rust/bssl-crypto/src/aead.rs - boringssl - Git at Google

 /* Copyright (c) 2023, Google Inc.
  *
  * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
  * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
  * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
  *
  * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
  * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
  * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
  * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
  * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
  * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
  * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
  */
 use crate::{CSlice, CSliceMut};
 use bssl_sys::{EVP_AEAD, EVP_AEAD_CTX};

 /// Error returned in the event of an unsuccessful AEAD operation.
 #[derive(Debug)]
 pub struct AeadError;

 /// Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithm trait.
 pub trait Aead {
     /// The size of the auth tag for the given AEAD implementation. This is the amount of bytes
     /// appended to the data when it is encrypted.
     const TAG_SIZE: usize;

     /// The byte array nonce type which specifies the size of the nonce used in the aes operations.
     type Nonce: AsRef<[u8]>;

     /// Encrypt the given buffer containing a plaintext message. On success returns the encrypted
     /// `msg` and appended auth tag, which will result in a Vec which is  `Self::TAG_SIZE` bytes
     /// greater than the initial message.
     fn encrypt(&self, msg: &[u8], aad: &[u8], nonce: &Self::Nonce) -> Result<Vec<u8>, AeadError>;

     /// Decrypt the message, returning the decrypted plaintext or an error in the event the
     /// provided authentication tag does not match the given ciphertext. On success the returned
     /// Vec will only contain the plaintext and so will be `Self::TAG_SIZE` bytes less than the
     /// initial message.
     fn decrypt(&self, msg: &[u8], aad: &[u8], nonce: &Self::Nonce) -> Result<Vec<u8>, AeadError>;
 }

 /// AES-GCM-SIV implementation.
 pub struct AesGcmSiv(AeadImpl<12, 16>);

 /// Instantiates a new AES-128-GCM-SIV instance from key material.
 pub fn new_aes_128_gcm_siv(key: &[u8; 16]) -> AesGcmSiv {
     AesGcmSiv(AeadImpl::new::<EvpAes128GcmSiv>(key))
 }

 /// Instantiates a new AES-256-GCM-SIV instance from key material.
 pub fn new_aes_256_gcm_siv(key: &[u8; 32]) -> AesGcmSiv {
     AesGcmSiv(AeadImpl::new::<EvpAes256GcmSiv>(key))
 }

 impl Aead for AesGcmSiv {
     const TAG_SIZE: usize = 16;
     type Nonce = [u8; 12];

     fn encrypt(&self, msg: &[u8], aad: &[u8], nonce: &[u8; 12]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, AeadError> {
         self.0.encrypt(msg, aad, nonce)
     }

     fn decrypt(&self, msg: &[u8], aad: &[u8], nonce: &[u8; 12]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, AeadError> {
         self.0.decrypt(msg, aad, nonce)
     }
 }

 // Private  implementation of an AEAD which is generic over Nonce size and Tag size. This should
 // only be exposed publicly by wrapper types which provide the correctly sized const generics for
 // the given aead algorithm.
 struct AeadImpl<const N: usize, const T: usize>(*mut EVP_AEAD_CTX);

 trait EvpAeadType {
     type Key: AsRef<[u8]>;
     fn evp_aead() -> *const EVP_AEAD;
 }

 struct EvpAes128GcmSiv;
 impl EvpAeadType for EvpAes128GcmSiv {
     type Key = [u8; 16];

     fn evp_aead() -> *const EVP_AEAD {
         // Safety:
         // - this just returns a constant value
         unsafe { bssl_sys::EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm_siv() }
     }
 }

 struct EvpAes256GcmSiv;
 impl EvpAeadType for EvpAes256GcmSiv {
     type Key = [u8; 32];

     fn evp_aead() -> *const EVP_AEAD {
         // Safety:
         // - this just returns a constant value
         unsafe { bssl_sys::EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm_siv() }
     }
 }

 impl<const N: usize, const T: usize> AeadImpl<N, T> {
     // Create a new AeadImpl instance from key material and for a supported AeadType.
     fn new<A: EvpAeadType>(key: &A::Key) -> Self {
         let key_cslice = CSlice::from(key.as_ref());

