| /* ssl/s3_clnt.c */ | |
| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | |
| * All rights reserved. | |
| * | |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
| * | |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
| * | |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | |
| * the code are not to be removed. | |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
| * | |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
| * are met: | |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
| * | |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
| * | |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | |
| */ | |
| /* ==================================================================== | |
| * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. | |
| * | |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
| * are met: | |
| * | |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
| * | |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in | |
| * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the | |
| * distribution. | |
| * | |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this | |
| * software must display the following acknowledgment: | |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
| * | |
| * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to | |
| * endorse or promote products derived from this software without | |
| * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact | |
| * openssl-core@openssl.org. | |
| * | |
| * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" | |
| * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written | |
| * permission of the OpenSSL Project. | |
| * | |
| * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following | |
| * acknowledgment: | |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
| * | |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY | |
| * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR | |
| * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR | |
| * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, | |
| * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT | |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; | |
| * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, | |
| * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) | |
| * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED | |
| * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | |
| * ==================================================================== | |
| * | |
| * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young | |
| * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim | |
| * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
| * | |
| */ | |
| /* ==================================================================== | |
| * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. | |
| * | |
| * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by | |
| * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. | |
| * | |
| * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source | |
| * license provided above. | |
| * | |
| * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by | |
| * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. | |
| * | |
| */ | |
| /* ==================================================================== | |
| * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. | |
| * | |
| * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by | |
| * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source | |
| * license. | |
| * | |
| * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of | |
| * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites | |
| * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. | |
| * | |
| * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in | |
| * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received | |
| * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. | |
| * | |
| * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not | |
| * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third | |
| * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights | |
| * to make use of the Contribution. | |
| * | |
| * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN | |
| * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA | |
| * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY | |
| * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR | |
| * OTHERWISE. | |
| */ | |
| #include <assert.h> | |
| #include <stdio.h> | |
| #include <string.h> | |
| #include <openssl/bn.h> | |
| #include <openssl/buf.h> | |
| #include <openssl/bytestring.h> | |
| #include <openssl/dh.h> | |
| #include <openssl/ec_key.h> | |
| #include <openssl/ecdsa.h> | |
| #include <openssl/err.h> | |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
| #include <openssl/md5.h> | |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> | |
| #include <openssl/obj.h> | |
| #include <openssl/rand.h> | |
| #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
| #include <openssl/x509v3.h> | |
| #include "internal.h" | |
| #include "../crypto/dh/internal.h" | |
| int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) { | |
| BUF_MEM *buf = NULL; | |
| void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; | |
| int ret = -1; | |
| int new_state, state, skip = 0; | |
| assert(s->handshake_func == ssl3_connect); | |
| assert(!s->server); | |
| assert(!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)); | |
| ERR_clear_error(); | |
| ERR_clear_system_error(); | |
| if (s->info_callback != NULL) { | |
| cb = s->info_callback; | |
| } else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) { | |
| cb = s->ctx->info_callback; | |
| } | |
| s->in_handshake++; | |
| for (;;) { | |
| state = s->state; | |
| switch (s->state) { | |
| case SSL_ST_CONNECT: | |
| if (cb != NULL) { | |
| cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); | |
| } | |
| if (s->init_buf == NULL) { | |
| buf = BUF_MEM_new(); | |
| if (buf == NULL || | |
| !BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { | |
| ret = -1; | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| s->init_buf = buf; | |
| buf = NULL; | |
| } | |
| if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 0)) { | |
| ret = -1; | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */ | |
| if (!ssl3_init_handshake_buffer(s)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| ret = -1; | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A; | |
| s->init_num = 0; | |
| break; | |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A: | |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B: | |
| s->shutdown = 0; | |
| ret = ssl3_send_client_hello(s); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A; | |
| s->init_num = 0; | |
| /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */ | |
| if (s->bbio != s->wbio) { | |
| s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio); | |
| } | |
| break; | |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A: | |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B: | |
| ret = ssl3_get_server_hello(s); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| if (s->hit) { | |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE; | |
| if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { | |
| /* receive renewed session ticket */ | |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; | |
| } | |
| } else { | |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A; | |
| } | |
| s->init_num = 0; | |
| break; | |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A: | |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B: | |
| if (ssl_cipher_has_server_public_key(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { | |
| ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(s); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| if (s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected) { | |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A; | |
| } else { | |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; | |
| } | |
| } else { | |
| skip = 1; | |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; | |
| } | |
| s->init_num = 0; | |
| break; | |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A: | |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B: | |
