crypto/bn/div.c - boringssl - Git at Google

 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
  * All rights reserved.
  *
  * This package is an SSL implementation written
  * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
  * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
  *
  * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
  * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
  * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
  * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
  * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
  * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
  *
  * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
  * the code are not to be removed.
  * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
  * as the author of the parts of the library used.
  * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
  * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
  * are met:
  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
  *    must display the following acknowledgement:
  *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
  *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
  *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
  *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
  * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
  *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
  *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
  *
  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
  *
  * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
  * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
  * copied and put under another distribution licence
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */

 #include <openssl/bn.h>

 #include <assert.h>
 #include <limits.h>

 #include <openssl/err.h>

 #include "internal.h"


 #if !defined(BN_ULLONG)
 /* bn_div_words divides a double-width |h|,|l| by |d| and returns the result,
  * which must fit in a |BN_ULONG|. */
 static BN_ULONG bn_div_words(BN_ULONG h, BN_ULONG l, BN_ULONG d) {
   BN_ULONG dh, dl, q, ret = 0, th, tl, t;
   int i, count = 2;

   if (d == 0) {
     return BN_MASK2;
   }

   i = BN_num_bits_word(d);
   assert((i == BN_BITS2) || (h <= (BN_ULONG)1 << i));

   i = BN_BITS2 - i;
   if (h >= d) {
     h -= d;
   }

   if (i) {
     d <<= i;
     h = (h << i) | (l >> (BN_BITS2 - i));
     l <<= i;
   }
   dh = (d & BN_MASK2h) >> BN_BITS4;
   dl = (d & BN_MASK2l);
   for (;;) {
     if ((h >> BN_BITS4) == dh) {
       q = BN_MASK2l;
     } else {
       q = h / dh;
     }

     th = q * dh;
     tl = dl * q;
     for (;;) {
       t = h - th;
       if ((t & BN_MASK2h) ||
           ((tl) <= ((t << BN_BITS4) | ((l & BN_MASK2h) >> BN_BITS4)))) {
         break;
       }
       q--;
       th -= dh;
       tl -= dl;
     }
     t = (tl >> BN_BITS4);
     tl = (tl << BN_BITS4) & BN_MASK2h;
     th += t;

     if (l < tl) {
       th++;
     }
     l -= tl;
     if (h < th) {
       h += d;
       q--;
     }
     h -= th;

     if (--count == 0) {
       break;
     }

     ret = q << BN_BITS4;
     h = ((h << BN_BITS4) | (l >> BN_BITS4)) & BN_MASK2;
     l = (l & BN_MASK2l) << BN_BITS4;
   }

   ret |= q;
   return ret;
 }
 #endif /* !defined(BN_ULLONG) */

 static inline void bn_div_rem_words(BN_ULONG *quotient_out, BN_ULONG *rem_out,
                                     BN_ULONG n0, BN_ULONG n1, BN_ULONG d0) {
   /* GCC and Clang generate function calls to |__udivdi3| and |__umoddi3| when
    * the |BN_ULLONG|-based C code is used.
    *
    * GCC bugs:
    *   * https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=14224
    *   * https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=43721
    *   * https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=54183
    *   * https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58897
    *   * https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=65668
    *
    * Clang bugs:
    *   * https://llvm.org/bugs/show_bug.cgi?id=6397
    *   * https://llvm.org/bugs/show_bug.cgi?id=12418
    *
    * These issues aren't specific to x86 and x86_64, so it might be worthwhile
    * to add more assembly language implementations. */
 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && defined(OPENSSL_X86) && defined(__GNUC__)
   __asm__ volatile (
     "divl %4"
     : "=a"(*quotient_out), "=d"(*rem_out)
     : "a"(n1), "d"(n0), "rm"(d0)
     : "cc" );
 #elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) && defined(__GNUC__)
   __asm__ volatile (
     "divq %4"
     : "=a"(*quotient_out), "=d"(*rem_out)
     : "a"(n1), "d"(n0), "rm"(d0)
     : "cc" );
 #else
 #if defined(BN_ULLONG)
   BN_ULLONG n = (((BN_ULLONG)n0) << BN_BITS2) | n1;
   *quotient_out = (BN_ULONG)(n / d0);
 #else
   *quotient_out = bn_div_words(n0, n1, d0);
 #endif
   *rem_out = n1 - (*quotient_out * d0);
 #endif
 }

 /* BN_div computes  dv := num / divisor,  rounding towards
  * zero, and sets up rm  such that  dv*divisor + rm = num  holds.
  * Thus:
  *     dv->neg == num->neg ^ divisor->neg  (unless the result is zero)
  *     rm->neg == num->neg                 (unless the remainder is zero)
  * If 'dv' or 'rm' is NULL, the respective value is not returned.
  *
  * This was specifically designed to contain fewer branches that may leak
  * sensitive information; see "New Branch Prediction Vulnerabilities in OpenSSL
  * and Necessary Software Countermeasures" by Onur Acıçmez, Shay Gueron, and
  * Jean-Pierre Seifert. */
 int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rm, const BIGNUM *num, const BIGNUM *divisor,
            BN_CTX *ctx) {
   int norm_shift, i, loop;
   BIGNUM *tmp, wnum, *snum, *sdiv, *res;
   BN_ULONG *resp, *wnump;
   BN_ULONG d0, d1;
   int num_n, div_n;