         // Safety:
         // - This is always safe as long as the correct key size is set by the wrapper type.
         let ctx = unsafe {
             bssl_sys::EVP_AEAD_CTX_new(
                 A::evp_aead(),
                 key_cslice.as_ptr(),
                 key_cslice.len(),
                 bssl_sys::EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH as usize,
             )
         };
         assert!(!ctx.is_null());
         AeadImpl(ctx)
     }

     // Encrypts msg in-place, adding enough space to msg for the auth tag.
     fn encrypt(&self, msg: &[u8], aad: &[u8], nonce: &[u8; N]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, AeadError> {
         let mut out = Vec::new();
         out.resize(msg.len() + T, 0u8);

         let mut out_cslice = CSliceMut::from(out.as_mut_slice());
         let msg_cslice = CSlice::from(msg);
         let aad_cslice = CSlice::from(aad);
         let nonce_cslice = CSlice::from(nonce.as_slice());
         let mut out_len = 0usize;

         // Safety:
         // - The buffers are all valid, with corresponding ptr and length
         let result = unsafe {
             bssl_sys::EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(
                 self.0,
                 out_cslice.as_mut_ptr(),
                 &mut out_len,
                 out_cslice.len(),
                 nonce_cslice.as_ptr(),
                 nonce_cslice.len(),
                 msg_cslice.as_ptr(),
                 msg_cslice.len(),
                 aad_cslice.as_ptr(),
                 aad_cslice.len(),
             )
         };

         if result == 1 {
             // Verify the correct number of bytes were written.
             assert_eq!(out_len, out.len());
             Ok(out)
         } else {
             Err(AeadError)
         }
     }

     // Decrypts msg in-place, on success msg will contain the plain text alone, without the auth
     // tag.
     fn decrypt(&self, msg: &[u8], aad: &[u8], nonce: &[u8; N]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, AeadError> {
         let mut out = Vec::new();
         out.resize(msg.len() - T, 0u8);

         let mut out_cslice = CSliceMut::from(out.as_mut_slice());
         let aad_cslice = CSlice::from(aad);
         let msg_cslice = CSlice::from(msg);
         let mut out_len = 0usize;

         // Safety:
         // - The buffers are all valid, with corresponding ptr and length
         let result = unsafe {
             bssl_sys::EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(
                 self.0,
                 out_cslice.as_mut_ptr(),
                 &mut out_len,
                 out_cslice.len(),
                 nonce.as_ptr(),
                 nonce.len(),
                 msg_cslice.as_ptr(),
                 msg_cslice.len(),
                 aad_cslice.as_ptr(),
                 aad_cslice.len(),
             )
         };

         if result == 1 {
             // Verify the correct number of bytes were written.
             assert_eq!(out_len, out.len());
             Ok(out)
         } else {
             Err(AeadError)
         }
     }
 }

 #[cfg(test)]
 mod test {
     use super::*;
     use crate::test_helpers::decode_hex;

     #[test]
     fn aes_128_gcm_siv_tests() {
         // https://github.com/google/wycheproof/blob/master/testvectors/aes_gcm_siv_test.json
         // TC1 - Empty Message
         let key = decode_hex("01000000000000000000000000000000");
         let nonce = decode_hex("030000000000000000000000");
         let tag: [u8; 16] = decode_hex("dc20e2d83f25705bb49e439eca56de25");
         let mut buf = Vec::from(&[] as &[u8]);
         let aes = new_aes_128_gcm_siv(&key);
         let result = aes.encrypt(&mut buf, b"", &nonce);
         assert!(result.is_ok());
         assert_eq!(result.unwrap(), &tag);

