| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
| * All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
| * |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
| * the code are not to be removed. |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ |
| |
| #include <assert.h> |
| #include <limits.h> |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| |
| #include <openssl/asn1t.h> |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> |
| #include <openssl/obj.h> |
| #include <openssl/pool.h> |
| #include <openssl/thread.h> |
| #include <openssl/x509.h> |
| #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
| |
| #include "../asn1/internal.h" |
| #include "../bytestring/internal.h" |
| #include "../internal.h" |
| #include "internal.h" |
| |
| static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class = CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT; |
| |
| ASN1_SEQUENCE_enc(X509_CINF, enc, 0) = { |
| ASN1_EXP_OPT(X509_CINF, version, ASN1_INTEGER, 0), |
| ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, serialNumber, ASN1_INTEGER), |
| ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, signature, X509_ALGOR), |
| ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, issuer, X509_NAME), |
| ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, validity, X509_VAL), |
| ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, subject, X509_NAME), |
| ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, key, X509_PUBKEY), |
| ASN1_IMP_OPT(X509_CINF, issuerUID, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 1), |
| ASN1_IMP_OPT(X509_CINF, subjectUID, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 2), |
| ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CINF, extensions, X509_EXTENSION, 3), |
| } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_enc(X509_CINF, X509_CINF) |
| |
| IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CINF) |
| |
| // x509_new_null returns a new |X509| object where the |cert_info|, |sig_alg|, |
| // and |signature| fields are not yet filled in. |
| static X509 *x509_new_null(void) { |
| X509 *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509)); |
| if (ret == NULL) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| OPENSSL_memset(ret, 0, sizeof(X509)); |
| |
| ret->references = 1; |
| ret->ex_pathlen = -1; |
| CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ret->ex_data); |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(&ret->lock); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| X509 *X509_new(void) { |
| X509 *ret = x509_new_null(); |
| if (ret == NULL) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| ret->cert_info = X509_CINF_new(); |
| ret->sig_alg = X509_ALGOR_new(); |
| ret->signature = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new(); |
| if (ret->cert_info == NULL || ret->sig_alg == NULL || |
| ret->signature == NULL) { |
| X509_free(ret); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| void X509_free(X509 *x509) { |
| if (x509 == NULL || !CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&x509->references)) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, x509, &x509->ex_data); |
| |
| X509_CINF_free(x509->cert_info); |
| X509_ALGOR_free(x509->sig_alg); |
| ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(x509->signature); |
| ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(x509->skid); |
| AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(x509->akid); |
| CRL_DIST_POINTS_free(x509->crldp); |
| GENERAL_NAMES_free(x509->altname); |
| NAME_CONSTRAINTS_free(x509->nc); |
| X509_CERT_AUX_free(x509->aux); |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&x509->lock); |
| |
| OPENSSL_free(x509); |
| } |
| |
| static X509 *x509_parse(CBS *cbs, CRYPTO_BUFFER *buf) { |
| CBS cert, tbs, sigalg, sig; |
| if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &cert, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || |
| // Bound the length to comfortably fit in an int. Lengths in this |
| // module often omit overflow checks. |
| CBS_len(&cert) > INT_MAX / 2 || |
| !CBS_get_asn1_element(&cert, &tbs, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || |
| !CBS_get_asn1_element(&cert, &sigalg, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| // For just the signature field, we accept non-minimal BER lengths, though not |
| // indefinite-length encoding. See b/18228011. |
| // |
| // TODO(crbug.com/boringssl/354): Switch the affected callers to convert the |
| // certificate before parsing and then remove this workaround. |
| CBS_ASN1_TAG tag; |
| size_t header_len; |
| int indefinite; |
| if (!CBS_get_any_ber_asn1_element(&cert, &sig, &tag, &header_len, |
| /*out_ber_found=*/NULL, |
| &indefinite) || |
| tag != CBS_ASN1_BITSTRING || indefinite || // |
| !CBS_skip(&sig, header_len) || // |
| CBS_len(&cert) != 0) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| X509 *ret = x509_new_null(); |
| if (ret == NULL) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| // TODO(crbug.com/boringssl/443): When the rest of the library is decoupled |
| // from the tasn_*.c implementation, replace this with |CBS|-based functions. |
| const uint8_t *inp = CBS_data(&tbs); |
| if (ASN1_item_ex_d2i((ASN1_VALUE **)&ret->cert_info, &inp, CBS_len(&tbs), |
| ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CINF), /*tag=*/-1, |
| /*aclass=*/0, /*opt=*/0, buf) <= 0 || |
| inp != CBS_data(&tbs) + CBS_len(&tbs)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| inp = CBS_data(&sigalg); |
| ret->sig_alg = d2i_X509_ALGOR(NULL, &inp, CBS_len(&sigalg)); |
