crypto/fipsmodule/rand/urandom.c - boringssl - Git at Google

 /* Copyright (c) 2014, Google Inc.
  *
  * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
  * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
  * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
  *
  * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
  * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
  * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
  * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
  * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
  * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
  * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */

 #if !defined(_GNU_SOURCE)
 #define _GNU_SOURCE  // needed for syscall() on Linux.
 #endif

 #include <openssl/rand.h>

 #if !defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS) && !defined(OPENSSL_FUCHSIA) && \
     !defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_DETERMINISTIC_MODE) && !defined(OPENSSL_TRUSTY)

 #include <assert.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <unistd.h>

 #if defined(OPENSSL_LINUX)
 #if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
 #include <linux/random.h>
 #include <sys/ioctl.h>
 #endif
 #include <sys/syscall.h>

 #if !defined(OPENSSL_ANDROID)
 #define OPENSSL_HAS_GETAUXVAL
 #endif
 // glibc prior to 2.16 does not have getauxval and sys/auxv.h. Android has some
 // host builds (i.e. not building for Android itself, so |OPENSSL_ANDROID| is
 // unset) which are still using a 2.15 sysroot.
 //
 // TODO(davidben): Remove this once Android updates their sysroot.
 #if defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ)
 #if !__GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 16)
 #undef OPENSSL_HAS_GETAUXVAL
 #endif
 #endif
 #if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_GETAUXVAL)
 #include <sys/auxv.h>
 #endif
 #endif  // OPENSSL_LINUX

 #include <openssl/thread.h>
 #include <openssl/mem.h>

 #include "internal.h"
 #include "../delocate.h"
 #include "../../internal.h"


 #if defined(OPENSSL_LINUX)

 #if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64)
 #define EXPECTED_NR_getrandom 318
 #elif defined(OPENSSL_X86)
 #define EXPECTED_NR_getrandom 355
 #elif defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64)
 #define EXPECTED_NR_getrandom 278
 #elif defined(OPENSSL_ARM)
 #define EXPECTED_NR_getrandom 384
 #elif defined(OPENSSL_PPC64LE)
 #define EXPECTED_NR_getrandom 359
 #endif

 #if defined(EXPECTED_NR_getrandom)
 #define USE_NR_getrandom

 #if defined(__NR_getrandom)

 #if __NR_getrandom != EXPECTED_NR_getrandom
 #error "system call number for getrandom is not the expected value"
 #endif

 #else  // __NR_getrandom

 #define __NR_getrandom EXPECTED_NR_getrandom

 #endif  // __NR_getrandom

 #if defined(OPENSSL_MSAN)
 void __msan_unpoison(void *, size_t);
 #endif

 static ssize_t boringssl_getrandom(void *buf, size_t buf_len, unsigned flags) {
   ssize_t ret;
   do {
     ret = syscall(__NR_getrandom, buf, buf_len, flags);
   } while (ret == -1 && errno == EINTR);

 #if defined(OPENSSL_MSAN)
   if (ret > 0) {
     // MSAN doesn't recognise |syscall| and thus doesn't notice that we have
     // initialised the output buffer.
     __msan_unpoison(buf, ret);
   }
 #endif  // OPENSSL_MSAN

   return ret;
 }

 #endif  // EXPECTED_NR_getrandom

 #if !defined(GRND_NONBLOCK)
 #define GRND_NONBLOCK 1
 #endif

 #endif  // OPENSSL_LINUX

 // rand_lock is used to protect the |*_requested| variables.
 DEFINE_STATIC_MUTEX(rand_lock)

 // The following constants are magic values of |urandom_fd|.
 static const int kUnset = 0;
 static const int kHaveGetrandom = -3;

 // urandom_fd_requested is set by |RAND_set_urandom_fd|. It's protected by
 // |rand_lock|.
 DEFINE_BSS_GET(int, urandom_fd_requested)

 // urandom_fd is a file descriptor to /dev/urandom. It's protected by |once|.
 DEFINE_BSS_GET(int, urandom_fd)

 DEFINE_STATIC_ONCE(rand_once)

