| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
| * All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
| * |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
| * the code are not to be removed. |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
| * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
| * distribution. |
| * |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
| * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
| * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
| * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
| * openssl-core@openssl.org. |
| * |
| * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
| * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
| * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
| * |
| * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
| * acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
| * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
| * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
| * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
| * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
| * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
| * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
| * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
| * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * ==================================================================== |
| * |
| * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
| * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
| * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. |
| * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by |
| * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ |
| |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| |
| #include <openssl/bio.h> |
| #include <openssl/bn.h> |
| #include <openssl/dh.h> |
| #include <openssl/err.h> |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> |
| #include <openssl/obj.h> |
| #include <openssl/pem.h> |
| #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
| |
| #include "../crypto/dh/internal.h" |
| #include "../crypto/directory.h" |
| #include "ssl_locl.h" |
| |
| int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void) |
| { |
| static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx= -1; |
| int got_write_lock = 0; |
| |
| CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); |
| |
| if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0) |
| { |
| CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); |
| CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); |
| got_write_lock = 1; |
| |
| if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0) |
| { |
| ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx=X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index( |
| 0,"SSL for verify callback",NULL,NULL,NULL); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (got_write_lock) |
| CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); |
| else |
| CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); |
| |
| return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx; |
| } |
| |
| void ssl_cert_set_default_md(CERT *cert) |
| { |
| /* Set digest values to defaults */ |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA |
| cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); |
| #endif |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
| cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); |
| cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1(); |
| #endif |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA |
| cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1(); |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| CERT *ssl_cert_new(void) |
| { |
| CERT *ret; |
| |
| ret=(CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT)); |
| if (ret == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_new, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return(NULL); |
| } |
| memset(ret,0,sizeof(CERT)); |
| |
| ret->key= &(ret->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]); |
| ret->references=1; |
| ssl_cert_set_default_md(ret); |
| return(ret); |
| } |
| |
| CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) |
| { |
| CERT *ret; |
| int i; |
| |
| ret = (CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT)); |
| if (ret == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return(NULL); |
| } |
| |
| memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT)); |
| |
| ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - &cert->pkeys[0]]; |
| /* or ret->key = ret->pkeys + (cert->key - cert->pkeys), |
| * if you find that more readable */ |
| |
| ret->valid = cert->valid; |
| ret->mask_k = cert->mask_k; |
| ret->mask_a = cert->mask_a; |
| ret->export_mask_k = cert->export_mask_k; |
| ret->export_mask_a = cert->export_mask_a; |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
| if (cert->rsa_tmp != NULL) |
| { |
| RSA_up_ref(cert->rsa_tmp); |
| ret->rsa_tmp = cert->rsa_tmp; |
| } |
| ret->rsa_tmp_cb = cert->rsa_tmp_cb; |
| #endif |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
| if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL) |
| { |
| ret->dh_tmp = DHparams_dup(cert->dh_tmp); |
