| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | |
| * All rights reserved. | |
| * | |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
| * | |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
| * | |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | |
| * the code are not to be removed. | |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
| * | |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
| * are met: | |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
| * | |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
| * | |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | |
| */ | |
| /* ==================================================================== | |
| * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. | |
| * | |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
| * are met: | |
| * | |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
| * | |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in | |
| * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the | |
| * distribution. | |
| * | |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this | |
| * software must display the following acknowledgment: | |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
| * | |
| * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to | |
| * endorse or promote products derived from this software without | |
| * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact | |
| * openssl-core@openssl.org. | |
| * | |
| * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" | |
| * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written | |
| * permission of the OpenSSL Project. | |
| * | |
| * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following | |
| * acknowledgment: | |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
| * | |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY | |
| * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR | |
| * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR | |
| * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, | |
| * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT | |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; | |
| * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, | |
| * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) | |
| * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED | |
| * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | |
| * ==================================================================== | |
| * | |
| * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young | |
| * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim | |
| * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
| * | |
| */ | |
| /* ==================================================================== | |
| * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. | |
| * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by | |
| * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. | |
| */ | |
| /* ==================================================================== | |
| * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. | |
| * | |
| * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by | |
| * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source | |
| * license. | |
| * | |
| * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of | |
| * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites | |
| * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. | |
| * | |
| * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in | |
| * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received | |
| * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. | |
| * | |
| * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not | |
| * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third | |
| * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights | |
| * to make use of the Contribution. | |
| * | |
| * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN | |
| * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA | |
| * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY | |
| * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR | |
| * OTHERWISE. */ | |
| #include <openssl/ssl.h> | |
| #include <assert.h> | |
| #include <string.h> | |
| #include <openssl/bytestring.h> | |
| #include <openssl/crypto.h> | |
| #include <openssl/dh.h> | |
| #include <openssl/err.h> | |
| #include <openssl/lhash.h> | |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> | |
| #include <openssl/rand.h> | |
| #include <openssl/x509v3.h> | |
| #include "internal.h" | |
| #include "../crypto/internal.h" | |
| /* |SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL| is no longer emitted, but continue to define it | |
| * to avoid downstream churn. */ | |
| OPENSSL_DECLARE_ERROR_REASON(SSL, UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL) | |
| /* Some error codes are special. Ensure the make_errors.go script never | |
| * regresses this. */ | |
| OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION == | |
| SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION + SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET, | |
| ssl_alert_reason_code_mismatch); | |
| /* kMaxHandshakeSize is the maximum size, in bytes, of a handshake message. */ | |
| static const size_t kMaxHandshakeSize = (1u << 24) - 1; | |
| static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class_ssl = | |
| CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA; | |
| static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class_ssl_ctx = | |
| CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA; | |
| int SSL_library_init(void) { | |
| CRYPTO_library_init(); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static uint32_t ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *sess) { | |
| const uint8_t *session_id = sess->session_id; | |
| uint8_t tmp_storage[sizeof(uint32_t)]; | |
| if (sess->session_id_length < sizeof(tmp_storage)) { | |
| memset(tmp_storage, 0, sizeof(tmp_storage)); | |
| memcpy(tmp_storage, sess->session_id, sess->session_id_length); | |
| session_id = tmp_storage; | |
| } | |
| uint32_t hash = | |
| ((uint32_t)session_id[0]) | | |
| ((uint32_t)session_id[1] << 8) | | |
| ((uint32_t)session_id[2] << 16) | | |
| ((uint32_t)session_id[3] << 24); | |
| return hash; | |
| } | |
| /* NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of | |
| * coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure | |
| * SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on being | |
| * able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing session | |
| * with a matching session ID. */ | |
| static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a, const SSL_SESSION *b) { | |
| if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| return memcmp(a->session_id, b->session_id, a->session_id_length); | |
| } | |
| SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *method) { | |
| SSL_CTX *ret = NULL; | |
| if (method == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| if (SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() < 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CTX)); | |
| if (ret == NULL) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| memset(ret, 0, sizeof(SSL_CTX)); | |
| ret->method = method->method; | |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(&ret->lock); | |
| ret->session_cache_mode = SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER; | |
| ret->session_cache_size = SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT; | |
| /* We take the system default */ | |
| ret->session_timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT; | |
| ret->references = 1; | |
| ret->max_cert_list = SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT; | |
| ret->verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_NONE; | |
| ret->cert = ssl_cert_new(); | |
| if (ret->cert == NULL) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| ret->sessions = lh_SSL_SESSION_new(ssl_session_hash, ssl_session_cmp); | |
| if (ret->sessions == NULL) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| ret->cert_store = X509_STORE_new(); | |
| if (ret->cert_store == NULL) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method, &ret->cipher_list, | |
| &ret->cipher_list_by_id, SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST); | |
| if (ret->cipher_list == NULL || | |
| sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list->ciphers) <= 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS); | |
| goto err2; | |
| } | |
| ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); | |
| if (!ret->param) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| ret->client_CA = sk_X509_NAME_new_null(); | |
| if (ret->client_CA == NULL) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ret->ex_data); | |
| ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; | |
| /* Setup RFC4507 ticket keys */ | |
| if (!RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16) || | |
| !RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16) || | |
| !RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16)) { | |
| ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; | |
| } | |
| ret->min_version = ret->method->min_version; | |
| ret->max_version = ret->method->max_version; | |
| /* Lock the SSL_CTX to the specified version, for compatibility with legacy | |
| * uses of SSL_METHOD. */ | |
| if (method->version != 0) { | |
| SSL_CTX_set_max_version(ret, method->version); | |
| SSL_CTX_set_min_version(ret, method->version); | |
| } else if (!method->method->is_dtls) { | |
| /* TODO(svaldez): Enable TLS 1.3 by default once fully implemented. */ | |
| SSL_CTX_set_max_version(ret, TLS1_2_VERSION); | |
| } | |
| return ret; | |
| err: | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| err2: | |
| SSL_CTX_free(ret); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_up_ref(SSL_CTX *ctx) { | |
| CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&ctx->references); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *ctx) { | |
| if (ctx == NULL || | |
| !CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&ctx->references)) { | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); | |
| /* Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference the | |
| * ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed after the | |
| * sessions were flushed. As the ex_data handling routines might also touch | |
| * the session cache, the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the | |
| * cache, then free ex_data, then finally free the cache. (See ticket | |
| * [openssl.org #212].) */ | |
| SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(ctx, 0); | |
| CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class_ssl_ctx, ctx, &ctx->ex_data); | |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&ctx->lock); | |
| lh_SSL_SESSION_free(ctx->sessions); | |
| X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store); | |
| ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(ctx->cipher_list); | |
| sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ctx->cipher_list_by_id); | |
| ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(ctx->cipher_list_tls10); | |
| ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(ctx->cipher_list_tls11); | |
| ssl_cert_free(ctx->cert); | |
| sk_SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_pop_free(ctx->client_custom_extensions, | |
| SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_free); | |
| sk_SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_pop_free(ctx->server_custom_extensions, | |
| SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_free); | |
| sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ctx->client_CA, X509_NAME_free); | |
| sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(ctx->srtp_profiles); | |
| OPENSSL_free(ctx->psk_identity_hint); | |
| OPENSSL_free(ctx->supported_group_list); | |
| OPENSSL_free(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list); | |
| OPENSSL_free(ctx->ocsp_response); | |
| OPENSSL_free(ctx->signed_cert_timestamp_list); | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private); | |
| OPENSSL_free(ctx); | |
| } | |
| SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) { | |
| if (ctx == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| if (ctx->method == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| SSL *ssl = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL)); | |
| if (ssl == NULL) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| memset(ssl, 0, sizeof(SSL)); | |
| ssl->min_version = ctx->min_version; | |
| ssl->max_version = ctx->max_version; | |
| /* RFC 6347 states that implementations SHOULD use an initial timer value of | |
| * 1 second. */ | |
| ssl->initial_timeout_duration_ms = 1000; | |
| ssl->options = ctx->options; | |
| ssl->mode = ctx->mode; | |
| ssl->max_cert_list = ctx->max_cert_list; | |
| ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert); | |
| if (ssl->cert == NULL) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| ssl->msg_callback = ctx->msg_callback; | |
| ssl->msg_callback_arg = ctx->msg_callback_arg; | |
| ssl->verify_mode = ctx->verify_mode; | |
| ssl->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length; | |
| assert(ssl->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof ssl->sid_ctx); | |
| memcpy(&ssl->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx)); | |
| ssl->verify_callback = ctx->default_verify_callback; | |
| ssl->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); | |
| if (!ssl->param) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ssl->param, ctx->param); | |
| ssl->quiet_shutdown = ctx->quiet_shutdown; | |
| ssl->max_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment; | |
| CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&ctx->references); | |
| ssl->ctx = ctx; | |
| CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&ctx->references); | |
| ssl->initial_ctx = ctx; | |
| if (ctx->supported_group_list) { | |
| ssl->supported_group_list = | |
| BUF_memdup(ctx->supported_group_list, | |
| ctx->supported_group_list_len * 2); | |
| if (!ssl->supported_group_list) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| ssl->supported_group_list_len = ctx->supported_group_list_len; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list) { | |
| ssl->alpn_client_proto_list = BUF_memdup( | |
| ssl->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list, ssl->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len); | |
| if (ssl->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| ssl->alpn_client_proto_list_len = ssl->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len; | |
| } | |
| ssl->verify_result = X509_V_OK; | |
| ssl->method = ctx->method; | |
| if (!ssl->method->ssl_new(ssl)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
| CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ssl->ex_data); | |
| ssl->psk_identity_hint = NULL; | |
| if (ctx->psk_identity_hint) { | |
| ssl->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(ctx->psk_identity_hint); | |
| if (ssl->psk_identity_hint == NULL) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| ssl->psk_client_callback = ctx->psk_client_callback; | |
| ssl->psk_server_callback = ctx->psk_server_callback; | |
| ssl->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = ctx->tlsext_channel_id_enabled; | |
| if (ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private) { | |
| EVP_PKEY_up_ref(ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private); | |
| ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private = ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private; | |
| } | |
| ssl->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled = | |
| ssl->ctx->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled; | |
| ssl->ocsp_stapling_enabled = ssl->ctx->ocsp_stapling_enabled; | |
| return ssl; | |
| err: | |
| SSL_free(ssl); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_free(SSL *ssl) { | |
| if (ssl == NULL) { | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ssl->param); | |
| CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class_ssl, ssl, &ssl->ex_data); | |
| ssl_free_wbio_buffer(ssl); | |
| assert(ssl->bbio == NULL); | |
| BIO_free_all(ssl->rbio); | |
| BIO_free_all(ssl->wbio); | |
| BUF_MEM_free(ssl->init_buf); | |
| /* add extra stuff */ | |
| ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(ssl->cipher_list); | |
| sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ssl->cipher_list_by_id); | |
| ssl_clear_bad_session(ssl); | |
| SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->session); | |
| ssl_cert_free(ssl->cert); | |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl->tlsext_hostname); | |
| SSL_CTX_free(ssl->initial_ctx); | |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl->supported_group_list); | |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list); | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private); | |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl->psk_identity_hint); | |
| sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ssl->client_CA, X509_NAME_free); | |
| sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(ssl->srtp_profiles); | |
| if (ssl->method != NULL) { | |
| ssl->method->ssl_free(ssl); | |
| } | |
| SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); | |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl); | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *ssl) { | |
| ssl->server = 0; | |
| ssl->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT; | |
| ssl->handshake_func = ssl3_connect; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *ssl) { | |
| ssl->server = 1; | |
| ssl->state = SSL_ST_ACCEPT; | |
| ssl->handshake_func = ssl3_accept; | |
| } | |
| static void ssl_set_rbio(SSL *ssl, BIO *rbio) { | |
| BIO_free_all(ssl->rbio); | |
| ssl->rbio = rbio; | |
| } | |
| static void ssl_set_wbio(SSL *ssl, BIO *wbio) { | |
| /* If the output buffering BIO is still in place, remove it. */ | |
| if (ssl->bbio != NULL) { | |
| ssl->wbio = BIO_pop(ssl->wbio); | |
| } | |
| BIO_free_all(ssl->wbio); | |
| ssl->wbio = wbio; | |
| /* Re-attach |bbio| to the new |wbio|. */ | |
| if (ssl->bbio != NULL) { | |
| ssl->wbio = BIO_push(ssl->bbio, ssl->wbio); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_bio(SSL *ssl, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio) { | |
| /* For historical reasons, this function has many different cases in ownership | |
| * handling. */ | |
| /* If the two arguments are equal, one fewer reference is granted than | |
| * taken. */ | |
| if (rbio != NULL && rbio == wbio) { | |
| BIO_up_ref(rbio); | |
| } | |
| /* If at most one of rbio or wbio is changed, only adopt one reference. */ | |
| if (rbio == SSL_get_rbio(ssl)) { | |
| ssl_set_wbio(ssl, wbio); | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| if (wbio == SSL_get_wbio(ssl)) { | |
| ssl_set_rbio(ssl, rbio); | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| /* Otherwise, adopt both references. */ | |
| ssl_set_rbio(ssl, rbio); | |
| ssl_set_wbio(ssl, wbio); | |
| } | |
| BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->rbio; } | |
| BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *ssl) { | |
| if (ssl->bbio != NULL) { | |
| /* If |bbio| is active, the true caller-configured BIO is its |next_bio|. */ | |
| assert(ssl->bbio == ssl->wbio); | |
| return ssl->bbio->next_bio; | |
| } | |
| return ssl->wbio; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *ssl) { | |
| ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
| /* Functions which use SSL_get_error must clear the error queue on entry. */ | |
| ERR_clear_error(); | |
| ERR_clear_system_error(); | |
| if (ssl->handshake_func == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| if (!SSL_in_init(ssl)) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| return ssl->handshake_func(ssl); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_connect(SSL *ssl) { | |
| if (ssl->handshake_func == NULL) { | |
| /* Not properly initialized yet */ | |
| SSL_set_connect_state(ssl); | |
| } | |
| return SSL_do_handshake(ssl); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_accept(SSL *ssl) { | |
| if (ssl->handshake_func == NULL) { | |
| /* Not properly initialized yet */ | |
| SSL_set_accept_state(ssl); | |
| } | |
| return SSL_do_handshake(ssl); | |
| } | |
| static int ssl_read_impl(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num, int peek) { | |
| ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
| /* Functions which use SSL_get_error must clear the error queue on entry. */ | |
| ERR_clear_error(); | |
| ERR_clear_system_error(); | |
| if (ssl->handshake_func == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| /* This may require multiple iterations. False Start will cause | |
| * |ssl->handshake_func| to signal success one step early, but the handshake | |
| * must be completely finished before other modes are accepted. */ | |
| while (SSL_in_init(ssl)) { | |
| int ret = SSL_do_handshake(ssl); | |
| if (ret < 0) { | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| if (ret == 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return ssl->method->read_app_data(ssl, buf, num, peek); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_read(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num) { | |
| return ssl_read_impl(ssl, buf, num, 0 /* consume bytes */); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_peek(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num) { | |
| return ssl_read_impl(ssl, buf, num, 1 /* peek */); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_write(SSL *ssl, const void *buf, int num) { | |
| ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
| /* Functions which use SSL_get_error must clear the error queue on entry. */ | |
| ERR_clear_error(); | |
| ERR_clear_system_error(); | |
| if (ssl->handshake_func == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl->s3->send_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_none) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| /* If necessary, complete the handshake implicitly. */ | |
| if (SSL_in_init(ssl) && !SSL_in_false_start(ssl)) { | |
| int ret = SSL_do_handshake(ssl); | |
| if (ret < 0) { | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| if (ret == 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return ssl->method->write_app_data(ssl, buf, num); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_shutdown(SSL *ssl) { | |
| ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
| /* Functions which use SSL_get_error must clear the error queue on entry. */ | |
| ERR_clear_error(); | |
| ERR_clear_system_error(); | |
| if (ssl->handshake_func == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| /* We can't shutdown properly if we are in the middle of a handshake. */ | |
| if (SSL_in_init(ssl)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SHUTDOWN_WHILE_IN_INIT); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl->quiet_shutdown) { | |
| /* Do nothing if configured not to send a close_notify. */ | |
