| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
| * All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
| * |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
| * the code are not to be removed. |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ |
| |
| #include <ctype.h> |
| #include <string.h> |
| #include <time.h> |
| |
| #include <openssl/asn1.h> |
| #include <openssl/err.h> |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> |
| #include <openssl/obj.h> |
| #include <openssl/thread.h> |
| #include <openssl/x509.h> |
| #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
| |
| #include "vpm_int.h" |
| #include "../internal.h" |
| #include "../x509v3/internal.h" |
| |
| static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class = |
| CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA; |
| |
| /* CRL score values */ |
| |
| /* No unhandled critical extensions */ |
| |
| #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100 |
| |
| /* certificate is within CRL scope */ |
| |
| #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080 |
| |
| /* CRL times valid */ |
| |
| #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040 |
| |
| /* Issuer name matches certificate */ |
| |
| #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020 |
| |
| /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */ |
| |
| #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) |
| |
| /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */ |
| |
| #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018 |
| |
| /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */ |
| |
| #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008 |
| |
| /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */ |
| |
| #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004 |
| |
| /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */ |
| |
| #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002 |
| |
| static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e); |
| static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); |
| static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x); |
| static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
| static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
| static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
| static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
| static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
| static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
| static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
| |
| static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, |
| unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x); |
| static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
| X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x); |
| static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, |
| int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base, |
| STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls); |
| static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer, |
| int *pcrl_score); |
| static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, |
| unsigned int *preasons); |
| static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); |
| static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
| STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, |
| STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path); |
| |
| static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
| |
| static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) |
| { |
| return ok; |
| } |
| |
| /* cert_self_signed checks if |x| is self-signed. If |x| is valid, it returns |
| * one and sets |*out_is_self_signed| to the result. If |x| is invalid, it |
| * returns zero. */ |
| static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x, int *out_is_self_signed) |
| { |
| if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| *out_is_self_signed = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) != 0; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */ |
| |
| static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
| { |
| STACK_OF(X509) *certs; |
| X509 *xtmp = NULL; |
| size_t i; |
| /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */ |
| certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x)); |
| if (certs == NULL) |
| return NULL; |
| /* Look for exact match */ |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { |
| xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i); |
| if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x)) |
| break; |
| } |
| if (i < sk_X509_num(certs)) |
| X509_up_ref(xtmp); |
| else |
| xtmp = NULL; |
| sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free); |
| return xtmp; |
| } |
| |
| int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL; |
| int bad_chain = 0; |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param; |
| int depth, i, ok = 0; |
| int num, j, retry, trust; |
| int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); |
| STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL; |
| if (ctx->cert == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL; |
| return -1; |
| } |
| if (ctx->chain != NULL) { |
| /* |
| * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We |
| * cannot do another one. |
| */ |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL; |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| cb = ctx->verify_cb; |
| |
| /* |
| * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that |
| * the first entry is in place |
| */ |
| ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null(); |
| if (ctx->chain == NULL || !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| X509_up_ref(ctx->cert); |
| ctx->last_untrusted = 1; |
| |
| /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it. |
| * sktmp = ctx->untrusted ++ ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted */ |
| if (ctx->untrusted != NULL |
| && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| if (ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted != NULL) { |
| if (sktmp == NULL) { |
| sktmp = sk_X509_new_null(); |
| if (sktmp == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| for (size_t k = 0; k < sk_X509_num(ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted); |
| k++) { |
| if (!sk_X509_push(sktmp, |
| sk_X509_value(ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted, |
| k))) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
| x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); |
| depth = param->depth; |
| |
| for (;;) { |
| /* If we have enough, we break */ |
| if (depth < num) |
| break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take |
| * note of it and, if appropriate, use the |
| * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code |
| * later. */ |
| |
| int is_self_signed; |
| if (!cert_self_signed(x, &is_self_signed)) { |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| /* If we are self signed, we break */ |
| if (is_self_signed) |
| break; |
| /* |
| * If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first |
| */ |
| if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) { |
| ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); |
| if (ok < 0) { |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| /* |
| * If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up |
| * again later. |
| */ |
| if (ok > 0) { |
| X509_free(xtmp); |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */ |
| if (sktmp != NULL) { |
| xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x); |
| if (xtmp != NULL) { |
| if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
| ok = 0; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| X509_up_ref(xtmp); |
| (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp); |
| ctx->last_untrusted++; |
| x = xtmp; |
| num++; |
| /* |
| * reparse the full chain for the next one |
| */ |
| continue; |
| } |
| } |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */ |
| j = num; |
| /* |
| * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates. |
| * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we |
| * complain. |
| */ |
| |
| do { |
| /* |
| * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed. |
| */ |
| i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
| x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1); |
| |
| int is_self_signed; |
| if (!cert_self_signed(x, &is_self_signed)) { |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| if (is_self_signed) { |