| if (ret->dh_tmp == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_DH_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| if (cert->dh_tmp->priv_key) |
| { |
| BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->priv_key); |
| if (!b) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| ret->dh_tmp->priv_key = b; |
| } |
| if (cert->dh_tmp->pub_key) |
| { |
| BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->pub_key); |
| if (!b) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| ret->dh_tmp->pub_key = b; |
| } |
| } |
| ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb; |
| #endif |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH |
| if (cert->ecdh_tmp) |
| { |
| ret->ecdh_tmp = EC_KEY_dup(cert->ecdh_tmp); |
| if (ret->ecdh_tmp == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| ret->ecdh_tmp_cb = cert->ecdh_tmp_cb; |
| ret->ecdh_tmp_auto = cert->ecdh_tmp_auto; |
| #endif |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) |
| { |
| CERT_PKEY *cpk = cert->pkeys + i; |
| CERT_PKEY *rpk = ret->pkeys + i; |
| if (cpk->x509 != NULL) |
| { |
| rpk->x509 = cpk->x509; |
| CRYPTO_add(&rpk->x509->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); |
| } |
| |
| if (cpk->privatekey != NULL) |
| { |
| rpk->privatekey = cpk->privatekey; |
| CRYPTO_add(&cpk->privatekey->references, 1, |
| CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY); |
| |
| switch(i) |
| { |
| /* If there was anything special to do for |
| * certain types of keys, we'd do it here. |
| * (Nothing at the moment, I think.) */ |
| |
| case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC: |
| case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN: |
| /* We have an RSA key. */ |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN: |
| /* We have a DSA key. */ |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA: |
| case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA: |
| /* We have a DH key. */ |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL_PKEY_ECC: |
| /* We have an ECC key */ |
| break; |
| |
| default: |
| /* Can't happen. */ |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (cpk->chain) |
| { |
| rpk->chain = X509_chain_up_ref(cpk->chain); |
| if (!rpk->chain) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| rpk->valid_flags = 0; |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
| if (cert->pkeys[i].authz != NULL) |
| { |
| /* Just copy everything. */ |
| ret->pkeys[i].authz_length = |
| cert->pkeys[i].authz_length; |
| ret->pkeys[i].authz = |
| OPENSSL_malloc(ret->pkeys[i].authz_length); |
| if (ret->pkeys[i].authz == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| memcpy(ret->pkeys[i].authz, |
| cert->pkeys[i].authz, |
| cert->pkeys[i].authz_length); |
| } |
| |
| if (cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo != NULL) |
| { |
| /* Just copy everything. */ |
| ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo = |
| OPENSSL_malloc(cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length); |
| if (ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length = |
| cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length; |
| memcpy(ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo, |
| cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo, |
| cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length); |
| } |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| ret->references=1; |
| /* Set digests to defaults. NB: we don't copy existing values as they |
| * will be set during handshake. |
| */ |
| ssl_cert_set_default_md(ret); |
| /* Peer sigalgs set to NULL as we get these from handshake too */ |
| ret->peer_sigalgs = NULL; |
| ret->peer_sigalgslen = 0; |
| /* Configured sigalgs however we copy across */ |
| |
| if (cert->conf_sigalgs) |
| { |
| ret->conf_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->conf_sigalgslen); |
| if (!ret->conf_sigalgs) |
| goto err; |
| memcpy(ret->conf_sigalgs, cert->conf_sigalgs, |
| cert->conf_sigalgslen); |
| ret->conf_sigalgslen = cert->conf_sigalgslen; |
| } |
| else |
| ret->conf_sigalgs = NULL; |
| |
| if (cert->client_sigalgs) |
| { |
| ret->client_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->client_sigalgslen); |
| if (!ret->client_sigalgs) |
| goto err; |
| memcpy(ret->client_sigalgs, cert->client_sigalgs, |
| cert->client_sigalgslen); |
| ret->client_sigalgslen = cert->client_sigalgslen; |
| } |
| else |
| ret->client_sigalgs = NULL; |
| /* Shared sigalgs also NULL */ |
| ret->shared_sigalgs = NULL; |
| /* Copy any custom client certificate types */ |
| if (cert->ctypes) |
| { |
| ret->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->ctype_num); |
| if (!ret->ctypes) |
| goto err; |
| memcpy(ret->ctypes, cert->ctypes, cert->ctype_num); |
| ret->ctype_num = cert->ctype_num; |
| } |
| |
| ret->cert_flags = cert->cert_flags; |
| |
| ret->cert_cb = cert->cert_cb; |
| ret->cert_cb_arg = cert->cert_cb_arg; |
| |
| if (cert->verify_store) |
| { |
| CRYPTO_add(&cert->verify_store->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); |
| ret->verify_store = cert->verify_store; |
| } |
| |
| if (cert->chain_store) |
| { |
| CRYPTO_add(&cert->chain_store->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); |
| ret->chain_store = cert->chain_store; |
| } |
| |
| ret->ciphers_raw = NULL; |
| |
| return(ret); |
| |