 // init_once initializes the state of this module to values previously
 // requested. This is the only function that modifies |urandom_fd| and
 // |urandom_buffering|, whose values may be read safely after calling the
 // once.
 static void init_once(void) {
   CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_read(rand_lock_bss_get());
   int fd = *urandom_fd_requested_bss_get();
   CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock_read(rand_lock_bss_get());

 #if defined(USE_NR_getrandom)
   uint8_t dummy;
   ssize_t getrandom_ret =
       boringssl_getrandom(&dummy, sizeof(dummy), GRND_NONBLOCK);

   if (getrandom_ret == -1 && errno == EAGAIN) {
     // Attempt to get the path of the current process to aid in debugging when
     // something blocks.
     const char *current_process = "<unknown>";
 #if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_GETAUXVAL)
     const unsigned long getauxval_ret = getauxval(AT_EXECFN);
     if (getauxval_ret != 0) {
       current_process = (const char *)getauxval_ret;
     }
 #endif

     fprintf(stderr,
             "%s: getrandom indicates that the entropy pool has not been "
             "initialized. Rather than continue with poor entropy, this process "
             "will block until entropy is available.\n",
             current_process);

     getrandom_ret =
         boringssl_getrandom(&dummy, sizeof(dummy), 0 /* no flags */);
   }

   if (getrandom_ret == 1) {
     *urandom_fd_bss_get() = kHaveGetrandom;
     return;
   }

   // Ignore ENOSYS and fallthrough to using /dev/urandom, below. Otherwise it's
   // a fatal error.
   if (getrandom_ret != -1 || errno != ENOSYS) {
     perror("getrandom");
     abort();
   }
 #endif  // USE_NR_getrandom

   if (fd == kUnset) {
     do {
       fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
     } while (fd == -1 && errno == EINTR);
   }

   if (fd < 0) {
     perror("failed to open /dev/urandom");
     abort();
   }

   assert(kUnset == 0);
   if (fd == kUnset) {
     // Because we want to keep |urandom_fd| in the BSS, we have to initialise
     // it to zero. But zero is a valid file descriptor too. Thus if open
     // returns zero for /dev/urandom, we dup it to get a non-zero number.
     fd = dup(fd);
     close(kUnset);

     if (fd <= 0) {
       perror("failed to dup /dev/urandom fd");
       abort();
     }
   }

 #if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
   // In FIPS mode we ensure that the kernel has sufficient entropy before
   // continuing. This is automatically handled by getrandom, which requires
   // that the entropy pool has been initialised, but for urandom we have to
   // poll.
   for (;;) {
     int entropy_bits;
     if (ioctl(fd, RNDGETENTCNT, &entropy_bits)) {
       fprintf(stderr,
               "RNDGETENTCNT on /dev/urandom failed. We cannot continue in this "
               "case when in FIPS mode.\n");
       abort();
     }

     static const int kBitsNeeded = 256;
     if (entropy_bits >= kBitsNeeded) {
       break;
     }

     usleep(250000);
   }
 #endif

   int flags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFD);
   if (flags == -1) {
     // Native Client doesn't implement |fcntl|.
     if (errno != ENOSYS) {
       perror("failed to get flags from urandom fd");
       abort();
     }
   } else {
     flags |= FD_CLOEXEC;
     if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, flags) == -1) {
       perror("failed to set FD_CLOEXEC on urandom fd");
       abort();
     }
   }
   *urandom_fd_bss_get() = fd;
 }

 void RAND_set_urandom_fd(int fd) {
   fd = dup(fd);
   if (fd < 0) {
     perror("failed to dup supplied urandom fd");
     abort();
   }

   assert(kUnset == 0);
   if (fd == kUnset) {
     // Because we want to keep |urandom_fd| in the BSS, we have to initialise
     // it to zero. But zero is a valid file descriptor too. Thus if dup
     // returned zero we dup it again to get a non-zero number.
     fd = dup(fd);
     close(kUnset);

     if (fd <= 0) {
       perror("failed to dup supplied urandom fd");
       abort();
     }
   }

   CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_write(rand_lock_bss_get());
   *urandom_fd_requested_bss_get() = fd;
   CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock_write(rand_lock_bss_get());

   CRYPTO_once(rand_once_bss_get(), init_once);
   if (*urandom_fd_bss_get() == kHaveGetrandom) {
     close(fd);
   } else if (*urandom_fd_bss_get() != fd) {
     fprintf(stderr, "RAND_set_urandom_fd called after initialisation.\n");
     abort();
   }
 }

 // fill_with_entropy writes |len| bytes of entropy into |out|. It returns one
 // on success and zero on error.
 static char fill_with_entropy(uint8_t *out, size_t len) {
   while (len > 0) {
     ssize_t r;

     if (*urandom_fd_bss_get() == kHaveGetrandom) {
 #if defined(USE_NR_getrandom)
       r = boringssl_getrandom(out, len, 0 /* no flags */);
 #else  // USE_NR_getrandom
       fprintf(stderr, "urandom fd corrupt.\n");
       abort();
 #endif
     } else {
       do {
         r = read(*urandom_fd_bss_get(), out, len);
       } while (r == -1 && errno == EINTR);
     }

     if (r <= 0) {
       return 0;
     }
     out += r;
     len -= r;
   }

   return 1;
 }

 // CRYPTO_sysrand puts |requested| random bytes into |out|.
 void CRYPTO_sysrand(uint8_t *out, size_t requested) {
   if (requested == 0) {
     return;
   }

   CRYPTO_once(rand_once_bss_get(), init_once);

   if (!fill_with_entropy(out, requested)) {
     perror("entropy fill failed");
     abort();
   }

 #if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS_BREAK_CRNG)
   // This breaks the "continuous random number generator test" defined in FIPS
   // 140-2, section 4.9.2, and implemented in rand_get_seed().
   OPENSSL_memset(out, 0, requested);
 #endif
 }

 #endif /* !OPENSSL_WINDOWS && !defined(OPENSSL_FUCHSIA) && \
           !BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_DETERMINISTIC_MODE && !OPENSSL_TRUSTY */
	/* Copyright (c) 2014, Google Inc.
	*
	* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
	* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
	* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
	*
	* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
	* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
	* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
	* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
	* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
	* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
	* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */

	#if !defined(_GNU_SOURCE)
	#define _GNU_SOURCE // needed for syscall() on Linux.
	#endif

	#include <openssl/rand.h>

	#if !defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS) && !defined(OPENSSL_FUCHSIA) && \
	!defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_DETERMINISTIC_MODE) && !defined(OPENSSL_TRUSTY)

	#include <assert.h>
	#include <errno.h>
	#include <fcntl.h>
	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <string.h>
	#include <unistd.h>

	#if defined(OPENSSL_LINUX)
	#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
	#include <linux/random.h>
	#include <sys/ioctl.h>
	#endif
	#include <sys/syscall.h>

	#if !defined(OPENSSL_ANDROID)
	#define OPENSSL_HAS_GETAUXVAL
	#endif
	// glibc prior to 2.16 does not have getauxval and sys/auxv.h. Android has some
	// host builds (i.e. not building for Android itself, so \|OPENSSL_ANDROID\| is
	// unset) which are still using a 2.15 sysroot.
	//
	// TODO(davidben): Remove this once Android updates their sysroot.
	#if defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ)
	#if !__GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 16)
	#undef OPENSSL_HAS_GETAUXVAL
	#endif
	#endif
	#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_GETAUXVAL)
	#include <sys/auxv.h>
	#endif
	#endif // OPENSSL_LINUX

	#include <openssl/thread.h>
	#include <openssl/mem.h>

	#include "internal.h"
	#include "../delocate.h"
	#include "../../internal.h"


	#if defined(OPENSSL_LINUX)

	#if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64)
	#define EXPECTED_NR_getrandom 318
	#elif defined(OPENSSL_X86)
	#define EXPECTED_NR_getrandom 355
	#elif defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64)
	#define EXPECTED_NR_getrandom 278
	#elif defined(OPENSSL_ARM)
	#define EXPECTED_NR_getrandom 384
	#elif defined(OPENSSL_PPC64LE)
	#define EXPECTED_NR_getrandom 359
	#endif