| /* we have a self signed certificate */ |
| if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) { |
| /* |
| * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can |
| * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid |
| * possible impersonation. |
| */ |
| ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); |
| if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) { |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT; |
| ctx->current_cert = x; |
| ctx->error_depth = i - 1; |
| if (ok == 1) |
| X509_free(xtmp); |
| bad_chain = 1; |
| ok = cb(0, ctx); |
| if (!ok) |
| goto end; |
| } else { |
| /* |
| * We have a match: replace certificate with store |
| * version so we get any trust settings. |
| */ |
| X509_free(x); |
| x = xtmp; |
| (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x); |
| ctx->last_untrusted = 0; |
| } |
| } else { |
| /* |
| * extract and save self signed certificate for later use |
| */ |
| chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); |
| ctx->last_untrusted--; |
| num--; |
| j--; |
| x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); |
| } |
| } |
| /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */ |
| for (;;) { |
| /* If we have enough, we break */ |
| if (depth < num) |
| break; |
| if (!cert_self_signed(x, &is_self_signed)) { |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| /* If we are self signed, we break */ |
| if (is_self_signed) |
| break; |
| ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); |
| |
| if (ok < 0) { |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| if (ok == 0) |
| break; |
| x = xtmp; |
| if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) { |
| X509_free(xtmp); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
| ok = 0; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| num++; |
| } |
| |
| /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */ |
| trust = check_trust(ctx); |
| |
| /* If explicitly rejected error */ |
| if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) { |
| ok = 0; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| /* |
| * If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there is an alternative |
| * chain that could be used. We only do this if we haven't already |
| * checked via TRUSTED_FIRST and the user hasn't switched off alternate |
| * chain checking |
| */ |
| retry = 0; |
| if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED |
| && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) |
| && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) { |
| while (j-- > 1) { |
| xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1); |
| ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2); |
| if (ok < 0) |
| goto end; |
| /* Check if we found an alternate chain */ |
| if (ok > 0) { |
| /* |
| * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later |
| */ |
| X509_free(xtmp); |
| |
| /* |
| * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an |
| * alternate chain |
| */ |
| while (num > j) { |
| xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); |
| X509_free(xtmp); |
| num--; |
| } |
| ctx->last_untrusted = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
| retry = 1; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } while (retry); |
| |
| /* |
| * If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single |
| * self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already |
| * and set bad_chain == 1 |
| */ |
| if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) { |
| if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) { |
| if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num) |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY; |
| else |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT; |
| ctx->current_cert = x; |
| } else { |
| |
| sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss); |
| num++; |
| ctx->last_untrusted = num; |
| ctx->current_cert = chain_ss; |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN; |
| chain_ss = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| ctx->error_depth = num - 1; |
| bad_chain = 1; |
| ok = cb(0, ctx); |
| if (!ok) |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */ |
| ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx); |
| |
| if (!ok) |
| goto end; |
| |
| ok = check_id(ctx); |
| |
| if (!ok) |
| goto end; |
| |
| /* |
| * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because |
| * they may be needed for CRL signature verification. |
| */ |
| |
| ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx); |
| if (!ok) |
| goto end; |
| |
| int err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain, |
| ctx->param->flags); |
| if (err != X509_V_OK) { |
| ctx->error = err; |
| ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth); |
| ok = cb(0, ctx); |
| if (!ok) |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */ |
| if (ctx->verify != NULL) |
| ok = ctx->verify(ctx); |
| else |
| ok = internal_verify(ctx); |
| if (!ok) |
| goto end; |
| |
| /* Check name constraints */ |
| |
| ok = check_name_constraints(ctx); |
| if (!ok) |
| goto end; |
| |
| /* If we get this far evaluate policies */ |
| if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)) |
| ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx); |
| |
| end: |
| if (sktmp != NULL) |
| sk_X509_free(sktmp); |
| if (chain_ss != NULL) |
| X509_free(chain_ss); |
| |
| /* Safety net, error returns must set ctx->error */ |
| if (ok <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK) |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; |
| return ok; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any) |
| */ |
| |
| static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) |
| { |
| size_t i; |
| X509 *issuer; |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { |
| issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i); |
| if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) |
| return issuer; |
| } |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */ |
| |
| static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x); |
| if (ret == X509_V_OK) |
| return 1; |
| /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */ |
| if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| ctx->error = ret; |
| ctx->current_cert = x; |
| ctx->current_issuer = issuer; |
| return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
| } |
| |
| /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */ |
| |
| static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
| { |
| *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x); |
| if (*issuer) { |
| X509_up_ref(*issuer); |
| return 1; |
| } else |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied |
| * purpose |
| */ |
| |
| static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| int i, ok = 0, plen = 0; |
| X509 *x; |
| int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); |
| int proxy_path_length = 0; |
| int purpose; |
| int allow_proxy_certs; |
| cb = ctx->verify_cb; |
| |
| enum { |
| // ca_or_leaf allows either type of certificate so that direct use of |
| // self-signed certificates works. |
| ca_or_leaf, |
| must_be_ca, |
| must_not_be_ca, |
| } ca_requirement; |
| |
| /* CRL path validation */ |
| if (ctx->parent) { |
| allow_proxy_certs = 0; |
| purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN; |
| } else { |
| allow_proxy_certs = |
| ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); |
| purpose = ctx->param->purpose; |
| } |
| |
| ca_requirement = ca_or_leaf; |
| |
| /* Check all untrusted certificates */ |
| for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) { |
| int ret; |
| x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); |
| if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) |
| && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) { |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION; |
| ctx->error_depth = i; |
| ctx->current_cert = x; |
| ok = cb(0, ctx); |
| if (!ok) |
| goto end; |
| } |
| if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) { |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED; |
| ctx->error_depth = i; |
| ctx->current_cert = x; |
| ok = cb(0, ctx); |
| if (!ok) |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| switch (ca_requirement) { |
| case ca_or_leaf: |
| ret = 1; |
| break; |
| case must_not_be_ca: |
| if (X509_check_ca(x)) { |
| ret = 0; |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA; |
| } else |
| ret = 1; |