| if (ret->sig_alg == NULL || inp != CBS_data(&sigalg) + CBS_len(&sigalg)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| inp = CBS_data(&sig); |
| ret->signature = c2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING(NULL, &inp, CBS_len(&sig)); |
| if (ret->signature == NULL || inp != CBS_data(&sig) + CBS_len(&sig)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| // The version must be one of v1(0), v2(1), or v3(2). |
| long version = X509_VERSION_1; |
| if (ret->cert_info->version != NULL) { |
| version = ASN1_INTEGER_get(ret->cert_info->version); |
| // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/364): |X509_VERSION_1| should |
| // also be rejected here. This means an explicitly-encoded X.509v1 |
| // version. v1 is DEFAULT, so DER requires it be omitted. |
| if (version < X509_VERSION_1 || version > X509_VERSION_3) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_VERSION); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // Per RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.8, these fields require v2 or v3. |
| if (version == X509_VERSION_1 && (ret->cert_info->issuerUID != NULL || |
| ret->cert_info->subjectUID != NULL)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_FIELD_FOR_VERSION); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| // Per RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.9, extensions require v3. |
| if (version != X509_VERSION_3 && ret->cert_info->extensions != NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_FIELD_FOR_VERSION); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| return ret; |
| |
| err: |
| X509_free(ret); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| X509 *d2i_X509(X509 **out, const uint8_t **inp, long len) { |
| X509 *ret = NULL; |
| if (len < 0) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| CBS cbs; |
| CBS_init(&cbs, *inp, (size_t)len); |
| ret = x509_parse(&cbs, NULL); |
| if (ret == NULL) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| *inp = CBS_data(&cbs); |
| |
| err: |
| if (out != NULL) { |
| X509_free(*out); |
| *out = ret; |
| } |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int i2d_X509(X509 *x509, uint8_t **outp) { |
| if (x509 == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_MISSING_VALUE); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| CBB cbb, cert; |
| if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 64) || // |
| !CBB_add_asn1(&cbb, &cert, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| // TODO(crbug.com/boringssl/443): When the rest of the library is decoupled |
| // from the tasn_*.c implementation, replace this with |CBS|-based functions. |
| uint8_t *out; |
| int len = i2d_X509_CINF(x509->cert_info, NULL); |
| if (len < 0 || // |
| !CBB_add_space(&cert, &out, (size_t)len) || |
| i2d_X509_CINF(x509->cert_info, &out) != len) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| len = i2d_X509_ALGOR(x509->sig_alg, NULL); |
| if (len < 0 || // |
| !CBB_add_space(&cert, &out, (size_t)len) || |
| i2d_X509_ALGOR(x509->sig_alg, &out) != len) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| len = i2d_ASN1_BIT_STRING(x509->signature, NULL); |
| if (len < 0 || // |
| !CBB_add_space(&cert, &out, (size_t)len) || |
| i2d_ASN1_BIT_STRING(x509->signature, &out) != len) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| return CBB_finish_i2d(&cbb, outp); |
| |
| err: |
| CBB_cleanup(&cbb); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| static int x509_new_cb(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { |
| *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)X509_new(); |
| return *pval != NULL; |
| } |
| |
| static void x509_free_cb(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { |
| X509_free((X509 *)*pval); |
| *pval = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| static int x509_d2i_cb(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len, |
| const ASN1_ITEM *it, int opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx) { |
| if (len < 0) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| CBS cbs; |
| CBS_init(&cbs, *in, len); |
| if (opt && !CBS_peek_asn1_tag(&cbs, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| X509 *ret = x509_parse(&cbs, NULL); |
| if (ret == NULL) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| *in = CBS_data(&cbs); |
| X509_free((X509 *)*pval); |
| *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)ret; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int x509_i2d_cb(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out, |
| const ASN1_ITEM *it) { |
| return i2d_X509((X509 *)*pval, out); |
| } |
| |
| static const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS x509_extern_funcs = { |
| x509_new_cb, |
| x509_free_cb, |
| /*asn1_ex_clear=*/NULL, |
| x509_d2i_cb, |
| x509_i2d_cb, |
| }; |
| |
| IMPLEMENT_EXTERN_ASN1(X509, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, x509_extern_funcs) |
| |
| X509 *X509_dup(X509 *x509) { |
| uint8_t *der = NULL; |
| int len = i2d_X509(x509, &der); |
| if (len < 0) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| const uint8_t *inp = der; |
| X509 *ret = d2i_X509(NULL, &inp, len); |
| OPENSSL_free(der); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| X509 *X509_parse_from_buffer(CRYPTO_BUFFER *buf) { |
| CBS cbs; |
| CBS_init(&cbs, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(buf), CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(buf)); |
| X509 *ret = x509_parse(&cbs, buf); |
| if (ret == NULL || CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) { |
