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boringssl/boringssl/6fb1c4b18dffa2fa7cc6b42ebb0b9e5373c283c0/./crypto/evp/evp_test.cc
blob: ec2271fb11832b2c76a00cf8e6a96f331967543d [file]
// Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <map>
#include <optional>
#include <string>
#include <string_view>
#include <utility>
#include <vector>
#include <gtest/gtest.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/digest.h>
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/mlkem.h>
#include <openssl/obj.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/xwing.h>
#include "../bytestring/internal.h"
#include "../test/der_trailing_data.h"
#include "../test/file_test.h"
#include "../test/test_util.h"
#include "../test/wycheproof_util.h"
BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
namespace {
// Each test in evp_test tests a different operation, based on the type of the
// first attribute.
//
// A test of type "Key" tests key import and takes both key name parameter and
// key information. The key information describes the key and activate the many
// APIs we have for importing and exporting keys. These APIs are all expected to
// import equivalent keys, except that some may or may not have the private half
// available. If the test is successful, the key is saved in a "key set" under
// the key name.
//
// Tests for individual operations, such as "Decrypt" or "Sign", may reference a
// previously imported key as parameter. By default, the test will run with all
// keys in the key set. A "/PublicOnly" suffix on the key name will limit to
// only those without the private half. A "/Private" suffix will limit to only
// those with the private half.
//
// A test that is expected to fail should have an "Error" attribute specifying
// the expected error.
const EVP_MD *GetDigest(std::string_view name) {
if (name == "MD5") {
return EVP_md5();
} else if (name == "SHA1") {
return EVP_sha1();
} else if (name == "SHA224") {
return EVP_sha224();
} else if (name == "SHA256") {
return EVP_sha256();
} else if (name == "SHA384") {
return EVP_sha384();
} else if (name == "SHA512") {
return EVP_sha512();
}
ADD_FAILURE() << "Unknown digest: " << name;
return nullptr;
}
std::optional<int> GetRSAPadding(std::string_view name) {
if (name == "PKCS1") {
return RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
}
if (name == "PSS") {
return RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
}
if (name == "OAEP") {
return RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
}
if (name == "None") {
return RSA_NO_PADDING;
}
ADD_FAILURE() << "Unknown RSA padding mode: " << name;
return std::nullopt;
}
struct AlgorithmInfo {
const EVP_PKEY_ALG *alg;
const EVP_KEM *kem;
int pkey_id;
bool is_default;
};
const std::map<std::string, AlgorithmInfo> kAllAlgorithms = {
{"RSA",
{EVP_pkey_rsa(),
/*kem=*/nullptr, EVP_PKEY_RSA, true}},
{"RSA-PSS-SHA-256",
{EVP_pkey_rsa_pss_sha256(), /*kem=*/nullptr, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, false}},
{"RSA-PSS-SHA-384",
{EVP_pkey_rsa_pss_sha384(), /*kem=*/nullptr, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, false}},
{"RSA-PSS-SHA-512",
{EVP_pkey_rsa_pss_sha512(), /*kem=*/nullptr, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, false}},
{"EC-P-224", {EVP_pkey_ec_p224(), /*kem=*/nullptr, EVP_PKEY_EC, true}},
{"EC-P-256", {EVP_pkey_ec_p256(), /*kem=*/nullptr, EVP_PKEY_EC, true}},
{"EC-P-384", {EVP_pkey_ec_p384(), /*kem=*/nullptr, EVP_PKEY_EC, true}},
{"EC-P-521", {EVP_pkey_ec_p521(), /*kem=*/nullptr, EVP_PKEY_EC, true}},
{"X25519", {EVP_pkey_x25519(), /*kem=*/nullptr, EVP_PKEY_X25519, true}},
{"Ed25519", {EVP_pkey_ed25519(), /*kem=*/nullptr, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, true}},
{"DSA", {EVP_pkey_dsa(), /*kem=*/nullptr, EVP_PKEY_DSA, true}},
{"ML-DSA-44",
{EVP_pkey_ml_dsa_44(), /*kem=*/nullptr, EVP_PKEY_ML_DSA_44, true}},
{"ML-DSA-65",
{EVP_pkey_ml_dsa_65(), /*kem=*/nullptr, EVP_PKEY_ML_DSA_65, true}},
{"ML-DSA-87",
{EVP_pkey_ml_dsa_87(), /*kem=*/nullptr, EVP_PKEY_ML_DSA_87, true}},
{"ML-KEM-768",
{EVP_pkey_ml_kem_768(), EVP_kem_ml_kem_768(), EVP_PKEY_ML_KEM_768, true}},
{"ML-KEM-1024",
{EVP_pkey_ml_kem_1024(), EVP_kem_ml_kem_1024(), EVP_PKEY_ML_KEM_1024,
true}},
{"X-Wing", {EVP_pkey_xwing(), EVP_kem_xwing(), EVP_PKEY_XWING, false}},
};
enum class KeyRole { kPublic, kPrivate };
struct SourceAndKey {
KeyRole role = KeyRole::kPublic;
std::string source;
UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey;
};
using KeySet = std::vector<SourceAndKey>;
using KeyMap = std::map<std::string, KeySet, std::less<>>;
enum class KeyRoleSelect { kAny, kPublicOnly, kPrivate };
bool KeyRoleMatches(KeyRoleSelect select, KeyRole role) {
switch (select) {
case KeyRoleSelect::kAny:
return true;
case KeyRoleSelect::kPublicOnly:
return role == KeyRole::kPublic;
case KeyRoleSelect::kPrivate:
return role == KeyRole::kPrivate;
}
abort();
}
std::vector<const SourceAndKey *> FindKeys(
const KeyMap *key_map, std::string_view name,
std::optional<KeyRoleSelect> override_select = std::nullopt) {
KeyRoleSelect select = KeyRoleSelect::kAny;
size_t slash = name.find('/');
if (slash != std::string_view::npos) {
std::string_view select_str = name.substr(slash + 1);
name = name.substr(0, slash);
if (select_str == "PublicOnly") {
select = KeyRoleSelect::kPublicOnly;
} else if (select_str == "Private") {
select = KeyRoleSelect::kPrivate;
} else {
ADD_FAILURE() << "Unknown selector " << select_str;
return {};
}
}
select = override_select.value_or(select);
auto it = key_map->find(name);
if (it == key_map->end()) {
ADD_FAILURE() << "Could not find key " << name;
return {};
}
std::vector<const SourceAndKey *> keys;
for (const auto &key : it->second) {
if (KeyRoleMatches(select, key.role)) {
keys.push_back(&key);
}
}
if (keys.empty()) {
ADD_FAILURE() << "Could not find keys of matching type in " << name;
return {};
}
return keys;
}
bool ImportSPKIOrPKCS8WithAllAlgs(FileTest *t, KeySet *key_set,
KeyRole key_role, std::string_view attr) {
SCOPED_TRACE(attr);
if (!t->HasAttribute(attr)) {
return true; // Nothing to import.
}
std::vector<uint8_t> input;
if (!t->GetBytes(&input, attr)) {
return false;
}
std::vector<const EVP_PKEY_ALG *> algs;
for (const auto &[name, info] : kAllAlgorithms) {
algs.push_back(info.alg);
}
auto parse_func = key_role == KeyRole::kPublic
? &EVP_PKEY_from_subject_public_key_info
: &EVP_PKEY_from_private_key_info;
UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> key(
parse_func(input.data(), input.size(), algs.data(), algs.size()));
if (key == nullptr) {
return false;
}
key_set->push_back(
{key_role, std::string(attr) + " - all algs", std::move(key)});
return true;
}
bool ImportSPKIOrPKCS8WithAlg(FileTest *t, KeySet *key_set, KeyRole key_role,
const AlgorithmInfo &alg_info,
std::string_view attr) {
SCOPED_TRACE(attr);
if (!t->HasAttribute(attr)) {
return true; // Nothing to import.
