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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/buf.h>
#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
#include <openssl/nid.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/sha.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include "internal.h"
/* ssl3_do_write sends |ssl->init_buf| in records of type 'type'
* (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC). It returns 1 on success
* and <= 0 on error. */
static int ssl3_do_write(SSL *ssl, int type, const uint8_t *data, size_t len) {
int ret = ssl3_write_bytes(ssl, type, data, len);
if (ret <= 0) {
return ret;
}
/* ssl3_write_bytes writes the data in its entirety. */
assert((size_t)ret == len);
ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, ssl->version, type, data, len);
return 1;
}
int ssl3_init_message(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb, CBB *body, uint8_t type) {
CBB_zero(cbb);
if (ssl->s3->pending_message != NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/* Pick a modest size hint to save most of the |realloc| calls. */
if (!CBB_init(cbb, 64) ||
!CBB_add_u8(cbb, type) ||
!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(cbb, body)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int ssl3_finish_message(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb) {
if (ssl->s3->pending_message != NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
uint8_t *msg = NULL;
size_t len;
if (!CBB_finish(cbb, &msg, &len) ||
len > 0xffffffffu) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
OPENSSL_free(msg);
return 0;
}
ssl3_update_handshake_hash(ssl, msg, len);
ssl->s3->pending_message = msg;
ssl->s3->pending_message_len = (uint32_t)len;
return 1;
}
int ssl3_write_message(SSL *ssl) {
if (ssl->s3->pending_message == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
int ret = ssl3_do_write(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, ssl->s3->pending_message,
ssl->s3->pending_message_len);
if (ret <= 0) {
return ret;
}
OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->pending_message);
ssl->s3->pending_message = NULL;
ssl->s3->pending_message_len = 0;
return 1;
}
int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *ssl, int a, int b) {
if (ssl->state == b) {
return ssl->method->write_message(ssl);
}
int n = ssl->s3->enc_method->final_finish_mac(ssl, ssl->server,
ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md);
if (n == 0) {
return 0;
}
ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = n;
/* Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. */
if (!ssl_log_master_secret(ssl, ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
ssl->session->master_key,
ssl->session->master_key_length)) {
return 0;
}
/* Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks */
if (ssl->server) {
assert(n <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished, ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md, n);
ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len = n;
} else {
assert(n <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md, n);
ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len = n;
}
CBB cbb, body;
if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, SSL3_MT_FINISHED) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&body, ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md,
ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) ||
!ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, &cbb)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
return -1;
}
ssl->state = b;
return ssl->method->write_message(ssl);
}
/* ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
* so far. */
static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *ssl) {
/* If no new cipher setup then return immediately: other functions will set
* the appropriate error. */
if (ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
return;
}
ssl->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = ssl->s3->enc_method->final_finish_mac(
ssl, !ssl->server, ssl->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
}
int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *ssl) {
int al, finished_len, ok;
long message_len;
uint8_t *p;
message_len = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, SSL3_MT_FINISHED,
ssl_dont_hash_message, &ok);
if (!ok) {
return message_len;
}
/* Snapshot the finished hash before incorporating the new message. */
ssl3_take_mac(ssl);
if (!ssl3_hash_current_message(ssl)) {
goto err;
}
p = ssl->init_msg;
finished_len = ssl->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
if (finished_len != message_len) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
int finished_ret =
CRYPTO_memcmp(p, ssl->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, finished_len);
#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
finished_ret = 0;
#endif
if (finished_ret != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
goto f_err;
}
/* Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks */
if (ssl->server) {
assert(finished_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, ssl->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
finished_len);
ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finished_len;
} else {
assert(finished_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished, ssl->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
finished_len);
ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finished_len;
}
return 1;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