| ret = ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(s); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A; | |
| s->init_num = 0; | |
| break; | |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A: | |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B: | |
| ret = ssl3_get_certificate_request(s); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A; | |
| s->init_num = 0; | |
| break; | |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A: | |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B: | |
| ret = ssl3_get_server_done(s); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req) { | |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A; | |
| } else { | |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A; | |
| } | |
| s->init_num = 0; | |
| break; | |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A: | |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B: | |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C: | |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D: | |
| ret = ssl3_send_client_certificate(s); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A; | |
| s->init_num = 0; | |
| break; | |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A: | |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B: | |
| ret = ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| /* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain | |
| * of nothing is sent, but no verify packet is sent */ | |
| if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) { | |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A; | |
| } else { | |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; | |
| s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; | |
| } | |
| s->init_num = 0; | |
| break; | |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A: | |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B: | |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_C: | |
| ret = ssl3_send_cert_verify(s); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; | |
| s->init_num = 0; | |
| s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; | |
| break; | |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A: | |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B: | |
| ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A, | |
| SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; | |
| if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) { | |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A; | |
| } | |
| if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { | |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A; | |
| } | |
| s->init_num = 0; | |
| s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; | |
| if (!s->enc_method->setup_key_block(s) || | |
| !s->enc_method->change_cipher_state( | |
| s, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { | |
| ret = -1; | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| break; | |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A: | |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B: | |
| ret = ssl3_send_next_proto(s); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) { | |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A; | |
| } else { | |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; | |
| } | |
| break; | |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A: | |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_B: | |
| ret = ssl3_send_channel_id(s); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; | |
| break; | |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A: | |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B: | |
| ret = | |
| ssl3_send_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B, | |
| s->enc_method->client_finished_label, | |
| s->enc_method->client_finished_label_len); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH; | |
| if (s->hit) { | |
| s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK; | |
| } else { | |
| /* This is a non-resumption handshake. If it involves ChannelID, then | |
| * record the handshake hashes at this point in the session so that | |
| * any resumption of this session with ChannelID can sign those | |
| * hashes. */ | |
| ret = tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(s); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| if ((SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_FALSE_START) && | |
| ssl3_can_false_start(s) && | |
| /* No False Start on renegotiation (would complicate the state | |
| * machine). */ | |
| !s->s3->initial_handshake_complete) { | |
| s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_FALSE_START; | |
| } else { | |
| /* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */ | |
| if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { | |
| s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; | |
| } else { | |
| s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| s->init_num = 0; | |
| break; | |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A: | |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B: | |
| ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE; | |
| s->init_num = 0; | |
| break; | |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A: | |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B: | |
| ret = ssl3_get_cert_status(s); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; | |
| s->init_num = 0; | |
| break; | |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE: | |
| /* At this point, the next message must be entirely behind a | |
| * ChangeCipherSpec. */ | |
| if (!ssl3_expect_change_cipher_spec(s)) { | |
| ret = -1; | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; | |
| break; | |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A: | |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B: | |
| ret = | |
| ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| if (s->hit) { | |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; | |
| } else { | |
| s->state = SSL_ST_OK; | |
| } | |
| s->init_num = 0; | |
| break; | |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH: | |
| s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; | |
| if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) { | |
| ret = -1; | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
| s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state; | |
| break; | |
| case SSL3_ST_FALSE_START: | |
| /* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */ | |
| if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { | |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; | |
| } else { | |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE; | |
| } | |
| s->s3->tmp.in_false_start = 1; | |
| ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); | |
| ret = 1; | |
| goto end; | |
| case SSL_ST_OK: | |
| /* clean a few things up */ | |
| ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); | |
| BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); | |
| s->init_buf = NULL; | |
| /* Remove write buffering now. */ | |
| ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); | |
| const int is_initial_handshake = !s->s3->initial_handshake_complete; | |
| s->init_num = 0; | |
| s->s3->tmp.in_false_start = 0; | |
| s->s3->initial_handshake_complete = 1; | |
| if (is_initial_handshake) { | |
| /* Renegotiations do not participate in session resumption. */ | |
| ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); | |
| } | |
| ret = 1; | |
| /* s->server=0; */ | |
| if (cb != NULL) { | |
| cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); | |
| } | |
| goto end; | |
| default: | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); | |
| ret = -1; | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) { | |
| if (cb != NULL && s->state != state) { | |
| new_state = s->state; | |
| s->state = state; | |
| cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1); | |
| s->state = new_state; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| skip = 0; | |
| } | |
| end: | |
| s->in_handshake--; | |
| BUF_MEM_free(buf); | |
| if (cb != NULL) { | |
| cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret); | |
| } | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int ssl3_send_client_hello(SSL *s) { | |