         // TC2
         let msg: [u8; 8] = decode_hex("0100000000000000");
         let ct: [u8; 8] = decode_hex("b5d839330ac7b786");
         let tag: [u8; 16] = decode_hex("578782fff6013b815b287c22493a364c");
         let result = aes.encrypt(&msg, b"", &nonce);
         assert!(result.is_ok());
         let mut result_vec = result.unwrap();
         assert_eq!(&result_vec[..8], &ct);
         assert_eq!(&result_vec[8..], &tag);
         let result = aes.decrypt(result_vec.as_mut_slice(), b"", &nonce);
         assert!(result.is_ok());
         assert_eq!(&result.unwrap(), &msg);

         // TC14 contains associated data
         let msg: [u8; 4] = decode_hex("02000000");
         let ct: [u8; 4] = decode_hex("a8fe3e87");
         let aad: [u8; 12] = decode_hex("010000000000000000000000");
         let tag: [u8; 16] = decode_hex("07eb1f84fb28f8cb73de8e99e2f48a14");
         let result = aes.encrypt(&msg, &aad, &nonce);
         assert!(result.is_ok());
         let mut result_vec = result.unwrap();
         assert_eq!(&result_vec[..4], &ct);
         assert_eq!(&result_vec[4..], &tag);
         let result = aes.decrypt(result_vec.as_mut_slice(), &aad, &nonce);
         assert!(result.is_ok());
         assert_eq!(&result.unwrap(), &msg);
     }

     #[test]
     fn aes_256_gcm_siv_tests() {
         // https://github.com/google/wycheproof/blob/master/testvectors/aes_gcm_siv_test.json
         // TC77
         let test_key =
             decode_hex("0100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000");
         let nonce = decode_hex("030000000000000000000000");
         let aes = new_aes_256_gcm_siv(&test_key);
         let mut msg: [u8; 8] = decode_hex("0100000000000000");
         let ct: [u8; 8] = decode_hex("c2ef328e5c71c83b");
         let tag: [u8; 16] = decode_hex("843122130f7364b761e0b97427e3df28");
         let enc_result = aes.encrypt(&mut msg, b"", &nonce);
         assert!(enc_result.is_ok());
         let mut enc_data = enc_result.unwrap();
         assert_eq!(&enc_data[..8], &ct);
         assert_eq!(&enc_data[8..], &tag);
         let result = aes.decrypt(enc_data.as_mut_slice(), b"", &nonce);
         assert!(result.is_ok());
         assert_eq!(&result.unwrap(), &msg);

         // TC78
         let mut msg: [u8; 12] = decode_hex("010000000000000000000000");
         let ct: [u8; 12] = decode_hex("9aab2aeb3faa0a34aea8e2b1");
         let tag: [u8; 16] = decode_hex("8ca50da9ae6559e48fd10f6e5c9ca17e");
         let enc_result = aes.encrypt(&mut msg, b"", &nonce);
         assert!(enc_result.is_ok());
         let mut enc_data = enc_result.unwrap();
         assert_eq!(&enc_data[..12], &ct);
         assert_eq!(&enc_data[12..], &tag);
         let result = aes.decrypt(enc_data.as_mut_slice(), b"", &nonce);
         assert!(result.is_ok());
         assert_eq!(&result.unwrap(), &msg);

         // TC89 contains associated data
         let mut msg: [u8; 4] = decode_hex("02000000");
         let ct: [u8; 4] = decode_hex("22b3f4cd");
         let tag: [u8; 16] = decode_hex("1835e517741dfddccfa07fa4661b74cf");
         let aad: [u8; 12] = decode_hex("010000000000000000000000");
         let enc_result = aes.encrypt(&mut msg, &aad, &nonce);
         assert!(enc_result.is_ok());
         let mut enc_data = enc_result.unwrap();
         assert_eq!(&enc_data[..4], &ct);
         assert_eq!(&enc_data[4..], &tag);
         let result = aes.decrypt(enc_data.as_mut_slice(), &aad, &nonce);
         assert!(result.is_ok());
         assert_eq!(&result.unwrap(), &msg);
     }
 }
	/* Copyright (c) 2023, Google Inc.
	*
	* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
	* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
	* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
	*
	* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
	* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
	* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
	* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
	* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
	* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
	* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
	*/
	use crate::{CSlice, CSliceMut};
	use bssl_sys::{EVP_AEAD, EVP_AEAD_CTX};