| #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) |
| err: |
| #endif |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
| if (ret->rsa_tmp != NULL) |
| RSA_free(ret->rsa_tmp); |
| #endif |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
| if (ret->dh_tmp != NULL) |
| DH_free(ret->dh_tmp); |
| #endif |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH |
| if (ret->ecdh_tmp != NULL) |
| EC_KEY_free(ret->ecdh_tmp); |
| #endif |
| |
| ssl_cert_clear_certs(ret); |
| |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| /* Free up and clear all certificates and chains */ |
| |
| void ssl_cert_clear_certs(CERT *c) |
| { |
| int i; |
| if (c == NULL) |
| return; |
| for (i = 0; i<SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) |
| { |
| CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i; |
| if (cpk->x509) |
| { |
| X509_free(cpk->x509); |
| cpk->x509 = NULL; |
| } |
| if (cpk->privatekey) |
| { |
| EVP_PKEY_free(cpk->privatekey); |
| cpk->privatekey = NULL; |
| } |
| if (cpk->chain) |
| { |
| sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free); |
| cpk->chain = NULL; |
| } |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
| if (cpk->authz) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_free(cpk->authz); |
| cpk->authz = NULL; |
| } |
| if (cpk->serverinfo) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_free(cpk->serverinfo); |
| cpk->serverinfo = NULL; |
| cpk->serverinfo_length = 0; |
| } |
| #endif |
| /* Clear all flags apart from explicit sign */ |
| cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c) |
| { |
| int i; |
| |
| if(c == NULL) |
| return; |
| |
| i=CRYPTO_add(&c->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT); |
| #ifdef REF_PRINT |
| REF_PRINT("CERT",c); |
| #endif |
| if (i > 0) return; |
| #ifdef REF_CHECK |
| if (i < 0) |
| { |
| fprintf(stderr,"ssl_cert_free, bad reference count\n"); |
| abort(); /* ok */ |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
| if (c->rsa_tmp) RSA_free(c->rsa_tmp); |
| #endif |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
| if (c->dh_tmp) DH_free(c->dh_tmp); |
| #endif |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH |
| if (c->ecdh_tmp) EC_KEY_free(c->ecdh_tmp); |
| #endif |
| |
| ssl_cert_clear_certs(c); |
| if (c->peer_sigalgs) |
| OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs); |
| if (c->conf_sigalgs) |
| OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs); |
| if (c->client_sigalgs) |
| OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs); |
| if (c->shared_sigalgs) |
| OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs); |
| if (c->ctypes) |
| OPENSSL_free(c->ctypes); |
| if (c->verify_store) |
| X509_STORE_free(c->verify_store); |
| if (c->chain_store) |
| X509_STORE_free(c->chain_store); |
| if (c->ciphers_raw) |
| OPENSSL_free(c->ciphers_raw); |
| OPENSSL_free(c); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_cert_inst(CERT **o) |
| { |
| /* Create a CERT if there isn't already one |
| * (which cannot really happen, as it is initially created in |
| * SSL_CTX_new; but the earlier code usually allows for that one |
| * being non-existant, so we follow that behaviour, as it might |
| * turn out that there actually is a reason for it -- but I'm |
| * not sure that *all* of the existing code could cope with |
| * s->cert being NULL, otherwise we could do without the |
| * initialization in SSL_CTX_new). |
| */ |
| |
| if (o == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_inst, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); |
| return(0); |
| } |
| if (*o == NULL) |
| { |
| if ((*o = ssl_cert_new()) == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_new, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return(0); |
| } |
| } |
| return(1); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_cert_set0_chain(CERT *c, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) |
| { |
| CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key; |
| if (!cpk) |
| return 0; |
| if (cpk->chain) |
| sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free); |
| cpk->chain = chain; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_cert_set1_chain(CERT *c, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) |
| { |
| STACK_OF(X509) *dchain; |
| if (!chain) |
| return ssl_cert_set0_chain(c, NULL); |
| dchain = X509_chain_up_ref(chain); |
| if (!dchain) |
| return 0; |
| if (!ssl_cert_set0_chain(c, dchain)) |
| { |
| sk_X509_pop_free(dchain, X509_free); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x) |
| { |
| CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key; |
| if (!cpk) |
| return 0; |
| if (!cpk->chain) |
| cpk->chain = sk_X509_new_null(); |
| if (!cpk->chain || !sk_X509_push(cpk->chain, x)) |
| return 0; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x) |
| { |
| if (!ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(c, x)) |
| return 0; |
| CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_cert_select_current(CERT *c, X509 *x) |
| { |
| int i; |
| if (x == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) |
| { |
| if (c->pkeys[i].x509 == x) |
| { |
| c->key = &c->pkeys[i]; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) |
| { |
| if (c->pkeys[i].x509 && !X509_cmp(c->pkeys[i].x509, x)) |
| { |
