|  | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | 
|  | * All rights reserved. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * This package is an SSL implementation written | 
|  | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | 
|  | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | 
|  | * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions | 
|  | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | 
|  | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation | 
|  | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | 
|  | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | 
|  | * | 
|  | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | 
|  | * the code are not to be removed. | 
|  | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | 
|  | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | 
|  | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | 
|  | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | 
|  | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | 
|  | * are met: | 
|  | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | 
|  | *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | 
|  | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | 
|  | *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | 
|  | *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | 
|  | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | 
|  | *    must display the following acknowledgement: | 
|  | *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by | 
|  | *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | 
|  | *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | 
|  | *    being used are not cryptographic related :-). | 
|  | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | 
|  | *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | 
|  | *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | 
|  | * | 
|  | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | 
|  | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | 
|  | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | 
|  | * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | 
|  | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | 
|  | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | 
|  | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | 
|  | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | 
|  | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | 
|  | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | 
|  | * SUCH DAMAGE. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | 
|  | * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be | 
|  | * copied and put under another distribution licence | 
|  | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ | 
|  |  | 
|  | #include <string.h> | 
|  |  | 
|  | #include <openssl/asn1.h> | 
|  | #include <openssl/digest.h> | 
|  | #include <openssl/err.h> | 
|  | #include <openssl/mem.h> | 
|  | #include <openssl/md5.h> | 
|  | #include <openssl/obj.h> | 
|  | #include <openssl/sha.h> | 
|  | #include <openssl/stack.h> | 
|  | #include <openssl/x509.h> | 
|  |  | 
|  | #include "../internal.h" | 
|  | #include "internal.h" | 
|  |  | 
|  |  | 
|  | int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) { | 
|  | return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer, b->cert_info->issuer)); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) { | 
|  | return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject, b->cert_info->subject)); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) { | 
|  | return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer, b->crl->issuer)); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) { | 
|  | return OPENSSL_memcmp(a->crl_hash, b->crl_hash, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a) { | 
|  | return a->cert_info->issuer; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | uint32_t X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x) { | 
|  | return X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | uint32_t X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x) { | 
|  | return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer)); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a) { | 
|  | return a->cert_info->subject; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a) { | 
|  | return a->cert_info->serialNumber; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *x509) { | 
|  | return x509->cert_info->serialNumber; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | uint32_t X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x) { | 
|  | return X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | uint32_t X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x) { | 
|  | return X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | // Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB: | 
|  | // Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const" | 
|  | // arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these | 
|  | // operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring | 
|  | // certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the | 
|  | // "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast. | 
|  | int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) { | 
|  | // Fill in the |cert_hash| fields. | 
|  | // | 
|  | // TODO(davidben): This may fail, in which case the the hash will be all | 
|  | // zeros. This produces a consistent comparison (failures are sticky), but | 
|  | // not a good one. OpenSSL now returns -2, but this is not a consistent | 
|  | // comparison and may cause misbehaving sorts by transitivity. For now, we | 
|  | // retain the old OpenSSL behavior, which was to ignore the error. See | 
|  | // https://crbug.com/boringssl/355. | 
|  | x509v3_cache_extensions((X509 *)a); | 
|  | x509v3_cache_extensions((X509 *)b); | 
|  |  | 
|  | return OPENSSL_memcmp(a->cert_hash, b->cert_hash, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b) { | 
|  | int ret; | 
|  |  | 
|  | // Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) { | 
|  | ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL); | 
|  | if (ret < 0) { | 
|  | return -2; | 
|  | } | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) { | 
|  | ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL); | 
|  | if (ret < 0) { | 
|  | return -2; | 
|  | } | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (ret) { | 
|  | return ret; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | return OPENSSL_memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | uint32_t X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x) { | 
|  | // Make sure the X509_NAME structure contains a valid cached encoding. | 
|  | if (i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL) < 0) { | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | uint8_t md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; | 
|  | SHA1(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md); | 
|  | return CRYPTO_load_u32_le(md); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | // I now DER encode the name and hash it.  Since I cache the DER encoding, | 
|  | // this is reasonably efficient. | 
|  |  | 
|  | uint32_t X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x) { | 
|  | // Make sure the X509_NAME structure contains a valid cached encoding. | 
|  | if (i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL) < 0) { | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | uint8_t md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; | 
|  | MD5((const uint8_t *)x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length, md); | 
|  | return CRYPTO_load_u32_le(md); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(const STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name, | 
|  | const ASN1_INTEGER *serial) { | 
|  | if (serial->type != V_ASN1_INTEGER && serial->type != V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) { | 
|  | return NULL; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { | 
|  | X509 *x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); | 
|  | if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get0_serialNumber(x509), serial) == 0 && | 
|  | X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x509), name) == 0) { | 
|  | return x509; | 
|  | } | 
|  | } | 
|  | return NULL; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | X509 *X509_find_by_subject(const STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name) { | 
|  | for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { | 
|  | X509 *x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); | 
|  | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0) { | 
|  | return x509; | 
|  | } | 
|  | } | 
|  | return NULL; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | EVP_PKEY *X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 *x) { | 
|  | if (x == NULL) { | 
|  | return NULL; | 
|  | } | 
|  | return X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info->key); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(const X509 *x) { | 
|  | if (x == NULL) { | 
|  | return NULL; | 
|  | } | 
|  | return X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x) { | 
|  | if (!x) { | 
|  | return NULL; | 
|  | } | 
|  | return x->cert_info->key->public_key; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | int X509_check_private_key(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *k) { | 
|  | const EVP_PKEY *xk = X509_get0_pubkey(x); | 
|  | if (xk == NULL) { | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | int ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k); | 
|  | if (ret > 0) { | 
|  | return 1; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | switch (ret) { | 
|  | case 0: | 
|  | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH); | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  | case -1: | 
|  | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH); | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  | case -2: | 
|  | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE); | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | // Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference | 
|  | // count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of | 
|  | // each X509 structure. | 
|  | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { | 
|  | STACK_OF(X509) *ret = sk_X509_dup(chain); | 
|  | if (ret == NULL) { | 
|  | return NULL; | 
|  | } | 
|  | for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) { | 
|  | X509_up_ref(sk_X509_value(ret, i)); | 
|  | } | 
|  | return ret; | 
|  | } |