| ssl->s3->send_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_close_notify; | |
| ssl->s3->recv_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_close_notify; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* This function completes in two stages. It sends a close_notify and then it | |
| * waits for a close_notify to come in. Perform exactly one action and return | |
| * whether or not it succeeds. */ | |
| if (ssl->s3->send_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_close_notify) { | |
| /* Send a close_notify. */ | |
| if (ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) <= 0) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| } else if (ssl->s3->alert_dispatch) { | |
| /* Finish sending the close_notify. */ | |
| if (ssl->method->dispatch_alert(ssl) <= 0) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| } else if (ssl->s3->recv_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_close_notify) { | |
| /* Wait for the peer's close_notify. */ | |
| ssl->method->read_close_notify(ssl); | |
| if (ssl->s3->recv_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_close_notify) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* Return 0 for unidirectional shutdown and 1 for bidirectional shutdown. */ | |
| return ssl->s3->recv_shutdown == ssl_shutdown_close_notify; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_error(const SSL *ssl, int ret_code) { | |
| int reason; | |
| uint32_t err; | |
| BIO *bio; | |
| if (ret_code > 0) { | |
| return SSL_ERROR_NONE; | |
| } | |
| /* Make things return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when doing SSL_do_handshake etc, | |
| * where we do encode the error */ | |
| err = ERR_peek_error(); | |
| if (err != 0) { | |
| if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_SYS) { | |
| return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL; | |
| } | |
| return SSL_ERROR_SSL; | |
| } | |
| if (ret_code == 0) { | |
| if (ssl->s3->recv_shutdown == ssl_shutdown_close_notify) { | |
| return SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN; | |
| } | |
| /* An EOF was observed which violates the protocol, and the underlying | |
| * transport does not participate in the error queue. Bubble up to the | |
| * caller. */ | |
| return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL; | |
| } | |
| if (SSL_want_session(ssl)) { | |
| return SSL_ERROR_PENDING_SESSION; | |
| } | |
| if (SSL_want_certificate(ssl)) { | |
| return SSL_ERROR_PENDING_CERTIFICATE; | |
| } | |
| if (SSL_want_read(ssl)) { | |
| bio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl); | |
| if (BIO_should_read(bio)) { | |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ; | |
| } | |
| if (BIO_should_write(bio)) { | |
| /* This one doesn't make too much sense ... We never try to write to the | |
| * rbio, and an application program where rbio and wbio are separate | |
| * couldn't even know what it should wait for. However if we ever set | |
| * ssl->rwstate incorrectly (so that we have SSL_want_read(ssl) instead of | |
| * SSL_want_write(ssl)) and rbio and wbio *are* the same, this test works | |
| * around that bug; so it might be safer to keep it. */ | |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE; | |
| } | |
| if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) { | |
| reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); | |
| if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) { | |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT; | |
| } | |
| if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) { | |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT; | |
| } | |
| return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL; /* unknown */ | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (SSL_want_write(ssl)) { | |
| bio = SSL_get_wbio(ssl); | |
| if (BIO_should_write(bio)) { | |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE; | |
| } | |
| if (BIO_should_read(bio)) { | |
| /* See above (SSL_want_read(ssl) with BIO_should_write(bio)) */ | |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ; | |
| } | |
| if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) { | |
| reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); | |
| if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) { | |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT; | |
| } | |
| if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) { | |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT; | |
| } | |
| return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (SSL_want_x509_lookup(ssl)) { | |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP; | |
| } | |
| if (SSL_want_channel_id_lookup(ssl)) { | |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP; | |
| } | |
| if (SSL_want_private_key_operation(ssl)) { | |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION; | |
| } | |
| return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_min_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t version) { | |
| ctx->min_version = ctx->method->version_from_wire(version); | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_max_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t version) { | |
| ctx->max_version = ctx->method->version_from_wire(version); | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_min_version(SSL *ssl, uint16_t version) { | |
| ssl->min_version = ssl->method->version_from_wire(version); | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_max_version(SSL *ssl, uint16_t version) { | |
| ssl->max_version = ssl->method->version_from_wire(version); | |
| } | |
| uint32_t SSL_CTX_set_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t options) { | |
| ctx->options |= options; | |
| return ctx->options; | |
| } | |
| uint32_t SSL_CTX_clear_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t options) { | |
| ctx->options &= ~options; | |
| return ctx->options; | |
| } | |
| uint32_t SSL_CTX_get_options(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->options; } | |
| uint32_t SSL_set_options(SSL *ssl, uint32_t options) { | |
| ssl->options |= options; | |
| return ssl->options; | |
| } | |
| uint32_t SSL_clear_options(SSL *ssl, uint32_t options) { | |
| ssl->options &= ~options; | |
| return ssl->options; | |
| } | |
| uint32_t SSL_get_options(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->options; } | |
| uint32_t SSL_CTX_set_mode(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t mode) { | |
| ctx->mode |= mode; | |
| return ctx->mode; | |
| } | |
| uint32_t SSL_CTX_clear_mode(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t mode) { | |
| ctx->mode &= ~mode; | |
| return ctx->mode; | |
| } | |
| uint32_t SSL_CTX_get_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->mode; } | |
| uint32_t SSL_set_mode(SSL *ssl, uint32_t mode) { | |
| ssl->mode |= mode; | |
| return ssl->mode; | |
| } | |
| uint32_t SSL_clear_mode(SSL *ssl, uint32_t mode) { | |
| ssl->mode &= ~mode; | |
| return ssl->mode; | |
| } | |
| uint32_t SSL_get_mode(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->mode; } | |
| X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *ssl) { | |
| if (ssl == NULL || ssl->session == NULL || ssl->session->peer == NULL) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| return X509_up_ref(ssl->session->peer); | |
| } | |
| STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *ssl) { | |
| if (ssl == NULL || ssl->session == NULL) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| return ssl->session->cert_chain; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_tls_unique(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, | |
| size_t max_out) { | |
| /* The tls-unique value is the first Finished message in the handshake, which | |
| * is the client's in a full handshake and the server's for a resumption. See | |
| * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5929#section-3.1. */ | |
| const uint8_t *finished = ssl->s3->previous_client_finished; | |
| size_t finished_len = ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len; | |
| if (ssl->hit) { | |
| /* tls-unique is broken for resumed sessions unless EMS is used. */ | |
| if (!ssl->session->extended_master_secret) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| finished = ssl->s3->previous_server_finished; | |
| finished_len = ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len; | |
| } | |
| if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete || | |
| ssl->version < TLS1_VERSION) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| *out_len = finished_len; | |
| if (finished_len > max_out) { | |
| *out_len = max_out; | |
| } | |
| memcpy(out, finished, *out_len); | |
| return 1; | |
| err: | |
| *out_len = 0; | |
| memset(out, 0, max_out); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *sid_ctx, | |
| unsigned sid_ctx_len) { | |
| if (sid_ctx_len > sizeof(ctx->sid_ctx)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ctx->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len; | |
| memcpy(ctx->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *sid_ctx, | |
| unsigned sid_ctx_len) { | |
| if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ssl->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len; | |
| memcpy(ssl->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *ctx, int purpose) { | |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(ctx->param, purpose); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *ssl, int purpose) { | |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(ssl->param, purpose); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *ctx, int trust) { | |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(ctx->param, trust); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set_trust(SSL *ssl, int trust) { | |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(ssl->param, trust); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, param); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ssl->param, param); | |
| } | |
| void ssl_cipher_preference_list_free( | |
| struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st *cipher_list) { | |
| if (cipher_list == NULL) { | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipher_list->ciphers); | |
| OPENSSL_free(cipher_list->in_group_flags); | |
| OPENSSL_free(cipher_list); | |
| } | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_CTX_get0_param(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->param; } | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_get0_param(SSL *ssl) { return ssl->param; } | |
| void SSL_certs_clear(SSL *ssl) { ssl_cert_clear_certs(ssl->cert); } | |
| int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *ssl) { return SSL_get_rfd(ssl); } | |
| int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *ssl) { | |
| int ret = -1; | |
| BIO *b = BIO_find_type(SSL_get_rbio(ssl), BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR); | |
| if (b != NULL) { | |
| BIO_get_fd(b, &ret); | |
| } | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *ssl) { | |
| int ret = -1; | |
| BIO *b = BIO_find_type(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR); | |
| if (b != NULL) { | |
| BIO_get_fd(b, &ret); | |
| } | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set_fd(SSL *ssl, int fd) { | |
| BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); | |
| if (bio == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE); | |
| SSL_set_bio(ssl, bio, bio); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *ssl, int fd) { | |
| BIO *rbio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl); | |