}
std::vector<uint8_t> input;
if (!t->GetBytes(&input, attr)) {
return false;
}
auto parse_func = key_role == KeyRole::kPublic
? &EVP_PKEY_from_subject_public_key_info
: &EVP_PKEY_from_private_key_info;
UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> key(
parse_func(input.data(), input.size(), &alg_info.alg, 1));
if (key == nullptr) {
return false;
}
key_set->push_back(
{key_role, std::string(attr) + " - specified alg", std::move(key)});
// Test that the parsers reject trailing data.
bool ok =
TestDERTrailingData(input, [&](Span<const uint8_t> rewritten, size_t n) {
// We currently intentionally ignore trailing data in the outermost
// PKCS#8 PrivateKeyInfo element because we don't parse the attributes.
if (n == 0 && key_role == KeyRole::kPrivate) {
return;
}
SCOPED_TRACE(n);
UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> parsed(
parse_func(rewritten.data(), rewritten.size(), &alg_info.alg, 1));
EXPECT_FALSE(parsed);
});
EXPECT_TRUE(ok);
// Also parse with the default algorithms.
auto parse_default_func = key_role == KeyRole::kPublic
? &EVP_parse_public_key
: &EVP_parse_private_key;
CBS cbs(input);
key.reset(parse_default_func(&cbs));
if (key == nullptr || CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
EXPECT_FALSE(alg_info.is_default);
if (alg_info.is_default) {
ERR_clear_error();
}
} else {
EXPECT_TRUE(alg_info.is_default);
key_set->push_back({key_role, std::string(attr) + " - default algorithms",
std::move(key)});
}
return true;
}
// Many parsing functions have a similar type signature.
bool ImportWithAlgCommon(FileTest *t, KeySet *key_set, KeyRole key_role,
std::string_view attr, const AlgorithmInfo &alg_info,
EVP_PKEY *(*parse_func)(const EVP_PKEY_ALG *,
const uint8_t *, size_t)) {
SCOPED_TRACE(attr);
if (!t->HasAttribute(attr)) {
return true; // Nothing to import.
}
std::vector<uint8_t> input;
if (!t->GetBytes(&input, attr)) {
return false;
}
UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> key(parse_func(alg_info.alg, input.data(), input.size()));
if (key == nullptr) {
return false;
}
key_set->push_back({key_role, std::string(attr), std::move(key)});
return true;
}
bool ImportRSAPublicParams(FileTest *t, KeySet *key_set,
const AlgorithmInfo &alg_info) {
if (alg_info.pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA || !t->HasAttribute("RSAParamN") ||
!t->HasAttribute("RSAParamE")) {
return true; // Nothing to import.
}
UniquePtr<BIGNUM> n = HexToBIGNUM(t->GetAttributeOrDie("RSAParamN").c_str());
UniquePtr<BIGNUM> e = HexToBIGNUM(t->GetAttributeOrDie("RSAParamE").c_str());
if (n == nullptr || e == nullptr) {
return false;
}
UniquePtr<RSA> rsa(RSA_new_public_key(n.get(), e.get()));
UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> key(EVP_PKEY_new());
if (rsa == nullptr || key == nullptr ||
!EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(key.get(), rsa.get())) {
return false;
}
key_set->push_back({KeyRole::kPublic, "RSA public params", std::move(key)});
return true;
}
bool ImportRSAPrivateParams(FileTest *t, KeySet *key_set,
const AlgorithmInfo &alg_info) {
if (alg_info.pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA || !t->HasAttribute("RSAParamN") ||
!t->HasAttribute("RSAParamE") || !t->HasAttribute("RSAParamD") ||
!t->HasAttribute("RSAParamP") || !t->HasAttribute("RSAParamQ") ||
!t->HasAttribute("RSAParamDMP1") || !t->HasAttribute("RSAParamDMQ1") ||
!t->HasAttribute("RSAParamIQMP")) {
return true; // Nothing to import.
}
UniquePtr<BIGNUM> n = HexToBIGNUM(t->GetAttributeOrDie("RSAParamN").c_str());
UniquePtr<BIGNUM> e = HexToBIGNUM(t->GetAttributeOrDie("RSAParamE").c_str());
UniquePtr<BIGNUM> d = HexToBIGNUM(t->GetAttributeOrDie("RSAParamD").c_str());
UniquePtr<BIGNUM> p = HexToBIGNUM(t->GetAttributeOrDie("RSAParamP").c_str());
UniquePtr<BIGNUM> q = HexToBIGNUM(t->GetAttributeOrDie("RSAParamQ").c_str());
UniquePtr<BIGNUM> dmp1 =
HexToBIGNUM(t->GetAttributeOrDie("RSAParamDMP1").c_str());
UniquePtr<BIGNUM> dmq1 =
HexToBIGNUM(t->GetAttributeOrDie("RSAParamDMQ1").c_str());
UniquePtr<BIGNUM> iqmp =
HexToBIGNUM(t->GetAttributeOrDie("RSAParamIQMP").c_str());
if (n == nullptr || e == nullptr || d == nullptr || p == nullptr ||
q == nullptr || dmp1 == nullptr || dmq1 == nullptr || iqmp == nullptr) {
return false;
}
UniquePtr<RSA> rsa(RSA_new_private_key(n.get(), e.get(), d.get(), p.get(),
q.get(), dmp1.get(), dmq1.get(),
iqmp.get()));
UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> key(EVP_PKEY_new());
if (rsa == nullptr || key == nullptr ||
!EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(key.get(), rsa.get())) {
return false;
}
key_set->push_back({KeyRole::kPrivate, "RSA private params", std::move(key)});
return true;
}
void CheckRSAParam(FileTest *t, std::string_view attr_name,
const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
const BIGNUM *(*rsa_getter)(const RSA *)) {
SCOPED_TRACE(attr_name);
if (t->HasAttribute(attr_name)) {
bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> want =
HexToBIGNUM(t->GetAttributeOrDie(attr_name).c_str());
ASSERT_TRUE(want);
const RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey);
ASSERT_TRUE(rsa);
const BIGNUM *got = rsa_getter(rsa);
ASSERT_TRUE(got);
EXPECT_EQ(BN_cmp(want.get(), got), 0)
<< "wanted: " << BIGNUMToHex(want.get())
<< "\ngot: " << BIGNUMToHex(got);
}
// We have many test RSA keys so, for now, don't require that all RSA keys
// list out these parameters. That is, the absence of an RSA parameter does
// not currently assert that we omit them.