   /* Invalid zero-padding would have particularly bad consequences
    * so don't just rely on bn_check_top() here */
   if ((num->top > 0 && num->d[num->top - 1] == 0) ||
       (divisor->top > 0 && divisor->d[divisor->top - 1] == 0)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED);
     return 0;
   }

   if (BN_is_zero(divisor)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_DIV_BY_ZERO);
     return 0;
   }

   BN_CTX_start(ctx);
   tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
   snum = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
   sdiv = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
   if (dv == NULL) {
     res = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
   } else {
     res = dv;
   }
   if (sdiv == NULL || res == NULL || tmp == NULL || snum == NULL) {
     goto err;
   }

   /* First we normalise the numbers */
   norm_shift = BN_BITS2 - ((BN_num_bits(divisor)) % BN_BITS2);
   if (!(BN_lshift(sdiv, divisor, norm_shift))) {
     goto err;
   }
   sdiv->neg = 0;
   norm_shift += BN_BITS2;
   if (!(BN_lshift(snum, num, norm_shift))) {
     goto err;
   }
   snum->neg = 0;

   /* Since we don't want to have special-case logic for the case where snum is
    * larger than sdiv, we pad snum with enough zeroes without changing its
    * value. */
   if (snum->top <= sdiv->top + 1) {
     if (bn_wexpand(snum, sdiv->top + 2) == NULL) {
       goto err;
     }
     for (i = snum->top; i < sdiv->top + 2; i++) {
       snum->d[i] = 0;
     }
     snum->top = sdiv->top + 2;
   } else {
     if (bn_wexpand(snum, snum->top + 1) == NULL) {
       goto err;
     }
     snum->d[snum->top] = 0;
     snum->top++;
   }

   div_n = sdiv->top;
   num_n = snum->top;
   loop = num_n - div_n;
   /* Lets setup a 'window' into snum
    * This is the part that corresponds to the current
    * 'area' being divided */
   wnum.neg = 0;
   wnum.d = &(snum->d[loop]);
   wnum.top = div_n;
   /* only needed when BN_ucmp messes up the values between top and max */
   wnum.dmax = snum->dmax - loop; /* so we don't step out of bounds */

   /* Get the top 2 words of sdiv */
   /* div_n=sdiv->top; */
   d0 = sdiv->d[div_n - 1];
   d1 = (div_n == 1) ? 0 : sdiv->d[div_n - 2];

   /* pointer to the 'top' of snum */
   wnump = &(snum->d[num_n - 1]);

   /* Setup to 'res' */
   res->neg = (num->neg ^ divisor->neg);
   if (!bn_wexpand(res, (loop + 1))) {
     goto err;
   }
   res->top = loop - 1;
   resp = &(res->d[loop - 1]);

   /* space for temp */
   if (!bn_wexpand(tmp, (div_n + 1))) {
     goto err;
   }

   /* if res->top == 0 then clear the neg value otherwise decrease
    * the resp pointer */
   if (res->top == 0) {
     res->neg = 0;
   } else {
     resp--;
   }

   for (i = 0; i < loop - 1; i++, wnump--, resp--) {
     BN_ULONG q, l0;
     /* the first part of the loop uses the top two words of snum and sdiv to
      * calculate a BN_ULONG q such that | wnum - sdiv * q | < sdiv */
     BN_ULONG n0, n1, rem = 0;

     n0 = wnump[0];
     n1 = wnump[-1];
     if (n0 == d0) {
       q = BN_MASK2;
     } else {
       /* n0 < d0 */
       bn_div_rem_words(&q, &rem, n0, n1, d0);

 #ifdef BN_ULLONG
       BN_ULLONG t2 = (BN_ULLONG)d1 * q;
       for (;;) {
         if (t2 <= ((((BN_ULLONG)rem) << BN_BITS2) | wnump[-2])) {
           break;
         }
         q--;
         rem += d0;
         if (rem < d0) {
           break; /* don't let rem overflow */
         }
         t2 -= d1;
       }
 #else /* !BN_ULLONG */
       BN_ULONG t2l, t2h;
       BN_UMULT_LOHI(t2l, t2h, d1, q);
       for (;;) {
         if ((t2h < rem) || ((t2h == rem) && (t2l <= wnump[-2]))) {
           break;
         }
         q--;
         rem += d0;
         if (rem < d0) {
           break; /* don't let rem overflow */
         }
         if (t2l < d1) {
           t2h--;
         }
         t2l -= d1;
       }
 #endif /* !BN_ULLONG */
     }

