OpenSSL Advisory: June 9th, 2026 (BoringSSL Not Affected) BoringSSL counterpart to https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20260609.txt Change-Id: I1dd83ef6e42f2d1d76cfba4a9831a265d97f864a Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/96987 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
diff --git a/docs/advisories/2026-06-09.md b/docs/advisories/2026-06-09.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f837cb4 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/advisories/2026-06-09.md
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +# OpenSSL Advisory: June 9th, 2026 (BoringSSL Not Affected) + +OpenSSL have published a [security advisory](https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20260609.txt). Here's how it affects BoringSSL: + +CVE | Summary | [Severity] in OpenSSL | Impact to BoringSSL +----|---------|-----------------------|--------------------- +CVE-2026-45447 | Heap Use-After-Free in the PKCS7_verify() Function | High | Not affected, impacted code was removed from BoringSSL in the initial fork +CVE-2026-34182 | CMS AuthEnvelopedData Processing May Accept Forged Messages | Moderate | Not affected, impacted code was removed from BoringSSL in the initial fork +CVE-2026-34183 | Unbounded Memory Growth in the QUIC PATH_CHALLENGE Handler | Moderate | Not affected, issue was introduced after fork +CVE-2026-35188 | Double-free When Checking OCSP Stapled Response | Moderate | Not affected, issue was introduced after fork +CVE-2026-42764 | NULL Pointer Dereference in QUIC Server Initial Packet Handling | Moderate | Not affected, issue was introduced after fork +CVE-2026-45445 | AES-OCB IV Ignored on EVP_Cipher() Path | Moderate | Not affected, issue was introduced after fork +CVE-2026-7383 | Possible Heap Buffer Overflow in ASN.1 Multibyte String Conversion | Low | Not affected, independently [fixed in 2018](https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/28325) +CVE-2026-9076 | Out-of-Bounds Read in CMS Password-Based Decryption | Low | Not affected, impacted code was removed from BoringSSL in the initial fork +CVE-2026-34180 | Heap Buffer Over-read in ASN.1 Content Parsing | Low | Not affected, independently [fixed in 2017](https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/20366). See discussion below. +CVE-2026-34181 | PKCS#12 Files with PBMAC1 Are Accepted with Short HMAC Keys | Low | Not affected, issue was introduced after fork +CVE-2026-42765 | NULL Dereference in Certificate Verification with OCSP Checking | Low | Not affected, issue was introduced after fork +CVE-2026-42766 | Possible NULL Dereference in Password-Based CMS Decryption | Low | Not affected, impacted code was removed from BoringSSL in the initial fork +CVE-2026-42767 | NULL Pointer Dereference in CRMF EncryptedValue Decryption | Low | Not affected, issue was introduced after fork +CVE-2026-42768 | Multi-RecipientInfo Bleichenbacher Oracle in CMS_decrypt() and PKCS7_decrypt() | Low | Not affected, impacted code was removed from BoringSSL in the initial fork +CVE-2026-42769 | Trust-Anchor Substitution via cert/issuer Typo in CMP rootCaKeyUpdate | Low | Not affected, issue was introduced after fork +CVE-2026-42770 | FFC-DH Peer Validation Uses Attacker-Supplied q | Low | Not affected, issue was introduced after fork +CVE-2026-42771 | Possible Out of Bounds Read in X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email() | Low | Not affected, issue was introduced after fork +CVE-2026-45446 | Incorrect Tag Processing for Empty Messages in AES-GCM-SIV and AES-SIV modes | Low | Not affected, issue was introduced after fork + +[Severity]: https://openssl-library.org/policies/general/security-policy/index.html#issue-severity + +## CVE-2026-34180 + +This issue concerns the table-based `crypto/asn1` module in OpenSSL. At the start of the project, we identified this module's parser as especially risky, particularly around mismatched use of integers, type-safety, and error-prone bounds-checking conventions. We wrote `crypto/bytestring`, a [simpler ASN.1 and TLS parsing library](https://commondatastorage.googleapis.com/chromium-boringssl-docs/bytestring.h.html), and have gradually replaced our parsing with the new library. + +Although the `crypto/asn1` parser is still in BoringSSL, in 2017 we [capped the input size](https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/20366) to mitigate its integer overflows, including CVE-2026-34180. + +Over time, we've [documented and trimmed](https://crbug.com/42290289) the library, [removed particularly complex parts](https://crbug.com/42290221) of the parser, and [fixed integer truncations](https://crbug.com/42290291) at the API boundary. Building on this, we plan to [reimplement the underlying table-processing logic](https://crbug.com/42290418) with `crypto/bytestring` to further harden this code.