}
bool CheckMarshalCBB(FileTest *t, std::string_view attr_name,
KeyRoleSelect role_select, const SourceAndKey &key,
int (*marshal_func)(CBB *cbb, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)) {
SCOPED_TRACE(attr_name);
ScopedCBB cbb;
if (!CBB_init(cbb.get(), 0)) {
return false;
}
if (!t->HasAttribute(attr_name) || !KeyRoleMatches(role_select, key.role)) {
EXPECT_FALSE(marshal_func(cbb.get(), key.pkey.get()))
<< "Marshaling key unexpectedly succeeded with "
<< Bytes(CBBAsSpan(cbb.get()));
ERR_clear_error();
return true;
}
std::vector<uint8_t> expected;
if (!t->GetBytes(&expected, attr_name)) {
return false;
}
if (!marshal_func(cbb.get(), key.pkey.get())) {
return false;
}
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(CBBAsSpan(cbb.get())), Bytes(expected));
return true;
}
bool CheckRawKey(FileTest *t, std::string_view attr_name,
KeyRoleSelect role_select, const SourceAndKey &key,
int (*getter)(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, uint8_t *out,
size_t *out_len)) {
SCOPED_TRACE(attr_name);
if (!t->HasAttribute(attr_name) || !KeyRoleMatches(role_select, key.role)) {
size_t len;
EXPECT_FALSE(getter(key.pkey.get(), nullptr, &len));
ERR_clear_error();
return true;
}
std::vector<uint8_t> expected;
if (!t->GetBytes(&expected, attr_name)) {
return false;
}
std::vector<uint8_t> raw;
size_t len;
if (!getter(key.pkey.get(), nullptr, &len)) {
return false;
}
const size_t expected_len = len;
raw.resize(len);
if (!getter(key.pkey.get(), raw.data(), &len)) {
return false;
}
EXPECT_EQ(len, expected_len);
raw.resize(len);
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(raw), Bytes(expected));
// Short buffers should be rejected.
raw.resize(expected_len - 1);
len = raw.size();
EXPECT_FALSE(getter(key.pkey.get(), raw.data(), &len));
// Long buffer should be accepted and the proper length written out.
raw.resize(expected_len + 1);
len = raw.size();
EXPECT_TRUE(getter(key.pkey.get(), raw.data(), &len));
EXPECT_EQ(len, expected_len);
raw.resize(len);
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(raw), Bytes(expected));
return true;
}
bool ImportKey(FileTest *t, KeyMap *key_map) {
// Fill in `key_set` with every import method we have that matches `t`.
KeySet key_set;
const std::pair<KeyRole, std::string_view> kSPKIOrPKCS8[] = {
{KeyRole::kPublic, "SPKI"},
{KeyRole::kPublic, "SPKINonCanonical"},
{KeyRole::kPrivate, "PKCS8"},
{KeyRole::kPrivate, "PKCS8NonCanonical"},
// TODO(davidben): Give FileTest a better API for repeat attributes. For
// now, just manually loop up to the highest that exists.
{KeyRole::kPrivate, "PKCS8NonCanonical/2"},
{KeyRole::kPrivate, "PKCS8NonCanonical/3"},
};
// Parse the key with all algorithms active. Check this before extracting
// Algorithm, so that error cases do not need to specify an Algorithm key.
for (const auto &[role, attr] : kSPKIOrPKCS8) {
if (!ImportSPKIOrPKCS8WithAllAlgs(t, &key_set, role, attr)) {
return false;
}
}
// All other methods depend on Algorithm.
std::string alg_name;
if (!t->GetAttribute(&alg_name, "Algorithm")) {
return false;
}
auto it = kAllAlgorithms.find(alg_name);
if (it == kAllAlgorithms.end()) {
ADD_FAILURE() << "Unknown algorithm: " << alg_name;
return false;
}
const AlgorithmInfo &alg_info = it->second;
for (const auto &[role, attr] : kSPKIOrPKCS8) {
if (!ImportSPKIOrPKCS8WithAlg(t, &key_set, role, alg_info, attr)) {
return false;
}
}
// Import various type-specific formats.
if (!ImportWithAlgCommon(t, &key_set, KeyRole::kPublic, "RawPublic", alg_info,
&EVP_PKEY_from_raw_public_key) ||
!ImportWithAlgCommon(t, &key_set, KeyRole::kPrivate, "RawPrivate",
alg_info, &EVP_PKEY_from_raw_private_key) ||
!ImportWithAlgCommon(t, &key_set, KeyRole::kPrivate, "PrivateSeed",
alg_info, &EVP_PKEY_from_private_seed) ||
!ImportRSAPublicParams(t, &key_set, alg_info) ||
!ImportRSAPrivateParams(t, &key_set, alg_info)) {
return false;
}
if (key_set.empty()) {
ADD_FAILURE() << "No keys imported";
return false;
}
// Add a key that went through `EVP_PKEY_copy_public` to the mix, one from
// each role.
for (KeyRole role : {KeyRole::kPublic, KeyRole::kPrivate}) {
auto found =
std::find_if(key_set.begin(), key_set.end(),
[=](const SourceAndKey &key) { return key.role == role; });
if (found != key_set.end()) {
UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> public_copy(EVP_PKEY_copy_public(found->pkey.get()));
if (!public_copy) {
return false;
}
key_set.push_back({KeyRole::kPublic,
role == KeyRole::kPublic
? "public copied from public"
: "public copied from private",
std::move(public_copy)});
}
}
// All keys, public or private, must compare equal:
for (const auto &key1 : key_set) {
SCOPED_TRACE("source: " + key1.source);
for (const auto &key2 : key_set) {
SCOPED_TRACE("source: " + key2.source);
EXPECT_EQ(EVP_PKEY_eq(key1.pkey.get(), key2.pkey.get()), 1);
}
}
// Check properties of the keys.
for (const auto &key : key_set) {
SCOPED_TRACE("source: " + key.source);
EXPECT_EQ(alg_info.pkey_id, EVP_PKEY_id(key.pkey.get()));
// In almost all cases, a non-empty key must have a public key. The only
// exception is a private RSA key with (n, d) params only, which is tested
// not here but elsewhere.
EXPECT_EQ(EVP_PKEY_has_public(key.pkey.get()), 1);
EXPECT_EQ(EVP_PKEY_has_private(key.pkey.get()),
key.role == KeyRole::kPrivate);
if (t->HasAttribute("Bits")) {
EXPECT_EQ(EVP_PKEY_bits(key.pkey.get()),
atoi(t->GetAttributeOrDie("Bits").c_str()));
}
if (t->HasAttribute("ECCurve")) {
EXPECT_EQ(OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_PKEY_get_ec_curve_nid(key.pkey.get())),
t->GetAttributeOrDie("ECCurve"));
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(EVP_PKEY_get_ec_curve_nid(key.pkey.get()), NID_undef);
}
CheckRSAParam(t, "RSAParamN", key.pkey.get(), RSA_get0_n);
CheckRSAParam(t, "RSAParamE", key.pkey.get(), RSA_get0_e);
if (key.role == KeyRole::kPrivate) {
CheckRSAParam(t, "RSAParamD", key.pkey.get(), RSA_get0_d);
CheckRSAParam(t, "RSAParamP", key.pkey.get(), RSA_get0_p);
CheckRSAParam(t, "RSAParamQ", key.pkey.get(), RSA_get0_q);
CheckRSAParam(t, "RSAParamDMP1", key.pkey.get(), RSA_get0_dmp1);
CheckRSAParam(t, "RSAParamDMQ1", key.pkey.get(), RSA_get0_dmq1);
CheckRSAParam(t, "RSAParamIQMP", key.pkey.get(), RSA_get0_iqmp);
}
// The key must re-encode correctly.
if (!CheckMarshalCBB(t, "SPKI", KeyRoleSelect::kAny, key,
EVP_marshal_public_key) ||
!CheckMarshalCBB(t, "PKCS8", KeyRoleSelect::kPrivate, key,
EVP_marshal_private_key) ||
!CheckRawKey(t, "RawPrivate", KeyRoleSelect::kPrivate, key,
EVP_PKEY_get_raw_private_key) ||
!CheckRawKey(t, "RawPublic", KeyRoleSelect::kAny, key,
EVP_PKEY_get_raw_public_key) ||
!CheckRawKey(t, "PrivateSeed", KeyRoleSelect::kPrivate, key,
EVP_PKEY_get_private_seed)) {
return false;
}
}
// Save the key for future tests.
const std::string &key_name = t->GetParameter();
EXPECT_EQ(0u, key_map->count(key_name)) << "Duplicate key: " << key_name;
(*key_map)[key_name] = std::move(key_set);
return true;
}
bool GetOptionalBignum(FileTest *t, bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> *out,
const std::string &key) {
if (!t->HasAttribute(key)) {
*out = nullptr;
return true;
}
std::vector<uint8_t> bytes;
if (!t->GetBytes(&bytes, key)) {
return false;
}
out->reset(BN_bin2bn(bytes.data(), bytes.size(), nullptr));
return *out != nullptr;
}
// TODO(davidben): Integrate this into the ImportKey framework.
