| /* DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu |
| * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005. */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
| * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
| * distribution. |
| * |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
| * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
| * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
| * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
| * openssl-core@openssl.org. |
| * |
| * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
| * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
| * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
| * |
| * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
| * acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
| * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
| * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
| * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
| * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
| * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
| * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
| * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
| * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * ==================================================================== |
| * |
| * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
| * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
| * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| */ |
| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
| * All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
| * |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
| * the code are not to be removed. |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ |
| |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| #include <errno.h> |
| #include <assert.h> |
| |
| #include <openssl/buf.h> |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> |
| #include <openssl/err.h> |
| #include <openssl/rand.h> |
| |
| #include "ssl_locl.h" |
| /* mod 128 saturating subtract of two 64-bit values in big-endian order */ |
| static int satsub64be(const unsigned char *v1,const unsigned char *v2) |
| { int ret,sat,brw,i; |
| |
| if (sizeof(long) == 8) do |
| { const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = {1}; |
| long l; |
| |
| if (is_endian.little) break; |
| /* not reached on little-endians */ |
| /* following test is redundant, because input is |
| * always aligned, but I take no chances... */ |
| if (((size_t)v1|(size_t)v2)&0x7) break; |
| |
| l = *((long *)v1); |
| l -= *((long *)v2); |
| if (l>128) return 128; |
| else if (l<-128) return -128; |
| else return (int)l; |
| } while (0); |
| |
| ret = (int)v1[7]-(int)v2[7]; |
| sat = 0; |
| brw = ret>>8; /* brw is either 0 or -1 */ |
| if (ret & 0x80) |
| { for (i=6;i>=0;i--) |
| { brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i]; |
| sat |= ~brw; |
| brw >>= 8; |
| } |
| } |
| else |
| { for (i=6;i>=0;i--) |
| { brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i]; |
| sat |= brw; |
| brw >>= 8; |
| } |
| } |
| brw <<= 8; /* brw is either 0 or -256 */ |
| |
| if (sat&0xff) return brw | 0x80; |
| else return brw + (ret&0xFF); |
| } |
| |
| static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, |
| int len, int peek); |
| static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap); |
| static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap); |
| static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, |
| unsigned int *is_next_epoch); |
| #if 0 |
| static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, |
| unsigned short *priority, unsigned long *offset); |
| #endif |
| static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q, |
| unsigned char *priority); |
| static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s); |
| static int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, |
| unsigned int len); |
| |
| /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */ |
| static int |
| dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item) |
| { |
| DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; |
| |
| rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; |
| |
| if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL) |
| OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf); |
| |
| s->packet = rdata->packet; |
| s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length; |
| memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); |
| memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); |
| |
| /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */ |
| memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6); |
| |
| return(1); |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int |
| dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority) |
| { |
| DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; |
| pitem *item; |
| |
| /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */ |
| if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100) |
| return 0; |
| |
| rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA)); |
| item = pitem_new(priority, rdata); |
| if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL) |
| { |
| if (rdata != NULL) OPENSSL_free(rdata); |
| if (item != NULL) pitem_free(item); |
| |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_buffer_record, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return(0); |
| } |
| |
| rdata->packet = s->packet; |
| rdata->packet_length = s->packet_length; |
| memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &(s->s3->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); |
| memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &(s->s3->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); |
| |
| item->data = rdata; |
| |
| /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */ |
| if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_free(rdata); |
| pitem_free(item); |
| return(0); |
| } |
| |
| s->packet = NULL; |
| s->packet_length = 0; |
| memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); |
| memset(&(s->s3->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); |
| |
| if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_buffer_record, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| OPENSSL_free(rdata); |
| pitem_free(item); |
| return(0); |
| } |
| |
| return(1); |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int |
| dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue) |
| { |
| pitem *item; |
| |
| item = pqueue_pop(queue->q); |
| if (item) |
| { |
| dtls1_copy_record(s, item); |
| |
| OPENSSL_free(item->data); |
| pitem_free(item); |
| |
| return(1); |
| } |
| |
| return(0); |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not processed |
| * yet */ |
| #define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \ |
| dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \ |
| &((s)->d1->unprocessed_rcds)) |
| |
| /* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie, processed */ |
| #define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \ |
| dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \ |
| &((s)->d1->processed_rcds)) |
| |
| static int |
| dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s) |
| { |
| pitem *item; |
| |
| item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q); |
| if (item) |
| { |
| /* Check if epoch is current. */ |
| if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch) |
| return(1); /* Nothing to do. */ |
| |
| /* Process all the records. */ |
| while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q)) |
| { |
| dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s); |
| if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s)) |
| return(0); |
| dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds), |
| s->s3->rrec.seq_num); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records |
| * have been processed */ |
| s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch; |
| s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1; |
| |
| return(1); |
| } |
| |
| |
| #if 0 |
| |
| static int |
| dtls1_get_buffered_record(SSL *s) |
| { |
| pitem *item; |
| PQ_64BIT priority = |
| (((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->handshake_read_seq) << 32) | |
| ((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off); |
| |
| if ( ! SSL_in_init(s)) /* if we're not (re)negotiating, |
| nothing buffered */ |
| return 0; |
| |
| |
| item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->rcvd_records); |
| if (item && item->priority == priority) |
| { |
| /* Check if we've received the record of interest. It must be |
| * a handshake record, since data records as passed up without |
| * buffering */ |
| DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; |
| item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->rcvd_records); |
| rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; |
| |
| if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL) |
| OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf); |
| |
| s->packet = rdata->packet; |
| s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length; |
| memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); |
| memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); |
| |
| OPENSSL_free(item->data); |
| pitem_free(item); |
| |
| /* s->d1->next_expected_seq_num++; */ |
| return(1); |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| #endif |
| |
| static int |
| dtls1_process_record(SSL *s) |
| { |
| int i,al; |
| int enc_err; |
| SSL_SESSION *sess; |
| SSL3_RECORD *rr; |
| unsigned int mac_size, orig_len; |
| unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| |
| rr= &(s->s3->rrec); |
| sess = s->session; |
| |
| /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length, |
| * and we have that many bytes in s->packet |
| */ |
| rr->input= &(s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); |
| |
| /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' |
| * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which |
| * need to be copied into rr->data by either |
| * the decryption or by the decompression |
| * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer, |
| * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */ |
| |
| /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] |
| * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */ |
| |
| /* check is not needed I believe */ |
| if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_process_record, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ |
| rr->data=rr->input; |
| |
| enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0); |
| /* enc_err is: |
| * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. |
| * 1: if the padding is valid |
| * -1: if the padding is invalid */ |
| if (enc_err == 0) |
| { |
| /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */ |
| rr->length = 0; |
| s->packet_length = 0; |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef TLS_DEBUG |
| printf("dec %d\n",rr->length); |
| { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } |
| printf("\n"); |
| #endif |
| |
| /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ |
| if ((sess != NULL) && |
| (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && |
| (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) |
| { |
| /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ |
| unsigned char *mac = NULL; |
| unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); |
| assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
| |
| /* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */ |
| orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8); |
| |
| /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was |
| * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, |
| * therefore we can safely process the record in a different |
| * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. |
| */ |
| if (orig_len < mac_size || |
| /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ |
| (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && |
| orig_len < mac_size+1)) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_process_record, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) |
| { |
| /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes |
| * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract |
| * the MAC in constant time from within the record, |
| * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes. |
| * */ |
| mac = mac_tmp; |
| ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len); |
| rr->length -= mac_size; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| |
| * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's |
| * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */ |
| rr->length -= mac_size; |
| mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; |
| } |
| |
| i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */); |