| c->key = &c->pkeys[i]; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| void ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(CERT *c, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) |
| { |
| c->cert_cb = cb; |
| c->cert_cb_arg = arg; |
| } |
| |
| SESS_CERT *ssl_sess_cert_new(void) |
| { |
| SESS_CERT *ret; |
| |
| ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *ret); |
| if (ret == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_sess_cert_new, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| memset(ret, 0 ,sizeof *ret); |
| ret->peer_key = &(ret->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]); |
| ret->references = 1; |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| void ssl_sess_cert_free(SESS_CERT *sc) |
| { |
| int i; |
| |
| if (sc == NULL) |
| return; |
| |
| i = CRYPTO_add(&sc->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESS_CERT); |
| #ifdef REF_PRINT |
| REF_PRINT("SESS_CERT", sc); |
| #endif |
| if (i > 0) |
| return; |
| #ifdef REF_CHECK |
| if (i < 0) |
| { |
| fprintf(stderr,"ssl_sess_cert_free, bad reference count\n"); |
| abort(); /* ok */ |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| /* i == 0 */ |
| if (sc->cert_chain != NULL) |
| sk_X509_pop_free(sc->cert_chain, X509_free); |
| for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) |
| { |
| if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL) |
| X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509); |
| #if 0 /* We don't have the peer's private key. These lines are just |
| * here as a reminder that we're still using a not-quite-appropriate |
| * data structure. */ |
| if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL) |
| EVP_PKEY_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey); |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
| if (sc->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) |
| RSA_free(sc->peer_rsa_tmp); |
| #endif |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
| if (sc->peer_dh_tmp != NULL) |
| DH_free(sc->peer_dh_tmp); |
| #endif |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH |
| if (sc->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) |
| EC_KEY_free(sc->peer_ecdh_tmp); |
| #endif |
| |
| OPENSSL_free(sc); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *sc,int type) |
| { |
| sc->peer_cert_type = type; |
| return(1); |
| } |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DANE |
| /* |
| * return value: |
| * -1: format or digest error |
| * 0: match |
| * 1: no match |
| */ |
| int tlsa_cmp(const X509 *cert, const unsigned char *tlsa_record, unsigned int reclen) |
| { |
| const EVP_MD *md; |
| unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| unsigned int len, selector, matching_type; |
| int ret; |
| |
| if (reclen<3) return -1; |
| |
| selector = tlsa_record[1]; |
| matching_type = tlsa_record[2]; |
| tlsa_record += 3; |
| reclen -= 3; |
| |
| switch (matching_type) { |
| case 0: /* exact match */ |
| if (selector==0) { /* full certificate */ |
| ret = EVP_Digest(tlsa_record,reclen,digest,&len,EVP_sha1(),NULL); |
| return ret ? memcmp(cert->sha1_hash,digest,len)!=0 : -1; |
| } |
| else if (selector==1) { /* SubjectPublicKeyInfo */ |
| ASN1_BIT_STRING *key = X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(cert); |
| |
| if (key == NULL) return -1; |
| if (key->length != reclen) return 1; |
| |
| return memcmp(key->data,tlsa_record,reclen)!=0; |
| } |
| return -1; |
| |
| case 1: /* SHA256 */ |
| case 2: /* SHA512 */ |
| md = matching_type==1 ? EVP_sha256() : EVP_sha512(); |
| |
| if (reclen!=EVP_MD_size(md)) return -1; |
| |
| if (selector==0) { /* full certificate */ |
| ret = X509_digest(cert,md,digest,&len); |
| } |
| else if (selector==1) { /* SubjectPublicKeyInfo */ |
| ret = X509_pubkey_digest(cert,md,digest,&len); |
| } |
| else |
| return -1; |
| |
| return ret ? memcmp(tlsa_record,digest,len)!=0 : -1; |
| default: |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| int dane_verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| SSL *s = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx()); |
| int depth=X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx); |
| X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,depth); |
| unsigned int reclen, certificate_usage; |
| const unsigned char *tlsa_record = s->tlsa_record; |
| int tlsa_ret = -1; |
| |
| if (s->verify_callback) ok = s->verify_callback(ok,ctx); |
| |
| if (tlsa_record == NULL) return ok; |
| |
| if (tlsa_record == (void*)-1) { |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; /* temporary code? */ |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| while ((reclen = *(unsigned int *)tlsa_record)) { |
| tlsa_record += sizeof(unsigned int); |
| |
| /* |
| * tlsa_record[0] Certificate Usage field |
| * tlsa_record[1] Selector field |
| * tlsa_record[2] Matching Type Field |
| * tlsa_record+3 Certificate Association data |
| */ |
| certificate_usage = tlsa_record[0]; |
| |
| if (depth==0 || certificate_usage==0 || certificate_usage==2) { |
| tlsa_ret = tlsa_cmp(cert,tlsa_record,reclen); |
| if (tlsa_ret==0) { |
| s->tlsa_witness = depth<<8|certificate_usage; |
| break; |
| } |
| else if (tlsa_ret==-1) |
| s->tlsa_witness = -1; /* something phishy? */ |
| } |
| |
| tlsa_record += reclen; |
| } |
| |