	/// Error returned in the event of an unsuccessful AEAD operation.
	#[derive(Debug)]
	pub struct AeadError;

	/// Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithm trait.
	pub trait Aead {
	/// The size of the auth tag for the given AEAD implementation. This is the amount of bytes
	/// appended to the data when it is encrypted.
	const TAG_SIZE: usize;

	/// The byte array nonce type which specifies the size of the nonce used in the aes operations.
	type Nonce: AsRef<[u8]>;

	/// Encrypt the given buffer containing a plaintext message. On success returns the encrypted
	/// `msg` and appended auth tag, which will result in a Vec which is `Self::TAG_SIZE` bytes
	/// greater than the initial message.
	fn encrypt(&self, msg: &[u8], aad: &[u8], nonce: &Self::Nonce) -> Result<Vec<u8>, AeadError>;

	/// Decrypt the message, returning the decrypted plaintext or an error in the event the
	/// provided authentication tag does not match the given ciphertext. On success the returned
	/// Vec will only contain the plaintext and so will be `Self::TAG_SIZE` bytes less than the
	/// initial message.
	fn decrypt(&self, msg: &[u8], aad: &[u8], nonce: &Self::Nonce) -> Result<Vec<u8>, AeadError>;
	}

	/// AES-GCM-SIV implementation.
	pub struct AesGcmSiv(AeadImpl<12, 16>);

	/// Instantiates a new AES-128-GCM-SIV instance from key material.
	pub fn new_aes_128_gcm_siv(key: &[u8; 16]) -> AesGcmSiv {
	AesGcmSiv(AeadImpl::new::<EvpAes128GcmSiv>(key))
	}

	/// Instantiates a new AES-256-GCM-SIV instance from key material.
	pub fn new_aes_256_gcm_siv(key: &[u8; 32]) -> AesGcmSiv {
	AesGcmSiv(AeadImpl::new::<EvpAes256GcmSiv>(key))
	}

	impl Aead for AesGcmSiv {
	const TAG_SIZE: usize = 16;
	type Nonce = [u8; 12];

	fn encrypt(&self, msg: &[u8], aad: &[u8], nonce: &[u8; 12]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, AeadError> {
	self.0.encrypt(msg, aad, nonce)
	}

	fn decrypt(&self, msg: &[u8], aad: &[u8], nonce: &[u8; 12]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, AeadError> {
	self.0.decrypt(msg, aad, nonce)
	}
	}

	// Private implementation of an AEAD which is generic over Nonce size and Tag size. This should
	// only be exposed publicly by wrapper types which provide the correctly sized const generics for
	// the given aead algorithm.
	struct AeadImpl<const N: usize, const T: usize>(*mut EVP_AEAD_CTX);

	trait EvpAeadType {
	type Key: AsRef<[u8]>;
	fn evp_aead() -> *const EVP_AEAD;
	}

	struct EvpAes128GcmSiv;
	impl EvpAeadType for EvpAes128GcmSiv {
	type Key = [u8; 16];

	fn evp_aead() -> *const EVP_AEAD {
	// Safety:
	// - this just returns a constant value
	unsafe { bssl_sys::EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm_siv() }
	}
	}

	struct EvpAes256GcmSiv;
	impl EvpAeadType for EvpAes256GcmSiv {
	type Key = [u8; 32];

	fn evp_aead() -> *const EVP_AEAD {
	// Safety:
	// - this just returns a constant value
	unsafe { bssl_sys::EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm_siv() }
	}
	}

	impl<const N: usize, const T: usize> AeadImpl<N, T> {
	// Create a new AeadImpl instance from key material and for a supported AeadType.
	fn new<A: EvpAeadType>(key: &A::Key) -> Self {
	let key_cslice = CSlice::from(key.as_ref());