	#if defined(EXPECTED_NR_getrandom)
	#define USE_NR_getrandom

	#if defined(__NR_getrandom)

	#if __NR_getrandom != EXPECTED_NR_getrandom
	#error "system call number for getrandom is not the expected value"
	#endif

	#else // __NR_getrandom

	#define __NR_getrandom EXPECTED_NR_getrandom

	#endif // __NR_getrandom

	#if defined(OPENSSL_MSAN)
	void __msan_unpoison(void *, size_t);
	#endif

	static ssize_t boringssl_getrandom(void *buf, size_t buf_len, unsigned flags) {
	ssize_t ret;
	do {
	ret = syscall(__NR_getrandom, buf, buf_len, flags);
	} while (ret == -1 && errno == EINTR);

	#if defined(OPENSSL_MSAN)
	if (ret > 0) {
	// MSAN doesn't recognise \|syscall\| and thus doesn't notice that we have
	// initialised the output buffer.
	__msan_unpoison(buf, ret);
	}
	#endif // OPENSSL_MSAN

	return ret;
	}

	#endif // EXPECTED_NR_getrandom

	#if !defined(GRND_NONBLOCK)
	#define GRND_NONBLOCK 1
	#endif

	#endif // OPENSSL_LINUX

	// rand_lock is used to protect the \|*_requested\| variables.
	DEFINE_STATIC_MUTEX(rand_lock)

	// The following constants are magic values of \|urandom_fd\|.
	static const int kUnset = 0;
	static const int kHaveGetrandom = -3;

	// urandom_fd_requested is set by \|RAND_set_urandom_fd\|. It's protected by
	// \|rand_lock\|.
	DEFINE_BSS_GET(int, urandom_fd_requested)

	// urandom_fd is a file descriptor to /dev/urandom. It's protected by \|once\|.
	DEFINE_BSS_GET(int, urandom_fd)

	DEFINE_STATIC_ONCE(rand_once)

	// init_once initializes the state of this module to values previously
	// requested. This is the only function that modifies \|urandom_fd\| and
	// \|urandom_buffering\|, whose values may be read safely after calling the
	// once.
	static void init_once(void) {
	CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_read(rand_lock_bss_get());
	int fd = *urandom_fd_requested_bss_get();
	CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock_read(rand_lock_bss_get());

	#if defined(USE_NR_getrandom)
	uint8_t dummy;
	ssize_t getrandom_ret =
	boringssl_getrandom(&dummy, sizeof(dummy), GRND_NONBLOCK);

	if (getrandom_ret == -1 && errno == EAGAIN) {
	// Attempt to get the path of the current process to aid in debugging when
	// something blocks.
	const char *current_process = "<unknown>";
	#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_GETAUXVAL)
	const unsigned long getauxval_ret = getauxval(AT_EXECFN);
	if (getauxval_ret != 0) {
	current_process = (const char *)getauxval_ret;
	}
	#endif

	fprintf(stderr,
	"%s: getrandom indicates that the entropy pool has not been "
	"initialized. Rather than continue with poor entropy, this process "
	"will block until entropy is available.\n",
	current_process);

	getrandom_ret =
	boringssl_getrandom(&dummy, sizeof(dummy), 0 /* no flags */);
	}

	if (getrandom_ret == 1) {
	*urandom_fd_bss_get() = kHaveGetrandom;
	return;
	}

	// Ignore ENOSYS and fallthrough to using /dev/urandom, below. Otherwise it's
	// a fatal error.
	if (getrandom_ret != -1 \|\| errno != ENOSYS) {
	perror("getrandom");
	abort();
	}
	#endif // USE_NR_getrandom

	if (fd == kUnset) {
	do {
	fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
	} while (fd == -1 && errno == EINTR);
	}

	if (fd < 0) {
	perror("failed to open /dev/urandom");
	abort();
	}

	assert(kUnset == 0);
	if (fd == kUnset) {
	// Because we want to keep \|urandom_fd\| in the BSS, we have to initialise
	// it to zero. But zero is a valid file descriptor too. Thus if open
	// returns zero for /dev/urandom, we dup it to get a non-zero number.
	fd = dup(fd);
	close(kUnset);