| if (depth==0) { |
| switch (s->tlsa_witness&0xff) { /* witnessed usage */ |
| case 0: /* CA constraint */ |
| if (s->tlsa_witness<0 && ctx->error==X509_V_OK) |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; |
| return 0; |
| case 1: /* service certificate constraint */ |
| if (tlsa_ret!=0 && ctx->error==X509_V_OK) |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED; |
| return 0; |
| case 2: /* trust anchor assertion */ |
| if ((s->tlsa_witness>>8)>0 && ctx->error==X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY) |
| ctx->error = X509_V_OK; |
| break; |
| case 3: /* domain-issued certificate */ |
| if (tlsa_ret==0) |
| ctx->error = X509_V_OK; /* override all errors? */ |
| break; |
| default:/* there were TLSA records, but something phishy happened */ |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED; |
| return ok; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * returning 1 makes verify procedure traverse the whole chain, |
| * not actually approve it... |
| */ |
| return 1; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509) *sk) |
| { |
| X509 *x; |
| int i; |
| X509_STORE *verify_store; |
| X509_STORE_CTX ctx; |
| |
| if (s->cert->verify_store) |
| verify_store = s->cert->verify_store; |
| else |
| verify_store = s->ctx->cert_store; |
| |
| if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_X509_num(sk) == 0)) |
| return(0); |
| |
| x=sk_X509_value(sk,0); |
| if(!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx,verify_store,x,sk)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_verify_cert_chain, ERR_R_X509_LIB); |
| return(0); |
| } |
| /* Set suite B flags if needed */ |
| X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, tls1_suiteb(s)); |
| #if 0 |
| if (SSL_get_verify_depth(s) >= 0) |
| X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(&ctx, SSL_get_verify_depth(s)); |
| #endif |
| X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&ctx,SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(),s); |
| |
| /* We need to inherit the verify parameters. These can be determined by |
| * the context: if its a server it will verify SSL client certificates |
| * or vice versa. |
| */ |
| |
| X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&ctx, |
| s->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server"); |
| /* Anything non-default in "param" should overwrite anything in the |
| * ctx. |
| */ |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx), s->param); |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DANE |
| X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, dane_verify_callback); |
| s->tlsa_witness = -1; |
| #else |
| if (s->verify_callback) |
| X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, s->verify_callback); |
| #endif |
| |
| if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL) |
| #if 1 /* new with OpenSSL 0.9.7 */ |
| i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg); |
| #else |
| i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx); /* should pass app_verify_arg */ |
| #endif |
| else |
| { |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_X509_VERIFY |
| i=X509_verify_cert(&ctx); |
| #else |
| i=0; |
| ctx.error=X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_verify_cert_chain, SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_CALLBACK); |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| s->verify_result=ctx.error; |
| X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); |
| |
| return(i); |
| } |
| |
| static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) |
| { |
| if (*ca_list != NULL) |
| sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list,X509_NAME_free); |
| |
| *ca_list=name_list; |
| } |
| |
| STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk) |
| { |
| int i; |
| STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret; |
| X509_NAME *name; |
| |
| ret=sk_X509_NAME_new_null(); |
| for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) |
| { |
| name=X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i)); |
| if ((name == NULL) || !sk_X509_NAME_push(ret,name)) |
| { |
| sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret,X509_NAME_free); |
| return(NULL); |
| } |
| } |
| return(ret); |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) |
| { |
| set_client_CA_list(&(s->client_CA),name_list); |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) |
| { |
| set_client_CA_list(&(ctx->client_CA),name_list); |
| } |
| |
| STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| return(ctx->client_CA); |
| } |
| |
| STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s) |
| { |
| if (s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT) |
| { /* we are in the client */ |
| if (((s->version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) && |
| (s->s3 != NULL)) |
| return(s->s3->tmp.ca_names); |
| else |
| return(NULL); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| if (s->client_CA != NULL) |
| return(s->client_CA); |
| else |
| return(s->ctx->client_CA); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static int add_client_CA(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **sk,X509 *x) |
| { |
| X509_NAME *name; |
| |
| if (x == NULL) return(0); |
| if ((*sk == NULL) && ((*sk=sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL)) |