| break; |
| case must_be_ca: |
| if (!X509_check_ca(x)) { |
| ret = 0; |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; |
| } else |
| ret = 1; |
| break; |
| default: |
| // impossible. |
| ret = 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (ret == 0) { |
| ctx->error_depth = i; |
| ctx->current_cert = x; |
| ok = cb(0, ctx); |
| if (!ok) |
| goto end; |
| } |
| if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) { |
| ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, ca_requirement == must_be_ca); |
| if (ret != 1) { |
| ret = 0; |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE; |
| ctx->error_depth = i; |
| ctx->current_cert = x; |
| ok = cb(0, ctx); |
| if (!ok) |
| goto end; |
| } |
| } |
| /* Check pathlen if not self issued */ |
| if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) |
| && (x->ex_pathlen != -1) |
| && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) { |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; |
| ctx->error_depth = i; |
| ctx->current_cert = x; |
| ok = cb(0, ctx); |
| if (!ok) |
| goto end; |
| } |
| /* Increment path length if not self issued */ |
| if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) |
| plen++; |
| /* |
| * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate |
| * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not, |
| * the next certificate must be a CA certificate. |
| */ |
| if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { |
| if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) { |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; |
| ctx->error_depth = i; |
| ctx->current_cert = x; |
| ok = cb(0, ctx); |
| if (!ok) |
| goto end; |
| } |
| proxy_path_length++; |
| ca_requirement = must_not_be_ca; |
| } else { |
| ca_requirement = must_be_ca; |
| } |
| } |
| ok = 1; |
| end: |
| return ok; |
| } |
| |
| static int reject_dns_name_in_common_name(X509 *x509) |
| { |
| X509_NAME *name = X509_get_subject_name(x509); |
| int i = -1; |
| for (;;) { |
| i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, NID_commonName, i); |
| if (i == -1) { |
| return X509_V_OK; |
| } |
| |
| X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i); |
| ASN1_STRING *common_name = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(entry); |
| unsigned char *idval; |
| int idlen = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&idval, common_name); |
| if (idlen < 0) { |
| return X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
| } |
| /* Only process attributes that look like host names. Note it is |
| * important that this check be mirrored in |X509_check_host|. */ |
| int looks_like_dns = x509v3_looks_like_dns_name(idval, (size_t)idlen); |
| OPENSSL_free(idval); |
| if (looks_like_dns) { |
| return X509_V_ERR_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_WITHOUT_SANS; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| int i, j, rv; |
| int has_name_constraints = 0; |
| /* Check name constraints for all certificates */ |
| for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { |
| X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); |
| /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */ |
| if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) |
| continue; |
| /* |
| * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain |
| * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed |
| * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them |
| * to be obeyed. |
| */ |
| for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) { |
| NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc; |
| if (nc) { |
| has_name_constraints = 1; |
| rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc); |
| switch (rv) { |
| case X509_V_OK: |
| continue; |
| case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: |
| ctx->error = rv; |
| return 0; |
| default: |
| ctx->error = rv; |
| ctx->error_depth = i; |
| ctx->current_cert = x; |
| if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) |
| return 0; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Name constraints do not match against the common name, but |
| * |X509_check_host| still implements the legacy behavior where, on |
| * certificates lacking a SAN list, DNS-like names in the common name are |
| * checked instead. |
| * |
| * While we could apply the name constraints to the common name, name |
| * constraints are rare enough that can hold such certificates to a higher |
| * standard. Note this does not make "DNS-like" heuristic failures any |
| * worse. A decorative common-name misidentified as a DNS name would fail |
| * the name constraint anyway. */ |
| X509 *leaf = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0); |
| if (has_name_constraints && leaf->altname == NULL) { |
| rv = reject_dns_name_in_common_name(leaf); |
| switch (rv) { |
| case X509_V_OK: |
| break; |
| case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: |
| ctx->error = rv; |
| return 0; |
| default: |
| ctx->error = rv; |
| ctx->error_depth = i; |
| ctx->current_cert = leaf; |
| if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) |
| return 0; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode) |
| { |
| ctx->error = errcode; |
| ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert; |
| ctx->error_depth = 0; |
| return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
| } |
| |
| static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id) |
| { |
| size_t i; |
| size_t n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id->hosts); |
| char *name; |
| |
| if (id->peername != NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_free(id->peername); |
| id->peername = NULL; |
| } |
| for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { |
| name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id->hosts, i); |
| if (X509_check_host(x, name, strlen(name), id->hostflags, |
| &id->peername) > 0) |
| return 1; |
| } |
| return n == 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param; |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id; |
| X509 *x = ctx->cert; |
| if (id->poison) { |
| if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (id->hosts && check_hosts(x, id) <= 0) { |
| if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (id->email && X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0) <= 0) { |
| if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (id->ip && X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0) <= 0) { |
| if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| size_t i; |
| int ok; |
| X509 *x = NULL; |
| int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); |
| cb = ctx->verify_cb; |
| /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */ |
| for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { |
| x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); |
| ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0); |
| /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */ |
| if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) |
| return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; |
| /* |
| * If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not |
| * overridden. |
| */ |
| if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) { |
| ctx->error_depth = i; |
| ctx->current_cert = x; |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED; |
| ok = cb(0, ctx); |
| if (!ok) |
| return X509_TRUST_REJECTED; |
| } |
| } |
| /* |
| * If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate |
| * return success. |
| */ |
| if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) { |
| X509 *mx; |
| if (ctx->last_untrusted < (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain)) |
| return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; |
| x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0); |
| mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x); |
| if (mx) { |
| (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx); |
| X509_free(x); |
| ctx->last_untrusted = 0; |
| return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow |
| * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated. |
| */ |
| return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| int i, last, ok; |
| if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)) |
| return 1; |
| if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) |
| last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; |
| else { |
| /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */ |
| if (ctx->parent) |
| return 1; |
