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
 * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
 * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */

#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>

#include <vector>

#include <gtest/gtest.h>

#include <openssl/aead.h>
#include <openssl/cipher.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>

#include "../fipsmodule/cipher/internal.h"
#include "internal.h"
#include "../internal.h"
#include "../test/abi_test.h"
#include "../test/file_test.h"
#include "../test/test_util.h"
#include "../test/wycheproof_util.h"

// kLimitedImplementation indicates that tests that assume a generic AEAD
// interface should not be performed. For example, the key-wrap AEADs only
// handle inputs that are a multiple of eight bytes in length and the TLS CBC
// AEADs have the concept of “direction”.
constexpr uint32_t kLimitedImplementation = 1 << 0;
// kCanTruncateTags indicates that the AEAD supports truncatating tags to
// arbitrary lengths.
constexpr uint32_t kCanTruncateTags = 1 << 1;
// kVariableNonce indicates that the AEAD supports a variable-length nonce.
constexpr uint32_t kVariableNonce = 1 << 2;
// kNondeterministic indicates that the AEAD performs randomised encryption thus
// one cannot assume that encrypting the same data will result in the same
// ciphertext.
constexpr uint32_t kNondeterministic = 1 << 7;

// RequiresADLength encodes an AD length requirement into flags.
constexpr uint32_t RequiresADLength(size_t length) {
  // If we had a more recent C++ version we could assert that the length is
  // sufficiently small with:
  //
  // if (length >= 16) {
  //  __builtin_unreachable();
  // }
  return (length & 0xf) << 3;
}

// RequiredADLength returns the AD length requirement encoded in |flags|, or
// zero if there isn't one.
constexpr size_t RequiredADLength(uint32_t flags) {
  return (flags >> 3) & 0xf;
}

constexpr uint32_t RequiresMinimumTagLength(size_t length) {
  // See above for statically checking the size at compile time with future C++
  // versions.
  return (length & 0xf) << 8;
}

constexpr size_t MinimumTagLength(uint32_t flags) {
  return ((flags >> 8) & 0xf) == 0 ? 1 : ((flags >> 8) & 0xf);
}

struct KnownAEAD {
  const char name[40];
  const EVP_AEAD *(*func)(void);
  const char *test_vectors;
  uint32_t flags;
};

static const struct KnownAEAD kAEADs[] = {
    {"AES_128_GCM", EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm, "aes_128_gcm_tests.txt",
     kCanTruncateTags | kVariableNonce},

    {"AES_128_GCM_NIST", EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm, "nist_cavp/aes_128_gcm.txt",
     kCanTruncateTags | kVariableNonce},

    {"AES_192_GCM", EVP_aead_aes_192_gcm, "aes_192_gcm_tests.txt",
     kCanTruncateTags | kVariableNonce},

    {"AES_256_GCM", EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm, "aes_256_gcm_tests.txt",
     kCanTruncateTags | kVariableNonce},

    {"AES_256_GCM_NIST", EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm, "nist_cavp/aes_256_gcm.txt",
     kCanTruncateTags | kVariableNonce},

    {"AES_128_GCM_SIV", EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm_siv, "aes_128_gcm_siv_tests.txt",
     0},

    {"AES_256_GCM_SIV", EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm_siv, "aes_256_gcm_siv_tests.txt",
     0},

    {"AES_128_GCM_RandomNonce", EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm_randnonce,
     "aes_128_gcm_randnonce_tests.txt",
     kNondeterministic | kCanTruncateTags | RequiresMinimumTagLength(13)},

    {"AES_256_GCM_RandomNonce", EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm_randnonce,
     "aes_256_gcm_randnonce_tests.txt",
     kNondeterministic | kCanTruncateTags | RequiresMinimumTagLength(13)},

    {"ChaCha20Poly1305", EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305,
     "chacha20_poly1305_tests.txt", kCanTruncateTags},

    {"XChaCha20Poly1305", EVP_aead_xchacha20_poly1305,
     "xchacha20_poly1305_tests.txt", kCanTruncateTags},

    {"AES_128_CBC_SHA1_TLS", EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls,
     "aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_tests.txt",
     kLimitedImplementation | RequiresADLength(11)},

    {"AES_128_CBC_SHA1_TLSImplicitIV",
     EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv,
     "aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv_tests.txt",
     kLimitedImplementation | RequiresADLength(11)},

    {"AES_128_CBC_SHA256_TLS", EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha256_tls,
     "aes_128_cbc_sha256_tls_tests.txt",
     kLimitedImplementation | RequiresADLength(11)},

    {"AES_256_CBC_SHA1_TLS", EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls,
     "aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_tests.txt",
     kLimitedImplementation | RequiresADLength(11)},

    {"AES_256_CBC_SHA1_TLSImplicitIV",
     EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv,
     "aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv_tests.txt",
     kLimitedImplementation | RequiresADLength(11)},

    {"AES_256_CBC_SHA256_TLS", EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha256_tls,
     "aes_256_cbc_sha256_tls_tests.txt",
     kLimitedImplementation | RequiresADLength(11)},

    {"AES_256_CBC_SHA384_TLS", EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha384_tls,
     "aes_256_cbc_sha384_tls_tests.txt",
     kLimitedImplementation | RequiresADLength(11)},

    {"DES_EDE3_CBC_SHA1_TLS", EVP_aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls,
     "des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_tests.txt",
     kLimitedImplementation | RequiresADLength(11)},