| if (rbio == NULL || BIO_method_type(rbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET || | |
| BIO_get_fd(rbio, NULL) != fd) { | |
| BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); | |
| if (bio == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE); | |
| SSL_set_bio(ssl, rbio, bio); | |
| } else { | |
| SSL_set_bio(ssl, rbio, rbio); | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *ssl, int fd) { | |
| BIO *wbio = SSL_get_wbio(ssl); | |
| if (wbio == NULL || BIO_method_type(wbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET || | |
| BIO_get_fd(wbio, NULL) != fd) { | |
| BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); | |
| if (bio == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE); | |
| SSL_set_bio(ssl, bio, wbio); | |
| } else { | |
| SSL_set_bio(ssl, wbio, wbio); | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *ssl, void *buf, size_t count) { | |
| size_t ret = 0; | |
| if (ssl->s3 != NULL) { | |
| ret = ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md_len; | |
| if (count > ret) { | |
| count = ret; | |
| } | |
| memcpy(buf, ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md, count); | |
| } | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *ssl, void *buf, size_t count) { | |
| size_t ret = 0; | |
| if (ssl->s3 != NULL) { | |
| ret = ssl->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; | |
| if (count > ret) { | |
| count = ret; | |
| } | |
| memcpy(buf, ssl->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, count); | |
| } | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->verify_mode; } | |
| int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *ssl) { | |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ssl->param); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_extms_support(const SSL *ssl) { | |
| return ssl->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret == 1; | |
| } | |
| int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *ssl))(int, X509_STORE_CTX *) { | |
| return ssl->verify_callback; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->verify_mode; } | |
| int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { | |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ctx->param); | |
| } | |
| int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx))( | |
| int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *store_ctx) { | |
| return ctx->default_verify_callback; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_verify(SSL *ssl, int mode, | |
| int (*callback)(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *store_ctx)) { | |
| ssl->verify_mode = mode; | |
| if (callback != NULL) { | |
| ssl->verify_callback = callback; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *ssl, int depth) { | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ssl->param, depth); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } | |
| int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *ssl) { return 0; } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(SSL_CTX *ctx, int yes) { } | |
| void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *ssl, int yes) { } | |
| int SSL_pending(const SSL *ssl) { | |
| if (ssl->s3->rrec.type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return ssl->s3->rrec.length; | |
| } | |
| /* Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options */ | |
| int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { | |
| if (ctx->cert->x509 == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (ctx->cert->privatekey == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return X509_check_private_key(ctx->cert->x509, ctx->cert->privatekey); | |
| } | |
| /* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */ | |
| int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl) { | |
| if (ssl->cert->x509 == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl->cert->privatekey == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return X509_check_private_key(ssl->cert->x509, ssl->cert->privatekey); | |
| } | |
| long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *ssl) { | |
| return SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *ssl) { | |
| /* Caller-initiated renegotiation is not supported. */ | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *ssl) { | |
| return SSL_in_init(ssl) && ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_total_renegotiations(const SSL *ssl) { | |
| return ssl->s3->total_renegotiations; | |
| } | |
| size_t SSL_CTX_get_max_cert_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { | |
| return ctx->max_cert_list; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t max_cert_list) { | |
| if (max_cert_list > kMaxHandshakeSize) { | |
| max_cert_list = kMaxHandshakeSize; | |
| } | |
| ctx->max_cert_list = (uint32_t)max_cert_list; | |
| } | |
| size_t SSL_get_max_cert_list(const SSL *ssl) { | |
| return ssl->max_cert_list; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_max_cert_list(SSL *ssl, size_t max_cert_list) { | |
| if (max_cert_list > kMaxHandshakeSize) { | |
| max_cert_list = kMaxHandshakeSize; | |
| } | |
| ssl->max_cert_list = (uint32_t)max_cert_list; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t max_send_fragment) { | |
| if (max_send_fragment < 512) { | |
| max_send_fragment = 512; | |
| } | |
| if (max_send_fragment > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { | |
| max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; | |
| } | |
| ctx->max_send_fragment = (uint16_t)max_send_fragment; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set_max_send_fragment(SSL *ssl, size_t max_send_fragment) { | |
| if (max_send_fragment < 512) { | |
| max_send_fragment = 512; | |
| } | |
| if (max_send_fragment > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { | |
| max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; | |
| } | |
| ssl->max_send_fragment = (uint16_t)max_send_fragment; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set_mtu(SSL *ssl, unsigned mtu) { | |
| if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl) || mtu < dtls1_min_mtu()) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ssl->d1->mtu = mtu; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(const SSL *ssl) { | |
| return ssl->s3->send_connection_binding; | |
| } | |
| LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->sessions; } | |
| size_t SSL_CTX_sess_number(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { | |
| return lh_SSL_SESSION_num_items(ctx->sessions); | |
| } | |
| unsigned long SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long size) { | |
| unsigned long ret = ctx->session_cache_size; | |
| ctx->session_cache_size = size; | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| unsigned long SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { | |
| return ctx->session_cache_size; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode) { | |
| int ret = ctx->session_cache_mode; | |
| ctx->session_cache_mode = mode; | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { | |
| return ctx->session_cache_mode; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_ticket_keys(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *out, size_t len) { | |
| if (out == NULL) { | |
| return 48; | |
| } | |
| if (len != 48) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| uint8_t *out_bytes = out; | |
| memcpy(out_bytes, ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); | |
| memcpy(out_bytes + 16, ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16); | |
| memcpy(out_bytes + 32, ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys(SSL_CTX *ctx, const void *in, size_t len) { | |
| if (in == NULL) { | |
| return 48; | |
| } | |
| if (len != 48) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| const uint8_t *in_bytes = in; | |
| memcpy(ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, in_bytes, 16); | |
| memcpy(ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, in_bytes + 16, 16); | |
| memcpy(ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, in_bytes + 32, 16); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb( | |
| SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*callback)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *key_name, uint8_t *iv, | |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, HMAC_CTX *hmac_ctx, | |
| int encrypt)) { | |
| ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb = callback; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set1_curves(SSL_CTX *ctx, const int *curves, size_t curves_len) { | |
| return tls1_set_curves(&ctx->supported_group_list, | |
| &ctx->supported_group_list_len, curves, | |
| curves_len); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set1_curves(SSL *ssl, const int *curves, size_t curves_len) { | |
| return tls1_set_curves(&ssl->supported_group_list, | |
| &ssl->supported_group_list_len, curves, | |
| curves_len); | |
| } | |
| uint16_t SSL_get_curve_id(const SSL *ssl) { | |
| /* TODO(davidben): This checks the wrong session if there is a renegotiation in | |
| * progress. */ | |
| if (ssl->session == NULL || | |
| ssl->session->cipher == NULL || | |
| !SSL_CIPHER_is_ECDHE(ssl->session->cipher)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return (uint16_t)ssl->session->key_exchange_info; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(SSL_CTX *ctx, const DH *dh) { | |
| DH_free(ctx->cert->dh_tmp); | |
| ctx->cert->dh_tmp = DHparams_dup(dh); | |
| if (ctx->cert->dh_tmp == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_DH_LIB); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set_tmp_dh(SSL *ssl, const DH *dh) { | |
| DH_free(ssl->cert->dh_tmp); | |
| ssl->cert->dh_tmp = DHparams_dup(dh); | |
| if (ssl->cert->dh_tmp == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_DH_LIB); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *ssl) { | |
| if (ssl == NULL) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl->cipher_list != NULL) { | |
| return ssl->cipher_list->ciphers; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION && ssl->ctx->cipher_list_tls11 != NULL) { | |
| return ssl->ctx->cipher_list_tls11->ciphers; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl->version >= TLS1_VERSION && ssl->ctx->cipher_list_tls10 != NULL) { | |
| return ssl->ctx->cipher_list_tls10->ciphers; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl->ctx->cipher_list != NULL) { | |
| return ssl->ctx->cipher_list->ciphers; | |
| } | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| /* return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of | |
| * algorithm id */ | |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *ssl) { | |
| if (ssl == NULL) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) { | |
| return ssl->cipher_list_by_id; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl->ctx->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) { | |
| return ssl->ctx->cipher_list_by_id; | |
| } | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *ssl, int n) { | |
| const SSL_CIPHER *c; | |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; | |
| if (ssl == NULL) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| sk = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl); | |
| if (sk == NULL || n < 0 || (size_t)n >= sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk)) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, n); | |
| if (c == NULL) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| return c->name; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) { | |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list = ssl_create_cipher_list( | |