| last = 0; |
| } |
| for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) { |
| ctx->error_depth = i; |
| ok = check_cert(ctx); |
| if (!ok) |
| return ok; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; |
| X509 *x; |
| int ok = 0, cnum; |
| unsigned int last_reasons; |
| cnum = ctx->error_depth; |
| x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum); |
| ctx->current_cert = x; |
| ctx->current_issuer = NULL; |
| ctx->current_crl_score = 0; |
| ctx->current_reasons = 0; |
| while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) { |
| last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons; |
| /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */ |
| if (ctx->get_crl) |
| ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x); |
| else |
| ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x); |
| /* |
| * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback |
| */ |
| if (!ok) { |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; |
| ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| ctx->current_crl = crl; |
| ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl); |
| if (!ok) |
| goto err; |
| |
| if (dcrl) { |
| ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl); |
| if (!ok) |
| goto err; |
| ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x); |
| if (!ok) |
| goto err; |
| } else |
| ok = 1; |
| |
| /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */ |
| if (ok != 2) { |
| ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x); |
| if (!ok) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| X509_CRL_free(crl); |
| X509_CRL_free(dcrl); |
| crl = NULL; |
| dcrl = NULL; |
| /* |
| * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration, |
| * so exit loop. |
| */ |
| if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) { |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; |
| ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| err: |
| X509_CRL_free(crl); |
| X509_CRL_free(dcrl); |
| |
| ctx->current_crl = NULL; |
| return ok; |
| |
| } |
| |
| /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */ |
| |
| static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) |
| { |
| time_t *ptime; |
| int i; |
| if (notify) |
| ctx->current_crl = crl; |
| if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) |
| ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; |
| else |
| ptime = NULL; |
| |
| i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl), ptime); |
| if (i == 0) { |
| if (!notify) |
| return 0; |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD; |
| if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (i > 0) { |
| if (!notify) |
| return 0; |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID; |
| if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl)) { |
| i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl), ptime); |
| |
| if (i == 0) { |
| if (!notify) |
| return 0; |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD; |
| if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */ |
| if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) { |
| if (!notify) |
| return 0; |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED; |
| if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (notify) |
| ctx->current_crl = NULL; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, |
| X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons, |
| STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) |
| { |
| int crl_score, best_score = *pscore; |
| size_t i; |
| unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0; |
| X509 *x = ctx->current_cert; |
| X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL; |
| X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { |
| crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); |
| reasons = *preasons; |
| crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x); |
| if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0) |
| continue; |
| /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */ |
| if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) { |
| int day, sec; |
| if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(best_crl), |
| X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0) |
| continue; |
| /* |
| * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day| |
| * and |sec|. |
| */ |
| if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0) |
| continue; |
| } |
| best_crl = crl; |
| best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer; |
| best_score = crl_score; |
| best_reasons = reasons; |
| } |
| |
| if (best_crl) { |
| if (*pcrl) |
| X509_CRL_free(*pcrl); |
| *pcrl = best_crl; |
| *pissuer = best_crl_issuer; |
| *pscore = best_score; |
| *preasons = best_reasons; |
| X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl); |
| if (*pdcrl) { |
| X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl); |
| *pdcrl = NULL; |
| } |
| get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls); |
| } |
| |
| if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID) |
| return 1; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be |
| * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical. |
| */ |
| |
| static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid) |
| { |
| ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb; |
| int i; |
| i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1); |
| if (i >= 0) { |
| /* Can't have multiple occurrences */ |
| if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1) |
| return 0; |
| exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i)); |
| } else |
| exta = NULL; |
| |
| i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1); |
| |
| if (i >= 0) { |
| |
| if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1) |
| return 0; |
| extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i)); |
| } else |
| extb = NULL; |
| |
| if (!exta && !extb) |
| return 1; |
| |
| if (!exta || !extb) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* See if a base and delta are compatible */ |
| |
| static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base) |
| { |
| /* Delta CRL must be a delta */ |
| if (!delta->base_crl_number) |
| return 0; |
| /* Base must have a CRL number */ |
| if (!base->crl_number) |
| return 0; |
| /* Issuer names must match */ |
| if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta))) |
| return 0; |
| /* AKID and IDP must match */ |
| if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier)) |
| return 0; |
| if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) |
| return 0; |
| /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */ |
| if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) |
| return 0; |
| /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ |
| if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) |
| return 1; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or |
| * retrieve a chain of deltas... |
| */ |
| |
| static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore, |
| X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) |
| { |
| X509_CRL *delta; |
| size_t i; |
| if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS)) |
| return; |
| if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST)) |
| return; |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { |
| delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); |
| if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) { |
| if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0)) |
| *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA; |
| X509_CRL_up_ref(delta); |
| *dcrl = delta; |
| return; |
| } |
| } |
| *dcrl = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate |
| * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not |
| * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is |
| * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL |
| * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated. |
| */ |
| |
| static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, |
| unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) |
| { |
| |
| int crl_score = 0; |
| unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons; |
| |
| /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */ |
| |
| /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */ |
| if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) |
| return 0; |
| /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */ |
| if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) { |