| if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) |
| enc_err = -1; |
| if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size) |
| enc_err = -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (enc_err < 0) |
| { |
| /* decryption failed, silently discard message */ |
| rr->length = 0; |
| s->packet_length = 0; |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* r->length is now just compressed */ |
| if (s->expand != NULL) |
| { |
| if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_process_record, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_process_record, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_process_record, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| rr->off=0; |
| /* So at this point the following is true |
| * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record |
| * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record |
| * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte |
| * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment |
| * after use :-). |
| */ |
| |
| /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ |
| s->packet_length=0; |
| dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, &(s->d1->bitmap));/* Mark receipt of record. */ |
| return(1); |
| |
| f_err: |
| ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
| err: |
| return(0); |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* Call this to get a new input record. |
| * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error |
| * or non-blocking IO. |
| * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in |
| * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record |
| * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data |
| * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes |
| */ |
| /* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */ |
| int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s) |
| { |
| int ssl_major,ssl_minor; |
| int i,n; |
| SSL3_RECORD *rr; |
| unsigned char *p = NULL; |
| unsigned short version; |
| DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap; |
| unsigned int is_next_epoch; |
| |
| rr= &(s->s3->rrec); |
| |
| /* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the |
| * pending records. This is a non-blocking operation. */ |
| dtls1_process_buffered_records(s); |
| |
| /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */ |
| if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s)) |
| return 1; |
| |
| /* get something from the wire */ |
| again: |
| /* check if we have the header */ |
| if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || |
| (s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) |
| { |
| n=ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0); |
| /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */ |
| if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */ |
| |
| /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */ |
| if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) |
| { |
| s->packet_length = 0; |
| goto again; |
| } |
| |
| s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY; |
| |
| p=s->packet; |
| |
| if (s->msg_callback) |
| s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
| |
| /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */ |
| rr->type= *(p++); |
| ssl_major= *(p++); |
| ssl_minor= *(p++); |
| version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor; |
| |
| /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */ |
| n2s(p,rr->epoch); |
| |
| memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6); |
| p+=6; |
| |
| n2s(p,rr->length); |
| |
| /* Lets check version */ |
| if (!s->first_packet) |
| { |
| if (version != s->version) |
| { |
| /* unexpected version, silently discard */ |
| rr->length = 0; |
| s->packet_length = 0; |
| goto again; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00)) |
| { |
| /* wrong version, silently discard record */ |
| rr->length = 0; |
| s->packet_length = 0; |
| goto again; |
| } |
| |
| if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) |
| { |
| /* record too long, silently discard it */ |
| rr->length = 0; |
| s->packet_length = 0; |
| goto again; |
| } |
| |
| /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ |
| } |
| |
| /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */ |
| |
| if (rr->length > s->packet_length-DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) |
| { |
| /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ |
| i=rr->length; |
| n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1); |
| if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */ |
| |
| /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */ |
| if ( n != i) |
| { |
| rr->length = 0; |
| s->packet_length = 0; |
| goto again; |
| } |
| |
| /* now n == rr->length, |
| * and s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */ |
| } |
| s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */ |
| |
| /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */ |
| bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch); |
| if ( bitmap == NULL) |
| { |
| rr->length = 0; |
| s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */ |
| goto again; /* get another record */ |
| } |
| |
| /* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. |
| * Don't check if we're listening and this message is |
| * a ClientHello. They can look as if they're replayed, |
| * since they arrive from different connections and |
| * would be dropped unnecessarily. |
| */ |
| if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && |
| *p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && |
| !dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap)) |
| { |
| rr->length = 0; |
| s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */ |
| goto again; /* get another record */ |
| } |
| |
| /* just read a 0 length packet */ |
| if (rr->length == 0) goto again; |
| |
| /* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), |
| * and a handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it |
| * cannot be processed at this time. However, do not buffer |
| * anything while listening. |
| */ |
| if (is_next_epoch) |
| { |
| if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen) |
| { |
| dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num); |
| } |
| rr->length = 0; |
| s->packet_length = 0; |
| goto again; |
| } |
| |
| if (!dtls1_process_record(s)) |
| { |
| rr->length = 0; |
| s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */ |
| goto again; /* get another record */ |