| ctx->method, &ctx->cipher_list, &ctx->cipher_list_by_id, str); | |
| if (cipher_list == NULL) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* |ssl_create_cipher_list| may succeed but return an empty cipher list. */ | |
| if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_list) == 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list_tls10(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) { | |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list = ssl_create_cipher_list( | |
| ctx->method, &ctx->cipher_list_tls10, NULL, str); | |
| if (cipher_list == NULL) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* |ssl_create_cipher_list| may succeed but return an empty cipher list. */ | |
| if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_list) == 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list_tls11(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) { | |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list = ssl_create_cipher_list( | |
| ctx->method, &ctx->cipher_list_tls11, NULL, str); | |
| if (cipher_list == NULL) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* |ssl_create_cipher_list| may succeed but return an empty cipher list. */ | |
| if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_list) == 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *ssl, const char *str) { | |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list = ssl_create_cipher_list( | |
| ssl->ctx->method, &ssl->cipher_list, &ssl->cipher_list_by_id, str); | |
| if (cipher_list == NULL) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* |ssl_create_cipher_list| may succeed but return an empty cipher list. */ | |
| if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_list) == 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) * | |
| ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *ssl, const CBS *cbs, uint16_t max_version) { | |
| CBS cipher_suites = *cbs; | |
| const SSL_CIPHER *c; | |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; | |
| if (ssl->s3) { | |
| ssl->s3->send_connection_binding = 0; | |
| } | |
| if (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) % 2 != 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); | |
| if (sk == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| while (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) { | |
| uint16_t cipher_suite; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16(&cipher_suites, &cipher_suite)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* Check for SCSV. */ | |
| if (ssl->s3 && cipher_suite == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xffff)) { | |
| /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating. */ | |
| if (ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING); | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| ssl->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; | |
| continue; | |
| } | |
| /* Check for FALLBACK_SCSV. */ | |
| if (ssl->s3 && cipher_suite == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xffff)) { | |
| if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < max_version) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| continue; | |
| } | |
| c = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite); | |
| if (c != NULL && !sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return sk; | |
| err: | |
| sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *ssl, const int type) { | |
| if (type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| /* Historically, |SSL_get_servername| was also the configuration getter | |
| * corresponding to |SSL_set_tlsext_host_name|. */ | |
| if (ssl->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { | |
| return ssl->tlsext_hostname; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl->session == NULL) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| return ssl->session->tlsext_hostname; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *ssl) { | |
| if (ssl->session != NULL && ssl->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { | |
| return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; | |
| } | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_enable_signed_cert_timestamps(SSL_CTX *ctx) { | |
| ctx->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled = 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_enable_signed_cert_timestamps(SSL *ssl) { | |
| ssl->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled = 1; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_enable_ocsp_stapling(SSL_CTX *ctx) { | |
| ctx->ocsp_stapling_enabled = 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_enable_ocsp_stapling(SSL *ssl) { | |
| ssl->ocsp_stapling_enabled = 1; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_get0_signed_cert_timestamp_list(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out, | |
| size_t *out_len) { | |
| SSL_SESSION *session = ssl->session; | |
| *out_len = 0; | |
| *out = NULL; | |
| if (ssl->server || !session || !session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list) { | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| *out = session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list; | |
| *out_len = session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_get0_ocsp_response(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out, | |
| size_t *out_len) { | |
| SSL_SESSION *session = ssl->session; | |
| *out_len = 0; | |
| *out = NULL; | |
| if (ssl->server || !session || !session->ocsp_response) { | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| *out = session->ocsp_response; | |
| *out_len = session->ocsp_response_length; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_signed_cert_timestamp_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *list, | |
| size_t list_len) { | |
| OPENSSL_free(ctx->signed_cert_timestamp_list); | |
| ctx->signed_cert_timestamp_list_length = 0; | |
| ctx->signed_cert_timestamp_list = BUF_memdup(list, list_len); | |
| if (ctx->signed_cert_timestamp_list == NULL) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ctx->signed_cert_timestamp_list_length = list_len; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_ocsp_response(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *response, | |
| size_t response_len) { | |
| OPENSSL_free(ctx->ocsp_response); | |
| ctx->ocsp_response_length = 0; | |
| ctx->ocsp_response = BUF_memdup(response, response_len); | |
| if (ctx->ocsp_response == NULL) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ctx->ocsp_response_length = response_len; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(SSL *ssl, const char *name) { | |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl->tlsext_hostname); | |
| ssl->tlsext_hostname = NULL; | |
| if (name == NULL) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| size_t len = strlen(name); | |
| if (len == 0 || len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ssl->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(name); | |
| if (ssl->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback( | |
| SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*callback)(SSL *ssl, int *out_alert, void *arg)) { | |
| ctx->tlsext_servername_callback = callback; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg) { | |
| ctx->tlsext_servername_arg = arg; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_select_next_proto(uint8_t **out, uint8_t *out_len, | |
| const uint8_t *server, unsigned server_len, | |
| const uint8_t *client, unsigned client_len) { | |
| unsigned int i, j; | |
| const uint8_t *result; | |
| int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED; | |
| /* For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it. */ | |
| for (i = 0; i < server_len;) { | |
| for (j = 0; j < client_len;) { | |
| if (server[i] == client[j] && | |
| memcmp(&server[i + 1], &client[j + 1], server[i]) == 0) { | |
| /* We found a match */ | |
| result = &server[i]; | |
| status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED; | |
| goto found; | |
| } | |
| j += client[j]; | |
| j++; | |
| } | |
| i += server[i]; | |
| i++; | |
| } | |
| /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */ | |
| result = client; | |
| status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP; | |
| found: | |
| *out = (uint8_t *)result + 1; | |
| *out_len = result[0]; | |
| return status; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out_data, | |
| unsigned *out_len) { | |
| *out_data = ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated; | |
| if (*out_data == NULL) { | |
| *out_len = 0; | |
| } else { | |
| *out_len = ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated_len; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb( | |
| SSL_CTX *ctx, | |
| int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out, unsigned *out_len, void *arg), | |
| void *arg) { | |
| ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb; | |
| ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb( | |
| SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t **out, uint8_t *out_len, | |
| const uint8_t *in, unsigned in_len, void *arg), | |
| void *arg) { | |
| ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb; | |
| ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *protos, | |
| unsigned protos_len) { | |
| OPENSSL_free(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list); | |
| ctx->alpn_client_proto_list = BUF_memdup(protos, protos_len); | |
| if (!ctx->alpn_client_proto_list) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set_alpn_protos(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *protos, unsigned protos_len) { | |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list); | |
| ssl->alpn_client_proto_list = BUF_memdup(protos, protos_len); | |
| if (!ssl->alpn_client_proto_list) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| ssl->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, | |
| int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out, | |
| uint8_t *out_len, const uint8_t *in, | |
| unsigned in_len, void *arg), | |
| void *arg) { | |
| ctx->alpn_select_cb = cb; | |
| ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg = arg; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out_data, | |
| unsigned *out_len) { | |
| *out_data = NULL; | |
| if (ssl->s3) { | |
| *out_data = ssl->s3->alpn_selected; | |
| } | |
| if (*out_data == NULL) { | |
| *out_len = 0; | |
| } else { | |
| *out_len = ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_enable_tls_channel_id(SSL_CTX *ctx) { | |
| ctx->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = 1; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_enable_tls_channel_id(SSL *ssl) { | |
| ssl->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = 1; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int is_p256_key(EVP_PKEY *private_key) { | |
| const EC_KEY *ec_key = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(private_key); | |
| return ec_key != NULL && | |
| EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key)) == | |
| NID_X9_62_prime256v1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set1_tls_channel_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *private_key) { | |
| if (!is_p256_key(private_key)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_NOT_P256); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private); | |
| EVP_PKEY_up_ref(private_key); | |
| ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private = private_key; | |