    {"DES_EDE3_CBC_SHA1_TLSImplicitIV",
     EVP_aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv,
     "des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv_tests.txt",
     kLimitedImplementation | RequiresADLength(11)},

    {"AES_128_CTR_HMAC_SHA256", EVP_aead_aes_128_ctr_hmac_sha256,
     "aes_128_ctr_hmac_sha256.txt", kCanTruncateTags},

    {"AES_256_CTR_HMAC_SHA256", EVP_aead_aes_256_ctr_hmac_sha256,
     "aes_256_ctr_hmac_sha256.txt", kCanTruncateTags},

    {"AES_128_CCM_BLUETOOTH", EVP_aead_aes_128_ccm_bluetooth,
     "aes_128_ccm_bluetooth_tests.txt", 0},

    {"AES_128_CCM_BLUETOOTH_8", EVP_aead_aes_128_ccm_bluetooth_8,
     "aes_128_ccm_bluetooth_8_tests.txt", 0},
};

class PerAEADTest : public testing::TestWithParam<KnownAEAD> {
 public:
  const EVP_AEAD *aead() { return GetParam().func(); }
};

INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(All, PerAEADTest, testing::ValuesIn(kAEADs),
                         [](const testing::TestParamInfo<KnownAEAD> &params)
                             -> std::string { return params.param.name; });

// Tests an AEAD against a series of test vectors from a file, using the
// FileTest format. As an example, here's a valid test case:
//
//   KEY: 5a19f3173586b4c42f8412f4d5a786531b3231753e9e00998aec12fda8df10e4
//   NONCE: 978105dfce667bf4
//   IN: 6a4583908d
//   AD: b654574932
//   CT: 5294265a60
//   TAG: 1d45758621762e061368e68868e2f929
TEST_P(PerAEADTest, TestVector) {
  std::string test_vectors = "crypto/cipher_extra/test/";
  test_vectors += GetParam().test_vectors;
  FileTestGTest(test_vectors.c_str(), [&](FileTest *t) {
    std::vector<uint8_t> key, nonce, in, ad, ct, tag;
    ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&key, "KEY"));
    ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&nonce, "NONCE"));
    ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&in, "IN"));
    ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&ad, "AD"));
    ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&ct, "CT"));
    ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&tag, "TAG"));
    size_t tag_len = tag.size();
    if (t->HasAttribute("TAG_LEN")) {
      // Legacy AEADs are MAC-then-encrypt and may include padding in the TAG
      // field. TAG_LEN contains the actual size of the digest in that case.
      std::string tag_len_str;
      ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetAttribute(&tag_len_str, "TAG_LEN"));
      tag_len = strtoul(tag_len_str.c_str(), nullptr, 10);
      ASSERT_TRUE(tag_len);
    }

    bssl::ScopedEVP_AEAD_CTX ctx;
    ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(
        ctx.get(), aead(), key.data(), key.size(), tag_len, evp_aead_seal));

    std::vector<uint8_t> out(in.size() + EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(aead()));
    if (!t->HasAttribute("NO_SEAL") &&
        !(GetParam().flags & kNondeterministic)) {
      size_t out_len;
      ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(ctx.get(), out.data(), &out_len, out.size(),
                                    nonce.data(), nonce.size(), in.data(),
                                    in.size(), ad.data(), ad.size()));
      out.resize(out_len);

      ASSERT_EQ(out.size(), ct.size() + tag.size());
      EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(ct), Bytes(out.data(), ct.size()));
      EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(tag), Bytes(out.data() + ct.size(), tag.size()));
    } else {
      out.resize(ct.size() + tag.size());
      OPENSSL_memcpy(out.data(), ct.data(), ct.size());
      OPENSSL_memcpy(out.data() + ct.size(), tag.data(), tag.size());
    }

    // The "stateful" AEADs for implementing pre-AEAD cipher suites need to be
    // reset after each operation.
    ctx.Reset();
    ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(
        ctx.get(), aead(), key.data(), key.size(), tag_len, evp_aead_open));

    std::vector<uint8_t> out2(out.size());
    size_t out2_len;
    int ret = EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(ctx.get(), out2.data(), &out2_len, out2.size(),
                                nonce.data(), nonce.size(), out.data(),
                                out.size(), ad.data(), ad.size());
    if (t->HasAttribute("FAILS")) {
      ASSERT_FALSE(ret) << "Decrypted bad data.";
      ERR_clear_error();
      return;
    }

    ASSERT_TRUE(ret) << "Failed to decrypt.";
    out2.resize(out2_len);
    EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(in), Bytes(out2));

    // The "stateful" AEADs for implementing pre-AEAD cipher suites need to be
    // reset after each operation.
    ctx.Reset();
    ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(
        ctx.get(), aead(), key.data(), key.size(), tag_len, evp_aead_open));

    // Garbage at the end isn't ignored.
    out.push_back(0);
    out2.resize(out.size());
    EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(
        ctx.get(), out2.data(), &out2_len, out2.size(), nonce.data(),
        nonce.size(), out.data(), out.size(), ad.data(), ad.size()))
        << "Decrypted bad data with trailing garbage.";
    ERR_clear_error();

    // The "stateful" AEADs for implementing pre-AEAD cipher suites need to be
    // reset after each operation.
    ctx.Reset();
    ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(
        ctx.get(), aead(), key.data(), key.size(), tag_len, evp_aead_open));