     l0 = bn_mul_words(tmp->d, sdiv->d, div_n, q);
     tmp->d[div_n] = l0;
     wnum.d--;
     /* ingore top values of the bignums just sub the two
      * BN_ULONG arrays with bn_sub_words */
     if (bn_sub_words(wnum.d, wnum.d, tmp->d, div_n + 1)) {
       /* Note: As we have considered only the leading
        * two BN_ULONGs in the calculation of q, sdiv * q
        * might be greater than wnum (but then (q-1) * sdiv
        * is less or equal than wnum)
        */
       q--;
       if (bn_add_words(wnum.d, wnum.d, sdiv->d, div_n)) {
         /* we can't have an overflow here (assuming
          * that q != 0, but if q == 0 then tmp is
          * zero anyway) */
         (*wnump)++;
       }
     }
     /* store part of the result */
     *resp = q;
   }
   bn_correct_top(snum);
   if (rm != NULL) {
     /* Keep a copy of the neg flag in num because if rm==num
      * BN_rshift() will overwrite it.
      */
     int neg = num->neg;
     if (!BN_rshift(rm, snum, norm_shift)) {
       goto err;
     }
     if (!BN_is_zero(rm)) {
       rm->neg = neg;
     }
   }
   bn_correct_top(res);
   BN_CTX_end(ctx);
   return 1;

 err:
   BN_CTX_end(ctx);
   return 0;
 }

 int BN_nnmod(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx) {
   if (!(BN_mod(r, m, d, ctx))) {
     return 0;
   }
   if (!r->neg) {
     return 1;
   }

   /* now -|d| < r < 0, so we have to set r := r + |d|. */
   return (d->neg ? BN_sub : BN_add)(r, r, d);
 }

 int BN_mod_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m,
                BN_CTX *ctx) {
   if (!BN_add(r, a, b)) {
     return 0;
   }
   return BN_nnmod(r, r, m, ctx);
 }

 int BN_mod_add_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
                      const BIGNUM *m) {
   if (!BN_uadd(r, a, b)) {
     return 0;
   }
   if (BN_ucmp(r, m) >= 0) {
     return BN_usub(r, r, m);
   }
   return 1;
 }

 int BN_mod_sub(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m,
                BN_CTX *ctx) {
   if (!BN_sub(r, a, b)) {
     return 0;
   }
   return BN_nnmod(r, r, m, ctx);
 }

 /* BN_mod_sub variant that may be used if both  a  and  b  are non-negative
  * and less than  m */
 int BN_mod_sub_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
                      const BIGNUM *m) {
   if (!BN_sub(r, a, b)) {
     return 0;
   }
   if (r->neg) {
     return BN_add(r, r, m);
   }
   return 1;
 }

 int BN_mod_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m,
                BN_CTX *ctx) {
   BIGNUM *t;
   int ret = 0;

   BN_CTX_start(ctx);
   t = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
   if (t == NULL) {
     goto err;
   }

   if (a == b) {
     if (!BN_sqr(t, a, ctx)) {
       goto err;
     }
   } else {
     if (!BN_mul(t, a, b, ctx)) {
       goto err;
     }
   }

   if (!BN_nnmod(r, t, m, ctx)) {
     goto err;
   }

   ret = 1;

 err:
   BN_CTX_end(ctx);
   return ret;
 }

 int BN_mod_sqr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) {
   if (!BN_sqr(r, a, ctx)) {
     return 0;
   }

   /* r->neg == 0,  thus we don't need BN_nnmod */
   return BN_mod(r, r, m, ctx);
 }

 int BN_mod_lshift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n, const BIGNUM *m,
                   BN_CTX *ctx) {
   BIGNUM *abs_m = NULL;
   int ret;

   if (!BN_nnmod(r, a, m, ctx)) {
     return 0;
   }

   if (m->neg) {
     abs_m = BN_dup(m);
     if (abs_m == NULL) {
       return 0;
     }
     abs_m->neg = 0;
   }

   ret = BN_mod_lshift_quick(r, r, n, (abs_m ? abs_m : m));

   BN_free(abs_m);
   return ret;
 }

 int BN_mod_lshift_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n, const BIGNUM *m) {
   if (r != a) {
     if (BN_copy(r, a) == NULL) {
       return 0;
     }
   }

   while (n > 0) {
     int max_shift;

     /* 0 < r < m */
     max_shift = BN_num_bits(m) - BN_num_bits(r);
     /* max_shift >= 0 */

     if (max_shift < 0) {
       OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_INPUT_NOT_REDUCED);
       return 0;
     }

     if (max_shift > n) {
       max_shift = n;
     }

     if (max_shift) {
       if (!BN_lshift(r, r, max_shift)) {
         return 0;
       }
       n -= max_shift;
     } else {
       if (!BN_lshift1(r, r)) {
         return 0;
       }
       --n;
     }

     /* BN_num_bits(r) <= BN_num_bits(m) */
     if (BN_cmp(r, m) >= 0) {
       if (!BN_sub(r, r, m)) {
         return 0;
       }
     }
   }

   return 1;
 }

 int BN_mod_lshift1(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) {
   if (!BN_lshift1(r, a)) {
     return 0;
   }

   return BN_nnmod(r, r, m, ctx);
 }

 int BN_mod_lshift1_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m) {
   if (!BN_lshift1(r, a)) {
     return 0;
   }
   if (BN_cmp(r, m) >= 0) {
     return BN_sub(r, r, m);
   }

   return 1;
 }

 BN_ULONG BN_div_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w) {
   BN_ULONG ret = 0;
   int i, j;

   w &= BN_MASK2;

   if (!w) {
     /* actually this an error (division by zero) */
     return (BN_ULONG) - 1;
   }