| ctx->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = 1; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set1_tls_channel_id(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *private_key) { | |
| if (!is_p256_key(private_key)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_NOT_P256); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private); | |
| EVP_PKEY_up_ref(private_key); | |
| ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private = private_key; | |
| ssl->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = 1; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| size_t SSL_get_tls_channel_id(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out) { | |
| if (!ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| memcpy(out, ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id, (max_out < 64) ? max_out : 64); | |
| return 64; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, | |
| int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *store_ctx, | |
| void *arg), | |
| void *arg) { | |
| ctx->app_verify_callback = cb; | |
| ctx->app_verify_arg = arg; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode, | |
| int (*cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) { | |
| ctx->verify_mode = mode; | |
| ctx->default_verify_callback = cb; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth) { | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), | |
| void *arg) { | |
| ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(ctx->cert, cb, arg); | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_cert_cb(SSL *ssl, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) { | |
| ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(ssl->cert, cb, arg); | |
| } | |
| size_t SSL_get0_certificate_types(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out_types) { | |
| if (ssl->server) { | |
| *out_types = NULL; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| *out_types = ssl->s3->tmp.certificate_types; | |
| return ssl->s3->tmp.num_certificate_types; | |
| } | |
| void ssl_get_compatible_server_ciphers(SSL *ssl, uint32_t *out_mask_k, | |
| uint32_t *out_mask_a) { | |
| uint32_t mask_k = 0; | |
| uint32_t mask_a = 0; | |
| if (ssl->cert->x509 != NULL && ssl_has_private_key(ssl)) { | |
| if (ssl_private_key_type(ssl) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { | |
| mask_k |= SSL_kRSA; | |
| mask_a |= SSL_aRSA; | |
| } else if (ssl_private_key_type(ssl) == EVP_PKEY_EC) { | |
| /* An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDSA cipher suites depending on | |
| * the key usage extension and on the client's group preferences. */ | |
| X509 *x = ssl->cert->x509; | |
| /* This call populates extension flags (ex_flags). */ | |
| X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); | |
| int ecdsa_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) | |
| ? (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) | |
| : 1; | |
| if (ecdsa_ok && tls1_check_ec_cert(ssl, x)) { | |
| mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (ssl->cert->dh_tmp != NULL || ssl->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL) { | |
| mask_k |= SSL_kDHE; | |
| } | |
| /* Check for a shared group to consider ECDHE ciphers. */ | |
| uint16_t unused; | |
| if (tls1_get_shared_group(ssl, &unused)) { | |
| mask_k |= SSL_kECDHE; | |
| } | |
| /* CECPQ1 ciphers are always acceptable if supported by both sides. */ | |
| mask_k |= SSL_kCECPQ1; | |
| /* PSK requires a server callback. */ | |
| if (ssl->psk_server_callback != NULL) { | |
| mask_k |= SSL_kPSK; | |
| mask_a |= SSL_aPSK; | |
| } | |
| *out_mask_k = mask_k; | |
| *out_mask_a = mask_a; | |
| } | |
| void ssl_update_cache(SSL *ssl, int mode) { | |
| SSL_CTX *ctx = ssl->initial_ctx; | |
| /* Never cache sessions with empty session IDs. */ | |
| if (ssl->session->session_id_length == 0 || | |
| (ctx->session_cache_mode & mode) != mode) { | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| /* Clients never use the internal session cache. */ | |
| int use_internal_cache = ssl->server && !(ctx->session_cache_mode & | |
| SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE); | |
| /* A client may see new sessions on abbreviated handshakes if the server | |
| * decides to renew the ticket. Once the handshake is completed, it should be | |
| * inserted into the cache. */ | |
| if (!ssl->hit || (!ssl->server && ssl->tlsext_ticket_expected)) { | |
| if (use_internal_cache) { | |
| SSL_CTX_add_session(ctx, ssl->session); | |
| } | |
| if (ctx->new_session_cb != NULL && | |
| !ctx->new_session_cb(ssl, SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ssl->session))) { | |
| /* |new_session_cb|'s return value signals whether it took ownership. */ | |
| SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->session); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (use_internal_cache && | |
| !(ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) { | |
| /* Automatically flush the internal session cache every 255 connections. */ | |
| int flush_cache = 0; | |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&ctx->lock); | |
| ctx->handshakes_since_cache_flush++; | |
| if (ctx->handshakes_since_cache_flush >= 255) { | |
| flush_cache = 1; | |
| ctx->handshakes_since_cache_flush = 0; | |
| } | |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&ctx->lock); | |
| if (flush_cache) { | |
| SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(ctx, (unsigned long)time(NULL)); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| static const char *ssl_get_version(int version) { | |
| switch (version) { | |
| case TLS1_3_VERSION: | |
| return "TLSv1.3"; | |
| case TLS1_2_VERSION: | |
| return "TLSv1.2"; | |
| case TLS1_1_VERSION: | |
| return "TLSv1.1"; | |
| case TLS1_VERSION: | |
| return "TLSv1"; | |
| case SSL3_VERSION: | |
| return "SSLv3"; | |
| case DTLS1_VERSION: | |
| return "DTLSv1"; | |
| case DTLS1_2_VERSION: | |
| return "DTLSv1.2"; | |
| default: | |
| return "unknown"; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *ssl) { | |
| return ssl_get_version(ssl->version); | |
| } | |
| const char *SSL_SESSION_get_version(const SSL_SESSION *session) { | |
| return ssl_get_version(session->ssl_version); | |
| } | |
| X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *ssl) { | |
| if (ssl->cert != NULL) { | |
| return ssl->cert->x509; | |
| } | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| EVP_PKEY *SSL_get_privatekey(const SSL *ssl) { | |
| if (ssl->cert != NULL) { | |
| return ssl->cert->privatekey; | |
| } | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| X509 *SSL_CTX_get0_certificate(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { | |
| if (ctx->cert != NULL) { | |
| return ctx->cert->x509; | |
| } | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| EVP_PKEY *SSL_CTX_get0_privatekey(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { | |
| if (ctx->cert != NULL) { | |
| return ctx->cert->privatekey; | |
| } | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *ssl) { | |
| if (ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx == NULL) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| return ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->cipher; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_session_reused(const SSL *ssl) { | |
| return ssl->hit; | |
| } | |
| const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *ssl) { return NULL; } | |
| const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *ssl) { return NULL; } | |
| int *SSL_get_server_tmp_key(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY **out_key) { return 0; } | |
| int ssl_is_wbio_buffered(const SSL *ssl) { | |
| return ssl->bbio != NULL; | |
| } | |
| int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *ssl) { | |
| if (ssl->bbio != NULL) { | |
| /* Already buffered. */ | |
| assert(ssl->bbio == ssl->wbio); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| BIO *bbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); | |
| if (bbio == NULL || | |
| !BIO_set_read_buffer_size(bbio, 1)) { | |
| BIO_free(bbio); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ssl->bbio = bbio; | |
| ssl->wbio = BIO_push(bbio, ssl->wbio); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *ssl) { | |
| if (ssl->bbio == NULL) { | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| assert(ssl->bbio == ssl->wbio); | |
| ssl->wbio = BIO_pop(ssl->wbio); | |
| BIO_free(ssl->bbio); | |
| ssl->bbio = NULL; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode) { | |
| ctx->quiet_shutdown = (mode != 0); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { | |
| return ctx->quiet_shutdown; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *ssl, int mode) { | |
| ssl->quiet_shutdown = (mode != 0); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->quiet_shutdown; } | |
| void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *ssl, int mode) { | |
| /* It is an error to clear any bits that have already been set. (We can't try | |
| * to get a second close_notify or send two.) */ | |
| assert((SSL_get_shutdown(ssl) & mode) == SSL_get_shutdown(ssl)); | |
| if (mode & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN && | |
| ssl->s3->recv_shutdown == ssl_shutdown_none) { | |
| ssl->s3->recv_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_close_notify; | |
| } | |
| if (mode & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN && | |
| ssl->s3->send_shutdown == ssl_shutdown_none) { | |
| ssl->s3->send_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_close_notify; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *ssl) { | |
| int ret = 0; | |
| if (ssl->s3->recv_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_none) { | |
| /* Historically, OpenSSL set |SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN| on both close_notify | |
| * and fatal alert. */ | |
| ret |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl->s3->send_shutdown == ssl_shutdown_close_notify) { | |
| /* Historically, OpenSSL set |SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN| on only close_notify. */ | |
| ret |= SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN; | |
| } | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_version(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->version; } | |
| SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->ctx; } | |
| SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx) { | |
| if (ssl->ctx == ctx) { | |
| return ssl->ctx; | |
| } | |
| if (ctx == NULL) { | |
| ctx = ssl->initial_ctx; | |
| } | |
| ssl_cert_free(ssl->cert); | |
| ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert); | |
| CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&ctx->references); | |
| SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */ | |
| ssl->ctx = ctx; | |
| ssl->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length; | |
| assert(ssl->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx)); | |
| memcpy(ssl->sid_ctx, ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx)); | |
| return ssl->ctx; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx) { | |
| return X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx->cert_store); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *ca_file, | |
| const char *ca_dir) { | |
| return X509_STORE_load_locations(ctx->cert_store, ca_file, ca_dir); | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl, | |
| void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value)) { | |
| ssl->info_callback = cb; | |
| } | |
| void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl))(const SSL *ssl, int type, | |
| int value) { | |
| return ssl->info_callback; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->state; } | |