    // Verify integrity is checked.
    out[0] ^= 0x80;
    out.resize(out.size() - 1);
    out2.resize(out.size());
    EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(
        ctx.get(), out2.data(), &out2_len, out2.size(), nonce.data(),
        nonce.size(), out.data(), out.size(), ad.data(), ad.size()))
        << "Decrypted bad data with corrupted byte.";
    ERR_clear_error();
  });
}

TEST_P(PerAEADTest, TestExtraInput) {
  const KnownAEAD &aead_config = GetParam();
  if (!aead()->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in) {
    return;
  }

  const std::string test_vectors =
      "crypto/cipher_extra/test/" + std::string(aead_config.test_vectors);
  FileTestGTest(test_vectors.c_str(), [&](FileTest *t) {
    if (t->HasAttribute("NO_SEAL") ||
        t->HasAttribute("FAILS") ||
        (aead_config.flags & kNondeterministic)) {
      t->SkipCurrent();
      return;
    }

    std::vector<uint8_t> key, nonce, in, ad, ct, tag;
    ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&key, "KEY"));
    ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&nonce, "NONCE"));
    ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&in, "IN"));
    ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&ad, "AD"));
    ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&ct, "CT"));
    ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&tag, "TAG"));

    bssl::ScopedEVP_AEAD_CTX ctx;
    ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(ctx.get(), aead(), key.data(), key.size(),
                                  tag.size(), nullptr));
    std::vector<uint8_t> out_tag(EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(aead()) + in.size());
    std::vector<uint8_t> out(in.size());

    for (size_t extra_in_size = 0; extra_in_size < in.size(); extra_in_size++) {
      size_t tag_bytes_written;
      SCOPED_TRACE(extra_in_size);
      ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal_scatter(
          ctx.get(), out.data(), out_tag.data(), &tag_bytes_written,
          out_tag.size(), nonce.data(), nonce.size(), in.data(),
          in.size() - extra_in_size, in.data() + in.size() - extra_in_size,
          extra_in_size, ad.data(), ad.size()));

      ASSERT_EQ(tag_bytes_written, extra_in_size + tag.size());

      memcpy(out.data() + in.size() - extra_in_size, out_tag.data(),
             extra_in_size);

      EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(ct), Bytes(out.data(), in.size()));
      EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(tag), Bytes(out_tag.data() + extra_in_size,
                                  tag_bytes_written - extra_in_size));
    }
  });
}

TEST_P(PerAEADTest, TestVectorScatterGather) {
  std::string test_vectors = "crypto/cipher_extra/test/";
  const KnownAEAD &aead_config = GetParam();
  test_vectors += aead_config.test_vectors;
  FileTestGTest(test_vectors.c_str(), [&](FileTest *t) {
    std::vector<uint8_t> key, nonce, in, ad, ct, tag;
    ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&key, "KEY"));
    ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&nonce, "NONCE"));
    ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&in, "IN"));
    ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&ad, "AD"));
    ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&ct, "CT"));
    ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&tag, "TAG"));
    size_t tag_len = tag.size();
    if (t->HasAttribute("TAG_LEN")) {
      // Legacy AEADs are MAC-then-encrypt and may include padding in the TAG
      // field. TAG_LEN contains the actual size of the digest in that case.
      std::string tag_len_str;
      ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetAttribute(&tag_len_str, "TAG_LEN"));
      tag_len = strtoul(tag_len_str.c_str(), nullptr, 10);
      ASSERT_TRUE(tag_len);
    }

    bssl::ScopedEVP_AEAD_CTX ctx;
    ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(
        ctx.get(), aead(), key.data(), key.size(), tag_len, evp_aead_seal));

    std::vector<uint8_t> out(in.size());
    std::vector<uint8_t> out_tag(EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(aead()));
    if (!t->HasAttribute("NO_SEAL") &&
        !(aead_config.flags & kNondeterministic)) {
      size_t out_tag_len;
      ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal_scatter(
          ctx.get(), out.data(), out_tag.data(), &out_tag_len, out_tag.size(),
          nonce.data(), nonce.size(), in.data(), in.size(), nullptr, 0,
          ad.data(), ad.size()));
      out_tag.resize(out_tag_len);

      ASSERT_EQ(out.size(), ct.size());
      ASSERT_EQ(out_tag.size(), tag.size());
      EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(ct), Bytes(out.data(), ct.size()));
      EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(tag), Bytes(out_tag.data(), tag.size()));
    } else {
      out.resize(ct.size());
      out_tag.resize(tag.size());
      OPENSSL_memcpy(out.data(), ct.data(), ct.size());
      OPENSSL_memcpy(out_tag.data(), tag.data(), tag.size());
    }

    // The "stateful" AEADs for implementing pre-AEAD cipher suites need to be
    // reset after each operation.
    ctx.Reset();
    ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(
        ctx.get(), aead(), key.data(), key.size(), tag_len, evp_aead_open));

    std::vector<uint8_t> out2(out.size());
    int ret = EVP_AEAD_CTX_open_gather(
        ctx.get(), out2.data(), nonce.data(), nonce.size(), out.data(),
        out.size(), out_tag.data(), out_tag.size(), ad.data(), ad.size());