	if (fd <= 0) {
	perror("failed to dup /dev/urandom fd");
	abort();
	}
	}

	#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
	// In FIPS mode we ensure that the kernel has sufficient entropy before
	// continuing. This is automatically handled by getrandom, which requires
	// that the entropy pool has been initialised, but for urandom we have to
	// poll.
	for (;;) {
	int entropy_bits;
	if (ioctl(fd, RNDGETENTCNT, &entropy_bits)) {
	fprintf(stderr,
	"RNDGETENTCNT on /dev/urandom failed. We cannot continue in this "
	"case when in FIPS mode.\n");
	abort();
	}

	static const int kBitsNeeded = 256;
	if (entropy_bits >= kBitsNeeded) {
	break;
	}

	usleep(250000);
	}
	#endif

	int flags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFD);
	if (flags == -1) {
	// Native Client doesn't implement \|fcntl\|.
	if (errno != ENOSYS) {
	perror("failed to get flags from urandom fd");
	abort();
	}
	} else {
	flags \|= FD_CLOEXEC;
	if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, flags) == -1) {
	perror("failed to set FD_CLOEXEC on urandom fd");
	abort();
	}
	}
	*urandom_fd_bss_get() = fd;
	}

	void RAND_set_urandom_fd(int fd) {
	fd = dup(fd);
	if (fd < 0) {
	perror("failed to dup supplied urandom fd");
	abort();
	}

	assert(kUnset == 0);
	if (fd == kUnset) {
	// Because we want to keep \|urandom_fd\| in the BSS, we have to initialise
	// it to zero. But zero is a valid file descriptor too. Thus if dup
	// returned zero we dup it again to get a non-zero number.
	fd = dup(fd);
	close(kUnset);

	if (fd <= 0) {
	perror("failed to dup supplied urandom fd");
	abort();
	}
	}

	CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_write(rand_lock_bss_get());
	*urandom_fd_requested_bss_get() = fd;
	CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock_write(rand_lock_bss_get());

	CRYPTO_once(rand_once_bss_get(), init_once);
	if (*urandom_fd_bss_get() == kHaveGetrandom) {
	close(fd);
	} else if (*urandom_fd_bss_get() != fd) {
	fprintf(stderr, "RAND_set_urandom_fd called after initialisation.\n");
	abort();
	}
	}

	// fill_with_entropy writes \|len\| bytes of entropy into \|out\|. It returns one
	// on success and zero on error.
	static char fill_with_entropy(uint8_t *out, size_t len) {
	while (len > 0) {
	ssize_t r;

	if (*urandom_fd_bss_get() == kHaveGetrandom) {
	#if defined(USE_NR_getrandom)
	r = boringssl_getrandom(out, len, 0 /* no flags */);
	#else // USE_NR_getrandom
	fprintf(stderr, "urandom fd corrupt.\n");
	abort();
	#endif
	} else {
	do {
	r = read(*urandom_fd_bss_get(), out, len);
	} while (r == -1 && errno == EINTR);
	}

	if (r <= 0) {
	return 0;
	}
	out += r;
	len -= r;
	}

	return 1;
	}

	// CRYPTO_sysrand puts \|requested\| random bytes into \|out\|.
	void CRYPTO_sysrand(uint8_t *out, size_t requested) {
	if (requested == 0) {
	return;
	}

	CRYPTO_once(rand_once_bss_get(), init_once);

	if (!fill_with_entropy(out, requested)) {
	perror("entropy fill failed");
	abort();
	}

	#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS_BREAK_CRNG)
	// This breaks the "continuous random number generator test" defined in FIPS
	// 140-2, section 4.9.2, and implemented in rand_get_seed().
	OPENSSL_memset(out, 0, requested);
	#endif
	}

	#endif /* !OPENSSL_WINDOWS && !defined(OPENSSL_FUCHSIA) && \
	!BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_DETERMINISTIC_MODE && !OPENSSL_TRUSTY */