| void SSL_set_state(SSL *ssl, int state) { } | |
| char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *ssl, char *buf, int len) { | |
| if (len <= 0) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| buf[0] = '\0'; | |
| return buf; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl, long result) { | |
| ssl->verify_result = result; | |
| } | |
| long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->verify_result; } | |
| int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused, | |
| CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) { | |
| int index; | |
| if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class_ssl, &index, argl, argp, | |
| dup_func, free_func)) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| return index; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *ssl, int idx, void *arg) { | |
| return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ssl->ex_data, idx, arg); | |
| } | |
| void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *ssl, int idx) { | |
| return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ssl->ex_data, idx); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused, | |
| CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, | |
| CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) { | |
| int index; | |
| if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class_ssl_ctx, &index, argl, argp, | |
| dup_func, free_func)) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| return index; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *arg) { | |
| return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, arg); | |
| } | |
| void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *ctx, int idx) { | |
| return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx); | |
| } | |
| X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { | |
| return ctx->cert_store; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store) { | |
| X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store); | |
| ctx->cert_store = store; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_want(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->rwstate; } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, | |
| RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, | |
| int keylength)) { | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl, RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, | |
| int keylength)) { | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, | |
| DH *(*callback)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, | |
| int keylength)) { | |
| ctx->cert->dh_tmp_cb = callback; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl, DH *(*callback)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, | |
| int keylength)) { | |
| ssl->cert->dh_tmp_cb = callback; | |
| } | |
| unsigned SSL_get_dhe_group_size(const SSL *ssl) { | |
| /* TODO(davidben): This checks the wrong session if there is a renegotiation in | |
| * progress. */ | |
| if (ssl->session == NULL || | |
| ssl->session->cipher == NULL || | |
| !SSL_CIPHER_is_DHE(ssl->session->cipher)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return ssl->session->key_exchange_info; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint) { | |
| if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| OPENSSL_free(ctx->psk_identity_hint); | |
| if (identity_hint != NULL) { | |
| ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint); | |
| if (ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } else { | |
| ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *ssl, const char *identity_hint) { | |
| if (ssl == NULL) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Clear currently configured hint, if any. */ | |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl->psk_identity_hint); | |
| ssl->psk_identity_hint = NULL; | |
| if (identity_hint != NULL) { | |
| ssl->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint); | |
| if (ssl->psk_identity_hint == NULL) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *ssl) { | |
| if (ssl == NULL) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| return ssl->psk_identity_hint; | |
| } | |
| const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *ssl) { | |
| if (ssl == NULL || ssl->session == NULL) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| return ssl->session->psk_identity; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_psk_client_callback( | |
| SSL *ssl, unsigned (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, | |
| unsigned max_identity_len, uint8_t *psk, | |
| unsigned max_psk_len)) { | |
| ssl->psk_client_callback = cb; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback( | |
| SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, | |
| unsigned max_identity_len, uint8_t *psk, | |
| unsigned max_psk_len)) { | |
| ctx->psk_client_callback = cb; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_psk_server_callback( | |
| SSL *ssl, unsigned (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, uint8_t *psk, | |
| unsigned max_psk_len)) { | |
| ssl->psk_server_callback = cb; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback( | |
| SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, | |
| uint8_t *psk, unsigned max_psk_len)) { | |
| ctx->psk_server_callback = cb; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, | |
| void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, | |
| int content_type, const void *buf, | |
| size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)) { | |
| ctx->msg_callback = cb; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg) { | |
| ctx->msg_callback_arg = arg; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, | |
| void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, | |
| const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, | |
| void *arg)) { | |
| ssl->msg_callback = cb; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(SSL *ssl, void *arg) { | |
| ssl->msg_callback_arg = arg; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, | |
| void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, const char *line)) { | |
| ctx->keylog_callback = cb; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_current_time_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, | |
| void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, | |
| struct timeval *out_clock)) { | |
| ctx->current_time_cb = cb; | |
| } | |
| static int cbb_add_hex(CBB *cbb, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) { | |
| static const char hextable[] = "0123456789abcdef"; | |
| uint8_t *out; | |
| size_t i; | |
| if (!CBB_add_space(cbb, &out, in_len * 2)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| for (i = 0; i < in_len; i++) { | |
| *(out++) = (uint8_t)hextable[in[i] >> 4]; | |
| *(out++) = (uint8_t)hextable[in[i] & 0xf]; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(const SSL *ssl, | |
| const uint8_t *encrypted_premaster, | |
| size_t encrypted_premaster_len, | |
| const uint8_t *premaster, | |
| size_t premaster_len) { | |
| if (ssl->ctx->keylog_callback == NULL) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| if (encrypted_premaster_len < 8) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| CBB cbb; | |
| uint8_t *out; | |
| size_t out_len; | |
| if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 4 + 16 + 1 + premaster_len * 2 + 1) || | |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, (const uint8_t *)"RSA ", 4) || | |
| /* Only the first 8 bytes of the encrypted premaster secret are | |
| * logged. */ | |
| !cbb_add_hex(&cbb, encrypted_premaster, 8) || | |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, (const uint8_t *)" ", 1) || | |
| !cbb_add_hex(&cbb, premaster, premaster_len) || | |
| !CBB_add_u8(&cbb, 0 /* NUL */) || | |
| !CBB_finish(&cbb, &out, &out_len)) { | |
| CBB_cleanup(&cbb); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ssl->ctx->keylog_callback(ssl, (const char *)out); | |
| OPENSSL_free(out); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int ssl_log_master_secret(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *client_random, | |
| size_t client_random_len, const uint8_t *master, | |
| size_t master_len) { | |
| if (ssl->ctx->keylog_callback == NULL) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| if (client_random_len != 32) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| CBB cbb; | |
| uint8_t *out; | |
| size_t out_len; | |
| if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 14 + 64 + 1 + master_len * 2 + 1) || | |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, (const uint8_t *)"CLIENT_RANDOM ", 14) || | |
| !cbb_add_hex(&cbb, client_random, 32) || | |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, (const uint8_t *)" ", 1) || | |
| !cbb_add_hex(&cbb, master, master_len) || | |
| !CBB_add_u8(&cbb, 0 /* NUL */) || | |
| !CBB_finish(&cbb, &out, &out_len)) { | |
| CBB_cleanup(&cbb); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ssl->ctx->keylog_callback(ssl, (const char *)out); | |
| OPENSSL_free(out); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_is_init_finished(const SSL *ssl) { | |
| return ssl->state == SSL_ST_OK; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_in_init(const SSL *ssl) { | |
| return (ssl->state & SSL_ST_INIT) != 0; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_in_false_start(const SSL *ssl) { | |
| return ssl->s3->tmp.in_false_start; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_cutthrough_complete(const SSL *ssl) { | |
| return SSL_in_false_start(ssl); | |
| } | |
| void SSL_get_structure_sizes(size_t *ssl_size, size_t *ssl_ctx_size, | |
| size_t *ssl_session_size) { | |
| *ssl_size = sizeof(SSL); | |
| *ssl_ctx_size = sizeof(SSL_CTX); | |
| *ssl_session_size = sizeof(SSL_SESSION); | |
| } | |
| int ssl3_can_false_start(const SSL *ssl) { | |
| const SSL_CIPHER *const cipher = SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl); | |
| /* False Start only for TLS 1.2 with an ECDHE+AEAD cipher and ALPN or NPN. */ | |
| return !SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl) && | |
| SSL_version(ssl) == TLS1_2_VERSION && | |
| (ssl->s3->alpn_selected || ssl->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) && | |
| cipher != NULL && | |
| (cipher->algorithm_mkey == SSL_kECDHE || | |
| cipher->algorithm_mkey == SSL_kCECPQ1) && | |
| cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD; | |
| } | |
| const SSL3_ENC_METHOD *ssl3_get_enc_method(uint16_t version) { | |
| switch (version) { | |
| case SSL3_VERSION: | |
| return &SSLv3_enc_data; | |
| case TLS1_VERSION: | |
| case TLS1_1_VERSION: | |
| case TLS1_2_VERSION: | |
| case TLS1_3_VERSION: | |
| return &TLSv1_enc_data; | |
| default: | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| const struct { | |
| uint16_t version; | |
| uint32_t flag; | |
| } kVersions[] = { | |
| {SSL3_VERSION, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3}, | |
| {TLS1_VERSION, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1}, | |
| {TLS1_1_VERSION, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1}, | |
| {TLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2}, | |
| {TLS1_3_VERSION, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3}, | |
| }; | |
| static const size_t kVersionsLen = sizeof(kVersions) / sizeof(kVersions[0]); | |
| int ssl_get_version_range(const SSL *ssl, uint16_t *out_min_version, | |
| uint16_t *out_max_version) { | |
| /* For historical reasons, |SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1| aliases |SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|, but | |