| } |
| |
| return(1); |
| |
| } |
| |
| /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. |
| * 'type' is one of the following: |
| * |
| * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) |
| * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) |
| * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) |
| * |
| * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first |
| * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). |
| * |
| * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as |
| * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really |
| * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests. |
| * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store |
| * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol |
| * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): |
| * Change cipher spec protocol |
| * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored |
| * Alert protocol |
| * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) |
| * Handshake protocol |
| * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have |
| * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages |
| * here, anything else is handled by higher layers |
| * Application data protocol |
| * none of our business |
| */ |
| int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) |
| { |
| int al,i,j,ret; |
| unsigned int n; |
| SSL3_RECORD *rr; |
| void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL; |
| |
| if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */ |
| if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) |
| return(-1); |
| |
| /* XXX: check what the second '&& type' is about */ |
| if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && |
| (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) || |
| (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_read_bytes, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting */ |
| if ( (ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek))) |
| return ret; |
| |
| /* Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */ |
| |
| if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) |
| { |
| /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ |
| i=s->handshake_func(s); |
| if (i < 0) return(i); |
| if (i == 0) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_read_bytes, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| return(-1); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| start: |
| s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
| |
| /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record |
| * s->s3->rrec.data, - data |
| * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read |
| * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */ |
| rr = &(s->s3->rrec); |
| |
| /* We are not handshaking and have no data yet, |
| * so process data buffered during the last handshake |
| * in advance, if any. |
| */ |
| if (s->state == SSL_ST_OK && rr->length == 0) |
| { |
| pitem *item; |
| item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q); |
| if (item) |
| { |
| dtls1_copy_record(s, item); |
| |
| OPENSSL_free(item->data); |
| pitem_free(item); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Check for timeout */ |
| if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0) |
| goto start; |
| |
| /* get new packet if necessary */ |
| if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) |
| { |
| ret=dtls1_get_record(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) |
| { |
| ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret); |
| /* anything other than a timeout is an error */ |
| if (ret <= 0) |
| return(ret); |
| else |
| goto start; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (s->d1->listen && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) |
| { |
| rr->length = 0; |
| goto start; |
| } |
| |
| /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ |
| |
| if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, |
| * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ |
| && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) |
| { |
| /* We now have application data between CCS and Finished. |
| * Most likely the packets were reordered on their way, so |
| * buffer the application data for later processing rather |
| * than dropping the connection. |
| */ |
| dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), rr->seq_num); |
| rr->length = 0; |
| goto start; |
| } |
| |
| /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away |
| * (even in 'peek' mode) */ |
| if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) |
| { |
| rr->length=0; |
| s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
| return(0); |
| } |
| |
| |
| if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */ |
| { |
| /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we |
| * are doing a handshake for the first time */ |
| if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && |
| (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_read_bytes, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (len <= 0) return(len); |
| |
| if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length) |
| n = rr->length; |
| else |
| n = (unsigned int)len; |
| |
| memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n); |
| if (!peek) |
| { |
| rr->length-=n; |
| rr->off+=n; |
| if (rr->length == 0) |
| { |
| s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; |
| rr->off=0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return(n); |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake |
| * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */ |
| |
| /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, |
| * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place. |
| */ |
| { |
| unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0; |
| unsigned char *dest = NULL; |
| unsigned int *dest_len = NULL; |
| |
| if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) |
| { |
| dest_maxlen = sizeof s->d1->handshake_fragment; |
| dest = s->d1->handshake_fragment; |
| dest_len = &s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; |
| } |
| else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) |
| { |
| dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->d1->alert_fragment); |
| dest = s->d1->alert_fragment; |
| dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len; |
| } |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS |
| else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) |