| if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS)) |
| return 0; |
| } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) { |
| /* If no new reasons reject */ |
| if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| /* Don't process deltas at this stage */ |
| else if (crl->base_crl_number) |
| return 0; |
| /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */ |
| if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) { |
| if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT)) |
| return 0; |
| } else |
| crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME; |
| |
| if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) |
| crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL; |
| |
| /* Check expiry */ |
| if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0)) |
| crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME; |
| |
| /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */ |
| crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score); |
| |
| /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */ |
| |
| if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */ |
| |
| if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) { |
| /* If no new reasons reject */ |
| if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) |
| return 0; |
| tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons; |
| crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE; |
| } |
| |
| *preasons = tmp_reasons; |
| |
| return crl_score; |
| |
| } |
| |
| static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, |
| X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score) |
| { |
| X509 *crl_issuer = NULL; |
| X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); |
| int cidx = ctx->error_depth; |
| size_t i; |
| |
| if ((size_t)cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1) |
| cidx++; |
| |
| crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); |
| |
| if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { |
| if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) { |
| *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT; |
| *pissuer = crl_issuer; |
| return; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| for (cidx++; cidx < (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) { |
| crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); |
| if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) |
| continue; |
| if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { |
| *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH; |
| *pissuer = crl_issuer; |
| return; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */ |
| |
| if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) |
| return; |
| |
| /* |
| * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of |
| * untrusted certificates. |
| */ |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) { |
| crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i); |
| if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) |
| continue; |
| if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { |
| *pissuer = crl_issuer; |
| *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID; |
| return; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted); i++) { |
| crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted, i); |
| if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) |
| continue; |
| if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { |
| *pissuer = crl_issuer; |
| *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID; |
| return; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new |
| * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the |
| * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will |
| * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice. |
| */ |
| |
| static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
| { |
| X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx; |
| int ret; |
| /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */ |
| if (ctx->parent) |
| return 0; |
| if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted)) |
| return -1; |
| |
| crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls; |
| /* Copy verify params across */ |
| X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param); |
| |
| crl_ctx.parent = ctx; |
| crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb; |
| |
| /* Verify CRL issuer */ |
| ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx); |
| |
| if (ret <= 0) |
| goto err; |
| |
| /* Check chain is acceptable */ |
| |
| ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain); |
| err: |
| X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and |
| * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could |
| * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more |
| * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor, |
| * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the |
| * RFC5280 version |
| */ |
| |
| static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
| STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, |
| STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path) |
| { |
| X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta; |
| cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1); |
| crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1); |
| if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta)) |
| return 1; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. 1. |
| * Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. 2. One full, one |
| * relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. 3. Both are full names and |
| * compare two GENERAL_NAMES. 4. One is NULL: automatic match. |
| */ |
| |
| static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b) |
| { |
| X509_NAME *nm = NULL; |
| GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; |
| GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb; |
| size_t i, j; |
| if (!a || !b) |
| return 1; |
| if (a->type == 1) { |
| if (!a->dpname) |
| return 0; |
| /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */ |
| if (b->type == 1) { |
| if (!b->dpname) |
| return 0; |
| if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname)) |
| return 1; |
| else |
| return 0; |
| } |
| /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ |
| nm = a->dpname; |
| gens = b->name.fullname; |
| } else if (b->type == 1) { |
| if (!b->dpname) |
| return 0; |
| /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ |
| gens = a->name.fullname; |
| nm = b->dpname; |
| } |
| |
| /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */ |
| if (nm) { |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { |
| gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); |
| if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME) |
| continue; |
| if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName)) |
| return 1; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */ |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) { |
| gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i); |
| for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) { |
| genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j); |
| if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb)) |
| return 1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| |
| } |
| |
| static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score) |
| { |
| size_t i; |
| X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); |
| /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */ |
| if (!dp->CRLissuer) |
| return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME); |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) { |
| GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); |
| if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) |
| continue; |
| if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm)) |
| return 1; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Check CRLDP and IDP */ |
| |
| static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, |
| unsigned int *preasons) |
| { |
| size_t i; |
| if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR) |
| return 0; |
| if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) { |
| if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER) |
| return 0; |
| } else { |
| if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| *preasons = crl->idp_reasons; |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) { |
| DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i); |