    // Skip decryption for AEADs that don't implement open_gather().
    if (!ret) {
      int err = ERR_peek_error();
      if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_CIPHER &&
          ERR_GET_REASON(err) == CIPHER_R_CTRL_NOT_IMPLEMENTED) {
          t->SkipCurrent();
          return;
        }
    }

    if (t->HasAttribute("FAILS")) {
      ASSERT_FALSE(ret) << "Decrypted bad data";
      ERR_clear_error();
      return;
    }

    ASSERT_TRUE(ret) << "Failed to decrypt: "
                     << ERR_reason_error_string(ERR_get_error());
    EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(in), Bytes(out2));

    // The "stateful" AEADs for implementing pre-AEAD cipher suites need to be
    // reset after each operation.
    ctx.Reset();
    ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(
        ctx.get(), aead(), key.data(), key.size(), tag_len, evp_aead_open));

    // Garbage at the end isn't ignored.
    out_tag.push_back(0);
    out2.resize(out.size());
    EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_open_gather(
        ctx.get(), out2.data(), nonce.data(), nonce.size(), out.data(),
        out.size(), out_tag.data(), out_tag.size(), ad.data(), ad.size()))
        << "Decrypted bad data with trailing garbage.";
    ERR_clear_error();

    // The "stateful" AEADs for implementing pre-AEAD cipher suites need to be
    // reset after each operation.
    ctx.Reset();
    ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(
        ctx.get(), aead(), key.data(), key.size(), tag_len, evp_aead_open));

    // Verify integrity is checked.
    out_tag[0] ^= 0x80;
    out_tag.resize(out_tag.size() - 1);
    out2.resize(out.size());
    EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_open_gather(
        ctx.get(), out2.data(), nonce.data(), nonce.size(), out.data(),
        out.size(), out_tag.data(), out_tag.size(), ad.data(), ad.size()))
        << "Decrypted bad data with corrupted byte.";
    ERR_clear_error();

    ctx.Reset();
    ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(
        ctx.get(), aead(), key.data(), key.size(), tag_len, evp_aead_open));

    // Check edge case for tag length.
    EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_open_gather(
        ctx.get(), out2.data(), nonce.data(), nonce.size(), out.data(),
        out.size(), out_tag.data(), 0, ad.data(), ad.size()))
        << "Decrypted bad data with corrupted byte.";
    ERR_clear_error();
  });
}

TEST_P(PerAEADTest, CleanupAfterInitFailure) {
  uint8_t key[EVP_AEAD_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
  OPENSSL_memset(key, 0, sizeof(key));
  const size_t key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead());
  ASSERT_GE(sizeof(key), key_len);

  EVP_AEAD_CTX ctx;
  ASSERT_FALSE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(
      &ctx, aead(), key, key_len,
      9999 /* a silly tag length to trigger an error */, NULL /* ENGINE */));
  ERR_clear_error();

  // Running a second, failed _init should not cause a memory leak.
  ASSERT_FALSE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(
      &ctx, aead(), key, key_len,
      9999 /* a silly tag length to trigger an error */, NULL /* ENGINE */));
  ERR_clear_error();

  // Calling _cleanup on an |EVP_AEAD_CTX| after a failed _init should be a
  // no-op.
  EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
}

TEST_P(PerAEADTest, TruncatedTags) {
  if (!(GetParam().flags & kCanTruncateTags)) {
    return;
  }

  uint8_t key[EVP_AEAD_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
  OPENSSL_memset(key, 0, sizeof(key));
  const size_t key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead());
  ASSERT_GE(sizeof(key), key_len);

  uint8_t nonce[EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH];
  OPENSSL_memset(nonce, 0, sizeof(nonce));
  const size_t nonce_len = EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead());
  ASSERT_GE(sizeof(nonce), nonce_len);

  const size_t tag_len = MinimumTagLength(GetParam().flags);
  bssl::ScopedEVP_AEAD_CTX ctx;
  ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(ctx.get(), aead(), key, key_len,
                                tag_len, NULL /* ENGINE */));

  const uint8_t plaintext[1] = {'A'};

  uint8_t ciphertext[128];
  size_t ciphertext_len;
  constexpr uint8_t kSentinel = 42;
  OPENSSL_memset(ciphertext, kSentinel, sizeof(ciphertext));

  ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(ctx.get(), ciphertext, &ciphertext_len,
                                sizeof(ciphertext), nonce, nonce_len, plaintext,
                                sizeof(plaintext), nullptr /* ad */, 0));

  for (size_t i = ciphertext_len; i < sizeof(ciphertext); i++) {
    // Sealing must not write past where it said it did.
    EXPECT_EQ(kSentinel, ciphertext[i])
        << "Sealing wrote off the end of the buffer.";
  }

  const size_t overhead_used = ciphertext_len - sizeof(plaintext);
  const size_t expected_overhead =
      tag_len + EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(aead()) - EVP_AEAD_max_tag_len(aead());
  EXPECT_EQ(overhead_used, expected_overhead)
      << "AEAD is probably ignoring request to truncate tags.";

  uint8_t plaintext2[sizeof(plaintext) + 16];
  OPENSSL_memset(plaintext2, kSentinel, sizeof(plaintext2));

  size_t plaintext2_len;
  ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(
      ctx.get(), plaintext2, &plaintext2_len, sizeof(plaintext2), nonce,
      nonce_len, ciphertext, ciphertext_len, nullptr /* ad */, 0))
      << "Opening with truncated tag didn't work.";

  for (size_t i = plaintext2_len; i < sizeof(plaintext2); i++) {
    // Likewise, opening should also stay within bounds.
    EXPECT_EQ(kSentinel, plaintext2[i])
        << "Opening wrote off the end of the buffer.";
  }

  EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(plaintext), Bytes(plaintext2, plaintext2_len));
}

TEST_P(PerAEADTest, AliasedBuffers) {
  if (GetParam().flags & kLimitedImplementation) {
    return;
  }

  const size_t key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead());
  const size_t nonce_len = EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead());
  const size_t max_overhead = EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(aead());

  std::vector<uint8_t> key(key_len, 'a');
  bssl::ScopedEVP_AEAD_CTX ctx;
  ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(ctx.get(), aead(), key.data(), key_len,
                                EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH, nullptr));

  static const uint8_t kPlaintext[260] =
      "testing123456testing123456testing123456testing123456testing123456testing"
      "123456testing123456testing123456testing123456testing123456testing123456t"
      "esting123456testing123456testing123456testing123456testing123456testing1"
      "23456testing123456testing123456testing12345";
  const std::vector<size_t> offsets = {
      0,  1,  2,  8,  15, 16,  17,  31,  32,  33,  63,
      64, 65, 95, 96, 97, 127, 128, 129, 255, 256, 257,
  };

  std::vector<uint8_t> nonce(nonce_len, 'b');
  std::vector<uint8_t> valid_encryption(sizeof(kPlaintext) + max_overhead);
  size_t valid_encryption_len;
  ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(
      ctx.get(), valid_encryption.data(), &valid_encryption_len,
      sizeof(kPlaintext) + max_overhead, nonce.data(), nonce_len, kPlaintext,
      sizeof(kPlaintext), nullptr, 0))
      << "EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal failed with disjoint buffers.";

  // Test with out != in which we expect to fail.
  std::vector<uint8_t> buffer(2 + valid_encryption_len);
  uint8_t *in = buffer.data() + 1;
  uint8_t *out1 = buffer.data();
  uint8_t *out2 = buffer.data() + 2;

  OPENSSL_memcpy(in, kPlaintext, sizeof(kPlaintext));
  size_t out_len;
  EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(
      ctx.get(), out1 /* in - 1 */, &out_len, sizeof(kPlaintext) + max_overhead,
      nonce.data(), nonce_len, in, sizeof(kPlaintext), nullptr, 0));
  EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(
      ctx.get(), out2 /* in + 1 */, &out_len, sizeof(kPlaintext) + max_overhead,
      nonce.data(), nonce_len, in, sizeof(kPlaintext), nullptr, 0));
  ERR_clear_error();

  OPENSSL_memcpy(in, valid_encryption.data(), valid_encryption_len);
  EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(ctx.get(), out1 /* in - 1 */, &out_len,
                                 valid_encryption_len, nonce.data(), nonce_len,
                                 in, valid_encryption_len, nullptr, 0));
  EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(ctx.get(), out2 /* in + 1 */, &out_len,
                                 valid_encryption_len, nonce.data(), nonce_len,
                                 in, valid_encryption_len, nullptr, 0));
  ERR_clear_error();

  // Test with out == in, which we expect to work.
  OPENSSL_memcpy(in, kPlaintext, sizeof(kPlaintext));

  ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(ctx.get(), in, &out_len,
                                sizeof(kPlaintext) + max_overhead, nonce.data(),
                                nonce_len, in, sizeof(kPlaintext), nullptr, 0));

  if (!(GetParam().flags & kNondeterministic)) {
    EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(valid_encryption.data(), valid_encryption_len),
              Bytes(in, out_len));
  }

  OPENSSL_memcpy(in, valid_encryption.data(), valid_encryption_len);
  ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(ctx.get(), in, &out_len, valid_encryption_len,
                                nonce.data(), nonce_len, in,
                                valid_encryption_len, nullptr, 0));
  EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(kPlaintext), Bytes(in, out_len));
}

TEST_P(PerAEADTest, UnalignedInput) {
  alignas(16) uint8_t key[EVP_AEAD_MAX_KEY_LENGTH + 1];
  alignas(16) uint8_t nonce[EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH + 1];
  alignas(16) uint8_t plaintext[32 + 1];
  alignas(16) uint8_t ad[32 + 1];
  OPENSSL_memset(key, 'K', sizeof(key));
  OPENSSL_memset(nonce, 'N', sizeof(nonce));
  OPENSSL_memset(plaintext, 'P', sizeof(plaintext));
  OPENSSL_memset(ad, 'A', sizeof(ad));
  const size_t key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead());
  ASSERT_GE(sizeof(key) - 1, key_len);
  const size_t nonce_len = EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead());
  ASSERT_GE(sizeof(nonce) - 1, nonce_len);
  const size_t ad_len = RequiredADLength(GetParam().flags) != 0
                            ? RequiredADLength(GetParam().flags)
                            : sizeof(ad) - 1;
  ASSERT_GE(sizeof(ad) - 1, ad_len);

  // Encrypt some input.
  bssl::ScopedEVP_AEAD_CTX ctx;
  ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(
      ctx.get(), aead(), key + 1, key_len, EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH,
      evp_aead_seal));
  alignas(16) uint8_t ciphertext[sizeof(plaintext) + EVP_AEAD_MAX_OVERHEAD];
  size_t ciphertext_len;
  ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(ctx.get(), ciphertext + 1, &ciphertext_len,
                                sizeof(ciphertext) - 1, nonce + 1, nonce_len,
                                plaintext + 1, sizeof(plaintext) - 1, ad + 1,
                                ad_len));