| { |
| dtls1_process_heartbeat(s); |
| |
| /* Exit and notify application to read again */ |
| rr->length = 0; |
| s->rwstate=SSL_READING; |
| BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); |
| BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); |
| return(-1); |
| } |
| #endif |
| /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */ |
| else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) |
| { |
| /* Application data while renegotiating |
| * is allowed. Try again reading. |
| */ |
| if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) |
| { |
| BIO *bio; |
| s->s3->in_read_app_data=2; |
| bio=SSL_get_rbio(s); |
| s->rwstate=SSL_READING; |
| BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); |
| BIO_set_retry_read(bio); |
| return(-1); |
| } |
| |
| /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */ |
| al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_read_bytes, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (dest_maxlen > 0) |
| { |
| /* XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello |
| * may be fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes */ |
| if ( rr->length < dest_maxlen) |
| { |
| #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE |
| /* |
| * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while |
| * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this |
| * non-existing alert... |
| */ |
| FIX ME |
| #endif |
| s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; |
| rr->length = 0; |
| goto start; |
| } |
| |
| /* now move 'n' bytes: */ |
| for ( k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++) |
| { |
| dest[k] = rr->data[rr->off++]; |
| rr->length--; |
| } |
| *dest_len = dest_maxlen; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; |
| * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT. |
| * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */ |
| |
| /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */ |
| if ((!s->server) && |
| (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) && |
| (s->d1->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) && |
| (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) |
| { |
| s->d1->handshake_fragment_len = 0; |
| |
| if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) || |
| (s->d1->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) || |
| (s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_read_bytes, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages */ |
| |
| if (s->msg_callback) |
| s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, |
| s->d1->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
| |
| if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && |
| !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) && |
| !s->s3->renegotiate) |
| { |
| s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; |
| s->new_session = 1; |
| ssl3_renegotiate(s); |
| if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) |
| { |
| i=s->handshake_func(s); |
| if (i < 0) return(i); |
| if (i == 0) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_read_bytes, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| return(-1); |
| } |
| |
| if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) |
| { |
| if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */ |
| { |
| BIO *bio; |
| /* In the case where we try to read application data, |
| * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with |
| * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may |
| * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */ |
| s->rwstate=SSL_READING; |
| bio=SSL_get_rbio(s); |
| BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); |
| BIO_set_retry_read(bio); |
| return(-1); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, |
| * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */ |
| goto start; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->d1->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH) |
| { |
| int alert_level = s->d1->alert_fragment[0]; |
| int alert_descr = s->d1->alert_fragment[1]; |
| |
| s->d1->alert_fragment_len = 0; |
| |
| if (s->msg_callback) |
| s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, |
| s->d1->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
| |
| if (s->info_callback != NULL) |
| cb=s->info_callback; |
| else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) |
| cb=s->ctx->info_callback; |
| |
| if (cb != NULL) |
| { |
| j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; |
| cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); |
| } |
| |
| if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */ |
| { |
| s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; |
| if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) |
| { |
| s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; |
| return(0); |
| } |
| #if 0 |
| /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */ |
| /* now check if it's a missing record */ |
| if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) |
| { |
| unsigned short seq; |
| unsigned int frag_off; |
| unsigned char *p = &(s->d1->alert_fragment[2]); |
| |
| n2s(p, seq); |
| n2l3(p, frag_off); |
| |
| dtls1_retransmit_message(s, |
| dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, 0), |
| frag_off, &found); |
| if ( ! found && SSL_in_init(s)) |
| { |
| /* fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s)); */ |
| /* requested a message not yet sent, |
| send an alert ourselves */ |
| ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, |
| DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE); |
| } |
| } |
| #endif |
| } |
| else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */ |
| { |
| char tmp[16]; |
| |
| s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
| s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_read_bytes, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); |
| BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr); |
| ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp); |
| s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; |
| SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session); |
| return(0); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_read_bytes, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| goto start; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */ |
| { |
| s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
| rr->length=0; |
| return(0); |
| } |
| |