| * DTLS 1.0 should be mapped to TLS 1.1. */ | |
| uint32_t options = ssl->options; | |
| if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { | |
| options &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1; | |
| if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) { | |
| options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| uint16_t min_version = ssl->min_version; | |
| uint16_t max_version = ssl->max_version; | |
| /* Bound the range to only those implemented in this protocol. */ | |
| if (min_version < ssl->method->min_version) { | |
| min_version = ssl->method->min_version; | |
| } | |
| if (max_version > ssl->method->max_version) { | |
| max_version = ssl->method->max_version; | |
| } | |
| /* OpenSSL's API for controlling versions entails blacklisting individual | |
| * protocols. This has two problems. First, on the client, the protocol can | |
| * only express a contiguous range of versions. Second, a library consumer | |
| * trying to set a maximum version cannot disable protocol versions that get | |
| * added in a future version of the library. | |
| * | |
| * To account for both of these, OpenSSL interprets the client-side bitmask | |
| * as a min/max range by picking the lowest contiguous non-empty range of | |
| * enabled protocols. Note that this means it is impossible to set a maximum | |
| * version of the higest supported TLS version in a future-proof way. */ | |
| size_t i; | |
| int any_enabled = 0; | |
| for (i = 0; i < kVersionsLen; i++) { | |
| /* Only look at the versions already enabled. */ | |
| if (min_version > kVersions[i].version) { | |
| continue; | |
| } | |
| if (max_version < kVersions[i].version) { | |
| break; | |
| } | |
| if (!(options & kVersions[i].flag)) { | |
| /* The minimum version is the first enabled version. */ | |
| if (!any_enabled) { | |
| any_enabled = 1; | |
| min_version = kVersions[i].version; | |
| } | |
| continue; | |
| } | |
| /* If there is a disabled version after the first enabled one, all versions | |
| * after it are implicitly disabled. */ | |
| if (any_enabled) { | |
| max_version = kVersions[i-1].version; | |
| break; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (!any_enabled) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| *out_min_version = min_version; | |
| *out_max_version = max_version; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| uint16_t ssl3_protocol_version(const SSL *ssl) { | |
| assert(ssl->s3->have_version); | |
| return ssl->method->version_from_wire(ssl->version); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_is_server(SSL *ssl) { return ssl->server; } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_select_certificate_cb( | |
| SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *)) { | |
| ctx->select_certificate_cb = cb; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_dos_protection_cb( | |
| SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *)) { | |
| ctx->dos_protection_cb = cb; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_renegotiate_mode(SSL *ssl, enum ssl_renegotiate_mode_t mode) { | |
| ssl->renegotiate_mode = mode; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_reject_peer_renegotiations(SSL *ssl, int reject) { | |
| SSL_set_renegotiate_mode( | |
| ssl, reject ? ssl_renegotiate_never : ssl_renegotiate_freely); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_rc4_state(const SSL *ssl, const RC4_KEY **read_key, | |
| const RC4_KEY **write_key) { | |
| if (ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx == NULL || ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx == NULL) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return EVP_AEAD_CTX_get_rc4_state(&ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->ctx, read_key) && | |
| EVP_AEAD_CTX_get_rc4_state(&ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->ctx, write_key); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_ivs(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out_read_iv, | |
| const uint8_t **out_write_iv, size_t *out_iv_len) { | |
| if (ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx == NULL || ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx == NULL) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| size_t write_iv_len; | |
| if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_get_iv(&ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->ctx, out_read_iv, | |
| out_iv_len) || | |
| !EVP_AEAD_CTX_get_iv(&ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->ctx, out_write_iv, | |
| &write_iv_len) || | |
| *out_iv_len != write_iv_len) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static uint64_t be_to_u64(const uint8_t in[8]) { | |
| return (((uint64_t)in[0]) << 56) | (((uint64_t)in[1]) << 48) | | |
| (((uint64_t)in[2]) << 40) | (((uint64_t)in[3]) << 32) | | |
| (((uint64_t)in[4]) << 24) | (((uint64_t)in[5]) << 16) | | |
| (((uint64_t)in[6]) << 8) | ((uint64_t)in[7]); | |
| } | |
| uint64_t SSL_get_read_sequence(const SSL *ssl) { | |
| /* TODO(davidben): Internally represent sequence numbers as uint64_t. */ | |
| if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { | |
| /* max_seq_num already includes the epoch. */ | |
| assert(ssl->d1->r_epoch == (ssl->d1->bitmap.max_seq_num >> 48)); | |
| return ssl->d1->bitmap.max_seq_num; | |
| } | |
| return be_to_u64(ssl->s3->read_sequence); | |
| } | |
| uint64_t SSL_get_write_sequence(const SSL *ssl) { | |
| uint64_t ret = be_to_u64(ssl->s3->write_sequence); | |
| if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { | |
| assert((ret >> 48) == 0); | |
| ret |= ((uint64_t)ssl->d1->w_epoch) << 48; | |
| } | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| uint16_t SSL_get_peer_signature_algorithm(const SSL *ssl) { | |
| return ssl->s3->tmp.peer_signature_algorithm; | |
| } | |
| size_t SSL_get_client_random(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out) { | |
| if (max_out == 0) { | |
| return sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random); | |
| } | |
| if (max_out > sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random)) { | |
| max_out = sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random); | |
| } | |
| memcpy(out, ssl->s3->client_random, max_out); | |
| return max_out; | |
| } | |
| size_t SSL_get_server_random(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out) { | |
| if (max_out == 0) { | |
| return sizeof(ssl->s3->server_random); | |
| } | |
| if (max_out > sizeof(ssl->s3->server_random)) { | |
| max_out = sizeof(ssl->s3->server_random); | |
| } | |
| memcpy(out, ssl->s3->server_random, max_out); | |
| return max_out; | |
| } | |
| const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_pending_cipher(const SSL *ssl) { | |
| if (!SSL_in_init(ssl)) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| return ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs(SSL_CTX *ctx, int enabled) { | |
| ctx->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs = !!enabled; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_clear(SSL *ssl) { | |
| if (ssl->method == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl_clear_bad_session(ssl)) { | |
| SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->session); | |
| ssl->session = NULL; | |
| } | |
| ssl->hit = 0; | |
| /* SSL_clear may be called before or after the |ssl| is initialized in either | |
| * accept or connect state. In the latter case, SSL_clear should preserve the | |
| * half and reset |ssl->state| accordingly. */ | |
| if (ssl->handshake_func != NULL) { | |
| if (ssl->server) { | |
| SSL_set_accept_state(ssl); | |
| } else { | |
| SSL_set_connect_state(ssl); | |
| } | |
| } else { | |
| assert(ssl->state == 0); | |
| } | |
| /* TODO(davidben): Some state on |ssl| is reset both in |SSL_new| and | |
| * |SSL_clear| because it is per-connection state rather than configuration | |
| * state. Per-connection state should be on |ssl->s3| and |ssl->d1| so it is | |
| * naturally reset at the right points between |SSL_new|, |SSL_clear|, and | |
| * |ssl3_new|. */ | |
| ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
| BUF_MEM_free(ssl->init_buf); | |
| ssl->init_buf = NULL; | |
| /* The ssl->d1->mtu is simultaneously configuration (preserved across | |
| * clear) and connection-specific state (gets reset). | |
| * | |
| * TODO(davidben): Avoid this. */ | |
| unsigned mtu = 0; | |
| if (ssl->d1 != NULL) { | |
| mtu = ssl->d1->mtu; | |
| } | |
| ssl->method->ssl_free(ssl); | |
| if (!ssl->method->ssl_new(ssl)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl) && (SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) { | |
| ssl->d1->mtu = mtu; | |
| } | |
| ssl->client_version = ssl->version; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| void ssl_do_info_callback(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value) { | |
| void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value) = NULL; | |
| if (ssl->info_callback != NULL) { | |
| cb = ssl->info_callback; | |
| } else if (ssl->ctx->info_callback != NULL) { | |
| cb = ssl->ctx->info_callback; | |
| } | |
| if (cb != NULL) { | |
| cb(ssl, type, value); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| void ssl_do_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, int is_write, int version, int content_type, | |
| const void *buf, size_t len) { | |
| if (ssl->msg_callback != NULL) { | |
| ssl->msg_callback(is_write, version, content_type, buf, len, ssl, | |
| ssl->msg_callback_arg); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_sess_connect(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } | |
| int SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } | |
| int SSL_CTX_sess_connect_renegotiate(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } | |
| int SSL_CTX_sess_accept(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } | |
| int SSL_CTX_sess_accept_renegotiate(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } | |
| int SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } | |
| int SSL_CTX_sess_hits(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } | |
| int SSL_CTX_sess_cb_hits(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } | |
| int SSL_CTX_sess_misses(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } | |
| int SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } | |
| int SSL_CTX_sess_cache_full(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } | |
| int SSL_num_renegotiations(const SSL *ssl) { | |
| return SSL_total_renegotiations(ssl); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_need_tmp_RSA(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } | |
| int SSL_need_tmp_RSA(const SSL *ssl) { return 0; } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa(SSL_CTX *ctx, const RSA *rsa) { return 1; } | |
| int SSL_set_tmp_rsa(SSL *ssl, const RSA *rsa) { return 1; } | |
| void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void) {} | |
| void SSL_load_error_strings(void) {} | |
| int SSL_cache_hit(SSL *ssl) { return SSL_session_reused(ssl); } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EC_KEY *ec_key) { | |
| if (ec_key == NULL || EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key) == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key)); | |
| return SSL_CTX_set1_curves(ctx, &nid, 1); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set_tmp_ecdh(SSL *ssl, const EC_KEY *ec_key) { | |
| if (ec_key == NULL || EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key) == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key)); | |
| return SSL_set1_curves(ssl, &nid, 1); | |
| } |