  // It must successfully decrypt.
  alignas(16) uint8_t out[sizeof(ciphertext)];
  ctx.Reset();
  ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(
      ctx.get(), aead(), key + 1, key_len, EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH,
      evp_aead_open));
  size_t out_len;
  ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(ctx.get(), out + 1, &out_len, sizeof(out) - 1,
                                nonce + 1, nonce_len, ciphertext + 1,
                                ciphertext_len, ad + 1, ad_len));
  EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(plaintext + 1, sizeof(plaintext) - 1),
            Bytes(out + 1, out_len));
}

TEST_P(PerAEADTest, Overflow) {
  uint8_t key[EVP_AEAD_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
  OPENSSL_memset(key, 'K', sizeof(key));

  bssl::ScopedEVP_AEAD_CTX ctx;
  const size_t max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_max_tag_len(aead());
  ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(ctx.get(), aead(), key,
                                               EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead()),
                                               max_tag_len, evp_aead_seal));

  uint8_t plaintext[1] = {0};
  uint8_t ciphertext[1024] = {0};
  size_t ciphertext_len;
  // The AEAD must not overflow when calculating the ciphertext length.
  ASSERT_FALSE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(
      ctx.get(), ciphertext, &ciphertext_len, sizeof(ciphertext), nullptr, 0,
      plaintext, std::numeric_limits<size_t>::max() - max_tag_len + 1, nullptr,
      0));
  ERR_clear_error();

  // (Can't test the scatter interface because it'll attempt to zero the output
  // buffer on error and the primary output buffer is implicitly the same size
  // as the input.)
}

TEST_P(PerAEADTest, InvalidNonceLength) {
  size_t valid_nonce_len = EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead());
  std::vector<size_t> nonce_lens;
  if (valid_nonce_len != 0) {
    // Other than the implicit IV TLS "AEAD"s, none of our AEADs allow empty
    // nonces. In particular, although AES-GCM was incorrectly specified with
    // variable-length nonces, it does not allow the empty nonce.
    nonce_lens.push_back(0);
  }
  if (!(GetParam().flags & kVariableNonce)) {
    nonce_lens.push_back(valid_nonce_len + 1);
    if (valid_nonce_len != 0) {
      nonce_lens.push_back(valid_nonce_len - 1);
    }
  }

  static const uint8_t kZeros[EVP_AEAD_MAX_KEY_LENGTH] = {0};
  const size_t ad_len = RequiredADLength(GetParam().flags) != 0
                            ? RequiredADLength(GetParam().flags)
                            : 16;
  ASSERT_LE(ad_len, sizeof(kZeros));

  for (size_t nonce_len : nonce_lens) {
    SCOPED_TRACE(nonce_len);
    uint8_t buf[256];
    size_t len;
    std::vector<uint8_t> nonce(nonce_len);
    bssl::ScopedEVP_AEAD_CTX ctx;
    ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(
        ctx.get(), aead(), kZeros, EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead()),
        EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH, evp_aead_seal));

    EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(ctx.get(), buf, &len, sizeof(buf),
                                   nonce.data(), nonce.size(), nullptr /* in */,
                                   0, kZeros /* ad */, ad_len));
    uint32_t err = ERR_get_error();
    EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_CIPHER, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
    // TODO(davidben): Merge these errors. https://crbug.com/boringssl/129.
    if (ERR_GET_REASON(err) != CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_NONCE_SIZE) {
      EXPECT_EQ(CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
    }

    ctx.Reset();
    ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(
        ctx.get(), aead(), kZeros, EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead()),
        EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH, evp_aead_open));
    EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(ctx.get(), buf, &len, sizeof(buf),
                                   nonce.data(), nonce.size(), kZeros /* in */,
                                   sizeof(kZeros), kZeros /* ad */, ad_len));
    err = ERR_get_error();
    EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_CIPHER, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
    if (ERR_GET_REASON(err) != CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_NONCE_SIZE) {
      EXPECT_EQ(CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
    }
  }
}

#if defined(SUPPORTS_ABI_TEST)
// CHECK_ABI can't pass enums, i.e. |evp_aead_seal| and |evp_aead_open|. Thus
// these two wrappers.
static int aead_ctx_init_for_seal(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_AEAD *aead,
                                  const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len) {
  return EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(ctx, aead, key, key_len, 0,
                                          evp_aead_seal);
}

static int aead_ctx_init_for_open(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_AEAD *aead,
                                  const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len) {
  return EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(ctx, aead, key, key_len, 0,
                                          evp_aead_open);
}

// CHECK_ABI can pass, at most, eight arguments. Thus these wrappers that
// figure out the output length from the input length, and take the nonce length
// from the configuration of the AEAD.
static int aead_ctx_seal(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out_ciphertext,
                         size_t *out_ciphertext_len, const uint8_t *nonce,
                         const uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_len,
                         const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
  const size_t nonce_len = EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(EVP_AEAD_CTX_aead(ctx));
  return EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(ctx, out_ciphertext, out_ciphertext_len,
                           plaintext_len + EVP_AEAD_MAX_OVERHEAD, nonce,
                           nonce_len, plaintext, plaintext_len, ad, ad_len);
}

static int aead_ctx_open(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out_plaintext,
                         size_t *out_plaintext_len, const uint8_t *nonce,
                         const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_len,
                         const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
  const size_t nonce_len = EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(EVP_AEAD_CTX_aead(ctx));
  return EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(ctx, out_plaintext, out_plaintext_len,
                           ciphertext_len, nonce, nonce_len, ciphertext,
                           ciphertext_len, ad, ad_len);
}