	// Safety:
	// - This is always safe as long as the correct key size is set by the wrapper type.
	let ctx = unsafe {
	bssl_sys::EVP_AEAD_CTX_new(
	A::evp_aead(),
	key_cslice.as_ptr(),
	key_cslice.len(),
	bssl_sys::EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH as usize,
	)
	};
	assert!(!ctx.is_null());
	AeadImpl(ctx)
	}

	// Encrypts msg in-place, adding enough space to msg for the auth tag.
	fn encrypt(&self, msg: &[u8], aad: &[u8], nonce: &[u8; N]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, AeadError> {
	let mut out = Vec::new();
	out.resize(msg.len() + T, 0u8);

	let mut out_cslice = CSliceMut::from(out.as_mut_slice());
	let msg_cslice = CSlice::from(msg);
	let aad_cslice = CSlice::from(aad);
	let nonce_cslice = CSlice::from(nonce.as_slice());
	let mut out_len = 0usize;

	// Safety:
	// - The buffers are all valid, with corresponding ptr and length
	let result = unsafe {
	bssl_sys::EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(
	self.0,
	out_cslice.as_mut_ptr(),
	&mut out_len,
	out_cslice.len(),
	nonce_cslice.as_ptr(),
	nonce_cslice.len(),
	msg_cslice.as_ptr(),
	msg_cslice.len(),
	aad_cslice.as_ptr(),
	aad_cslice.len(),
	)
	};

	if result == 1 {
	// Verify the correct number of bytes were written.
	assert_eq!(out_len, out.len());
	Ok(out)
	} else {
	Err(AeadError)
	}
	}

	// Decrypts msg in-place, on success msg will contain the plain text alone, without the auth
	// tag.
	fn decrypt(&self, msg: &[u8], aad: &[u8], nonce: &[u8; N]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, AeadError> {
	let mut out = Vec::new();
	out.resize(msg.len() - T, 0u8);

	let mut out_cslice = CSliceMut::from(out.as_mut_slice());
	let aad_cslice = CSlice::from(aad);
	let msg_cslice = CSlice::from(msg);
	let mut out_len = 0usize;

	// Safety:
	// - The buffers are all valid, with corresponding ptr and length
	let result = unsafe {
	bssl_sys::EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(
	self.0,
	out_cslice.as_mut_ptr(),
	&mut out_len,
	out_cslice.len(),
	nonce.as_ptr(),
	nonce.len(),
	msg_cslice.as_ptr(),
	msg_cslice.len(),
	aad_cslice.as_ptr(),
	aad_cslice.len(),
	)
	};

	if result == 1 {
	// Verify the correct number of bytes were written.
	assert_eq!(out_len, out.len());
	Ok(out)
	} else {
	Err(AeadError)
	}
	}
	}

	#[cfg(test)]
	mod test {
	use super::*;
	use crate::test_helpers::decode_hex;

	#[test]
	fn aes_128_gcm_siv_tests() {
	// https://github.com/google/wycheproof/blob/master/testvectors/aes_gcm_siv_test.json
	// TC1 - Empty Message
	let key = decode_hex("01000000000000000000000000000000");
	let nonce = decode_hex("030000000000000000000000");
	let tag: [u8; 16] = decode_hex("dc20e2d83f25705bb49e439eca56de25");
	let mut buf = Vec::from(&[] as &[u8]);
	let aes = new_aes_128_gcm_siv(&key);
	let result = aes.encrypt(&mut buf, b"", &nonce);
	assert!(result.is_ok());
	assert_eq!(result.unwrap(), &tag);