| if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) { |
| if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) { |
| *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) |
| && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)) |
| return 1; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try |
| * to find a delta CRL too |
| */ |
| |
| static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
| X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x) |
| { |
| int ok; |
| X509 *issuer = NULL; |
| int crl_score = 0; |
| unsigned int reasons; |
| X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; |
| STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl; |
| X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); |
| reasons = ctx->current_reasons; |
| ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, |
| &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls); |
| |
| if (ok) |
| goto done; |
| |
| /* Lookup CRLs from store */ |
| |
| skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm); |
| |
| /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */ |
| if (!skcrl && crl) |
| goto done; |
| |
| get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl); |
| |
| sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free); |
| |
| done: |
| |
| /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */ |
| if (crl) { |
| ctx->current_issuer = issuer; |
| ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score; |
| ctx->current_reasons = reasons; |
| *pcrl = crl; |
| *pdcrl = dcrl; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Check CRL validity */ |
| static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) |
| { |
| X509 *issuer = NULL; |
| EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL; |
| int ok = 0, chnum, cnum; |
| cnum = ctx->error_depth; |
| chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; |
| /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */ |
| if (ctx->current_issuer) |
| issuer = ctx->current_issuer; |
| |
| /* |
| * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next |
| * certificate in chain. |
| */ |
| else if (cnum < chnum) |
| issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1); |
| else { |
| issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum); |
| /* If not self signed, can't check signature */ |
| if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) { |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER; |
| ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
| if (!ok) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (issuer) { |
| /* |
| * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done |
| */ |
| if (!crl->base_crl_number) { |
| /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */ |
| if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && |
| !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) { |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN; |
| ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
| if (!ok) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) { |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE; |
| ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
| if (!ok) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) { |
| if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) { |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR; |
| ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
| if (!ok) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) { |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION; |
| ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
| if (!ok) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| } |
| |
| if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) { |
| ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1); |
| if (!ok) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */ |
| ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer); |
| |
| if (!ikey) { |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; |
| ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
| if (!ok) |
| goto err; |
| } else { |
| int rv; |
| rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags); |
| if (rv != X509_V_OK) { |
| ctx->error = rv; |
| ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
| if (!ok) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| /* Verify CRL signature */ |
| if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) { |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; |
| ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
| if (!ok) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| ok = 1; |
| |
| err: |
| EVP_PKEY_free(ikey); |
| return ok; |
| } |
| |
| /* Check certificate against CRL */ |
| static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) |
| { |
| int ok; |
| X509_REVOKED *rev; |
| /* |
| * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled |
| * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate |
| * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can |
| * change the meaning of CRL entries. |
| */ |
| if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) |
| && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) { |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION; |
| ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
| if (!ok) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| /* |
| * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason |
| * is not removeFromCRL. |
| */ |
| if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) { |
| if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL) |
| return 2; |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED; |
| ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
| if (!ok) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| if (ctx->parent) |
| return 1; |
| ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain, |
| ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); |
| if (ret == 0) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ |
| if (ret == -1) { |
| /* |
| * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. |
| */ |
| X509 *x; |
| size_t i; |
| for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { |
| x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); |
| if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)) |
| continue; |
| ctx->current_cert = x; |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION; |
| if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| if (ret == -2) { |
| ctx->current_cert = NULL; |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY; |
| return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
| } |
| |
| if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) { |
| ctx->current_cert = NULL; |
| /* |
| * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed |
| * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then |
| * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier |
| * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK. |
| */ |
| if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
| { |
| time_t *ptime; |
| int i; |
| |
| if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) |
| ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; |
| else |
| ptime = NULL; |
| |
| i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime); |
| if (i == 0) { |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD; |
| ctx->current_cert = x; |
| if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (i > 0) { |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID; |
| ctx->current_cert = x; |
| if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime); |
| if (i == 0) { |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD; |
| ctx->current_cert = x; |
| if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (i < 0) { |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED; |
| ctx->current_cert = x; |
| if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| int ok = 0, n; |
| X509 *xs, *xi; |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; |
| int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); |
| |
| cb = ctx->verify_cb; |
| |
| n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
| ctx->error_depth = n - 1; |
| n--; |
| xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); |
| |
| if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi)) |
| xs = xi; |
| else { |
| if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) { |
| xs = xi; |
| goto check_cert; |
| } |
| if (n <= 0) { |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE; |
