Remove s->renegotiate check in SSL_clear.
This dates back to upstream's a2a0158959e597188c10fbfeaf61888b2df2e587.
It seems to be a remnant of those SSL_clear calls in the handshake state
machine which... were also bizarre and since gone.
Since SSL_clear is to drop the current connection but retain the
configuration, it doesn't really make sense to forbid it while you're
mid-handshake.
This removes another consumer of s->renegotiate.
BUG=429450
Change-Id: Ifac6bf11644447fd5571262bed7421684739bc39
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4823
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index a93134d..e53d12c 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -181,11 +181,6 @@
ssl->hit = 0;
ssl->shutdown = 0;
- if (ssl->renegotiate) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_clear, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
/* SSL_clear may be called before or after the |ssl| is initialized in either
* accept or connect state. In the latter case, SSL_clear should preserve the
* half and reset |ssl->state| accordingly. */
@@ -199,7 +194,7 @@
assert(ssl->state == 0);
}
- /* TODO(davidben): Some state on |s| is reset both in |SSL_new| and
+ /* TODO(davidben): Some state on |ssl| is reset both in |SSL_new| and
* |SSL_clear| because it is per-connection state rather than configuration
* state. Per-connection state should be on |ssl->s3| and |ssl->d1| so it is
* naturally reset at the right points between |SSL_new|, |SSL_clear|, and