| uint8_t *buf, *p, *d; | |
| int i; | |
| unsigned long l; | |
| buf = (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data; | |
| if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) { | |
| if (!s->s3->have_version) { | |
| uint16_t max_version = ssl3_get_max_client_version(s); | |
| /* Disabling all versions is silly: return an error. */ | |
| if (max_version == 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| s->version = max_version; | |
| s->client_version = max_version; | |
| } | |
| /* If the configured session was created at a version higher than our | |
| * maximum version, drop it. */ | |
| if (s->session && | |
| (s->session->session_id_length == 0 || s->session->not_resumable || | |
| (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->session->ssl_version > s->version) || | |
| (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->session->ssl_version < s->version))) { | |
| SSL_set_session(s, NULL); | |
| } | |
| /* else use the pre-loaded session */ | |
| p = s->s3->client_random; | |
| /* If resending the ClientHello in DTLS after a HelloVerifyRequest, don't | |
| * renegerate the client_random. The random must be reused. */ | |
| if ((!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || !s->d1->send_cookie) && | |
| !ssl_fill_hello_random(p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random), | |
| 0 /* client */)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* Do the message type and length last. Note: the final argument to | |
| * ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext below depends on the size of this prefix. */ | |
| d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); | |
| /* version indicates the negotiated version: for example from an SSLv2/v3 | |
| * compatible client hello). The client_version field is the maximum | |
| * version we permit and it is also used in RSA encrypted premaster | |
| * secrets. Some servers can choke if we initially report a higher version | |
| * then renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This didn't | |
| * happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it but it can with TLS 1.1 | |
| * or later if the server only supports 1.0. | |
| * | |
| * Possible scenario with previous logic: | |
| * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2 | |
| * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0 | |
| * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2. | |
| * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0. | |
| * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate. | |
| * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now | |
| * know that is maximum server supports. | |
| * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret | |
| * containing version 1.0. | |
| * | |
| * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the maximum version | |
| * we support in client hello and then rely on the checking of version to | |
| * ensure the servers isn't being inconsistent: for example initially | |
| * negotiating with TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by | |
| * using client_version in client hello and not resetting it to the | |
| * negotiated version. */ | |
| *(p++) = s->client_version >> 8; | |
| *(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff; | |
| /* Random stuff */ | |
| memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
| p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; | |
| /* Session ID */ | |
| if (s->s3->initial_handshake_complete || s->session == NULL) { | |
| /* Renegotiations do not participate in session resumption. */ | |
| i = 0; | |
| } else { | |
| i = s->session->session_id_length; | |
| } | |
| *(p++) = i; | |
| if (i != 0) { | |
| if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i); | |
| p += i; | |
| } | |
| /* cookie stuff for DTLS */ | |
| if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
| if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| *(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len; | |
| memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len); | |
| p += s->d1->cookie_len; | |
| } | |
| /* Ciphers supported */ | |
| i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &p[2]); | |
| if (i == 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| s2n(i, p); | |
| p += i; | |
| /* COMPRESSION */ | |
| *(p++) = 1; | |
| *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */ | |
| /* TLS extensions*/ | |
| p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, | |
| p - buf); | |
| if (p == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| l = p - d; | |
| if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B; | |
| } | |
| /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */ | |
| return ssl_do_write(s); | |
| err: | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s) { | |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; | |
| const SSL_CIPHER *c; | |
| CERT *ct = s->cert; | |
| int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ok; | |
| long n; | |
| CBS server_hello, server_random, session_id; | |
| uint16_t server_version, cipher_suite; | |
| uint8_t compression_method; | |
| uint32_t mask_ssl; | |
| n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A, | |
| SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, | |
| 20000, /* ?? */ | |
| ssl_hash_message, &ok); | |
| if (!ok) { | |
| uint32_t err = ERR_peek_error(); | |
| if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_SSL && | |
| ERR_GET_REASON(err) == SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) { | |
| /* Add a dedicated error code to the queue for a handshake_failure alert | |
| * in response to ClientHello. This matches NSS's client behavior and | |
| * gives a better error on a (probable) failure to negotiate initial | |
| * parameters. Note: this error code comes after the original one. | |
| * | |
| * See https://crbug.com/446505. */ | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ON_CLIENT_HELLO); | |
| } | |
| return n; | |
| } | |
| CBS_init(&server_hello, s->init_msg, n); | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16(&server_hello, &server_version) || | |
| !CBS_get_bytes(&server_hello, &server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || | |
| !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&server_hello, &session_id) || | |
| CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE || | |
| !CBS_get_u16(&server_hello, &cipher_suite) || | |
| !CBS_get_u8(&server_hello, &compression_method)) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| assert(s->s3->have_version == s->s3->initial_handshake_complete); | |
| if (!s->s3->have_version) { | |
| if (!ssl3_is_version_enabled(s, server_version)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); | |
| s->version = server_version; | |
| /* Mark the version as fixed so the record-layer version is not clamped | |
| * to TLS 1.0. */ | |
| s->s3->have_version = 1; | |
| al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| s->version = server_version; | |
| s->enc_method = ssl3_get_enc_method(server_version); | |
| assert(s->enc_method != NULL); | |
| /* At this point, the connection's version is known and s->version is | |
| * fixed. Begin enforcing the record-layer version. */ | |
| s->s3->have_version = 1; | |
| } else if (server_version != s->version) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); | |
| al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| /* Copy over the server random. */ | |
| memcpy(s->s3->server_random, CBS_data(&server_random), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
| assert(s->session == NULL || s->session->session_id_length > 0); | |
| if (!s->s3->initial_handshake_complete && s->session != NULL && | |
| CBS_mem_equal(&session_id, s->session->session_id, | |
| s->session->session_id_length)) { | |
| if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length || | |
| memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) { | |
| /* actually a client application bug */ | |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, | |
| SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| s->hit = 1; | |
| } else { | |
| /* The session wasn't resumed. Create a fresh SSL_SESSION to | |
| * fill out. */ | |
| s->hit = 0; | |