bool ImportDHKey(FileTest *t, KeyMap *key_map) {
bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> p, q, g, pub_key, priv_key;
if (!GetOptionalBignum(t, &p, "P") || //
!GetOptionalBignum(t, &q, "Q") || //
!GetOptionalBignum(t, &g, "G") ||
!GetOptionalBignum(t, &pub_key, "Public") ||
!GetOptionalBignum(t, &priv_key, "Private")) {
return false;
}
bssl::UniquePtr<DH> dh(DH_new());
if (dh == nullptr || !DH_set0_pqg(dh.get(), p.get(), q.get(), g.get())) {
return false;
}
// `DH_set0_pqg` takes ownership on success.
p.release();
q.release();
g.release();
if (!DH_set0_key(dh.get(), pub_key.get(), priv_key.get())) {
return false;
}
// `DH_set0_key` takes ownership on success.
pub_key.release();
priv_key.release();
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey(EVP_PKEY_new());
if (pkey == nullptr || !EVP_PKEY_set1_DH(pkey.get(), dh.get())) {
return false;
}
// Save the key for future tests.
const std::string &key_name = t->GetParameter();
EXPECT_EQ(0u, key_map->count(key_name)) << "Duplicate key: " << key_name;
(*key_map)[key_name].push_back(
{priv_key != nullptr ? KeyRole::kPrivate : KeyRole::kPublic, "DH params",
std::move(pkey)});
return true;
}
// SetupContext configures `ctx` based on attributes in `t`, with the exception
// of the signing digest which must be configured externally.
bool SetupContext(FileTest *t, const KeyMap *key_map, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) {
if (t->HasAttribute("RSAPadding")) {
auto padding = GetRSAPadding(t->GetAttributeOrDie("RSAPadding"));
if (!padding || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, *padding)) {
return false;
}
}
if (t->HasAttribute("PSSSaltLength") &&
!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(
ctx, atoi(t->GetAttributeOrDie("PSSSaltLength").c_str()))) {
return false;
}
if (t->HasAttribute("MGF1Digest")) {
const EVP_MD *digest = GetDigest(t->GetAttributeOrDie("MGF1Digest"));
if (digest == nullptr || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(ctx, digest)) {
return false;
}
}
if (t->HasAttribute("OAEPDigest")) {
const EVP_MD *digest = GetDigest(t->GetAttributeOrDie("OAEPDigest"));
if (digest == nullptr || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(ctx, digest)) {
return false;
}
}
if (t->HasAttribute("OAEPLabel")) {
std::vector<uint8_t> label;
if (!t->GetBytes(&label, "OAEPLabel")) {
return false;
}
// For historical reasons, `EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label` expects to be
// take ownership of the input.
bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> buf(reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(
OPENSSL_memdup(label.data(), label.size())));
if (!buf ||
!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(ctx, buf.get(), label.size())) {
return false;
}
buf.release();
}
if (t->HasAttribute("DerivePeer")) {
auto keys = FindKeys(key_map, t->GetAttributeOrDie("DerivePeer"));
if (keys.empty()) {
return false;
}
EVP_PKEY *derive_peer_key = keys.front()->pkey.get();
if (!EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, derive_peer_key)) {
return false;
}
}
if (t->HasAttribute("DiffieHellmanPad") && !EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_pad(ctx, 1)) {
return false;
}
if (t->HasAttribute("Context")) {
std::vector<uint8_t> context;
if (!t->GetBytes(&context, "Context") ||
!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_signature_context_string(ctx, context.data(),
context.size())) {
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
bool MaybeReplaceWithCopy(bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY_CTX> *ctx, bool copy_ctx) {
if (!copy_ctx) {
return true;
}
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY_CTX> copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup(ctx->get()));
if (!copy) {
return false;
}
*ctx = std::move(copy);
return true;
}
bool MaybeReplaceWithCopy(bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_MD_CTX> *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
bool copy_ctx) {
if (!copy_ctx) {
return true;
}
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_MD_CTX> copy(EVP_MD_CTX_new());
if (ctx == nullptr || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(copy.get(), ctx->get())) {
return false;
}
*ctx = std::move(copy);
*pctx = EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(ctx->get());
return true;
}
bool TestDerive(FileTest *t, const KeyMap *key_map, EVP_PKEY *key,
bool copy_ctx) {
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY_CTX> ctx(EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(key, nullptr));
if (!ctx || //
!EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx.get()) ||
!MaybeReplaceWithCopy(&ctx, copy_ctx) ||
!SetupContext(t, key_map, ctx.get()) ||
!MaybeReplaceWithCopy(&ctx, copy_ctx)) {
return false;
}
size_t len;
std::vector<uint8_t> actual, output;
if (!EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx.get(), nullptr, &len)) {
return false;
}
actual.resize(len);
if (!EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx.get(), actual.data(), &len)) {
return false;
}
actual.resize(len);
// Defer looking up the attribute so Error works properly.
if (!t->GetBytes(&output, "Output")) {
return false;
}
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(output), Bytes(actual));
// Test when the buffer is too large.
actual.resize(len + 1);
len = actual.size();
if (!EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx.get(), actual.data(), &len)) {
return false;
}
actual.resize(len);
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(output), Bytes(actual));
// Test when the buffer is too small.
actual.resize(len - 1);
len = actual.size();
if (t->HasAttribute("SmallBufferTruncates")) {
if (!EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx.get(), actual.data(), &len)) {
return false;
}
actual.resize(len);
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(output.data(), len), Bytes(actual));
} else {
EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx.get(), actual.data(), &len));
ERR_clear_error();
}
return true;
}
// Tests encapsulation and/or decapsulation. If performing both, this checks
// that the output of encapsulation is successfully decapsulated to the same
// shared secret value. If only performing decapsulation, this reads ciphertext
// input from the test vectors file and checks the decapsulation result against
// known output. If only performing encapsulation, this only checks that the
// operation succeeds.
bool TestKem(FileTest *t, EVP_PKEY *pkey, bool copy_ctx, bool encapsulate,
bool decapsulate) {
std::string alg_name;
if (!t->GetAttribute(&alg_name, "Algorithm")) {
ADD_FAILURE() << "Algorithm not specified.";
return false;
}
auto it = kAllAlgorithms.find(alg_name);
if (it == kAllAlgorithms.end()) {
ADD_FAILURE() << "Unknown algorithm: " << alg_name;
return false;
}
const AlgorithmInfo &alg_info = it->second;
if (alg_info.alg == nullptr || alg_info.kem == nullptr) {
ADD_FAILURE() << "Method not defined: " << alg_name;
return false;
}
size_t expected_ciphertext_len;
size_t expected_secret_len;
if (alg_info.kem == EVP_kem_ml_kem_768()) {
expected_ciphertext_len = MLKEM768_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES;
expected_secret_len = MLKEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES;
} else if (alg_info.kem == EVP_kem_ml_kem_1024()) {
expected_ciphertext_len = MLKEM1024_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES;
expected_secret_len = MLKEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES;
} else if (alg_info.kem == EVP_kem_xwing()) {
expected_ciphertext_len = XWING_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES;
expected_secret_len = XWING_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES;
} else {
ADD_FAILURE() << "KEM not found: " << alg_name;
return false;
}
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY_CTX> ctx;
std::vector<uint8_t> ciphertext, secret, decapsulated_secret;
size_t ciphertext_size, secret_size;
const auto resize_output_buffers =
[&](std::optional<size_t> new_ciphertext_len,
std::optional<size_t> new_secret_len,
bool resize_decap_buffer_only = false) {
if (new_ciphertext_len) {
ciphertext_size = *new_ciphertext_len;
ciphertext.resize(ciphertext_size);
}
if (new_secret_len) {
secret_size = *new_secret_len;
if (!resize_decap_buffer_only) {
secret.resize(secret_size);
}
decapsulated_secret.resize(secret_size);
}
};
const auto reset_test_state = [&]() {
ctx.reset(EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, nullptr));
resize_output_buffers(0, 0);
// Read values from the test vector file.