TEST_P(PerAEADTest, ABI) {
  uint8_t key[EVP_AEAD_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
  OPENSSL_memset(key, 'K', sizeof(key));
  const size_t key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead());
  ASSERT_LE(key_len, sizeof(key));

  bssl::ScopedEVP_AEAD_CTX ctx_seal;
  ASSERT_TRUE(
      CHECK_ABI(aead_ctx_init_for_seal, ctx_seal.get(), aead(), key, key_len));

  bssl::ScopedEVP_AEAD_CTX ctx_open;
  ASSERT_TRUE(
      CHECK_ABI(aead_ctx_init_for_open, ctx_open.get(), aead(), key, key_len));

  alignas(2) uint8_t plaintext[512];
  OPENSSL_memset(plaintext, 'P', sizeof(plaintext));

  alignas(2) uint8_t ad_buf[512];
  OPENSSL_memset(ad_buf, 'A', sizeof(ad_buf));
  const uint8_t *const ad = ad_buf + 1;
  ASSERT_LE(RequiredADLength(GetParam().flags), sizeof(ad_buf) - 1);
  const size_t ad_len = RequiredADLength(GetParam().flags) != 0
                            ? RequiredADLength(GetParam().flags)
                            : sizeof(ad_buf) - 1;

  uint8_t nonce[EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH];
  OPENSSL_memset(nonce, 'N', sizeof(nonce));
  const size_t nonce_len = EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead());
  ASSERT_LE(nonce_len, sizeof(nonce));

  alignas(2) uint8_t ciphertext[sizeof(plaintext) + EVP_AEAD_MAX_OVERHEAD + 1];
  size_t ciphertext_len;
  // Knock plaintext, ciphertext, and AD off alignment and give odd lengths for
  // plaintext and AD. This hopefully triggers any edge-cases in the assembly.
  ASSERT_TRUE(CHECK_ABI(aead_ctx_seal, ctx_seal.get(), ciphertext + 1,
                        &ciphertext_len, nonce, plaintext + 1,
                        sizeof(plaintext) - 1, ad, ad_len));

  alignas(2) uint8_t plaintext2[sizeof(ciphertext) + 1];
  size_t plaintext2_len;
  ASSERT_TRUE(CHECK_ABI(aead_ctx_open, ctx_open.get(), plaintext2 + 1,
                        &plaintext2_len, nonce, ciphertext + 1, ciphertext_len,
                        ad, ad_len));

  EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(plaintext + 1, sizeof(plaintext) - 1),
            Bytes(plaintext2 + 1, plaintext2_len));
}

TEST(ChaChaPoly1305Test, ABI) {
  if (!chacha20_poly1305_asm_capable()) {
    return;
  }

  std::unique_ptr<uint8_t[]> buf(new uint8_t[1024]);
  for (size_t len = 0; len <= 1024; len += 5) {
    SCOPED_TRACE(len);
    union chacha20_poly1305_open_data open_ctx = {};
    CHECK_ABI(chacha20_poly1305_open, buf.get(), buf.get(), len, buf.get(),
              len % 128, &open_ctx);
  }

  for (size_t len = 0; len <= 1024; len += 5) {
    SCOPED_TRACE(len);
    union chacha20_poly1305_seal_data seal_ctx = {};
    CHECK_ABI(chacha20_poly1305_seal, buf.get(), buf.get(), len, buf.get(),
              len % 128, &seal_ctx);
  }
}
#endif  // SUPPORTS_ABI_TEST

TEST(AEADTest, AESCCMLargeAD) {
  static const std::vector<uint8_t> kKey(16, 'A');
  static const std::vector<uint8_t> kNonce(13, 'N');
  static const std::vector<uint8_t> kAD(65536, 'D');
  static const std::vector<uint8_t> kPlaintext = {
      0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
      0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f};
  static const std::vector<uint8_t> kCiphertext = {
      0xa2, 0x12, 0x3f, 0x0b, 0x07, 0xd5, 0x02, 0xff,
      0xa9, 0xcd, 0xa0, 0xf3, 0x69, 0x1c, 0x49, 0x0c};
  static const std::vector<uint8_t> kTag = {0x4a, 0x31, 0x82, 0x96};

  // Test AES-128-CCM-Bluetooth.
  bssl::ScopedEVP_AEAD_CTX ctx;
  ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(ctx.get(), EVP_aead_aes_128_ccm_bluetooth(),
                                kKey.data(), kKey.size(),
                                EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH, nullptr));

  std::vector<uint8_t> out(kCiphertext.size() + kTag.size());
  size_t out_len;
  EXPECT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(ctx.get(), out.data(), &out_len, out.size(),
                                kNonce.data(), kNonce.size(), kPlaintext.data(),
                                kPlaintext.size(), kAD.data(), kAD.size()));

  ASSERT_EQ(out_len, kCiphertext.size() + kTag.size());
  EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(kCiphertext), Bytes(out.data(), kCiphertext.size()));
  EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(kTag), Bytes(out.data() + kCiphertext.size(), kTag.size()));