   if (a->top == 0) {
     return 0;
   }

   /* normalize input for |bn_div_rem_words|. */
   j = BN_BITS2 - BN_num_bits_word(w);
   w <<= j;
   if (!BN_lshift(a, a, j)) {
     return (BN_ULONG) - 1;
   }

   for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
     BN_ULONG l = a->d[i];
     BN_ULONG d;
     BN_ULONG unused_rem;
     bn_div_rem_words(&d, &unused_rem, ret, l, w);
     ret = (l - ((d * w) & BN_MASK2)) & BN_MASK2;
     a->d[i] = d;
   }

   if ((a->top > 0) && (a->d[a->top - 1] == 0)) {
     a->top--;
   }

   if (a->top == 0) {
     a->neg = 0;
   }

   ret >>= j;
   return ret;
 }

 BN_ULONG BN_mod_word(const BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w) {
 #ifndef BN_ULLONG
   BN_ULONG ret = 0;
 #else
   BN_ULLONG ret = 0;
 #endif
   int i;

   if (w == 0) {
     return (BN_ULONG) -1;
   }

 #ifndef BN_ULLONG
   /* If |w| is too long and we don't have |BN_ULLONG| then we need to fall back
    * to using |BN_div_word|. */
   if (w > ((BN_ULONG)1 << BN_BITS4)) {
     BIGNUM *tmp = BN_dup(a);
     if (tmp == NULL) {
       return (BN_ULONG)-1;
     }
     ret = BN_div_word(tmp, w);
     BN_free(tmp);
     return ret;
   }
 #endif

   w &= BN_MASK2;
   for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
 #ifndef BN_ULLONG
     ret = ((ret << BN_BITS4) | ((a->d[i] >> BN_BITS4) & BN_MASK2l)) % w;
     ret = ((ret << BN_BITS4) | (a->d[i] & BN_MASK2l)) % w;
 #else
     ret = (BN_ULLONG)(((ret << (BN_ULLONG)BN_BITS2) | a->d[i]) % (BN_ULLONG)w);
 #endif
   }
   return (BN_ULONG)ret;
 }

 int BN_mod_pow2(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, size_t e) {
   if (e == 0 || a->top == 0) {
     BN_zero(r);
     return 1;
   }

   size_t num_words = 1 + ((e - 1) / BN_BITS2);

   /* If |a| definitely has less than |e| bits, just BN_copy. */
   if ((size_t) a->top < num_words) {
     return BN_copy(r, a) != NULL;
   }

   /* Otherwise, first make sure we have enough space in |r|.
    * Note that this will fail if num_words > INT_MAX. */
   if (bn_wexpand(r, num_words) == NULL) {
     return 0;
   }

   /* Copy the content of |a| into |r|. */
   OPENSSL_memcpy(r->d, a->d, num_words * sizeof(BN_ULONG));

   /* If |e| isn't word-aligned, we have to mask off some of our bits. */
   size_t top_word_exponent = e % (sizeof(BN_ULONG) * 8);
   if (top_word_exponent != 0) {
     r->d[num_words - 1] &= (((BN_ULONG) 1) << top_word_exponent) - 1;
   }

   /* Fill in the remaining fields of |r|. */
   r->neg = a->neg;
   r->top = (int) num_words;
   bn_correct_top(r);
   return 1;
 }

 int BN_nnmod_pow2(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, size_t e) {
   if (!BN_mod_pow2(r, a, e)) {
     return 0;
   }

   /* If the returned value was non-negative, we're done. */
   if (BN_is_zero(r) || !r->neg) {
     return 1;
   }

   size_t num_words = 1 + (e - 1) / BN_BITS2;

   /* Expand |r| to the size of our modulus. */
   if (bn_wexpand(r, num_words) == NULL) {
     return 0;
   }

   /* Clear the upper words of |r|. */
   OPENSSL_memset(&r->d[r->top], 0, (num_words - r->top) * BN_BYTES);

   /* Set parameters of |r|. */
   r->neg = 0;
   r->top = (int) num_words;

   /* Now, invert every word. The idea here is that we want to compute 2^e-|x|,
    * which is actually equivalent to the twos-complement representation of |x|
    * in |e| bits, which is -x = ~x + 1. */
   for (int i = 0; i < r->top; i++) {
     r->d[i] = ~r->d[i];
   }

   /* If our exponent doesn't span the top word, we have to mask the rest. */
   size_t top_word_exponent = e % BN_BITS2;
   if (top_word_exponent != 0) {
     r->d[r->top - 1] &= (((BN_ULONG) 1) << top_word_exponent) - 1;
   }

   /* Keep the correct_top invariant for BN_add. */
   bn_correct_top(r);

   /* Finally, add one, for the reason described above. */
   return BN_add(r, r, BN_value_one());
 }
	/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
	* All rights reserved.
	*
	* This package is an SSL implementation written
	* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
	* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
	*
	* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
	* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
	* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
	* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
	* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
	* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
	*
	* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
	* the code are not to be removed.
	* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
	* as the author of the parts of the library used.
	* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
	* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
	*
	* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
	* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
	* are met:
	* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
	* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
	* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
	* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
	* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
	* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
	* must display the following acknowledgement:
	* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
	* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
	* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
	* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
	* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
	* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
	* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
	*
	* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
	* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
	* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
	* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
	* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
	* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
	* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
	* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
	* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
	* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
	* SUCH DAMAGE.
	*
	* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
	* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
	* copied and put under another distribution licence
	* [including the GNU Public Licence.] */