| return(0); |
| |
| if ((name=X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(x))) == NULL) |
| return(0); |
| |
| if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(*sk,name)) |
| { |
| X509_NAME_free(name); |
| return(0); |
| } |
| return(1); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl,X509 *x) |
| { |
| return(add_client_CA(&(ssl->client_CA),x)); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx,X509 *x) |
| { |
| return(add_client_CA(&(ctx->client_CA),x)); |
| } |
| |
| static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME **a, const X509_NAME **b) |
| { |
| return(X509_NAME_cmp(*a,*b)); |
| } |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO |
| /*! |
| * Load CA certs from a file into a ::STACK. Note that it is somewhat misnamed; |
| * it doesn't really have anything to do with clients (except that a common use |
| * for a stack of CAs is to send it to the client). Actually, it doesn't have |
| * much to do with CAs, either, since it will load any old cert. |
| * \param file the file containing one or more certs. |
| * \return a ::STACK containing the certs. |
| */ |
| STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file) |
| { |
| BIO *in; |
| X509 *x=NULL; |
| X509_NAME *xn=NULL; |
| STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = NULL,*sk; |
| |
| sk=sk_X509_NAME_new(xname_cmp); |
| |
| in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); |
| |
| if ((sk == NULL) || (in == NULL)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_load_client_CA_file, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (!BIO_read_filename(in,file)) |
| goto err; |
| |
| for (;;) |
| { |
| if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in,&x,NULL,NULL) == NULL) |
| break; |
| if (ret == NULL) |
| { |
| ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null(); |
| if (ret == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_load_client_CA_file, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| if ((xn=X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL) goto err; |
| /* check for duplicates */ |
| xn=X509_NAME_dup(xn); |
| if (xn == NULL) goto err; |
| if (sk_X509_NAME_find(sk, NULL, xn)) |
| X509_NAME_free(xn); |
| else |
| { |
| sk_X509_NAME_push(sk,xn); |
| sk_X509_NAME_push(ret,xn); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (0) |
| { |
| err: |
| if (ret != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret,X509_NAME_free); |
| ret=NULL; |
| } |
| if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_free(sk); |
| if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in); |
| if (x != NULL) X509_free(x); |
| if (ret != NULL) |
| ERR_clear_error(); |
| return(ret); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| /*! |
| * Add a file of certs to a stack. |
| * \param stack the stack to add to. |
| * \param file the file to add from. All certs in this file that are not |
| * already in the stack will be added. |
| * \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some |
| * certs may have been added to \c stack. |
| */ |
| |
| int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack, |
| const char *file) |
| { |
| BIO *in; |
| X509 *x=NULL; |
| X509_NAME *xn=NULL; |
| int ret=1; |
| int (*oldcmp)(const X509_NAME **a, const X509_NAME **b); |
| |
| oldcmp=sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack,xname_cmp); |
| |
| in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); |
| |
| if (in == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (!BIO_read_filename(in,file)) |
| goto err; |
| |
| for (;;) |
| { |
| if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in,&x,NULL,NULL) == NULL) |
| break; |
| if ((xn=X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL) goto err; |
| xn=X509_NAME_dup(xn); |
| if (xn == NULL) goto err; |
| if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack, NULL, xn)) |
| X509_NAME_free(xn); |
| else |
| sk_X509_NAME_push(stack,xn); |
| } |
| |
| ERR_clear_error(); |
| |
| if (0) |
| { |
| err: |
| ret=0; |
| } |
| if(in != NULL) |
| BIO_free(in); |
| if(x != NULL) |
| X509_free(x); |
| |
| (void)sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack,oldcmp); |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /*! |
| * Add a directory of certs to a stack. |
| * \param stack the stack to append to. |
| * \param dir the directory to append from. All files in this directory will be |
| * examined as potential certs. Any that are acceptable to |
| * SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack() that are not already in the stack will be |
| * included. |
| * \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some |
| * certs may have been added to \c stack. |
| */ |
| |
| int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack, |
| const char *dir) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_DIR_CTX *d = NULL; |
| const char *filename; |
| int ret = 0; |
| |
| CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR); |
| |
| /* Note that a side effect is that the CAs will be sorted by name */ |
| |
| while((filename = OPENSSL_DIR_read(&d, dir))) |
| { |
| char buf[1024]; |
| int r; |
| |
| if(strlen(dir)+strlen(filename)+2 > sizeof buf) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack, SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS |
| r = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s%s",dir,filename); |
| #else |
| r = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s/%s",dir,filename); |
| #endif |
| if (r <= 0 || r >= (int)sizeof(buf)) |
| goto err; |
| if(!SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack,buf)) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (errno) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); |
| ERR_add_error_data(3, "OPENSSL_DIR_read(&ctx, '", dir, "')"); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| ret = 1; |
| |
| err: |
| if (d) OPENSSL_DIR_end(&d); |
| CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* Add a certificate to a BUF_MEM structure */ |
| |
| static int ssl_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x) |
| { |
| int n; |
| unsigned char *p; |
| |
| n=i2d_X509(x,NULL); |
| if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(int)(n+(*l)+3))) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_cert_to_buf, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]); |
| l2n3(n,p); |
| i2d_X509(x,&p); |
| *l+=n+3; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* Add certificate chain to internal SSL BUF_MEM strcuture */ |
| int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk, unsigned long *l) |
| { |
| BUF_MEM *buf = s->init_buf; |
| int no_chain; |
| int i; |
| |
| X509 *x; |
| STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; |
| X509_STORE *chain_store; |
| |
| if (cpk) |
| x = cpk->x509; |
| else |
| x = NULL; |
| |
| if (s->cert->chain_store) |
| chain_store = s->cert->chain_store; |
| else |
| chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store; |
| |
| /* If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use |
| * parent ctx. |
| */ |
| if (cpk && cpk->chain) |
| extra_certs = cpk->chain; |
| else |
| extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs; |
| |
| if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs) |
| no_chain = 1; |
| else |
| no_chain = 0; |
| |
| /* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */ |
| if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,10)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_cert_chain, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (x != NULL) |
| { |
| if (no_chain) |
| { |
| if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx; |
| |
| if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx,chain_store,x,NULL)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_cert_chain, ERR_R_X509_LIB); |
| return(0); |
| } |
| X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx); |
| /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ |
| ERR_clear_error(); |
| for (i=0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++) |
| { |
| x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i); |
| |
| if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x)) |
| { |
| X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx); |
| } |
| } |
| for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) |
| { |
| x=sk_X509_value(extra_certs,i); |
| if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* Build a certificate chain for current certificate */ |
| int ssl_build_cert_chain(CERT *c, X509_STORE *chain_store, int flags) |
| { |
| CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key; |
| X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx; |
| STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL, *untrusted = NULL; |
| X509 *x; |
| int i; |
| |
| if (!cpk->x509) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_build_cert_chain, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (c->chain_store) |
| chain_store = c->chain_store; |
| |
| if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_UNTRUSTED) |
| untrusted = cpk->chain; |
| |
| if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx, chain_store, cpk->x509, untrusted)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_build_cert_chain, ERR_R_X509_LIB); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| /* Set suite B flags if needed */ |
| X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&xs_ctx, c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS); |
| |
| i = X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx); |
| if (i > 0) |
| chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&xs_ctx); |
| X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx); |
| if (i <= 0) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_build_cert_chain, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (cpk->chain) |
| sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free); |
| /* Remove EE certificate from chain */ |
| x = sk_X509_shift(chain); |
| X509_free(x); |
| if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_NO_ROOT) |
| { |
| x = sk_X509_pop(chain); |
| X509_free(x); |
| } |
| cpk->chain = chain; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_cert_set_cert_store(CERT *c, X509_STORE *store, int chain, int ref) |
| { |
| X509_STORE **pstore; |
| if (chain) |
| pstore = &c->chain_store; |
| else |
| pstore = &c->verify_store; |
| if (*pstore) |
| X509_STORE_free(*pstore); |
| *pstore = store; |
| if (ref && store) |
| CRYPTO_add(&store->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |