| /* Originally written by Bodo Moeller for the OpenSSL project. |
| * ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
| * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
| * distribution. |
| * |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
| * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
| * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
| * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
| * openssl-core@openssl.org. |
| * |
| * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
| * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
| * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
| * |
| * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
| * acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
| * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
| * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
| * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
| * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
| * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
| * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
| * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
| * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * ==================================================================== |
| * |
| * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
| * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
| * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. |
| * |
| * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by |
| * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. |
| * |
| * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source |
| * license provided above. |
| * |
| * The elliptic curve binary polynomial software is originally written by |
| * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems |
| * Laboratories. */ |
| |
| #include <openssl/ec_key.h> |
| |
| #include <string.h> |
| |
| #include <openssl/ec.h> |
| #include <openssl/ecdsa.h> |
| #include <openssl/engine.h> |
| #include <openssl/err.h> |
| #include <openssl/ex_data.h> |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> |
| #include <openssl/thread.h> |
| |
| #include "internal.h" |
| #include "../delocate.h" |
| #include "../service_indicator/internal.h" |
| #include "../../internal.h" |
| |
| |
| DEFINE_STATIC_EX_DATA_CLASS(g_ec_ex_data_class) |
| |
| static EC_WRAPPED_SCALAR *ec_wrapped_scalar_new(const EC_GROUP *group) { |
| EC_WRAPPED_SCALAR *wrapped = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(EC_WRAPPED_SCALAR)); |
| if (wrapped == NULL) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| wrapped->bignum.d = wrapped->scalar.words; |
| wrapped->bignum.width = group->order.N.width; |
| wrapped->bignum.dmax = group->order.N.width; |
| wrapped->bignum.flags = BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA; |
| return wrapped; |
| } |
| |
| static void ec_wrapped_scalar_free(EC_WRAPPED_SCALAR *scalar) { |
| OPENSSL_free(scalar); |
| } |
| |
| EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new(void) { return EC_KEY_new_method(NULL); } |
| |
| EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_method(const ENGINE *engine) { |
| EC_KEY *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(EC_KEY)); |
| if (ret == NULL) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| if (engine) { |
| ret->ecdsa_meth = ENGINE_get_ECDSA_method(engine); |
| } |
| if (ret->ecdsa_meth) { |
| METHOD_ref(ret->ecdsa_meth); |
| } |
| |
| ret->conv_form = POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED; |
| ret->references = 1; |
| |
| CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ret->ex_data); |
| |
| if (ret->ecdsa_meth && ret->ecdsa_meth->init && !ret->ecdsa_meth->init(ret)) { |
| CRYPTO_free_ex_data(g_ec_ex_data_class_bss_get(), ret, &ret->ex_data); |
| if (ret->ecdsa_meth) { |
| METHOD_unref(ret->ecdsa_meth); |
| } |
| OPENSSL_free(ret); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(int nid) { |
| EC_KEY *ret = EC_KEY_new(); |
| if (ret == NULL) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| ret->group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid); |
| if (ret->group == NULL) { |
| EC_KEY_free(ret); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| void EC_KEY_free(EC_KEY *r) { |
| if (r == NULL) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| if (!CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&r->references)) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| if (r->ecdsa_meth) { |
| if (r->ecdsa_meth->finish) { |
| r->ecdsa_meth->finish(r); |
| } |
| METHOD_unref(r->ecdsa_meth); |
| } |
| |
| CRYPTO_free_ex_data(g_ec_ex_data_class_bss_get(), r, &r->ex_data); |
| |
| EC_GROUP_free(r->group); |
| EC_POINT_free(r->pub_key); |
| ec_wrapped_scalar_free(r->priv_key); |
| |
| OPENSSL_free(r); |
| } |
| |
| EC_KEY *EC_KEY_dup(const EC_KEY *src) { |
| if (src == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| EC_KEY *ret = EC_KEY_new(); |
| if (ret == NULL) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| if ((src->group != NULL && |
| !EC_KEY_set_group(ret, src->group)) || |
| (src->pub_key != NULL && |