  EXPECT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(ctx.get(), out.data(), &out_len, out.size(),
                                kNonce.data(), kNonce.size(), out.data(),
                                out.size(), kAD.data(), kAD.size()));

  ASSERT_EQ(out_len, kPlaintext.size());
  EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(kPlaintext), Bytes(out.data(), kPlaintext.size()));
}

static void RunWycheproofTestCase(FileTest *t, const EVP_AEAD *aead) {
  t->IgnoreInstruction("ivSize");

  std::vector<uint8_t> aad, ct, iv, key, msg, tag;
  ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&aad, "aad"));
  ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&ct, "ct"));
  ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&iv, "iv"));
  ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&key, "key"));
  ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&msg, "msg"));
  ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&tag, "tag"));
  std::string tag_size_str;
  ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetInstruction(&tag_size_str, "tagSize"));
  size_t tag_size = static_cast<size_t>(atoi(tag_size_str.c_str()));
  ASSERT_EQ(0u, tag_size % 8);
  tag_size /= 8;
  WycheproofResult result;
  ASSERT_TRUE(GetWycheproofResult(t, &result));

  std::vector<uint8_t> ct_and_tag = ct;
  ct_and_tag.insert(ct_and_tag.end(), tag.begin(), tag.end());

  bssl::ScopedEVP_AEAD_CTX ctx;
  ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(ctx.get(), aead, key.data(), key.size(),
                                tag_size, nullptr));
  std::vector<uint8_t> out(msg.size());
  size_t out_len;
  // Wycheproof tags small AES-GCM IVs as "acceptable" and otherwise does not
  // use it in AEADs. Any AES-GCM IV that isn't 96 bits is absurd, but our API
  // supports those, so we treat SmallIv tests as valid.
  if (result.IsValid({"SmallIv"})) {
    // Decryption should succeed.
    ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(ctx.get(), out.data(), &out_len, out.size(),
                                  iv.data(), iv.size(), ct_and_tag.data(),
                                  ct_and_tag.size(), aad.data(), aad.size()));
    EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(msg), Bytes(out.data(), out_len));

    // Decryption in-place should succeed.
    out = ct_and_tag;
    ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(ctx.get(), out.data(), &out_len, out.size(),
                                  iv.data(), iv.size(), out.data(), out.size(),
                                  aad.data(), aad.size()));
    EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(msg), Bytes(out.data(), out_len));

    // AEADs are deterministic, so encryption should produce the same result.
    out.resize(ct_and_tag.size());
    ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(ctx.get(), out.data(), &out_len, out.size(),
                                  iv.data(), iv.size(), msg.data(), msg.size(),
                                  aad.data(), aad.size()));
    EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(ct_and_tag), Bytes(out.data(), out_len));

    // Encrypt in-place.
    out = msg;
    out.resize(ct_and_tag.size());
    ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(ctx.get(), out.data(), &out_len, out.size(),
                                  iv.data(), iv.size(), out.data(), msg.size(),
                                  aad.data(), aad.size()));
    EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(ct_and_tag), Bytes(out.data(), out_len));
  } else {
    // Decryption should fail.
    EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(ctx.get(), out.data(), &out_len, out.size(),
                                   iv.data(), iv.size(), ct_and_tag.data(),
                                   ct_and_tag.size(), aad.data(), aad.size()));

    // Decryption in-place should also fail.
    out = ct_and_tag;
    EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(ctx.get(), out.data(), &out_len, out.size(),
                                   iv.data(), iv.size(), out.data(), out.size(),
                                   aad.data(), aad.size()));
  }
}

TEST(AEADTest, WycheproofAESGCMSIV) {
  FileTestGTest("third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/aes_gcm_siv_test.txt",
                [](FileTest *t) {
    std::string key_size_str;
    ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetInstruction(&key_size_str, "keySize"));
    const EVP_AEAD *aead;
    switch (atoi(key_size_str.c_str())) {
      case 128:
        aead = EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm_siv();
        break;
      case 256:
        aead = EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm_siv();
        break;
      default:
        FAIL() << "Unknown key size: " << key_size_str;
    }

    RunWycheproofTestCase(t, aead);
  });
}

TEST(AEADTest, WycheproofAESGCM) {
  FileTestGTest("third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/aes_gcm_test.txt",
                [](FileTest *t) {
    std::string key_size_str;
    ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetInstruction(&key_size_str, "keySize"));
    const EVP_AEAD *aead;
    switch (atoi(key_size_str.c_str())) {
      case 128:
        aead = EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm();
        break;
      case 192:
        aead = EVP_aead_aes_192_gcm();
        break;
      case 256:
        aead = EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm();
        break;
      default:
        FAIL() << "Unknown key size: " << key_size_str;
    }

    RunWycheproofTestCase(t, aead);
  });
}

TEST(AEADTest, WycheproofChaCha20Poly1305) {
  FileTestGTest("third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/chacha20_poly1305_test.txt",
                [](FileTest *t) {
    t->IgnoreInstruction("keySize");
    RunWycheproofTestCase(t, EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305());
  });
}

TEST(AEADTest, WycheproofXChaCha20Poly1305) {
  FileTestGTest(
      "third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/xchacha20_poly1305_test.txt",
      [](FileTest *t) {
        t->IgnoreInstruction("keySize");
        RunWycheproofTestCase(t, EVP_aead_xchacha20_poly1305());
      });
}