	#include <openssl/bn.h>

	#include <assert.h>
	#include <limits.h>

	#include <openssl/err.h>

	#include "internal.h"


	#if !defined(BN_ULLONG)
	/* bn_div_words divides a double-width \|h\|,\|l\| by \|d\| and returns the result,
	* which must fit in a \|BN_ULONG\|. */
	static BN_ULONG bn_div_words(BN_ULONG h, BN_ULONG l, BN_ULONG d) {
	BN_ULONG dh, dl, q, ret = 0, th, tl, t;
	int i, count = 2;

	if (d == 0) {
	return BN_MASK2;
	}

	i = BN_num_bits_word(d);
	assert((i == BN_BITS2) \|\| (h <= (BN_ULONG)1 << i));

	i = BN_BITS2 - i;
	if (h >= d) {
	h -= d;
	}

	if (i) {
	d <<= i;
	h = (h << i) \| (l >> (BN_BITS2 - i));
	l <<= i;
	}
	dh = (d & BN_MASK2h) >> BN_BITS4;
	dl = (d & BN_MASK2l);
	for (;;) {
	if ((h >> BN_BITS4) == dh) {
	q = BN_MASK2l;
	} else {
	q = h / dh;
	}

	th = q * dh;
	tl = dl * q;
	for (;;) {
	t = h - th;
	if ((t & BN_MASK2h) \|\|
	((tl) <= ((t << BN_BITS4) \| ((l & BN_MASK2h) >> BN_BITS4)))) {
	break;
	}
	q--;
	th -= dh;
	tl -= dl;
	}
	t = (tl >> BN_BITS4);
	tl = (tl << BN_BITS4) & BN_MASK2h;
	th += t;

	if (l < tl) {
	th++;
	}
	l -= tl;
	if (h < th) {
	h += d;
	q--;
	}
	h -= th;

	if (--count == 0) {
	break;
	}

	ret = q << BN_BITS4;
	h = ((h << BN_BITS4) \| (l >> BN_BITS4)) & BN_MASK2;
	l = (l & BN_MASK2l) << BN_BITS4;
	}

	ret \|= q;
	return ret;
	}
	#endif /* !defined(BN_ULLONG) */

	static inline void bn_div_rem_words(BN_ULONG quotient_out, BN_ULONG rem_out,
	BN_ULONG n0, BN_ULONG n1, BN_ULONG d0) {
	/* GCC and Clang generate function calls to \|__udivdi3\| and \|__umoddi3\| when
	* the \|BN_ULLONG\|-based C code is used.
	*
	* GCC bugs:
	* * https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=14224
	* * https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=43721
	* * https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=54183
	* * https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58897
	* * https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=65668
	*
	* Clang bugs:
	* * https://llvm.org/bugs/show_bug.cgi?id=6397
	* * https://llvm.org/bugs/show_bug.cgi?id=12418
	*
	* These issues aren't specific to x86 and x86_64, so it might be worthwhile
	* to add more assembly language implementations. */
	#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && defined(OPENSSL_X86) && defined(__GNUC__)
	__asm__ volatile (
	"divl %4"
	: "=a"(quotient_out), "=d"(rem_out)
	: "a"(n1), "d"(n0), "rm"(d0)
	: "cc" );
	#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) && defined(__GNUC__)
	__asm__ volatile (
	"divq %4"
	: "=a"(quotient_out), "=d"(rem_out)
	: "a"(n1), "d"(n0), "rm"(d0)
	: "cc" );
	#else
	#if defined(BN_ULLONG)
	BN_ULLONG n = (((BN_ULLONG)n0) << BN_BITS2) \| n1;
	*quotient_out = (BN_ULONG)(n / d0);
	#else
	*quotient_out = bn_div_words(n0, n1, d0);
	#endif
	rem_out = n1 - (quotient_out * d0);
	#endif
	}

	/* BN_div computes dv := num / divisor, rounding towards
	* zero, and sets up rm such that dv*divisor + rm = num holds.
	* Thus:
	* dv->neg == num->neg ^ divisor->neg (unless the result is zero)
	* rm->neg == num->neg (unless the remainder is zero)
	* If 'dv' or 'rm' is NULL, the respective value is not returned.
	*
	* This was specifically designed to contain fewer branches that may leak
	* sensitive information; see "New Branch Prediction Vulnerabilities in OpenSSL
	* and Necessary Software Countermeasures" by Onur Acıçmez, Shay Gueron, and
	* Jean-Pierre Seifert. */
	int BN_div(BIGNUM dv, BIGNUM rm, const BIGNUM num, const BIGNUM divisor,
	BN_CTX *ctx) {
	int norm_shift, i, loop;
	BIGNUM tmp, wnum, snum, sdiv, res;
	BN_ULONG resp, wnump;
	BN_ULONG d0, d1;
	int num_n, div_n;

	/* Invalid zero-padding would have particularly bad consequences
	* so don't just rely on bn_check_top() here */
	if ((num->top > 0 && num->d[num->top - 1] == 0) \|\|
	(divisor->top > 0 && divisor->d[divisor->top - 1] == 0)) {
	OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED);
	return 0;
	}

	if (BN_is_zero(divisor)) {
	OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_DIV_BY_ZERO);
	return 0;
	}