if (decapsulate && !encapsulate) {
if (!t->GetBytes(&ciphertext, "Input")) {
ADD_FAILURE() << "Input not found.";
}
if (!t->HasAttribute("DecapsulateFail") &&
!t->GetBytes(&secret, "Output")) {
ADD_FAILURE() << "Output not found.";
}
}
};
reset_test_state();
// Perform encapsulation.
if (encapsulate) {
if (!ctx || //
!EVP_PKEY_encapsulate_init(ctx.get(), nullptr) ||
!MaybeReplaceWithCopy(&ctx, copy_ctx)) {
return false;
}
// Test the mode that writes the output size.
EXPECT_EQ(EVP_PKEY_encapsulate(ctx.get(), nullptr, &ciphertext_size,
nullptr, &secret_size),
1);
EXPECT_EQ(ciphertext_size, expected_ciphertext_len);
EXPECT_EQ(secret_size, expected_secret_len);
// If insufficient space is supplied, the function will fail.
resize_output_buffers(ciphertext_size - 1, secret_size - 1);
EXPECT_EQ(
EVP_PKEY_encapsulate(ctx.get(), ciphertext.data(), &ciphertext_size,
secret.data(), &secret_size),
0);
EXPECT_TRUE(
ErrorEquals(ERR_get_error(), ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL));
ERR_clear_error();
// Test the mode that actually performs the operation.
resize_output_buffers(expected_ciphertext_len + 1, expected_secret_len + 1);
EXPECT_EQ(
EVP_PKEY_encapsulate(ctx.get(), ciphertext.data(), &ciphertext_size,
secret.data(), &secret_size),
1);
// The correct output sizes are written out.
EXPECT_EQ(ciphertext_size, expected_ciphertext_len);
EXPECT_EQ(secret_size, expected_secret_len);
resize_output_buffers(ciphertext_size, secret_size);
}
const auto check_decapsulate_result = [&](int result) {
if (t->HasAttribute("DecapsulateFail")) {
EXPECT_EQ(result, 0);
return;
}
EXPECT_EQ(result, 1);
// The correct output size was written out.
EXPECT_EQ(secret_size, expected_secret_len);
decapsulated_secret.resize(secret_size);
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(secret), Bytes(decapsulated_secret));
};
// Perform decapsulation.
if (decapsulate) {
ctx.reset(EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, nullptr));
if (!ctx || //
!EVP_PKEY_decapsulate_init(ctx.get(), nullptr) ||
!MaybeReplaceWithCopy(&ctx, copy_ctx)) {
return false;
}
// Test the mode that writes the output size.
secret_size = 0;
EXPECT_EQ(EVP_PKEY_decapsulate(ctx.get(), nullptr, &secret_size,
ciphertext.data(), ciphertext.size()),
1);
EXPECT_EQ(secret_size, expected_secret_len);
// If insufficient space is supplied, the function will fail.
resize_output_buffers(std::nullopt, secret_size - 1, true);
EXPECT_EQ(EVP_PKEY_decapsulate(ctx.get(), decapsulated_secret.data(),
&secret_size, ciphertext.data(),
ciphertext.size()),
0);
EXPECT_TRUE(
ErrorEquals(ERR_get_error(), ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL));
ERR_clear_error();
// Test the mode that actually performs the operation.
resize_output_buffers(std::nullopt, secret_size + 1, true);
check_decapsulate_result(EVP_PKEY_decapsulate(
ctx.get(), decapsulated_secret.data(), &secret_size, ciphertext.data(),
ciphertext.size()));
}
// Repeat everything the EVP_KEM way, which is simpler.
reset_test_state();
EXPECT_EQ(EVP_KEM_ciphertext_len(alg_info.kem), expected_ciphertext_len);
EXPECT_EQ(EVP_KEM_secret_len(alg_info.kem), expected_secret_len);
if (encapsulate) {
ciphertext.resize(ciphertext_size);
// Passing the wrong sizes fails (even if larger than required).
resize_output_buffers(expected_ciphertext_len - 1, expected_secret_len);
EXPECT_EQ(EVP_KEM_encap(alg_info.kem, ciphertext.data(), ciphertext.size(),
secret.data(), secret.size(), pkey),
0);
EXPECT_TRUE(ErrorEquals(ERR_get_error(), ERR_LIB_EVP,
EVP_R_INVALID_CIPHERTEXT_LENGTH));
ERR_clear_error();
resize_output_buffers(expected_ciphertext_len + 1, expected_secret_len);
EXPECT_EQ(EVP_KEM_encap(alg_info.kem, ciphertext.data(), ciphertext.size(),
secret.data(), secret.size(), pkey),
0);
EXPECT_TRUE(ErrorEquals(ERR_get_error(), ERR_LIB_EVP,
EVP_R_INVALID_CIPHERTEXT_LENGTH));
ERR_clear_error();
resize_output_buffers(expected_ciphertext_len, expected_secret_len - 1);
EXPECT_EQ(EVP_KEM_encap(alg_info.kem, ciphertext.data(), ciphertext.size(),
secret.data(), secret.size(), pkey),
0);
EXPECT_TRUE(
ErrorEquals(ERR_get_error(), ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_SECRET_LENGTH));
ERR_clear_error();
resize_output_buffers(expected_ciphertext_len, expected_secret_len + 1);
EXPECT_EQ(EVP_KEM_encap(alg_info.kem, ciphertext.data(), ciphertext.size(),
secret.data(), secret.size(), pkey),
0);
EXPECT_TRUE(
ErrorEquals(ERR_get_error(), ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_SECRET_LENGTH));
ERR_clear_error();
// Only the correct sizes are accepted.
resize_output_buffers(expected_ciphertext_len, expected_secret_len);
EXPECT_EQ(EVP_KEM_encap(alg_info.kem, ciphertext.data(), ciphertext.size(),
secret.data(), secret.size(), pkey),
1);
}
if (decapsulate) {
// Passing the wrong sizes fails (even if larger than required).