	// TC2
	let msg: [u8; 8] = decode_hex("0100000000000000");
	let ct: [u8; 8] = decode_hex("b5d839330ac7b786");
	let tag: [u8; 16] = decode_hex("578782fff6013b815b287c22493a364c");
	let result = aes.encrypt(&msg, b"", &nonce);
	assert!(result.is_ok());
	let mut result_vec = result.unwrap();
	assert_eq!(&result_vec[..8], &ct);
	assert_eq!(&result_vec[8..], &tag);
	let result = aes.decrypt(result_vec.as_mut_slice(), b"", &nonce);
	assert!(result.is_ok());
	assert_eq!(&result.unwrap(), &msg);

	// TC14 contains associated data
	let msg: [u8; 4] = decode_hex("02000000");
	let ct: [u8; 4] = decode_hex("a8fe3e87");
	let aad: [u8; 12] = decode_hex("010000000000000000000000");
	let tag: [u8; 16] = decode_hex("07eb1f84fb28f8cb73de8e99e2f48a14");
	let result = aes.encrypt(&msg, &aad, &nonce);
	assert!(result.is_ok());
	let mut result_vec = result.unwrap();
	assert_eq!(&result_vec[..4], &ct);
	assert_eq!(&result_vec[4..], &tag);
	let result = aes.decrypt(result_vec.as_mut_slice(), &aad, &nonce);
	assert!(result.is_ok());
	assert_eq!(&result.unwrap(), &msg);
	}

	#[test]
	fn aes_256_gcm_siv_tests() {
	// https://github.com/google/wycheproof/blob/master/testvectors/aes_gcm_siv_test.json
	// TC77
	let test_key =
	decode_hex("0100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000");
	let nonce = decode_hex("030000000000000000000000");
	let aes = new_aes_256_gcm_siv(&test_key);
	let mut msg: [u8; 8] = decode_hex("0100000000000000");
	let ct: [u8; 8] = decode_hex("c2ef328e5c71c83b");
	let tag: [u8; 16] = decode_hex("843122130f7364b761e0b97427e3df28");
	let enc_result = aes.encrypt(&mut msg, b"", &nonce);
	assert!(enc_result.is_ok());
	let mut enc_data = enc_result.unwrap();
	assert_eq!(&enc_data[..8], &ct);
	assert_eq!(&enc_data[8..], &tag);
	let result = aes.decrypt(enc_data.as_mut_slice(), b"", &nonce);
	assert!(result.is_ok());
	assert_eq!(&result.unwrap(), &msg);

	// TC78
	let mut msg: [u8; 12] = decode_hex("010000000000000000000000");
	let ct: [u8; 12] = decode_hex("9aab2aeb3faa0a34aea8e2b1");
	let tag: [u8; 16] = decode_hex("8ca50da9ae6559e48fd10f6e5c9ca17e");
	let enc_result = aes.encrypt(&mut msg, b"", &nonce);
	assert!(enc_result.is_ok());
	let mut enc_data = enc_result.unwrap();
	assert_eq!(&enc_data[..12], &ct);
	assert_eq!(&enc_data[12..], &tag);
	let result = aes.decrypt(enc_data.as_mut_slice(), b"", &nonce);
	assert!(result.is_ok());
	assert_eq!(&result.unwrap(), &msg);

	// TC89 contains associated data
	let mut msg: [u8; 4] = decode_hex("02000000");
	let ct: [u8; 4] = decode_hex("22b3f4cd");
	let tag: [u8; 16] = decode_hex("1835e517741dfddccfa07fa4661b74cf");
	let aad: [u8; 12] = decode_hex("010000000000000000000000");
	let enc_result = aes.encrypt(&mut msg, &aad, &nonce);
	assert!(enc_result.is_ok());
	let mut enc_data = enc_result.unwrap();
	assert_eq!(&enc_data[..4], &ct);
	assert_eq!(&enc_data[4..], &tag);
	let result = aes.decrypt(enc_data.as_mut_slice(), &aad, &nonce);
	assert!(result.is_ok());
	assert_eq!(&result.unwrap(), &msg);
	}
	}