return 0;
}
int ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl) {
static const uint8_t kChangeCipherSpec[1] = {SSL3_MT_CCS};
return ssl3_do_write(ssl, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, kChangeCipherSpec,
sizeof(kChangeCipherSpec));
}
int ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *ssl) {
CBB cbb, body;
if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) ||
!ssl_add_cert_chain(ssl, &body) ||
!ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, &cbb)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
size_t ssl_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *ssl) {
/* kMaxMessageLen is the default maximum message size for handshakes which do
* not accept peer certificate chains. */
static const size_t kMaxMessageLen = 16384;
if ((!ssl->server || (ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) &&
kMaxMessageLen < ssl->max_cert_list) {
return ssl->max_cert_list;
}
return kMaxMessageLen;
}
static int extend_handshake_buffer(SSL *ssl, size_t length) {
if (!BUF_MEM_reserve(ssl->init_buf, length)) {
return -1;
}
while (ssl->init_buf->length < length) {
int ret =
ssl3_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
(uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data + ssl->init_buf->length,
length - ssl->init_buf->length, 0);
if (ret <= 0) {
return ret;
}
ssl->init_buf->length += (size_t)ret;
}
return 1;
}
/* Obtain handshake message of message type |msg_type| (any if |msg_type| ==
* -1). */
long ssl3_get_message(SSL *ssl, int msg_type,
enum ssl_hash_message_t hash_message, int *ok) {
*ok = 0;
if (ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message) {
/* A ssl_dont_hash_message call cannot be combined with reuse_message; the
* ssl_dont_hash_message would have to have been applied to the previous
* call. */
assert(hash_message == ssl_hash_message);
assert(ssl->s3->tmp.message_complete);
ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 0;
if (msg_type >= 0 && ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != msg_type) {
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
return -1;
}
*ok = 1;
assert(ssl->init_buf->length >= 4);
ssl->init_msg = (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data + 4;
ssl->init_num = (int)ssl->init_buf->length - 4;
return ssl->init_num;
}
again:
if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_complete) {
ssl->s3->tmp.message_complete = 0;
ssl->init_buf->length = 0;
}
/* Read the message header, if we haven't yet. */
int ret = extend_handshake_buffer(ssl, 4);
if (ret <= 0) {
return ret;
}
/* Parse out the length. Cap it so the peer cannot force us to buffer up to
* 2^24 bytes. */
const uint8_t *p = (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data;
size_t msg_len = (((uint32_t)p[1]) << 16) | (((uint32_t)p[2]) << 8) | p[3];
if (msg_len > ssl_max_handshake_message_len(ssl)) {
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
return -1;
}
/* Read the message body, if we haven't yet. */
ret = extend_handshake_buffer(ssl, 4 + msg_len);
if (ret <= 0) {
return ret;
}
/* We have now received a complete message. */
ssl->s3->tmp.message_complete = 1;
ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, ssl->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
ssl->init_buf->data, ssl->init_buf->length);
static const uint8_t kHelloRequest[4] = {SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0, 0, 0};
if (!ssl->server && ssl->init_buf->length == sizeof(kHelloRequest) &&
memcmp(kHelloRequest, ssl->init_buf->data, sizeof(kHelloRequest)) == 0) {
/* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- we are doing a
* handshake anyway now, so ignore them if their format is correct. Does
* not count for 'Finished' MAC. */
goto again;
}
uint8_t actual_type = ((const uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data)[0];
if (msg_type >= 0 && actual_type != msg_type) {
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
return -1;
}
ssl->s3->tmp.message_type = actual_type;
ssl->init_msg = (uint8_t*)ssl->init_buf->data + 4;
ssl->init_num = ssl->init_buf->length - 4;
/* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
if (hash_message == ssl_hash_message && !ssl3_hash_current_message(ssl)) {
return -1;
}
*ok = 1;
return ssl->init_num;
}
int ssl3_hash_current_message(SSL *ssl) {
/* The handshake header (different size between DTLS and TLS) is included in
* the hash. */
size_t header_len = ssl->init_msg - (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data;
return ssl3_update_handshake_hash(ssl, (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data,
ssl->init_num + header_len);
}
int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) {
int al;
switch (type) {
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH:
case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH:
case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH:
al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED:
case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL:
case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP:
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
break;
default:
al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
break;
}
return al;
}
int ssl_fill_hello_random(uint8_t *out, size_t len, int is_server) {
if (is_server) {
const uint32_t current_time = time(NULL);
uint8_t *p = out;
if (len < 4) {
return 0;
}
p[0] = current_time >> 24;
p[1] = current_time >> 16;
p[2] = current_time >> 8;
p[3] = current_time;
return RAND_bytes(p + 4, len - 4);
} else {
return RAND_bytes(out, len);
}
}