resize_output_buffers(std::nullopt, expected_secret_len - 1, true);
EXPECT_EQ(EVP_KEM_decap(alg_info.kem, decapsulated_secret.data(),
decapsulated_secret.size(), ciphertext.data(),
ciphertext.size(), pkey),
0);
EXPECT_TRUE(
ErrorEquals(ERR_get_error(), ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_SECRET_LENGTH));
ERR_clear_error();
resize_output_buffers(std::nullopt, expected_secret_len + 1, true);
EXPECT_EQ(EVP_KEM_decap(alg_info.kem, decapsulated_secret.data(),
decapsulated_secret.size(), ciphertext.data(),
ciphertext.size(), pkey),
0);
EXPECT_TRUE(
ErrorEquals(ERR_get_error(), ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_SECRET_LENGTH));
ERR_clear_error();
resize_output_buffers(std::nullopt, expected_secret_len, true);
check_decapsulate_result(EVP_KEM_decap(
alg_info.kem, decapsulated_secret.data(), decapsulated_secret.size(),
ciphertext.data(), ciphertext.size(), pkey));
}
return true;
}
bool TestEVPOperation(FileTest *t, const KeyMap *key_map, EVP_PKEY *key,
bool copy_ctx) {
SCOPED_TRACE(copy_ctx);
int (*key_op_init)(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) = nullptr;
int (*key_op)(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) = nullptr;
int (*md_op_init)(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx, const EVP_MD *type,
ENGINE *e, EVP_PKEY *pkey) = nullptr;
bool is_verify = false;
if (t->GetType() == "Decrypt") {
key_op_init = EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init;
key_op = EVP_PKEY_decrypt;
} else if (t->GetType() == "Sign") {
key_op_init = EVP_PKEY_sign_init;
key_op = EVP_PKEY_sign;
} else if (t->GetType() == "Verify") {
key_op_init = EVP_PKEY_verify_init;
is_verify = true;
} else if (t->GetType() == "SignMessage") {
md_op_init = EVP_DigestSignInit;
} else if (t->GetType() == "VerifyMessage") {
md_op_init = EVP_DigestVerifyInit;
is_verify = true;
} else if (t->GetType() == "Encrypt") {
key_op_init = EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init;
key_op = EVP_PKEY_encrypt;
} else if (t->GetType() == "Derive") {
return TestDerive(t, key_map, key, copy_ctx);
} else if (t->GetType() == "Encapsulate") {
return TestKem(t, key, copy_ctx, true, false);
} else if (t->GetType() == "EncapsulateDecapsulate") {
return TestKem(t, key, copy_ctx, true, true);
} else if (t->GetType() == "Decapsulate") {
return TestKem(t, key, copy_ctx, false, true);
} else {
ADD_FAILURE() << "Unknown test " << t->GetType();
return false;
}
const EVP_MD *digest = nullptr;
if (t->HasAttribute("Digest")) {
digest = GetDigest(t->GetAttributeOrDie("Digest"));
if (digest == nullptr) {
return false;
}
}
// For verify tests, the "output" is the signature. Read it now so that, for
// tests which expect a failure in SetupContext, the attribute is still
// consumed.
std::vector<uint8_t> input, actual, output;
if (!t->GetBytes(&input, "Input") ||
(is_verify && !t->GetBytes(&output, "Output"))) {
return false;
}
if (md_op_init) {
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_MD_CTX> ctx(EVP_MD_CTX_new());
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
if (ctx == nullptr || //
!md_op_init(ctx.get(), &pctx, digest, nullptr, key) ||
!MaybeReplaceWithCopy(&ctx, &pctx, copy_ctx) ||
!SetupContext(t, key_map, pctx) ||
!MaybeReplaceWithCopy(&ctx, &pctx, copy_ctx)) {
return false;
}
if (is_verify) {
return EVP_DigestVerify(ctx.get(), output.data(), output.size(),
input.data(), input.size());
}
size_t len;
if (!EVP_DigestSign(ctx.get(), nullptr, &len, input.data(), input.size())) {
return false;
}
actual.resize(len);
if (!EVP_DigestSign(ctx.get(), actual.data(), &len, input.data(),
input.size())) {
return false;
}
actual.resize(len);
if (t->HasAttribute("CheckVerify")) {
// Some signature schemes are non-deterministic, so we check by verifying.
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_MD_CTX> verify_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX_new());
EVP_PKEY_CTX *verify_pctx;
if (verify_ctx == nullptr ||
!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(verify_ctx.get(), &verify_pctx, digest, nullptr,
key) ||
!MaybeReplaceWithCopy(&verify_ctx, &verify_pctx, copy_ctx) ||
!SetupContext(t, key_map, verify_pctx) ||
!MaybeReplaceWithCopy(&verify_ctx, &verify_pctx, copy_ctx)) {
return false;
}
EXPECT_TRUE(EVP_DigestVerify(verify_ctx.get(), actual.data(),
actual.size(), input.data(), input.size()))
<< "Could not verify result.";
return true;
}
if (!t->GetBytes(&output, "Output")) {
return false;
}
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(output), Bytes(actual));
return true;
}
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY_CTX> ctx(EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(key, nullptr));
if (!ctx || !key_op_init(ctx.get()) ||
!MaybeReplaceWithCopy(&ctx, copy_ctx) ||
(digest != nullptr &&
!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(ctx.get(), digest)) ||
!SetupContext(t, key_map, ctx.get()) ||
!MaybeReplaceWithCopy(&ctx, copy_ctx)) {
return false;
}
if (is_verify) {
return EVP_PKEY_verify(ctx.get(), output.data(), output.size(),
input.data(), input.size());
}
size_t len;
if (!key_op(ctx.get(), nullptr, &len, input.data(), input.size())) {
return false;
}
actual.resize(len);
if (!key_op(ctx.get(), actual.data(), &len, input.data(), input.size())) {
return false;
}
if (t->HasAttribute("CheckDecrypt")) {
// Encryption is non-deterministic, so we check by decrypting. We may be
// testing a public key, so look for a corresponding private key to check.
auto private_keys =
FindKeys(key_map, t->GetParameter(), KeyRoleSelect::kPrivate);
if (private_keys.empty()) {
return false;
}
size_t plaintext_len;
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY_CTX> decrypt_ctx(
EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(private_keys.front()->pkey.get(), nullptr));
if (!decrypt_ctx || //
!EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(decrypt_ctx.get()) ||
!MaybeReplaceWithCopy(&decrypt_ctx, copy_ctx) ||
(digest != nullptr &&
!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(decrypt_ctx.get(), digest)) ||
!SetupContext(t, key_map, decrypt_ctx.get()) ||
!MaybeReplaceWithCopy(&decrypt_ctx, copy_ctx) ||
!EVP_PKEY_decrypt(decrypt_ctx.get(), nullptr, &plaintext_len,
actual.data(), actual.size())) {
return false;
}
output.resize(plaintext_len);
if (!EVP_PKEY_decrypt(decrypt_ctx.get(), output.data(), &plaintext_len,
actual.data(), actual.size())) {
ADD_FAILURE() << "Could not decrypt result.";
return false;
}
output.resize(plaintext_len);
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(input), Bytes(output)) << "Decrypted result mismatch.";
} else if (t->HasAttribute("CheckVerify")) {
// Some signature schemes are non-deterministic, so we check by verifying.
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY_CTX> verify_ctx(EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(key, nullptr));
if (!verify_ctx || //
!EVP_PKEY_verify_init(verify_ctx.get()) ||
!MaybeReplaceWithCopy(&verify_ctx, copy_ctx) ||
(digest != nullptr &&
!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(verify_ctx.get(), digest)) ||
!SetupContext(t, key_map, verify_ctx.get()) ||
!MaybeReplaceWithCopy(&verify_ctx, copy_ctx)) {
return false;
}
if (t->HasAttribute("VerifyPSSSaltLength")) {
if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(
verify_ctx.get(),
atoi(t->GetAttributeOrDie("VerifyPSSSaltLength").c_str()))) {
return false;
}
}
EXPECT_TRUE(EVP_PKEY_verify(verify_ctx.get(), actual.data(), actual.size(),
input.data(), input.size()))
<< "Could not verify result.";
} else {
// By default, check by comparing the result against Output.
if (!t->GetBytes(&output, "Output")) {
return false;
}
actual.resize(len);
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(output), Bytes(actual));
}
return true;
}
bool TestEVP(FileTest *t, KeyMap *key_map) {
if (t->GetType() == "Key") {
return ImportKey(t, key_map);
}
if (t->GetType() == "DHKey") {
return ImportDHKey(t, key_map);
}
auto keys = FindKeys(key_map, t->GetParameter());
if (keys.empty()) {
return false;
}
for (const SourceAndKey *key : keys) {
SCOPED_TRACE(key->source);
// Run the test twice, once copying the context and once normally.