| if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) { | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| /* Note: session_id could be empty. */ | |
| s->session->session_id_length = CBS_len(&session_id); | |
| memcpy(s->session->session_id, CBS_data(&session_id), CBS_len(&session_id)); | |
| } | |
| c = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite); | |
| if (c == NULL) { | |
| /* unknown cipher */ | |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| /* ct->mask_ssl was computed from client capabilities. Now | |
| * that the final version is known, compute a new mask_ssl. */ | |
| if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s)) { | |
| mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2; | |
| } else { | |
| mask_ssl = 0; | |
| } | |
| /* If the cipher is disabled then we didn't sent it in the ClientHello, so if | |
| * the server selected it, it's an error. */ | |
| if ((c->algorithm_ssl & mask_ssl) || | |
| (c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k) || | |
| (c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s); | |
| if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, NULL, c)) { | |
| /* we did not say we would use this cipher */ | |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| if (s->hit) { | |
| if (s->session->cipher != c) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| if (s->session->ssl_version != s->version) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_VERSION_NOT_RETURNED); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c; | |
| /* Now that the cipher is known, initialize the handshake hash. */ | |
| if (!ssl3_init_handshake_hash(s)) { | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| /* If doing a full handshake with TLS 1.2, the server may request a client | |
| * certificate which requires hashing the handshake transcript under a | |
| * different hash. Otherwise, the handshake buffer may be released. */ | |
| if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || s->hit) { | |
| ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(s); | |
| } | |
| /* Only the NULL compression algorithm is supported. */ | |
| if (compression_method != 0) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| /* TLS extensions */ | |
| if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, &server_hello)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* There should be nothing left over in the record. */ | |
| if (CBS_len(&server_hello) != 0) { | |
| /* wrong packet length */ | |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| if (s->hit && | |
| s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret != s->session->extended_master_secret) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
| if (s->session->extended_master_secret) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RESUMED_EMS_SESSION_WITHOUT_EMS_EXTENSION); | |
| } else { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RESUMED_NON_EMS_SESSION_WITH_EMS_EXTENSION); | |
| } | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| f_err: | |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
| err: | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| /* ssl3_check_certificate_for_cipher returns one if |leaf| is a suitable server | |
| * certificate type for |cipher|. Otherwise, it returns zero and pushes an error | |
| * on the error queue. */ | |
| static int ssl3_check_certificate_for_cipher(X509 *leaf, | |
| const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) { | |
| int ret = 0; | |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(leaf); | |
| if (pkey == NULL) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* Check the certificate's type matches the cipher. */ | |
| int expected_type = ssl_cipher_get_key_type(cipher); | |
| assert(expected_type != EVP_PKEY_NONE); | |
| if (pkey->type != expected_type) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* TODO(davidben): This behavior is preserved from upstream. Should key usages | |
| * be checked in other cases as well? */ | |
| if (cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA) { | |
| /* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */ | |
| X509_check_purpose(leaf, -1, 0); | |
| if ((leaf->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && | |
| !(leaf->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| ret = 1; | |
| err: | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s) { | |
| int al, i, ok, ret = -1; | |
| unsigned long n; | |
| X509 *x = NULL; | |
| STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; | |
| SESS_CERT *sc; | |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
| CBS cbs, certificate_list; | |
| const uint8_t *data; | |
| n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B, | |
| SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, (long)s->max_cert_list, | |
| ssl_hash_message, &ok); | |
| if (!ok) { | |
| return n; | |
| } | |
| CBS_init(&cbs, s->init_msg, n); | |
| sk = sk_X509_new_null(); | |
| if (sk == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cbs, &certificate_list) || | |
| CBS_len(&certificate_list) == 0 || | |
| CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| while (CBS_len(&certificate_list) > 0) { | |
| CBS certificate; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &certificate)) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| data = CBS_data(&certificate); | |
| x = d2i_X509(NULL, &data, CBS_len(&certificate)); | |
| if (x == NULL) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| if (data != CBS_data(&certificate) + CBS_len(&certificate)) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| x = NULL; | |
| } | |
| i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); | |
| if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) { | |
| al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */ | |
| X509 *leaf = sk_X509_value(sk, 0); | |
| if (!ssl3_check_certificate_for_cipher(leaf, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| sc = ssl_sess_cert_new(); | |
| if (sc == NULL) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert); | |
| s->session->sess_cert = sc; | |
| /* NOTE: Unlike the server half, the client's copy of |cert_chain| includes | |
| * the leaf. */ | |
| sc->cert_chain = sk; | |
| sk = NULL; | |
| X509_free(sc->peer_cert); | |
| sc->peer_cert = X509_up_ref(leaf); | |
| X509_free(s->session->peer); | |
| s->session->peer = X509_up_ref(leaf); | |
| s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; | |
| ret = 1; | |
| if (0) { | |
| f_err: | |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
| } | |
| err: | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
| X509_free(x); | |
| sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) { | |
| EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; | |
| int al, ok; | |
| long n, alg_k, alg_a; | |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
| const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
| RSA *rsa = NULL; | |
| DH *dh = NULL; | |
| EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL; | |
| BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; | |
| EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL; | |
| CBS server_key_exchange, server_key_exchange_orig, parameter; | |
| /* use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() as | |
| * ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped */ | |
| n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A, | |
| SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B, -1, s->max_cert_list, | |
| ssl_hash_message, &ok); | |
| if (!ok) { | |
| return n; | |
| } | |
| if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { | |
| if (ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| /* In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be | |
| omitted if no identity hint is sent. Set session->sess_cert anyway to | |
| avoid problems later.*/ | |
| if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK) { | |
| /* PSK ciphersuites that also send a Certificate would have already | |
| * initialized |sess_cert|. */ | |
| if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { | |
| s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); | |
| if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* TODO(davidben): This should be reset in one place with the rest of the | |
| * handshake state. */ | |
| OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_psk_identity_hint); | |
| s->s3->tmp.peer_psk_identity_hint = NULL; | |
| } | |
| s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* Retain a copy of the original CBS to compute the signature over. */ | |
| CBS_init(&server_key_exchange, s->init_msg, n); | |
| server_key_exchange_orig = server_key_exchange; | |
| if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL) { | |
| DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp); | |
| s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = NULL; | |
| EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp); | |
| s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = NULL; | |
| } else { | |
| s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); | |
| if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; | |
| alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; | |
| EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); | |
| if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) { | |
| CBS psk_identity_hint; | |
| /* Each of the PSK key exchanges begins with a psk_identity_hint. */ | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, | |
| &psk_identity_hint)) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| /* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in | |
| * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of a PSK | |
| * identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK identity. | |
| * Also do not allow NULL characters; identities are saved as C strings. | |
| * | |
| * TODO(davidben): Should invalid hints be ignored? It's a hint rather than | |
| * a specific identity. */ | |
| if (CBS_len(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN || | |
| CBS_contains_zero_byte(&psk_identity_hint)) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| /* Save the identity hint as a C string. */ | |
| if (!CBS_strdup(&psk_identity_hint, &s->s3->tmp.peer_psk_identity_hint)) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) { | |
| CBS dh_p, dh_g, dh_Ys; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &dh_p) || | |
| CBS_len(&dh_p) == 0 || | |
| !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &dh_g) || | |
| CBS_len(&dh_g) == 0 || | |
| !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &dh_Ys) || | |
| CBS_len(&dh_Ys) == 0) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| dh = DH_new(); | |
| if (dh == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_DH_LIB); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if ((dh->p = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_p), CBS_len(&dh_p), NULL)) == NULL || | |
| (dh->g = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_g), CBS_len(&dh_g), NULL)) == NULL || | |
| (dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_Ys), CBS_len(&dh_Ys), NULL)) == | |
| NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_BN_LIB); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (DH_num_bits(dh) < 1024) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = dh; | |
| dh = NULL; | |
| } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) { | |
| uint16_t curve_id; | |
| int curve_nid = 0; | |
| const EC_GROUP *group; | |
| CBS point; | |
| /* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH public | |
| * key. Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an | |
| * invalid curve. */ | |
| if (!tls1_check_curve(s, &server_key_exchange, &curve_id)) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(curve_id); | |
| if (curve_nid == 0) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid); | |
| if (ecdh == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_EC_LIB); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh); | |
| /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */ | |
| if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &point)) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) || | |
| ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint, CBS_data(&point), | |
| CBS_len(&point), bn_ctx)) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint); | |
| s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = ecdh; | |
| ecdh = NULL; | |
| BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); | |
| bn_ctx = NULL; | |
| EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint); | |
| srvr_ecpoint = NULL; | |
| } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| /* At this point, |server_key_exchange| contains the signature, if any, while | |
| * |server_key_exchange_orig| contains the entire message. From that, derive | |
| * a CBS containing just the parameter. */ | |
| CBS_init(¶meter, CBS_data(&server_key_exchange_orig), | |
| CBS_len(&server_key_exchange_orig) - CBS_len(&server_key_exchange)); | |
| /* ServerKeyExchange should be signed by the server's public key. */ | |
| if (ssl_cipher_has_server_public_key(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { | |
| pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_cert); | |
| if (pkey == NULL) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { | |
| if (!tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, &al, s, &server_key_exchange, pkey)) { | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { | |
| md = EVP_md5_sha1(); | |
| } else { | |
| md = EVP_sha1(); | |
| } | |
| /* The last field in |server_key_exchange| is the signature. */ | |
| CBS signature; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &signature) || | |
| CBS_len(&server_key_exchange) != 0) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&md_ctx, NULL, md, NULL, pkey) || | |
| !EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->client_random, | |
| SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || | |
| !EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->server_random, | |
| SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || | |
| !EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, CBS_data(¶meter), | |
| CBS_len(¶meter)) || | |
| !EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&md_ctx, CBS_data(&signature), | |
| CBS_len(&signature))) { | |
| /* bad signature */ | |
| al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| } else { | |
| /* PSK ciphers are the only supported certificate-less ciphers. */ | |
| assert(alg_a == SSL_aPSK); | |
| if (CBS_len(&server_key_exchange) > 0) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); | |
| return 1; | |
| f_err: | |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
| err: | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
| RSA_free(rsa); | |
| DH_free(dh); | |
| BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); | |
| EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint); | |
| EC_KEY_free(ecdh); | |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME **a, const X509_NAME **b) { | |
| return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b); | |
| } | |
| int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s) { | |
| int ok, ret = 0; | |
| unsigned long n; | |
| X509_NAME *xn = NULL; | |
| STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL; | |
| CBS cbs; | |
| CBS certificate_types; | |
| CBS certificate_authorities; | |
| const uint8_t *data; | |
| n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A, | |
| SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B, -1, s->max_cert_list, | |
| ssl_hash_message, &ok); | |
| if (!ok) { | |
| return n; | |
| } | |
| s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0; | |
| if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) { | |
| s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; | |
| /* If we get here we don't need the handshake buffer as we won't be doing | |
| * client auth. */ | |
| ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(s); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { | |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| CBS_init(&cbs, s->init_msg, n); | |
| ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp); | |
| if (ca_sk == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* get the certificate types */ | |
| if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &certificate_types)) { | |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (!CBS_stow(&certificate_types, &s->s3->tmp.certificate_types, | |
| &s->s3->tmp.num_certificate_types)) { | |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { | |
| CBS supported_signature_algorithms; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &supported_signature_algorithms)) { | |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, &supported_signature_algorithms)) { | |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* get the CA RDNs */ | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &certificate_authorities)) { | |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| while (CBS_len(&certificate_authorities) > 0) { | |
| CBS distinguished_name; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&certificate_authorities, | |
| &distinguished_name)) { | |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| data = CBS_data(&distinguished_name); | |
| xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &data, CBS_len(&distinguished_name)); | |
| if (xn == NULL) { | |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (!CBS_skip(&distinguished_name, data - CBS_data(&distinguished_name))) { | |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (CBS_len(&distinguished_name) != 0) { | |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */ | |
| s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1; | |
| sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free); | |
| s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk; | |
| ca_sk = NULL; | |
| ret = 1; | |
| err: | |
| sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) { | |
| int ok, al; | |
| long n; | |
| CBS new_session_ticket, ticket; | |
| n = s->method->ssl_get_message( | |
| s, SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A, SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B, | |
| SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, 16384, ssl_hash_message, &ok); | |
| if (!ok) { | |
| return n; | |
| } | |
| if (s->hit) { | |
| /* The server is sending a new ticket for an existing session. Sessions are | |
| * immutable once established, so duplicate all but the ticket of the | |
| * existing session. */ | |
| uint8_t *bytes; | |
| size_t bytes_len; | |
| if (!SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_for_ticket(s->session, &bytes, &bytes_len)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| SSL_SESSION *new_session = SSL_SESSION_from_bytes(bytes, bytes_len); | |
| OPENSSL_free(bytes); | |
| if (new_session == NULL) { | |
| /* This should never happen. */ | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL) { | |
| /* |sess_cert| is not serialized and must be duplicated explicitly. */ | |
| assert(new_session->sess_cert == NULL); | |
| new_session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_dup(s->session->sess_cert); | |
| if (new_session->sess_cert == NULL) { | |
| SSL_SESSION_free(new_session); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); | |
| s->session = new_session; | |
| } | |
| CBS_init(&new_session_ticket, s->init_msg, n); | |
| if (!CBS_get_u32(&new_session_ticket, | |
| &s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint) || | |
| !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&new_session_ticket, &ticket) || | |
| CBS_len(&new_session_ticket) != 0) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| if (!CBS_stow(&ticket, &s->session->tlsext_tick, | |
| &s->session->tlsext_ticklen)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* Generate a session ID for this session based on the session ticket. We use | |
| * the session ID mechanism for detecting ticket resumption. This also fits in | |
| * with assumptions elsewhere in OpenSSL.*/ | |
| if (!EVP_Digest(CBS_data(&ticket), CBS_len(&ticket), s->session->session_id, | |
| &s->session->session_id_length, EVP_sha256(), NULL)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| f_err: | |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
| err: | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s) { | |
| int ok, al; | |
| long n; | |
| CBS certificate_status, ocsp_response; | |
| uint8_t status_type; | |
| n = s->method->ssl_get_message( | |
| s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B, | |
| -1, 16384, ssl_hash_message, &ok); | |
| if (!ok) { | |
| return n; | |
| } | |
| if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) { | |
| /* A server may send status_request in ServerHello and then change | |
| * its mind about sending CertificateStatus. */ | |
| s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| CBS_init(&certificate_status, s->init_msg, n); | |
| if (!CBS_get_u8(&certificate_status, &status_type) || | |
| status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp || | |
| !CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_status, &ocsp_response) || | |
| CBS_len(&ocsp_response) == 0 || | |
| CBS_len(&certificate_status) != 0) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| if (!CBS_stow(&ocsp_response, &s->session->ocsp_response, | |
| &s->session->ocsp_response_length)) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| f_err: | |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s) { | |
| int ok; | |
| long n; | |
| n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A, | |
| SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, | |
| 30, /* should be very small, like 0 :-) */ | |
| ssl_hash_message, &ok); | |
| if (!ok) { | |
| return n; | |
| } | |
| if (n > 0) { | |
| /* should contain no data */ | |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) { | |
| uint8_t *p; | |
| int n = 0; | |
| uint32_t alg_k; | |
| uint32_t alg_a; | |
| uint8_t *q; | |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
| EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL; | |
| const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL; | |
| EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL; | |
| uint8_t *encodedPoint = NULL; | |
| int encoded_pt_len = 0; | |
| BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; | |
| unsigned int psk_len = 0; | |
| uint8_t psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; | |
| uint8_t *pms = NULL; | |
| size_t pms_len = 0; | |
| if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) { | |
| p = ssl_handshake_start(s); | |
| alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; | |
| alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; | |
| /* If using a PSK key exchange, prepare the pre-shared key. */ | |
| if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) { | |
| char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1]; | |
| size_t identity_len; | |
| if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity)); | |
| psk_len = | |
| s->psk_client_callback(s, s->s3->tmp.peer_psk_identity_hint, identity, | |
| sizeof(identity), psk, sizeof(psk)); | |
| if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| goto err; | |
| } else if (psk_len == 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); | |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| identity_len = OPENSSL_strnlen(identity, sizeof(identity)); | |
| if (identity_len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); | |
| s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity); | |
| if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* Write out psk_identity. */ | |
| s2n(identity_len, p); | |
| memcpy(p, identity, identity_len); | |
| p += identity_len; | |
| n = 2 + identity_len; | |
| } | |
| /* Depending on the key exchange method, compute |pms| and |pms_len|. */ | |
| if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { | |
| RSA *rsa; | |
| size_t enc_pms_len; | |
| pms_len = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; | |
| pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pms_len); | |
| if (pms == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { | |
| /* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. */ | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_cert); | |
| if (pkey == NULL || | |
| pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA || | |
| pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa; | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
| pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8; | |
| pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; | |
| if (!RAND_bytes(&pms[2], SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH - 2)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| s->session->master_key_length = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; | |
| q = p; | |
| /* In TLS and beyond, reserve space for the length prefix. */ | |
| if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) { | |
| p += 2; | |
| n += 2; | |
| } | |
| if (!RSA_encrypt(rsa, &enc_pms_len, p, RSA_size(rsa), pms, pms_len, | |
| RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| n += enc_pms_len; | |
| /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */ | |
| if (!ssl_ctx_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s->ctx, p, enc_pms_len, pms, | |
| pms_len)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* Fill in the length prefix. */ | |
| if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) { | |
| s2n(enc_pms_len, q); | |
| } | |
| } else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) { | |
| DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt; | |
| SESS_CERT *scert = s->session->sess_cert; | |
| int dh_len; | |
| size_t pub_len; | |
| if (scert == NULL) { | |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (scert->peer_dh_tmp == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| dh_srvr = scert->peer_dh_tmp; | |
| /* generate a new random key */ | |
| dh_clnt = DHparams_dup(dh_srvr); | |
| if (dh_clnt == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_DH_LIB); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_DH_LIB); | |
| DH_free(dh_clnt); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| pms_len = DH_size(dh_clnt); | |
| pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pms_len); | |
| if (pms == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| DH_free(dh_clnt); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| dh_len = DH_compute_key(pms, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt); | |
| if (dh_len <= 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_DH_LIB); | |
| DH_free(dh_clnt); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| pms_len = dh_len; | |
| /* send off the data */ | |
| pub_len = BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key); | |
| s2n(pub_len, p); | |
| BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, p); | |
| n += 2 + pub_len; | |
| DH_free(dh_clnt); | |
| } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) { | |
| const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL; | |
| EC_KEY *tkey; | |
| int field_size = 0, ecdh_len; | |
| if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { | |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp; | |
| srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); | |
| srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey); | |
| if (srvr_group == NULL || srvr_ecpoint == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| clnt_ecdh = EC_KEY_new(); | |
| if (clnt_ecdh == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_EC_LIB); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */ | |
| if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group); | |
| if (field_size <= 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| pms_len = (field_size + 7) / 8; | |
| pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pms_len); | |
| if (pms == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| ecdh_len = ECDH_compute_key(pms, pms_len, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL); | |
| if (ecdh_len <= 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| pms_len = ecdh_len; | |
| /* First check the size of encoding and allocate memory accordingly. */ | |
| encoded_pt_len = | |
| EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh), | |
| POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL); | |
| encodedPoint = | |
| (uint8_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * sizeof(uint8_t)); | |
| bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); | |
| if (encodedPoint == NULL || bn_ctx == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* Encode the public key */ | |
| encoded_pt_len = EC_POINT_point2oct( | |
| srvr_group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh), | |
| POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx); | |
| *p = encoded_pt_len; /* length of encoded point */ | |
| /* Encoded point will be copied here */ | |
| p += 1; | |
| n += 1; | |
| /* copy the point */ | |
| memcpy(p, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len); | |
| /* increment n to account for length field */ | |
| n += encoded_pt_len; | |
| /* Free allocated memory */ | |
| BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); | |
| bn_ctx = NULL; | |
| OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); | |
| encodedPoint = NULL; | |
| EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh); | |
| clnt_ecdh = NULL; | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey); | |
| srvr_pub_pkey = NULL; | |
| } else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { | |
| /* For plain PSK, other_secret is a block of 0s with the same length as | |
| * the pre-shared key. */ | |
| pms_len = psk_len; | |
| pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pms_len); | |
| if (pms == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| memset(pms, 0, pms_len); | |
| } else { | |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* For a PSK cipher suite, other_secret is combined with the pre-shared | |
| * key. */ | |
| if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) { | |
| CBB cbb, child; | |
| uint8_t *new_pms; | |
| size_t new_pms_len; | |
| CBB_zero(&cbb); | |
| if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 2 + psk_len + 2 + pms_len) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) || | |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&child, pms, pms_len) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) || | |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&child, psk, psk_len) || | |
| !CBB_finish(&cbb, &new_pms, &new_pms_len)) { | |
| CBB_cleanup(&cbb); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pms_len); | |
| OPENSSL_free(pms); | |
| pms = new_pms; | |
| pms_len = new_pms_len; | |
| } | |
| /* The message must be added to the finished hash before calculating the | |
| * master secret. */ | |
| if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B; | |
| s->session->master_key_length = s->enc_method->generate_master_secret( | |
| s, s->session->master_key, pms, pms_len); | |
| if (s->session->master_key_length == 0) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| s->session->extended_master_secret = s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret; | |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pms_len); | |
| OPENSSL_free(pms); | |
| } | |
| /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */ | |
| return s->method->do_write(s); | |
| err: | |
| BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); | |
| OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); | |
| EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh); | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey); | |
| if (pms) { | |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pms_len); | |
| OPENSSL_free(pms); | |
| } | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| int ssl3_send_cert_verify(SSL *s) { | |
| if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A || | |
| s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B) { | |
| enum ssl_private_key_result_t sign_result; | |
| uint8_t *p = ssl_handshake_start(s); | |
| size_t signature_length = 0; | |
| unsigned long n = 0; | |
| assert(ssl_has_private_key(s)); | |
| if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) { | |
| uint8_t *buf = (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data; | |
| const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
| uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
| size_t digest_length; | |
| /* Write out the digest type if need be. */ | |
| if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { | |
| md = tls1_choose_signing_digest(s); | |
| if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(s, p, md)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| p += 2; | |
| n += 2; | |
| } | |
| /* Compute the digest. */ | |
| const int pkey_type = ssl_private_key_type(s); | |
| if (!ssl3_cert_verify_hash(s, digest, &digest_length, &md, pkey_type)) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| /* The handshake buffer is no longer necessary. */ | |
| ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(s); | |
| /* Sign the digest. */ | |
| signature_length = ssl_private_key_max_signature_len(s); | |
| if (p + 2 + signature_length > buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| s->rwstate = SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION; | |
| sign_result = ssl_private_key_sign(s, &p[2], &signature_length, | |
| signature_length, md, digest, | |
| digest_length); | |
| } else { | |
| if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { | |
| /* The digest has already been selected and written. */ | |
| p += 2; | |
| n += 2; | |
| } | |
| signature_length = ssl_private_key_max_signature_len(s); | |
| s->rwstate = SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION; | |
| sign_result = ssl_private_key_sign_complete(s, &p[2], &signature_length, | |
| signature_length); | |
| } | |
| if (sign_result == ssl_private_key_retry) { | |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B; | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
| if (sign_result != ssl_private_key_success) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| s2n(signature_length, p); | |
| n += signature_length + 2; | |
| if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n)) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_C; | |
| } | |
| return ssl_do_write(s); | |
| } | |
| /* ssl3_has_client_certificate returns true if a client certificate is | |
| * configured. */ | |
| static int ssl3_has_client_certificate(SSL *ssl) { | |
| return ssl->cert && ssl->cert->x509 && ssl_has_private_key(ssl); | |
| } | |
| int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s) { | |
| X509 *x509 = NULL; | |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
| int i; | |
| if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) { | |
| /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */ | |
| if (s->cert->cert_cb) { | |
| i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); | |
| if (i < 0) { | |
| s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| if (i == 0) { | |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl3_has_client_certificate(s)) { | |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C; | |
| } else { | |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* We need to get a client cert */ | |
| if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) { | |
| /* If we get an error, we need to: | |
| * ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return(-1); | |
| * We then get retried later */ | |
| i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey); | |
| if (i < 0) { | |
| s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
| if (i == 1 && pkey != NULL && x509 != NULL) { | |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B; | |
| if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey)) { | |
| i = 0; | |
| } | |
| } else if (i == 1) { | |
| i = 0; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK); | |
| } | |
| X509_free(x509); | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
| if (i && !ssl3_has_client_certificate(s)) { | |
| i = 0; | |
| } | |
| if (i == 0) { | |
| if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
| s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0; | |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE); | |
| return 1; | |
| } else { | |
| s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2; | |
| /* There is no client certificate, so the handshake buffer may be | |
| * released. */ | |
| ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(s); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* Ok, we have a cert */ | |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C; | |
| } | |
| if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) { | |
| if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) { | |
| /* Send an empty Certificate message. */ | |
| uint8_t *p = ssl_handshake_start(s); | |
| l2n3(0, p); | |
| if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, 3)) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| } else if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s)) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D; | |
| } | |
| /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */ | |
| return ssl_do_write(s); | |
| } | |
| int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s) { | |
| unsigned int len, padding_len; | |
| uint8_t *d, *p; | |
| if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A) { | |
| len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len; | |
| padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32); | |
| d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); | |
| *(p++) = len; | |
| memcpy(p, s->next_proto_negotiated, len); | |
| p += len; | |
| *(p++) = padding_len; | |
| memset(p, 0, padding_len); | |
| p += padding_len; | |
| if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, p - d)) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B; | |
| } | |
| return ssl_do_write(s); | |
| } | |
| int ssl3_send_channel_id(SSL *s) { | |
| uint8_t *d; | |
| int ret = -1, public_key_len; | |
| EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; | |
| ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL; | |
| uint8_t *public_key = NULL, *derp, *der_sig = NULL; | |
| if (s->state != SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A) { | |
| return ssl_do_write(s); | |
| } | |
| if (!s->tlsext_channel_id_private && s->ctx->channel_id_cb) { | |
| EVP_PKEY *key = NULL; | |
| s->ctx->channel_id_cb(s, &key); | |
| if (key != NULL) { | |
| s->tlsext_channel_id_private = key; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (!s->tlsext_channel_id_private) { | |
| s->rwstate = SSL_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP; | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
| if (EVP_PKEY_id(s->tlsext_channel_id_private) != EVP_PKEY_EC) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| EC_KEY *ec_key = s->tlsext_channel_id_private->pkey.ec; | |
| d = ssl_handshake_start(s); | |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id, d); | |
| s2n(TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE, d); | |
| EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); | |
| public_key_len = i2o_ECPublicKey(ec_key, NULL); | |
| if (public_key_len <= 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CANNOT_SERIALIZE_PUBLIC_KEY); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* i2o_ECPublicKey will produce an ANSI X9.62 public key which, for a | |
| * P-256 key, is 0x04 (meaning uncompressed) followed by the x and y | |
| * field elements as 32-byte, big-endian numbers. */ | |
| if (public_key_len != 65) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_NOT_P256); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| public_key = OPENSSL_malloc(public_key_len); | |
| if (!public_key) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| derp = public_key; | |
| i2o_ECPublicKey(ec_key, &derp); | |
| uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
| size_t digest_len; | |
| if (!tls1_channel_id_hash(s, digest, &digest_len)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| sig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, digest_len, ec_key); | |
| if (sig == NULL) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* The first byte of public_key will be 0x4, denoting an uncompressed key. */ | |
| memcpy(d, public_key + 1, 64); | |
| d += 64; | |
| if (!BN_bn2bin_padded(d, 32, sig->r) || | |
| !BN_bn2bin_padded(d + 32, 32, sig->s)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, | |
| 2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_B; | |
| ret = ssl_do_write(s); | |
| err: | |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); | |
| OPENSSL_free(public_key); | |
| OPENSSL_free(der_sig); | |
| ECDSA_SIG_free(sig); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey) { | |
| int i = 0; | |
| if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb) { | |
| i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey); | |
| } | |
| return i; | |
| } |