| if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) |
| { |
| struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr; |
| unsigned int ccs_hdr_len = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH; |
| |
| dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr); |
| |
| if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) |
| ccs_hdr_len = 3; |
| |
| /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know |
| * exactly what the record payload has to look like */ |
| /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */ |
| if ( (rr->length != ccs_hdr_len) || |
| (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) |
| { |
| i=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_read_bytes, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| rr->length=0; |
| |
| if (s->msg_callback) |
| s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, |
| rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
| |
| /* We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake |
| * messages are still missing, so just drop it. |
| */ |
| if (!s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok) |
| { |
| goto start; |
| } |
| |
| s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0; |
| |
| s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1; |
| if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) |
| goto err; |
| |
| /* do this whenever CCS is processed */ |
| dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ); |
| |
| if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) |
| s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; |
| |
| goto start; |
| } |
| |
| /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */ |
| if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) && |
| !s->in_handshake) |
| { |
| struct hm_header_st msg_hdr; |
| |
| /* this may just be a stale retransmit */ |
| dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr); |
| if( rr->epoch != s->d1->r_epoch) |
| { |
| rr->length = 0; |
| goto start; |
| } |
| |
| /* If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the |
| * client here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED. |
| */ |
| if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) |
| { |
| if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0) |
| return -1; |
| |
| dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s); |
| rr->length = 0; |
| goto start; |
| } |
| |
| if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) && |
| !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) |
| { |
| #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and |
| * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting |
| * protocol violations): */ |
| s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server) |
| ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT |
| :SSL_ST_CONNECT; |
| #else |
| s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; |
| #endif |
| s->renegotiate=1; |
| s->new_session=1; |
| } |
| i=s->handshake_func(s); |
| if (i < 0) return(i); |
| if (i == 0) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_read_bytes, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| return(-1); |
| } |
| |
| if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) |
| { |
| if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */ |
| { |
| BIO *bio; |
| /* In the case where we try to read application data, |
| * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with |
| * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may |
| * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */ |
| s->rwstate=SSL_READING; |
| bio=SSL_get_rbio(s); |
| BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); |
| BIO_set_retry_read(bio); |
| return(-1); |
| } |
| } |
| goto start; |
| } |
| |
| switch (rr->type) |
| { |
| default: |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS |
| /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */ |
| if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) |
| { |
| rr->length = 0; |
| goto start; |
| } |
| #endif |
| al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_read_bytes, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); |
| goto f_err; |
| case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: |
| case SSL3_RT_ALERT: |
| case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: |
| /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception |
| * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that |
| * should not happen when type != rr->type */ |
| al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_read_bytes, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: |
| /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data, |
| * but have application data. If the library was |
| * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data |
| * is set) and it makes sense to read application data |
| * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started), |
| * we will indulge it. |
| */ |
| if (s->s3->in_read_app_data && |
| (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) && |
| (( |
| (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) && |
| (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) && |
| (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A) |
| ) || ( |
| (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) && |
| (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) && |
| (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) |
| ) |
| )) |
| { |
| s->s3->in_read_app_data=2; |
| return(-1); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_read_bytes, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| } |
| /* not reached */ |
| |
| f_err: |
| ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
| err: |
| return(-1); |
| } |
| |
| int |
| dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) |
| { |
| int i; |
| |
| if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) |
| { |
| i=s->handshake_func(s); |
| if (i < 0) return(i); |
| if (i == 0) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_write_app_data_bytes, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_write_app_data_bytes, SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len); |
| return i; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake |
| * is started. */ |
| static int |
| have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, |
| int len, int peek) |
| { |
| |
| if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) |
| /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ |
| { |