	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
	tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
	snum = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
	sdiv = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
	if (dv == NULL) {
	res = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
	} else {
	res = dv;
	}
	if (sdiv == NULL \|\| res == NULL \|\| tmp == NULL \|\| snum == NULL) {
	goto err;
	}

	/* First we normalise the numbers */
	norm_shift = BN_BITS2 - ((BN_num_bits(divisor)) % BN_BITS2);
	if (!(BN_lshift(sdiv, divisor, norm_shift))) {
	goto err;
	}
	sdiv->neg = 0;
	norm_shift += BN_BITS2;
	if (!(BN_lshift(snum, num, norm_shift))) {
	goto err;
	}
	snum->neg = 0;

	/* Since we don't want to have special-case logic for the case where snum is
	* larger than sdiv, we pad snum with enough zeroes without changing its
	* value. */
	if (snum->top <= sdiv->top + 1) {
	if (bn_wexpand(snum, sdiv->top + 2) == NULL) {
	goto err;
	}
	for (i = snum->top; i < sdiv->top + 2; i++) {
	snum->d[i] = 0;
	}
	snum->top = sdiv->top + 2;
	} else {
	if (bn_wexpand(snum, snum->top + 1) == NULL) {
	goto err;
	}
	snum->d[snum->top] = 0;
	snum->top++;
	}

	div_n = sdiv->top;
	num_n = snum->top;
	loop = num_n - div_n;
	/* Lets setup a 'window' into snum
	* This is the part that corresponds to the current
	* 'area' being divided */
	wnum.neg = 0;
	wnum.d = &(snum->d[loop]);
	wnum.top = div_n;
	/* only needed when BN_ucmp messes up the values between top and max */
	wnum.dmax = snum->dmax - loop; /* so we don't step out of bounds */

	/* Get the top 2 words of sdiv */
	/* div_n=sdiv->top; */
	d0 = sdiv->d[div_n - 1];
	d1 = (div_n == 1) ? 0 : sdiv->d[div_n - 2];

	/* pointer to the 'top' of snum */
	wnump = &(snum->d[num_n - 1]);

	/* Setup to 'res' */
	res->neg = (num->neg ^ divisor->neg);
	if (!bn_wexpand(res, (loop + 1))) {
	goto err;
	}
	res->top = loop - 1;
	resp = &(res->d[loop - 1]);

	/* space for temp */
	if (!bn_wexpand(tmp, (div_n + 1))) {
	goto err;
	}

	/* if res->top == 0 then clear the neg value otherwise decrease
	* the resp pointer */
	if (res->top == 0) {
	res->neg = 0;
	} else {
	resp--;
	}

	for (i = 0; i < loop - 1; i++, wnump--, resp--) {
	BN_ULONG q, l0;
	/* the first part of the loop uses the top two words of snum and sdiv to
	* calculate a BN_ULONG q such that \| wnum - sdiv * q \| < sdiv */
	BN_ULONG n0, n1, rem = 0;

	n0 = wnump[0];
	n1 = wnump[-1];
	if (n0 == d0) {
	q = BN_MASK2;
	} else {
	/* n0 < d0 */
	bn_div_rem_words(&q, &rem, n0, n1, d0);

	#ifdef BN_ULLONG
	BN_ULLONG t2 = (BN_ULLONG)d1 * q;
	for (;;) {
	if (t2 <= ((((BN_ULLONG)rem) << BN_BITS2) \| wnump[-2])) {
	break;
	}
	q--;
	rem += d0;
	if (rem < d0) {
	break; /* don't let rem overflow */
	}
	t2 -= d1;
	}
	#else /* !BN_ULLONG */
	BN_ULONG t2l, t2h;
	BN_UMULT_LOHI(t2l, t2h, d1, q);
	for (;;) {
	if ((t2h < rem) \|\| ((t2h == rem) && (t2l <= wnump[-2]))) {
	break;
	}
	q--;
	rem += d0;
	if (rem < d0) {
	break; /* don't let rem overflow */
	}
	if (t2l < d1) {
	t2h--;
	}
	t2l -= d1;
	}
	#endif /* !BN_ULLONG */
	}

	l0 = bn_mul_words(tmp->d, sdiv->d, div_n, q);
	tmp->d[div_n] = l0;
	wnum.d--;
	/* ingore top values of the bignums just sub the two
	* BN_ULONG arrays with bn_sub_words */
	if (bn_sub_words(wnum.d, wnum.d, tmp->d, div_n + 1)) {
	/* Note: As we have considered only the leading
	* two BN_ULONGs in the calculation of q, sdiv * q
	* might be greater than wnum (but then (q-1) * sdiv
	* is less or equal than wnum)
	*/
	q--;
	if (bn_add_words(wnum.d, wnum.d, sdiv->d, div_n)) {
	/* we can't have an overflow here (assuming
	* that q != 0, but if q == 0 then tmp is
	* zero anyway) */
	(*wnump)++;
	}
	}
	/* store part of the result */
	*resp = q;
	}
	bn_correct_top(snum);
	if (rm != NULL) {
	/* Keep a copy of the neg flag in num because if rm==num
	* BN_rshift() will overwrite it.
	*/
	int neg = num->neg;
	if (!BN_rshift(rm, snum, norm_shift)) {
	goto err;
	}
	if (!BN_is_zero(rm)) {
	rm->neg = neg;
	}
	}
	bn_correct_top(res);
	BN_CTX_end(ctx);
	return 1;

	err:
	BN_CTX_end(ctx);
	return 0;
	}

	int BN_nnmod(BIGNUM r, const BIGNUM m, const BIGNUM d, BN_CTX ctx) {
	if (!(BN_mod(r, m, d, ctx))) {
	return 0;
	}
	if (!r->neg) {
	return 1;
	}