| !EC_KEY_set_public_key(ret, src->pub_key)) || |
| (src->priv_key != NULL && |
| !EC_KEY_set_private_key(ret, EC_KEY_get0_private_key(src)))) { |
| EC_KEY_free(ret); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| ret->enc_flag = src->enc_flag; |
| ret->conv_form = src->conv_form; |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int EC_KEY_up_ref(EC_KEY *r) { |
| CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&r->references); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int EC_KEY_is_opaque(const EC_KEY *key) { |
| return key->ecdsa_meth && (key->ecdsa_meth->flags & ECDSA_FLAG_OPAQUE); |
| } |
| |
| const EC_GROUP *EC_KEY_get0_group(const EC_KEY *key) { return key->group; } |
| |
| int EC_KEY_set_group(EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *group) { |
| // If |key| already has a group, it is an error to switch to another one. |
| if (key->group != NULL) { |
| if (EC_GROUP_cmp(key->group, group, NULL) != 0) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_GROUP_MISMATCH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| assert(key->priv_key == NULL); |
| assert(key->pub_key == NULL); |
| |
| EC_GROUP_free(key->group); |
| key->group = EC_GROUP_dup(group); |
| return key->group != NULL; |
| } |
| |
| const BIGNUM *EC_KEY_get0_private_key(const EC_KEY *key) { |
| return key->priv_key != NULL ? &key->priv_key->bignum : NULL; |
| } |
| |
| int EC_KEY_set_private_key(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *priv_key) { |
| if (key->group == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| EC_WRAPPED_SCALAR *scalar = ec_wrapped_scalar_new(key->group); |
| if (scalar == NULL) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (!ec_bignum_to_scalar(key->group, &scalar->scalar, priv_key) || |
| ec_scalar_is_zero(key->group, &scalar->scalar)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY); |
| ec_wrapped_scalar_free(scalar); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| ec_wrapped_scalar_free(key->priv_key); |
| key->priv_key = scalar; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| const EC_POINT *EC_KEY_get0_public_key(const EC_KEY *key) { |
| return key->pub_key; |
| } |
| |
| int EC_KEY_set_public_key(EC_KEY *key, const EC_POINT *pub_key) { |
| if (key->group == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (pub_key != NULL && EC_GROUP_cmp(key->group, pub_key->group, NULL) != 0) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_GROUP_MISMATCH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| EC_POINT_free(key->pub_key); |
| key->pub_key = EC_POINT_dup(pub_key, key->group); |
| return (key->pub_key == NULL) ? 0 : 1; |
| } |
| |
| unsigned int EC_KEY_get_enc_flags(const EC_KEY *key) { return key->enc_flag; } |
| |
| void EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(EC_KEY *key, unsigned int flags) { |
| key->enc_flag = flags; |
| } |
| |
| point_conversion_form_t EC_KEY_get_conv_form(const EC_KEY *key) { |
| return key->conv_form; |
| } |
| |
| void EC_KEY_set_conv_form(EC_KEY *key, point_conversion_form_t cform) { |
| key->conv_form = cform; |
| } |
| |
| int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey) { |
| if (!eckey || !eckey->group || !eckey->pub_key) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| // Test whether the public key is on the elliptic curve. |
| if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, NULL)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| // Check the public and private keys match. |
| // |
| // NOTE: this is a FIPS pair-wise consistency check for the ECDH case. See SP |
| // 800-56Ar3, page 36. |
| if (eckey->priv_key != NULL) { |
| EC_JACOBIAN point; |
| if (!ec_point_mul_scalar_base(eckey->group, &point, |
| &eckey->priv_key->scalar)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| // Leaking this comparison only leaks whether |eckey|'s public key was |
| // correct. |
| if (!constant_time_declassify_int(ec_GFp_simple_points_equal( |
| eckey->group, &point, &eckey->pub_key->raw))) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int EC_KEY_check_fips(const EC_KEY *key) { |
| int ret = 0; |
| FIPS_service_indicator_lock_state(); |
| |
| if (EC_KEY_is_opaque(key)) { |
| // Opaque keys can't be checked. |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_PUBLIC_KEY_VALIDATION_FAILED); |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| if (!EC_KEY_check_key(key)) { |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| if (key->priv_key) { |
| uint8_t data[16] = {0}; |
| ECDSA_SIG *sig = ECDSA_do_sign(data, sizeof(data), key); |
| if (boringssl_fips_break_test("ECDSA_PWCT")) { |
| data[0] = ~data[0]; |
| } |
| int ok = sig != NULL && |
| ECDSA_do_verify(data, sizeof(data), sig, key); |
| ECDSA_SIG_free(sig); |
| if (!ok) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_PUBLIC_KEY_VALIDATION_FAILED); |
| goto end; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| ret = 1; |
| |
| end: |
| FIPS_service_indicator_unlock_state(); |
| if (ret) { |
| EC_KEY_keygen_verify_service_indicator(key); |
| } |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *x, |
| const BIGNUM *y) { |
| EC_POINT *point = NULL; |
| int ok = 0; |
| |