| ctx->current_cert = xi; |
| ok = cb(0, ctx); |
| goto end; |
| } else { |
| n--; |
| ctx->error_depth = n; |
| xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* ctx->error=0; not needed */ |
| while (n >= 0) { |
| ctx->error_depth = n; |
| |
| /* |
| * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless |
| * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes |
| * time. |
| */ |
| if (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)) { |
| if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) { |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; |
| ctx->current_cert = xi; |
| ok = (*cb) (0, ctx); |
| if (!ok) |
| goto end; |
| } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) { |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; |
| ctx->current_cert = xs; |
| ok = (*cb) (0, ctx); |
| if (!ok) { |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
| goto end; |
| } |
| } |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
| pkey = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| check_cert: |
| ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs); |
| if (!ok) |
| goto end; |
| |
| /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */ |
| ctx->current_issuer = xi; |
| ctx->current_cert = xs; |
| ok = (*cb) (1, ctx); |
| if (!ok) |
| goto end; |
| |
| n--; |
| if (n >= 0) { |
| xi = xs; |
| xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); |
| } |
| } |
| ok = 1; |
| end: |
| return ok; |
| } |
| |
| int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm) |
| { |
| return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) |
| { |
| static const size_t utctime_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1; |
| static const size_t generalizedtime_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1; |
| ASN1_TIME *asn1_cmp_time = NULL; |
| int i, day, sec, ret = 0; |
| |
| /* |
| * Note that ASN.1 allows much more slack in the time format than RFC5280. |
| * In RFC5280, the representation is fixed: |
| * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ |
| * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ |
| * |
| * We do NOT currently enforce the following RFC 5280 requirement: |
| * "CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate |
| * validity dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity |
| * dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime." |
| */ |
| switch (ctm->type) { |
| case V_ASN1_UTCTIME: |
| if (ctm->length != (int)(utctime_length)) |
| return 0; |
| break; |
| case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME: |
| if (ctm->length != (int)(generalizedtime_length)) |
| return 0; |
| break; |
| default: |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * Verify the format: the ASN.1 functions we use below allow a more |
| * flexible format than what's mandated by RFC 5280. |
| * Digit and date ranges will be verified in the conversion methods. |
| */ |
| for (i = 0; i < ctm->length - 1; i++) { |
| if (!isdigit(ctm->data[i])) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (ctm->data[ctm->length - 1] != 'Z') |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* |
| * There is ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t but no |
| * ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_cmp_time_t or ASN1_TIME_cmp_time_t, |
| * so we go through ASN.1 |
| */ |
| asn1_cmp_time = X509_time_adj(NULL, 0, cmp_time); |
| if (asn1_cmp_time == NULL) |
| goto err; |
| if (!ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, ctm, asn1_cmp_time)) |
| goto err; |
| |
| /* |
| * X509_cmp_time comparison is <=. |
| * The return value 0 is reserved for errors. |
| */ |
| ret = (day >= 0 && sec >= 0) ? -1 : 1; |
| |
| err: |
| ASN1_TIME_free(asn1_cmp_time); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj) |
| { |
| return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) |
| { |
| return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm); |
| } |
| |
| ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s, |
| int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) |
| { |
| time_t t = 0; |
| |
| if (in_tm) |
| t = *in_tm; |
| else |
| time(&t); |
| |
| if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) { |
| if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) |
| return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); |
| if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) |
| return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); |
| } |
| return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); |
| } |
| |
| /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */ |
| |
| X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer, |
| EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags) |
| { |
| X509_CRL *crl = NULL; |
| int i; |
| size_t j; |
| STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL; |
| /* CRLs can't be delta already */ |
| if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */ |
| if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| /* Issuer names must match */ |
| if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| /* AKID and IDP must match */ |
| if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ |
| if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| /* CRLs must verify */ |
| if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 || |
| X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| /* Create new CRL */ |
| crl = X509_CRL_new(); |
| if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, X509_CRL_VERSION_2)) |
| goto memerr; |
| /* Set issuer name */ |
| if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) |
| goto memerr; |
| |
| if (!X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(newer))) |
| goto memerr; |
| if (!X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(newer))) |
| goto memerr; |
| |
| /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */ |
| |
| if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0)) |
| goto memerr; |
| |
| /* |
| * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL |
| * number to correct value too. |
| */ |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) { |
| X509_EXTENSION *ext; |
| ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i); |
| if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1)) |
| goto memerr; |
| } |
| |
| /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */ |
| |
| revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer); |
| |
| for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); j++) { |
| X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp; |
| rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, j); |
| /* |
| * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here |
| * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs. |
| */ |
| if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber)) { |
| rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn); |
| if (!rvtmp) |
| goto memerr; |
| if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) { |
| X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp); |
| goto memerr; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */ |
| |
| if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md)) |
| goto memerr; |
| |
| return crl; |
| |
| memerr: |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| if (crl) |
| X509_CRL_free(crl); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, |
| CRYPTO_EX_unused * unused, |
| CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused, |
| CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) |
| { |
| /* |
| * This function is (usually) called only once, by |
| * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). |
| */ |
| int index; |
| if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp, |
| free_func)) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| return index; |
| } |
| |
| int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) |
| { |
| return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data); |
| } |
| |
| void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) |
| { |
| return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx); |
| } |
| |
| int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| return ctx->error; |
| } |
| |
| void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) |
| { |
| ctx->error = err; |
| } |
| |
| int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| return ctx->error_depth; |
| } |
| |
| X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| return ctx->current_cert; |