| unsigned char *src = s->d1->handshake_fragment; |
| unsigned char *dst = buf; |
| unsigned int k,n; |
| |
| /* peek == 0 */ |
| n = 0; |
| while ((len > 0) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) |
| { |
| *dst++ = *src++; |
| len--; s->d1->handshake_fragment_len--; |
| n++; |
| } |
| /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ |
| for (k = 0; k < s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; k++) |
| s->d1->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; |
| return n; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type' |
| * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. |
| */ |
| int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len) |
| { |
| int i; |
| |
| assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH); |
| s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
| i=do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len); |
| return i; |
| } |
| |
| static int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, |
| unsigned int len) |
| { |
| unsigned char *p,*pseq; |
| int i,mac_size,clear=0; |
| int prefix_len = 0; |
| int eivlen; |
| SSL3_RECORD *wr; |
| SSL3_BUFFER *wb; |
| SSL_SESSION *sess; |
| |
| /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written |
| * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */ |
| if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0) |
| { |
| assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */ |
| return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len)); |
| } |
| |
| /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ |
| if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) |
| { |
| i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); |
| if (i <= 0) |
| return(i); |
| /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ |
| } |
| |
| if (len == 0) |
| return 0; |
| |
| wr= &(s->s3->wrec); |
| wb= &(s->s3->wbuf); |
| sess=s->session; |
| |
| if ( (sess == NULL) || |
| (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || |
| (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) |
| clear=1; |
| |
| if (clear) |
| mac_size=0; |
| else |
| { |
| mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); |
| if (mac_size < 0) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| p = wb->buf + prefix_len; |
| |
| /* write the header */ |
| |
| *(p++)=type&0xff; |
| wr->type=type; |
| /* Special case: for hello verify request, client version 1.0 and |
| * we haven't decided which version to use yet send back using |
| * version 1.0 header: otherwise some clients will ignore it. |
| */ |
| if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) |
| { |
| *(p++)=DTLS1_VERSION>>8; |
| *(p++)=DTLS1_VERSION&0xff; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| *(p++)=s->version>>8; |
| *(p++)=s->version&0xff; |
| } |
| |
| /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */ |
| pseq=p; |
| p+=10; |
| |
| /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */ |
| if (s->enc_write_ctx) |
| { |
| int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx); |
| if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) |
| { |
| eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx); |
| if (eivlen <= 1) |
| eivlen = 0; |
| } |
| /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */ |
| else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) |
| eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
| else |
| eivlen = 0; |
| } |
| else |
| eivlen = 0; |
| |
| /* lets setup the record stuff. */ |
| wr->data=p + eivlen; /* make room for IV in case of CBC */ |
| wr->length=(int)len; |
| wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf; |
| |
| /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into |
| * wr->data */ |
| |
| /* first we compress */ |
| if (s->compress != NULL) |
| { |
| if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, do_dtls1_write, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length); |
| wr->input=wr->data; |
| } |
| |
| /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input |
| * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length. |
| * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */ |
| |
| if (mac_size != 0) |
| { |
| if(s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen]),1) < 0) |
| goto err; |
| wr->length+=mac_size; |
| } |
| |
| /* this is true regardless of mac size */ |
| wr->input=p; |
| wr->data=p; |
| |
| if (eivlen) |
| wr->length += eivlen; |
| |
| s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1); |
| |
| /* record length after mac and block padding */ |
| /* if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA || |
| (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && ! SSL_in_init(s))) */ |
| |
| /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */ |
| |
| s2n(s->d1->w_epoch, pseq); |
| |
| /* XDTLS: ?? */ |
| /* else |
| s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq); */ |
| |
| memcpy(pseq, &(s->s3->write_sequence[2]), 6); |
| pseq+=6; |
| s2n(wr->length,pseq); |
| |
| if (s->msg_callback) |
| s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, pseq - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
| |
| /* we should now have |
| * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is |
| * wr->length long */ |
| wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */ |
| wr->length+=DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; |
| |
| #if 0 /* this is now done at the message layer */ |
| /* buffer the record, making it easy to handle retransmits */ |
| if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) |
| dtls1_buffer_record(s, wr->data, wr->length, |
| *((PQ_64BIT *)&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]))); |
| #endif |
| |
| ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0])); |
| |
| /* now let's set up wb */ |
| wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length; |
| wb->offset = 0; |
| |
| /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */ |
| s->s3->wpend_tot=len; |
| s->s3->wpend_buf=buf; |
| s->s3->wpend_type=type; |
| s->s3->wpend_ret=len; |
| |
| /* we now just need to write the buffer */ |
| return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len); |
| err: |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| |
| |
| static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap) |
| { |
| int cmp; |
| unsigned int shift; |
| const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence; |
| |
| cmp = satsub64be(seq,bitmap->max_seq_num); |
| if (cmp > 0) |