| if (!key || !key->group || !x || !y) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| point = EC_POINT_new(key->group); |
| if (point == NULL || |
| !EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(key->group, point, x, y, NULL) || |
| !EC_KEY_set_public_key(key, point) || |
| !EC_KEY_check_key(key)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| ok = 1; |
| |
| err: |
| EC_POINT_free(point); |
| return ok; |
| } |
| |
| int EC_KEY_oct2key(EC_KEY *key, const uint8_t *in, size_t len, BN_CTX *ctx) { |
| if (key->group == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| EC_POINT *point = EC_POINT_new(key->group); |
| int ok = point != NULL && |
| EC_POINT_oct2point(key->group, point, in, len, ctx) && |
| EC_KEY_set_public_key(key, point); |
| EC_POINT_free(point); |
| return ok; |
| } |
| |
| size_t EC_KEY_key2buf(const EC_KEY *key, point_conversion_form_t form, |
| uint8_t **out_buf, BN_CTX *ctx) { |
| if (key == NULL || key->pub_key == NULL || key->group == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return EC_POINT_point2buf(key->group, key->pub_key, form, out_buf, ctx); |
| } |
| |
| int EC_KEY_oct2priv(EC_KEY *key, const uint8_t *in, size_t len) { |
| if (key->group == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (len != BN_num_bytes(EC_GROUP_get0_order(key->group))) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| BIGNUM *priv_key = BN_bin2bn(in, len, NULL); |
| int ok = priv_key != NULL && // |
| EC_KEY_set_private_key(key, priv_key); |
| BN_free(priv_key); |
| return ok; |
| } |
| |
| size_t EC_KEY_priv2oct(const EC_KEY *key, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out) { |
| if (key->group == NULL || key->priv_key == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| size_t len = BN_num_bytes(EC_GROUP_get0_order(key->group)); |
| if (out == NULL) { |
| return len; |
| } |
| |
| if (max_out < len) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| size_t bytes_written; |
| ec_scalar_to_bytes(key->group, out, &bytes_written, &key->priv_key->scalar); |
| assert(bytes_written == len); |
| return len; |
| } |
| |
| size_t EC_KEY_priv2buf(const EC_KEY *key, uint8_t **out_buf) { |
| *out_buf = NULL; |
| size_t len = EC_KEY_priv2oct(key, NULL, 0); |
| if (len == 0) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| uint8_t *buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len); |
| if (buf == NULL) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| len = EC_KEY_priv2oct(key, buf, len); |
| if (len == 0) { |
| OPENSSL_free(buf); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| *out_buf = buf; |
| return len; |
| } |
| |
| int EC_KEY_generate_key(EC_KEY *key) { |
| if (key == NULL || key->group == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| // Check that the group order is FIPS compliant (FIPS 186-4 B.4.2). |
| if (EC_GROUP_order_bits(key->group) < 160) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static const uint8_t kDefaultAdditionalData[32] = {0}; |
| EC_WRAPPED_SCALAR *priv_key = ec_wrapped_scalar_new(key->group); |
| EC_POINT *pub_key = EC_POINT_new(key->group); |
| if (priv_key == NULL || pub_key == NULL || |
| // Generate the private key by testing candidates (FIPS 186-4 B.4.2). |
| !ec_random_nonzero_scalar(key->group, &priv_key->scalar, |
| kDefaultAdditionalData) || |
| !ec_point_mul_scalar_base(key->group, &pub_key->raw, &priv_key->scalar)) { |
| EC_POINT_free(pub_key); |
| ec_wrapped_scalar_free(priv_key); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| // The public key is derived from the private key, but it is public. |
| // |
| // TODO(crbug.com/boringssl/677): This isn't quite right. While |pub_key| |
| // represents a public point, it is still in Jacobian form and the exact |
| // Jacobian representation is secret. We need to make it affine first. See |
| // discussion in the bug. |
| CONSTTIME_DECLASSIFY(&pub_key->raw, sizeof(pub_key->raw)); |
| |
| ec_wrapped_scalar_free(key->priv_key); |
| key->priv_key = priv_key; |
| EC_POINT_free(key->pub_key); |
| key->pub_key = pub_key; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int EC_KEY_generate_key_fips(EC_KEY *eckey) { |
| boringssl_ensure_ecc_self_test(); |
| |
| if (EC_KEY_generate_key(eckey) && EC_KEY_check_fips(eckey)) { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| EC_POINT_free(eckey->pub_key); |
| ec_wrapped_scalar_free(eckey->priv_key); |
| eckey->pub_key = NULL; |
| eckey->priv_key = NULL; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int EC_KEY_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused, |
| CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused, |
| CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) { |
| return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(g_ec_ex_data_class_bss_get(), argl, argp, |
| free_func); |
| } |
| |
| int EC_KEY_set_ex_data(EC_KEY *d, int idx, void *arg) { |
| return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx, arg); |
| } |
| |
| void *EC_KEY_get_ex_data(const EC_KEY *d, int idx) { |
| return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx); |
| } |
| |
| void EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(EC_KEY *key, int flag) {} |