| X509_free(ret); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int X509_up_ref(X509 *x) { |
| CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&x->references); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int X509_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused, |
| CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused, |
| CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) { |
| int index; |
| if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp, |
| free_func)) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| return index; |
| } |
| |
| int X509_set_ex_data(X509 *r, int idx, void *arg) { |
| return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx, arg)); |
| } |
| |
| void *X509_get_ex_data(X509 *r, int idx) { |
| return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx)); |
| } |
| |
| // X509_AUX ASN1 routines. X509_AUX is the name given to a certificate with |
| // extra info tagged on the end. Since these functions set how a certificate |
| // is trusted they should only be used when the certificate comes from a |
| // reliable source such as local storage. |
| |
| X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length) { |
| const unsigned char *q = *pp; |
| X509 *ret; |
| int freeret = 0; |
| |
| if (!a || *a == NULL) { |
| freeret = 1; |
| } |
| ret = d2i_X509(a, &q, length); |
| // If certificate unreadable then forget it |
| if (!ret) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| // update length |
| length -= q - *pp; |
| // Parse auxiliary information if there is any. |
| if (length > 0 && !d2i_X509_CERT_AUX(&ret->aux, &q, length)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| *pp = q; |
| return ret; |
| err: |
| if (freeret) { |
| X509_free(ret); |
| if (a) { |
| *a = NULL; |
| } |
| } |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| // Serialize trusted certificate to *pp or just return the required buffer |
| // length if pp == NULL. We ultimately want to avoid modifying *pp in the |
| // error path, but that depends on similar hygiene in lower-level functions. |
| // Here we avoid compounding the problem. |
| static int i2d_x509_aux_internal(X509 *a, unsigned char **pp) { |
| int length, tmplen; |
| unsigned char *start = pp != NULL ? *pp : NULL; |
| |
| assert(pp == NULL || *pp != NULL); |
| |
| // This might perturb *pp on error, but fixing that belongs in i2d_X509() |
| // not here. It should be that if a == NULL length is zero, but we check |
| // both just in case. |
| length = i2d_X509(a, pp); |
| if (length <= 0 || a == NULL) { |
| return length; |
| } |
| |
| if (a->aux != NULL) { |
| tmplen = i2d_X509_CERT_AUX(a->aux, pp); |
| if (tmplen < 0) { |
| if (start != NULL) { |
| *pp = start; |
| } |
| return tmplen; |
| } |
| length += tmplen; |
| } |
| |
| return length; |
| } |
| |
| // Serialize trusted certificate to *pp, or just return the required buffer |
| // length if pp == NULL. |
| // |
| // When pp is not NULL, but *pp == NULL, we allocate the buffer, but since |
| // we're writing two ASN.1 objects back to back, we can't have i2d_X509() do |
| // the allocation, nor can we allow i2d_X509_CERT_AUX() to increment the |
| // allocated buffer. |
| int i2d_X509_AUX(X509 *a, unsigned char **pp) { |
| int length; |
| unsigned char *tmp; |
| |
| // Buffer provided by caller |
| if (pp == NULL || *pp != NULL) { |
| return i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, pp); |
| } |
| |
| // Obtain the combined length |
| if ((length = i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, NULL)) <= 0) { |
| return length; |
| } |
| |
| // Allocate requisite combined storage |
| *pp = tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(length); |
| if (tmp == NULL) { |
| return -1; // Push error onto error stack? |
| } |
| |
| // Encode, but keep *pp at the originally malloced pointer |
| length = i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, &tmp); |
| if (length <= 0) { |
| OPENSSL_free(*pp); |
| *pp = NULL; |
| } |
| return length; |
| } |
| |
| int i2d_re_X509_tbs(X509 *x509, unsigned char **outp) { |
| asn1_encoding_clear(&x509->cert_info->enc); |
| return i2d_X509_CINF(x509->cert_info, outp); |
| } |
| |
| int i2d_X509_tbs(X509 *x509, unsigned char **outp) { |
| return i2d_X509_CINF(x509->cert_info, outp); |
| } |
| |
| int X509_set1_signature_algo(X509 *x509, const X509_ALGOR *algo) { |
| X509_ALGOR *copy1 = X509_ALGOR_dup(algo); |
| X509_ALGOR *copy2 = X509_ALGOR_dup(algo); |
| if (copy1 == NULL || copy2 == NULL) { |
| X509_ALGOR_free(copy1); |
| X509_ALGOR_free(copy2); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| X509_ALGOR_free(x509->sig_alg); |
| x509->sig_alg = copy1; |
| X509_ALGOR_free(x509->cert_info->signature); |
| x509->cert_info->signature = copy2; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int X509_set1_signature_value(X509 *x509, const uint8_t *sig, size_t sig_len) { |
| if (!ASN1_STRING_set(x509->signature, sig, sig_len)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| x509->signature->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07); |
| x509->signature->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| void X509_get0_signature(const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psig, const X509_ALGOR **palg, |
| const X509 *x) { |
| if (psig) { |
| *psig = x->signature; |
| } |
| if (palg) { |
| *palg = x->sig_alg; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| int X509_get_signature_nid(const X509 *x) { |
| return OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm); |
| } |