| { |
| memcpy (s->s3->rrec.seq_num,seq,8); |
| return 1; /* this record in new */ |
| } |
| shift = -cmp; |
| if (shift >= sizeof(bitmap->map)*8) |
| return 0; /* stale, outside the window */ |
| else if (bitmap->map & (1UL<<shift)) |
| return 0; /* record previously received */ |
| |
| memcpy (s->s3->rrec.seq_num,seq,8); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap) |
| { |
| int cmp; |
| unsigned int shift; |
| const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence; |
| |
| cmp = satsub64be(seq,bitmap->max_seq_num); |
| if (cmp > 0) |
| { |
| shift = cmp; |
| if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8) |
| bitmap->map <<= shift, bitmap->map |= 1UL; |
| else |
| bitmap->map = 1UL; |
| memcpy(bitmap->max_seq_num,seq,8); |
| } |
| else { |
| shift = -cmp; |
| if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8) |
| bitmap->map |= 1UL<<shift; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| |
| int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) |
| { |
| int i,j; |
| void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; |
| unsigned char buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH]; |
| unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0]; |
| |
| s->s3->alert_dispatch=0; |
| |
| memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf)); |
| *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[0]; |
| *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[1]; |
| |
| #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE |
| if (s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) |
| { |
| s2n(s->d1->handshake_read_seq, ptr); |
| #if 0 |
| if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* waiting for a new msg */ |
| |
| else |
| s2n(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq, ptr); /* partial msg read */ |
| #endif |
| |
| #if 0 |
| fprintf(stderr, "s->d1->handshake_read_seq = %d, s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = %d\n",s->d1->handshake_read_seq,s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq); |
| #endif |
| l2n3(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off, ptr); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf)); |
| if (i <= 0) |
| { |
| s->s3->alert_dispatch=1; |
| /* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */ |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL |
| #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE |
| || s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE |
| #endif |
| ) |
| (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio); |
| |
| if (s->msg_callback) |
| s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, |
| 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
| |
| if (s->info_callback != NULL) |
| cb=s->info_callback; |
| else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) |
| cb=s->ctx->info_callback; |
| |
| if (cb != NULL) |
| { |
| j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1]; |
| cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j); |
| } |
| } |
| return(i); |
| } |
| |
| |
| static DTLS1_BITMAP * |
| dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned int *is_next_epoch) |
| { |
| |
| *is_next_epoch = 0; |
| |
| /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */ |
| if (rr->epoch == s->d1->r_epoch) |
| return &s->d1->bitmap; |
| |
| /* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */ |
| else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->d1->r_epoch + 1) && |
| (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || |
| rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)) |
| { |
| *is_next_epoch = 1; |
| return &s->d1->next_bitmap; |
| } |
| |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| #if 0 |
| static int |
| dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned short *priority, |
| unsigned long *offset) |
| { |
| |
| /* alerts are passed up immediately */ |
| if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA || |
| rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* Only need to buffer if a handshake is underway. |
| * (this implies that Hello Request and Client Hello are passed up |
| * immediately) */ |
| if ( SSL_in_init(s)) |
| { |
| unsigned char *data = rr->data; |
| /* need to extract the HM/CCS sequence number here */ |
| if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || |
| rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) |
| { |
| unsigned short seq_num; |
| struct hm_header_st msg_hdr; |
| struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr; |
| |
| if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) |
| { |
| dtls1_get_message_header(data, &msg_hdr); |
| seq_num = msg_hdr.seq; |
| *offset = msg_hdr.frag_off; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| dtls1_get_ccs_header(data, &ccs_hdr); |
| seq_num = ccs_hdr.seq; |
| *offset = 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* this is either a record we're waiting for, or a |
| * retransmit of something we happened to previously |
| * receive (higher layers will drop the repeat silently */ |
| if ( seq_num < s->d1->handshake_read_seq) |
| return 0; |
| if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && |
| seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq && |
| msg_hdr.frag_off < s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off) |
| return 0; |
| else if ( seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq && |
| (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC || |
| msg_hdr.frag_off == s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off)) |
| return 0; |
| else |
| { |
| *priority = seq_num; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| } |
| else /* unknown record type */ |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| void |
| dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw) |
| { |
| unsigned char *seq; |
| unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->s3->read_sequence); |
| |
| if ( rw & SSL3_CC_READ) |
| { |
| seq = s->s3->read_sequence; |
| s->d1->r_epoch++; |
| memcpy(&(s->d1->bitmap), &(s->d1->next_bitmap), sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP)); |
| memset(&(s->d1->next_bitmap), 0x00, sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP)); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| seq = s->s3->write_sequence; |
| memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, seq, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence)); |
| s->d1->w_epoch++; |
| } |
| |
| memset(seq, 0x00, seq_bytes); |
| } |