if (!TestEVPOperation(t, key_map, key->pkey.get(), /*copy_ctx=*/false) ||
!TestEVPOperation(t, key_map, key->pkey.get(), /*copy_ctx=*/true)) {
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
void RunEVPTests(const char *path) {
KeyMap key_map;
FileTestGTest(path, [&](FileTest *t) {
bool result = TestEVP(t, &key_map);
if (t->HasAttribute("Error")) {
ASSERT_FALSE(result) << "Operation unexpectedly succeeded.";
uint32_t err = ERR_peek_error();
EXPECT_EQ(t->GetAttributeOrDie("Error"), ERR_reason_error_string(err));
} else if (!result) {
ADD_FAILURE() << "Operation unexpectedly failed.";
}
});
}
TEST(EVPTest, GeneralTestVectors) {
RunEVPTests("crypto/evp/test/evp_tests.txt");
}
TEST(EVPTest, DHTestVectors) { RunEVPTests("crypto/evp/test/dh_tests.txt"); }
TEST(EVPTest, ECTestVectors) { RunEVPTests("crypto/evp/test/ec_tests.txt"); }
TEST(EVPTest, Ed25519TestVectors) {
RunEVPTests("crypto/evp/test/ed25519_tests.txt");
}
TEST(EVPTest, MLDSATestVectors) {
RunEVPTests("crypto/evp/test/mldsa_tests.txt");
}
TEST(EVPTest, MLKEMTestVectors) {
RunEVPTests("crypto/evp/test/mlkem_tests.txt");
}
TEST(EVPTest, RSATestVectors) { RunEVPTests("crypto/evp/test/rsa_tests.txt"); }
TEST(EVPTest, X25519TestVectors) {
RunEVPTests("crypto/evp/test/x25519_tests.txt");
}
TEST(EVPTest, XWingTestVectors) {
RunEVPTests("crypto/evp/test/xwing_tests.txt");
}
void RunWycheproofVerifyTest(const char *path, const EVP_PKEY_ALG *alg) {
SCOPED_TRACE(path);
FileTestGTest(path, [&](FileTest *t) {
t->IgnoreAllUnusedInstructions();
const EVP_MD *md = nullptr;
if (t->HasInstruction("sha")) {
md = GetWycheproofDigest(t, "sha", true);
ASSERT_TRUE(md);
}
bool is_pss = t->HasInstruction("mgf");
const EVP_MD *mgf1_md = nullptr;
int pss_salt_len = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST;
if (is_pss) {
ASSERT_EQ("MGF1", t->GetInstructionOrDie("mgf"));
mgf1_md = GetWycheproofDigest(t, "mgfSha", true);
std::string s_len;
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetInstruction(&s_len, "sLen"));
pss_salt_len = atoi(s_len.c_str());
}
std::vector<uint8_t> msg;
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&msg, "msg"));
std::vector<uint8_t> sig;
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&sig, "sig"));
std::vector<uint8_t> sig_ctx;
if (t->HasAttribute("ctx")) {
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&sig_ctx, "ctx"));
}
WycheproofResult result;
ASSERT_TRUE(GetWycheproofResult(t, &result));
// BoringSSL does not enforce policies on weak keys and leaves it to the
// caller.
bool expect_valid =
result.IsValid({"SmallModulus", "SmallPublicKey", "WeakHash"});
std::vector<uint8_t> der;
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetInstructionBytes(&der, "publicKeyDer"));
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> key(
EVP_PKEY_from_subject_public_key_info(der.data(), der.size(), &alg, 1));
if (!key) {
EXPECT_FALSE(expect_valid);
return;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_id(key.get()) == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
// DSA is deprecated and is not usable via EVP.
DSA *dsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(key.get());
uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned digest_len;
ASSERT_TRUE(
EVP_Digest(msg.data(), msg.size(), digest, &digest_len, md, nullptr));
int valid;
bool sig_ok = DSA_check_signature(&valid, digest, digest_len, sig.data(),
sig.size(), dsa) &&
valid;
EXPECT_EQ(sig_ok, result.IsValid());
} else {
bssl::ScopedEVP_MD_CTX ctx;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
ASSERT_TRUE(
EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx.get(), &pctx, md, nullptr, key.get()));
if (is_pss) {
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING));
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(pctx, mgf1_md));
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, pss_salt_len));
}
if (!sig_ctx.empty() && !EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_signature_context_string(
pctx, sig_ctx.data(), sig_ctx.size())) {
EXPECT_FALSE(expect_valid);
return;
}
int ret = EVP_DigestVerify(ctx.get(), sig.data(), sig.size(), msg.data(),
msg.size());
EXPECT_EQ(ret, expect_valid ? 1 : 0);
}
});
}
TEST(EVPTest, WycheproofDSA) {
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/dsa_2048_224_sha224_test.txt",
EVP_pkey_dsa());
}
TEST(EVPTest, WycheproofECDSAP224) {
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/ecdsa_secp224r1_sha224_test.txt",
EVP_pkey_ec_p224());
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/ecdsa_secp224r1_sha256_test.txt",
EVP_pkey_ec_p224());
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/ecdsa_secp224r1_sha512_test.txt",
EVP_pkey_ec_p224());
}
TEST(EVPTest, WycheproofECDSAP256) {
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256_test.txt",
EVP_pkey_ec_p256());
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/ecdsa_secp256r1_sha512_test.txt",
EVP_pkey_ec_p256());
}
TEST(EVPTest, WycheproofECDSAP384) {
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384_test.txt",
EVP_pkey_ec_p384());
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/ecdsa_secp384r1_sha512_test.txt",
EVP_pkey_ec_p384());
}
TEST(EVPTest, WycheproofECDSAP521) {
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512_test.txt",
EVP_pkey_ec_p521());
}
TEST(EVPTest, WycheproofEd25519) {
RunWycheproofVerifyTest("third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/ed25519_test.txt",
EVP_pkey_ed25519());
}
// TODO(crbug.com/449751916): We also test these in the low-level ML-DSA code.
// The EVP-level tests are not yet redundant:
//
// * We can't yet run the signing tests with external entropy.
//
// When/if we add `EVP_PKEY`-based APIs for those, we may be able to remove the
// low-level copy.
TEST(EVPTest, WycheproofMLDSA44) {
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/mldsa_44_verify_test.txt",
EVP_pkey_ml_dsa_44());
}
TEST(EVPTest, WycheproofMLDSA65) {
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/mldsa_65_verify_test.txt",
EVP_pkey_ml_dsa_65());
}
TEST(EVPTest, WycheproofMLDSA87) {
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/mldsa_87_verify_test.txt",
EVP_pkey_ml_dsa_87());
}
TEST(EVPTest, WycheproofRSAPKCS1) {
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_signature_2048_sha224_test.txt",
EVP_pkey_rsa());
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_signature_2048_sha256_test.txt",
EVP_pkey_rsa());
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_signature_2048_sha384_test.txt",
EVP_pkey_rsa());
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_signature_2048_sha512_test.txt",
EVP_pkey_rsa());
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_signature_3072_sha256_test.txt",
EVP_pkey_rsa());
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_signature_3072_sha384_test.txt",
EVP_pkey_rsa());
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_signature_3072_sha512_test.txt",
EVP_pkey_rsa());
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_signature_4096_sha256_test.txt",
EVP_pkey_rsa());
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_signature_4096_sha384_test.txt",
EVP_pkey_rsa());
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_signature_4096_sha512_test.txt",
EVP_pkey_rsa());
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_signature_8192_sha256_test.txt",
EVP_pkey_rsa());
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_signature_8192_sha384_test.txt",
EVP_pkey_rsa());
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_signature_8192_sha512_test.txt",
EVP_pkey_rsa());
}
void RunWycheproofSignTest(FileTest *t) {
t->IgnoreAllUnusedInstructions();
std::vector<uint8_t> pkcs8;
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetInstructionBytes(&pkcs8, "privateKeyPkcs8"));
CBS cbs;
CBS_init(&cbs, pkcs8.data(), pkcs8.size());
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> key(EVP_parse_private_key(&cbs));
ASSERT_TRUE(key);
const EVP_MD *md = GetWycheproofDigest(t, "sha", true);
ASSERT_TRUE(md);
std::vector<uint8_t> msg, sig;
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&msg, "msg"));
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&sig, "sig"));
WycheproofResult result;
ASSERT_TRUE(GetWycheproofResult(t, &result));
bssl::ScopedEVP_MD_CTX ctx;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx.get(), &pctx, md, nullptr, key.get()));
std::vector<uint8_t> out(EVP_PKEY_size(key.get()));
size_t len = out.size();
int ret = EVP_DigestSign(ctx.get(), out.data(), &len, msg.data(), msg.size());
// BoringSSL does not enforce policies on weak keys and leaves it to the
// caller.