| } |
| |
| STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| return ctx->chain; |
| } |
| |
| STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| return ctx->chain; |
| } |
| |
| STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| if (!ctx->chain) |
| return NULL; |
| return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain); |
| } |
| |
| X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| return ctx->current_issuer; |
| } |
| |
| X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| return ctx->current_crl; |
| } |
| |
| X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| return ctx->parent; |
| } |
| |
| void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
| { |
| ctx->cert = x; |
| } |
| |
| void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) |
| { |
| ctx->untrusted = sk; |
| } |
| |
| STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| return ctx->untrusted; |
| } |
| |
| void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) |
| { |
| ctx->crls = sk; |
| } |
| |
| int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) |
| { |
| return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0); |
| } |
| |
| int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) |
| { |
| return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values. |
| * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and |
| * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't |
| * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then |
| * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL |
| * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the |
| * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL |
| * client/server. |
| */ |
| |
| int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, |
| int purpose, int trust) |
| { |
| int idx; |
| /* If purpose not set use default */ |
| if (!purpose) |
| purpose = def_purpose; |
| /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */ |
| if (purpose) { |
| X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; |
| idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose); |
| if (idx == -1) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); |
| if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) { |
| idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose); |
| if (idx == -1) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); |
| } |
| /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */ |
| if (!trust) |
| trust = ptmp->trust; |
| } |
| if (trust) { |
| idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust); |
| if (idx == -1) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) |
| ctx->param->purpose = purpose; |
| if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) |
| ctx->param->trust = trust; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) |
| { |
| X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; |
| ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); |
| if (!ctx) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| X509_STORE_CTX_zero(ctx); |
| return ctx; |
| } |
| |
| void X509_STORE_CTX_zero(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); |
| } |
| |
| void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| if (ctx == NULL) { |
| return; |
| } |
| X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); |
| OPENSSL_free(ctx); |
| } |
| |
| int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, |
| STACK_OF(X509) *chain) |
| { |
| X509_STORE_CTX_zero(ctx); |
| ctx->ctx = store; |
| ctx->cert = x509; |
| ctx->untrusted = chain; |
| |
| CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data); |
| |
| if (store == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); |
| if (!ctx->param) |
| goto err; |
| |
| /* |
| * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE. |
| */ |
| |
| ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; |
| ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup; |
| |
| if (!X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param) || |
| !X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"))) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (store->check_issued) |
| ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued; |
| else |
| ctx->check_issued = check_issued; |
| |
| if (store->get_issuer) |
| ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer; |
| else |
| ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer; |
| |
| if (store->verify_cb) |
| ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; |
| else |
| ctx->verify_cb = null_callback; |
| |
| if (store->verify) |
| ctx->verify = store->verify; |
| else |
| ctx->verify = internal_verify; |
| |
| if (store->check_revocation) |
| ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation; |
| else |
| ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation; |
| |
| if (store->get_crl) |
| ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl; |
| else |
| ctx->get_crl = NULL; |
| |
| if (store->check_crl) |
| ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl; |
| else |
| ctx->check_crl = check_crl; |
| |
| if (store->cert_crl) |
| ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl; |
| else |
| ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl; |
| |
| if (store->lookup_certs) |
| ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs; |
| else |
| ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs; |
| |
| if (store->lookup_crls) |
| ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls; |
| else |
| ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls; |
| |
| ctx->check_policy = check_policy; |
| |
| return 1; |
| |
| err: |
| CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &ctx->ex_data); |
| if (ctx->param != NULL) { |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); |
| } |
| |
| OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This |
| * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed. |
| */ |
| |
| void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) |
| { |
| ctx->other_ctx = sk; |
| ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk; |
| } |
| |
| void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| /* We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, |X509_STORE_CTX_free| |
| * also calls this function. */ |
| if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) { |
| ctx->cleanup(ctx); |
| ctx->cleanup = NULL; |
| } |
| if (ctx->param != NULL) { |
| if (ctx->parent == NULL) |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); |
| ctx->param = NULL; |
| } |
| if (ctx->tree != NULL) { |
| X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree); |
| ctx->tree = NULL; |
| } |
| if (ctx->chain != NULL) { |
| sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free); |
| ctx->chain = NULL; |
| } |
| CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data)); |
| OPENSSL_memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); |
| } |
| |
| void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) |
| { |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); |
| } |
| |
| void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) |
| { |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags); |
| } |
| |
| void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, |
| time_t t) |
| { |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t); |
| } |
| |
| X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| return ctx->cert; |
| } |
| |
| void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
| int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) |
| { |
| ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb; |
| } |
| |
| X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| return ctx->tree; |
| } |
| |
| int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| return ctx->explicit_policy; |
| } |
| |
| int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name) |
| { |
| const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; |
| param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name); |
| if (!param) |
| return 0; |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param); |
| } |
| |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| return ctx->param; |
| } |
| |
| void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) |
| { |
| if (ctx->param) |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); |
| ctx->param = param; |
| } |
| |
| IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509) |
| |
| IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) |