blob: 0978a5d139a43705c10890b7c2d9883ab371b4cb [file] [log] [blame]
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */
#include <assert.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/buf.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
#include <openssl/obj.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/sha.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include "internal.h"
/* ssl3_do_write sends |s->init_buf| in records of type 'type'
* (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC). It returns -1 on error, 1
* on success or zero if the transmission is still incomplete. */
int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) {
int n;
n = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], s->init_num);
if (n < 0) {
return -1;
}
if (n == s->init_num) {
if (s->msg_callback) {
s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
(size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
s->msg_callback_arg);
}
return 1;
}
s->init_off += n;
s->init_num -= n;
return 0;
}
int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen) {
uint8_t *p;
int n;
if (s->state == a) {
p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
n = s->enc_method->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen, s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
if (n == 0) {
return 0;
}
s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = n;
memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, n);
/* Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. */
if (!ssl_ctx_log_master_secret(s->ctx, s->s3->client_random,
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->session->master_key,
s->session->master_key_length)) {
return 0;
}
/* Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks */
if (s->server) {
assert(n <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, n);
s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = n;
} else {
assert(n <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, n);
s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = n;
}
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, n)) {
return 0;
}
s->state = b;
}
/* SSL3_ST_SEND_xxxxxx_HELLO_B */
return ssl_do_write(s);
}
/* ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
* so far. */
static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) {
const char *sender;
int slen;
/* If no new cipher setup then return immediately: other functions will set
* the appropriate error. */
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
return;
}
if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) {
sender = s->enc_method->server_finished_label;
slen = s->enc_method->server_finished_label_len;
} else {
sender = s->enc_method->client_finished_label;
slen = s->enc_method->client_finished_label_len;
}
s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->enc_method->final_finish_mac(
s, sender, slen, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
}
int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b) {
int al, finished_len, ok;
long message_len;
uint8_t *p;
message_len =
s->method->ssl_get_message(s, a, b, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE,
ssl_dont_hash_message, &ok);
if (!ok) {
return message_len;
}
/* Snapshot the finished hash before incorporating the new message. */
ssl3_take_mac(s);
if (!ssl3_hash_current_message(s)) {
goto err;
}
/* If this occurs, we have missed a message.
* TODO(davidben): Is this check now redundant with SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS? */
if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
p = s->init_msg;
finished_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
if (finished_len != message_len) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(p, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, finished_len) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
goto f_err;
}
/* Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks */
if (s->server) {
assert(finished_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, finished_len);
s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finished_len;
} else {
assert(finished_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, finished_len);
s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finished_len;
}
return 1;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
return 0;
}
/* for these 2 messages, we need to
* ssl->enc_read_ctx re-init
* ssl->s3->read_sequence zero
* ssl->s3->read_mac_secret re-init
* ssl->session->read_sym_enc assign
* ssl->session->read_compression assign
* ssl->session->read_hash assign */
int ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b) {
if (s->state == a) {
*((uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data) = SSL3_MT_CCS;
s->init_num = 1;
s->init_off = 0;
s->state = b;
}
/* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */
return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
}
int ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s) {
uint8_t *p;
unsigned long l = 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s);
if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, &l)) {
return 0;
}
l -= 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s);
p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
l2n3(l, p);
l += 3;
return ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, l);
}
/* Obtain handshake message of message type |msg_type| (any if |msg_type| == -1),
* maximum acceptable body length |max|. The first four bytes (msg_type and
* length) are read in state |header_state|, the body is read in state |body_state|. */
long ssl3_get_message(SSL *s, int header_state, int body_state, int msg_type,
long max, enum ssl_hash_message_t hash_message, int *ok) {
uint8_t *p;
unsigned long l;
long n;
int al;
if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message) {
/* A ssl_dont_hash_message call cannot be combined with reuse_message; the
* ssl_dont_hash_message would have to have been applied to the previous
* call. */
assert(hash_message == ssl_hash_message);
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 0;
if (msg_type >= 0 && s->s3->tmp.message_type != msg_type) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
*ok = 1;
s->state = body_state;
s->init_msg = (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data + 4;
s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size;
return s->init_num;
}
p = (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data;
if (s->state == header_state) {
assert(s->init_num < 4);
for (;;) {
while (s->init_num < 4) {
int bytes_read = ssl3_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &p[s->init_num],
4 - s->init_num, 0);
if (bytes_read <= 0) {
*ok = 0;
return bytes_read;
}
s->init_num += bytes_read;
}
static const uint8_t kHelloRequest[4] = {SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0, 0, 0};
if (s->server || memcmp(p, kHelloRequest, sizeof(kHelloRequest)) != 0) {
break;
}
/* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- we are doing
* a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if their format is correct.
* Does not count for 'Finished' MAC. */
s->init_num = 0;
if (s->msg_callback) {
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, p, 4, s,
s->msg_callback_arg);
}
}
/* s->init_num == 4 */
if (msg_type >= 0 && *p != msg_type) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++);
n2l3(p, l);
if (l > (unsigned long)max) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
goto f_err;
}
if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, l + 4)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto err;
}
s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
s->state = body_state;
s->init_msg = (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data + 4;
s->init_num = 0;
}
/* next state (body_state) */
p = s->init_msg;
n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
while (n > 0) {
int bytes_read = ssl3_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &p[s->init_num], n,
0);
if (bytes_read <= 0) {
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
*ok = 0;
return bytes_read;
}
s->init_num += bytes_read;
n -= bytes_read;
}
/* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
if (hash_message == ssl_hash_message && !ssl3_hash_current_message(s)) {
goto err;
}
if (s->msg_callback) {
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
(size_t)s->init_num + 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
}
*ok = 1;
return s->init_num;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
*ok = 0;
return -1;
}
int ssl3_hash_current_message(SSL *s) {
/* The handshake header (different size between DTLS and TLS) is included in
* the hash. */
size_t header_len = s->init_msg - (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data;
return ssl3_update_handshake_hash(s, (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data,
s->init_num + header_len);
}
/* ssl3_cert_verify_hash is documented as needing EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE because that
* is sufficient pre-TLS1.2 as well. */
OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE > MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
combined_tls_hash_fits_in_max);
int ssl3_cert_verify_hash(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
const EVP_MD **out_md, int pkey_type) {
/* For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using
* agreed digest and cached handshake records. Otherwise, use
* SHA1 or MD5 + SHA1 depending on key type. */
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
unsigned len;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&mctx, *out_md, NULL) ||
!EVP_DigestUpdate(&mctx, s->s3->handshake_buffer->data,
s->s3->handshake_buffer->length) ||
!EVP_DigestFinal(&mctx, out, &len)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
return 0;
}
*out_len = len;
} else if (pkey_type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
if (s->enc_method->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, out) == 0 ||
s->enc_method->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_sha1, out + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) ==
0) {
return 0;
}
*out_len = MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
*out_md = EVP_md5_sha1();
} else if (pkey_type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
if (s->enc_method->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_sha1, out) == 0) {
return 0;
}
*out_len = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
*out_md = EVP_sha1();
} else {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) {
int al;
switch (type) {
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
break;
default:
al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
break;
}
return al;
}
int ssl_fill_hello_random(uint8_t *out, size_t len, int is_server) {
if (is_server) {
const uint32_t current_time = time(NULL);
uint8_t *p = out;
if (len < 4) {
return 0;
}
p[0] = current_time >> 24;
p[1] = current_time >> 16;
p[2] = current_time >> 8;
p[3] = current_time;
return RAND_bytes(p + 4, len - 4);
} else {
return RAND_bytes(out, len);
}
}