	/* now -\|d\| < r < 0, so we have to set r := r + \|d\|. */
	return (d->neg ? BN_sub : BN_add)(r, r, d);
	}

	int BN_mod_add(BIGNUM r, const BIGNUM a, const BIGNUM b, const BIGNUM m,
	BN_CTX *ctx) {
	if (!BN_add(r, a, b)) {
	return 0;
	}
	return BN_nnmod(r, r, m, ctx);
	}

	int BN_mod_add_quick(BIGNUM r, const BIGNUM a, const BIGNUM *b,
	const BIGNUM *m) {
	if (!BN_uadd(r, a, b)) {
	return 0;
	}
	if (BN_ucmp(r, m) >= 0) {
	return BN_usub(r, r, m);
	}
	return 1;
	}

	int BN_mod_sub(BIGNUM r, const BIGNUM a, const BIGNUM b, const BIGNUM m,
	BN_CTX *ctx) {
	if (!BN_sub(r, a, b)) {
	return 0;
	}
	return BN_nnmod(r, r, m, ctx);
	}

	/* BN_mod_sub variant that may be used if both a and b are non-negative
	* and less than m */
	int BN_mod_sub_quick(BIGNUM r, const BIGNUM a, const BIGNUM *b,
	const BIGNUM *m) {
	if (!BN_sub(r, a, b)) {
	return 0;
	}
	if (r->neg) {
	return BN_add(r, r, m);
	}
	return 1;
	}

	int BN_mod_mul(BIGNUM r, const BIGNUM a, const BIGNUM b, const BIGNUM m,
	BN_CTX *ctx) {
	BIGNUM *t;
	int ret = 0;

	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
	t = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
	if (t == NULL) {
	goto err;
	}

	if (a == b) {
	if (!BN_sqr(t, a, ctx)) {
	goto err;
	}
	} else {
	if (!BN_mul(t, a, b, ctx)) {
	goto err;
	}
	}

	if (!BN_nnmod(r, t, m, ctx)) {
	goto err;
	}

	ret = 1;

	err:
	BN_CTX_end(ctx);
	return ret;
	}

	int BN_mod_sqr(BIGNUM r, const BIGNUM a, const BIGNUM m, BN_CTX ctx) {
	if (!BN_sqr(r, a, ctx)) {
	return 0;
	}

	/* r->neg == 0, thus we don't need BN_nnmod */
	return BN_mod(r, r, m, ctx);
	}

	int BN_mod_lshift(BIGNUM r, const BIGNUM a, int n, const BIGNUM *m,
	BN_CTX *ctx) {
	BIGNUM *abs_m = NULL;
	int ret;

	if (!BN_nnmod(r, a, m, ctx)) {
	return 0;
	}

	if (m->neg) {
	abs_m = BN_dup(m);
	if (abs_m == NULL) {
	return 0;
	}
	abs_m->neg = 0;
	}

	ret = BN_mod_lshift_quick(r, r, n, (abs_m ? abs_m : m));

	BN_free(abs_m);
	return ret;
	}

	int BN_mod_lshift_quick(BIGNUM r, const BIGNUM a, int n, const BIGNUM *m) {
	if (r != a) {
	if (BN_copy(r, a) == NULL) {
	return 0;
	}
	}

	while (n > 0) {
	int max_shift;

	/* 0 < r < m */
	max_shift = BN_num_bits(m) - BN_num_bits(r);
	/* max_shift >= 0 */

	if (max_shift < 0) {
	OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_INPUT_NOT_REDUCED);
	return 0;
	}

	if (max_shift > n) {
	max_shift = n;
	}

	if (max_shift) {
	if (!BN_lshift(r, r, max_shift)) {
	return 0;
	}
	n -= max_shift;
	} else {
	if (!BN_lshift1(r, r)) {
	return 0;
	}
	--n;
	}