bool is_valid =
result.IsValid({"SmallModulus", "SmallPublicKey", "WeakHash"});
EXPECT_EQ(ret, is_valid ? 1 : 0);
if (is_valid) {
out.resize(len);
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(sig), Bytes(out));
}
}
TEST(EVPTest, WycheproofRSAPKCS1Sign) {
FileTestGTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_pkcs1_1024_sig_gen_test.txt",
RunWycheproofSignTest);
FileTestGTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_pkcs1_1536_sig_gen_test.txt",
RunWycheproofSignTest);
FileTestGTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_pkcs1_2048_sig_gen_test.txt",
RunWycheproofSignTest);
FileTestGTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_pkcs1_3072_sig_gen_test.txt",
RunWycheproofSignTest);
FileTestGTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_pkcs1_4096_sig_gen_test.txt",
RunWycheproofSignTest);
}
TEST(EVPTest, WycheproofRSAPSS) {
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_pss_2048_sha1_mgf1_20_test.txt",
EVP_pkey_rsa());
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_pss_2048_sha256_mgf1_0_test.txt",
EVP_pkey_rsa());
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_pss_2048_sha256_mgf1_32_test.txt",
EVP_pkey_rsa());
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_pss_3072_sha256_mgf1_32_test.txt",
EVP_pkey_rsa());
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_pss_4096_sha256_mgf1_32_test.txt",
EVP_pkey_rsa());
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_pss_4096_sha512_mgf1_32_test.txt",
EVP_pkey_rsa());
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_pss_misc_test.txt",
EVP_pkey_rsa());
}
void RunWycheproofDecryptTest(
const char *path,
std::function<void(FileTest *, EVP_PKEY_CTX *)> setup_cb) {
FileTestGTest(path, [&](FileTest *t) {
t->IgnoreAllUnusedInstructions();
std::vector<uint8_t> pkcs8;
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetInstructionBytes(&pkcs8, "privateKeyPkcs8"));
CBS cbs;
CBS_init(&cbs, pkcs8.data(), pkcs8.size());
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> key(EVP_parse_private_key(&cbs));
ASSERT_TRUE(key);
std::vector<uint8_t> ct, msg;
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&ct, "ct"));
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&msg, "msg"));
WycheproofResult result;
ASSERT_TRUE(GetWycheproofResult(t, &result));
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY_CTX> ctx(EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(key.get(), nullptr));
ASSERT_TRUE(ctx);
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx.get()));
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(setup_cb(t, ctx.get()));
std::vector<uint8_t> out(EVP_PKEY_size(key.get()));
size_t len = out.size();
int ret =
EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx.get(), out.data(), &len, ct.data(), ct.size());
// BoringSSL does not enforce policies on weak keys and leaves it to the
// caller.
bool is_valid =
result.IsValid({"SmallModulus", "Constructed", "EncryptionWithLabel",
"SmallIntegerCiphertext"});
EXPECT_EQ(ret, is_valid ? 1 : 0);
if (is_valid) {
out.resize(len);
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(msg), Bytes(out));
}
});
}
void RunWycheproofOAEPTest(const char *path) {
RunWycheproofDecryptTest(path, [](FileTest *t, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) {
const EVP_MD *md = GetWycheproofDigest(t, "sha", true);
ASSERT_TRUE(md);
const EVP_MD *mgf1_md = GetWycheproofDigest(t, "mgfSha", true);
ASSERT_TRUE(mgf1_md);
std::vector<uint8_t> label;
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&label, "label"));
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING));
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(ctx, md));
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(ctx, mgf1_md));
bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> label_copy(
static_cast<uint8_t *>(OPENSSL_memdup(label.data(), label.size())));
ASSERT_TRUE(label_copy || label.empty());
ASSERT_TRUE(
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(ctx, label_copy.get(), label.size()));
// `EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label` takes ownership on success.
label_copy.release();
});
}
TEST(EVPTest, WycheproofRSAOAEP2048) {
RunWycheproofOAEPTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/"
"rsa_oaep_2048_sha1_mgf1sha1_test.txt");
RunWycheproofOAEPTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/"
"rsa_oaep_2048_sha224_mgf1sha1_test.txt");
RunWycheproofOAEPTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/"
"rsa_oaep_2048_sha224_mgf1sha224_test.txt");
RunWycheproofOAEPTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/"
"rsa_oaep_2048_sha256_mgf1sha1_test.txt");
RunWycheproofOAEPTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/"
"rsa_oaep_2048_sha256_mgf1sha256_test.txt");
RunWycheproofOAEPTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/"
"rsa_oaep_2048_sha384_mgf1sha1_test.txt");
RunWycheproofOAEPTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/"
"rsa_oaep_2048_sha384_mgf1sha384_test.txt");
RunWycheproofOAEPTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/"
"rsa_oaep_2048_sha512_mgf1sha1_test.txt");
RunWycheproofOAEPTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/"
"rsa_oaep_2048_sha512_mgf1sha512_test.txt");
}
TEST(EVPTest, WycheproofRSAOAEP3072) {
RunWycheproofOAEPTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/"
"rsa_oaep_3072_sha256_mgf1sha1_test.txt");
RunWycheproofOAEPTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/"
"rsa_oaep_3072_sha256_mgf1sha256_test.txt");
RunWycheproofOAEPTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/"
"rsa_oaep_3072_sha512_mgf1sha1_test.txt");
RunWycheproofOAEPTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/"
"rsa_oaep_3072_sha512_mgf1sha512_test.txt");
}
TEST(EVPTest, WycheproofRSAOAEP4096) {
RunWycheproofOAEPTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/"
"rsa_oaep_4096_sha256_mgf1sha1_test.txt");
RunWycheproofOAEPTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/"
"rsa_oaep_4096_sha256_mgf1sha256_test.txt");
RunWycheproofOAEPTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/"
"rsa_oaep_4096_sha512_mgf1sha1_test.txt");
RunWycheproofOAEPTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/"
"rsa_oaep_4096_sha512_mgf1sha512_test.txt");
}
TEST(EVPTest, WycheproofRSAOAEPMisc) {
RunWycheproofOAEPTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_oaep_misc_test.txt");
}
void RunWycheproofPKCS1DecryptTest(const char *path) {
RunWycheproofDecryptTest(path, [](FileTest *t, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) {
// No setup needed. PKCS#1 is, sadly, the default.
});
}
TEST(EVPTest, WycheproofRSAPKCS1Decrypt) {
RunWycheproofPKCS1DecryptTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_pkcs1_2048_test.txt");
RunWycheproofPKCS1DecryptTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_pkcs1_3072_test.txt");
RunWycheproofPKCS1DecryptTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_pkcs1_4096_test.txt");
}
} // namespace
BSSL_NAMESPACE_END