	/* BN_num_bits(r) <= BN_num_bits(m) */
	if (BN_cmp(r, m) >= 0) {
	if (!BN_sub(r, r, m)) {
	return 0;
	}
	}
	}

	return 1;
	}

	int BN_mod_lshift1(BIGNUM r, const BIGNUM a, const BIGNUM m, BN_CTX ctx) {
	if (!BN_lshift1(r, a)) {
	return 0;
	}

	return BN_nnmod(r, r, m, ctx);
	}

	int BN_mod_lshift1_quick(BIGNUM r, const BIGNUM a, const BIGNUM *m) {
	if (!BN_lshift1(r, a)) {
	return 0;
	}
	if (BN_cmp(r, m) >= 0) {
	return BN_sub(r, r, m);
	}

	return 1;
	}

	BN_ULONG BN_div_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w) {
	BN_ULONG ret = 0;
	int i, j;

	w &= BN_MASK2;

	if (!w) {
	/* actually this an error (division by zero) */
	return (BN_ULONG) - 1;
	}

	if (a->top == 0) {
	return 0;
	}

	/* normalize input for \|bn_div_rem_words\|. */
	j = BN_BITS2 - BN_num_bits_word(w);
	w <<= j;
	if (!BN_lshift(a, a, j)) {
	return (BN_ULONG) - 1;
	}

	for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
	BN_ULONG l = a->d[i];
	BN_ULONG d;
	BN_ULONG unused_rem;
	bn_div_rem_words(&d, &unused_rem, ret, l, w);
	ret = (l - ((d * w) & BN_MASK2)) & BN_MASK2;
	a->d[i] = d;
	}

	if ((a->top > 0) && (a->d[a->top - 1] == 0)) {
	a->top--;
	}

	if (a->top == 0) {
	a->neg = 0;
	}

	ret >>= j;
	return ret;
	}

	BN_ULONG BN_mod_word(const BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w) {
	#ifndef BN_ULLONG
	BN_ULONG ret = 0;
	#else
	BN_ULLONG ret = 0;
	#endif
	int i;

	if (w == 0) {
	return (BN_ULONG) -1;
	}

	#ifndef BN_ULLONG
	/* If \|w\| is too long and we don't have \|BN_ULLONG\| then we need to fall back
	* to using \|BN_div_word\|. */
	if (w > ((BN_ULONG)1 << BN_BITS4)) {
	BIGNUM *tmp = BN_dup(a);
	if (tmp == NULL) {
	return (BN_ULONG)-1;
	}
	ret = BN_div_word(tmp, w);
	BN_free(tmp);
	return ret;
	}
	#endif

	w &= BN_MASK2;
	for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
	#ifndef BN_ULLONG
	ret = ((ret << BN_BITS4) \| ((a->d[i] >> BN_BITS4) & BN_MASK2l)) % w;
	ret = ((ret << BN_BITS4) \| (a->d[i] & BN_MASK2l)) % w;
	#else
	ret = (BN_ULLONG)(((ret << (BN_ULLONG)BN_BITS2) \| a->d[i]) % (BN_ULLONG)w);
	#endif
	}
	return (BN_ULONG)ret;
	}

	int BN_mod_pow2(BIGNUM r, const BIGNUM a, size_t e) {
	if (e == 0 \|\| a->top == 0) {
	BN_zero(r);
	return 1;
	}

	size_t num_words = 1 + ((e - 1) / BN_BITS2);

	/* If \|a\| definitely has less than \|e\| bits, just BN_copy. */
	if ((size_t) a->top < num_words) {
	return BN_copy(r, a) != NULL;
	}

	/* Otherwise, first make sure we have enough space in \|r\|.
	* Note that this will fail if num_words > INT_MAX. */
	if (bn_wexpand(r, num_words) == NULL) {
	return 0;
	}

	/* Copy the content of \|a\| into \|r\|. */
	OPENSSL_memcpy(r->d, a->d, num_words * sizeof(BN_ULONG));

	/* If \|e\| isn't word-aligned, we have to mask off some of our bits. */
	size_t top_word_exponent = e % (sizeof(BN_ULONG) * 8);
	if (top_word_exponent != 0) {
	r->d[num_words - 1] &= (((BN_ULONG) 1) << top_word_exponent) - 1;
	}

	/* Fill in the remaining fields of \|r\|. */
	r->neg = a->neg;
	r->top = (int) num_words;
	bn_correct_top(r);
	return 1;
	}

	int BN_nnmod_pow2(BIGNUM r, const BIGNUM a, size_t e) {
	if (!BN_mod_pow2(r, a, e)) {
	return 0;
	}

	/* If the returned value was non-negative, we're done. */
	if (BN_is_zero(r) \|\| !r->neg) {
	return 1;
	}

	size_t num_words = 1 + (e - 1) / BN_BITS2;

	/* Expand \|r\| to the size of our modulus. */
	if (bn_wexpand(r, num_words) == NULL) {
	return 0;
	}

	/* Clear the upper words of \|r\|. */
	OPENSSL_memset(&r->d[r->top], 0, (num_words - r->top) * BN_BYTES);

	/* Set parameters of \|r\|. */
	r->neg = 0;
	r->top = (int) num_words;

	/* Now, invert every word. The idea here is that we want to compute 2^e-\|x\|,
	* which is actually equivalent to the twos-complement representation of \|x\|
	* in \|e\| bits, which is -x = ~x + 1. */
	for (int i = 0; i < r->top; i++) {
	r->d[i] = ~r->d[i];
	}

	/* If our exponent doesn't span the top word, we have to mask the rest. */
	size_t top_word_exponent = e % BN_BITS2;
	if (top_word_exponent != 0) {
	r->d[r->top - 1] &= (((BN_ULONG) 1) << top_word_exponent) - 1;
	}

	/* Keep the correct_top invariant for BN_add. */
	bn_correct_top(r);

	/* Finally, add one, for the reason described above. */
	return BN_add(r, r, BN_value_one());
	}