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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
#include <openssl/digest.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/obj.h>
#include <openssl/stack.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include "../internal.h"
#include "internal.h"
int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) {
return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer, b->cert_info->issuer));
}
int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) {
return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject, b->cert_info->subject));
}
int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) {
return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer, b->crl->issuer));
}
int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) {
return OPENSSL_memcmp(a->crl_hash, b->crl_hash, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
}
X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a) {
return a->cert_info->issuer;
}
unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x) {
return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer));
}
unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x) {
return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer));
}
X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a) {
return a->cert_info->subject;
}
ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a) {
return a->cert_info->serialNumber;
}
const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *x509) {
return x509->cert_info->serialNumber;
}
unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x) {
return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject));
}
unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x) {
return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject));
}
// Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB:
// Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const"
// arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these
// operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
// certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the
// "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast.
int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) {
// Fill in the |cert_hash| fields.
//
// TODO(davidben): This may fail, in which case the the hash will be all
// zeros. This produces a consistent comparison (failures are sticky), but
// not a good one. OpenSSL now returns -2, but this is not a consistent
// comparison and may cause misbehaving sorts by transitivity. For now, we
// retain the old OpenSSL behavior, which was to ignore the error. See
// https://crbug.com/boringssl/355.
x509v3_cache_extensions((X509 *)a);
x509v3_cache_extensions((X509 *)b);
return OPENSSL_memcmp(a->cert_hash, b->cert_hash, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
}
int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b) {
int ret;
// Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date
if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) {
ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
if (ret < 0) {
return -2;
}
}
if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) {
ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
if (ret < 0) {
return -2;
}
}
ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
if (ret) {
return ret;
}
return OPENSSL_memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
}
unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x) {
unsigned long ret = 0;
unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
// Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding
i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) {
return 0;
}
ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)) &
0xffffffffL;
return ret;
}
// I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding,
// this is reasonably efficient.
unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x) {
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
unsigned long ret = 0;
unsigned char md[16];
// Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding
i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
// EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL) &&
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length) &&
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL)) {
ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)) &
0xffffffffL;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return ret;
}
X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(const STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name,
const ASN1_INTEGER *serial) {
if (serial->type != V_ASN1_INTEGER && serial->type != V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) {
return NULL;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
X509 *x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get0_serialNumber(x509), serial) == 0 &&
X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x509), name) == 0) {
return x509;
}
}
return NULL;
}
X509 *X509_find_by_subject(const STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
X509 *x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0) {
return x509;
}
}
return NULL;
}
EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x) {
if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL)) {
return NULL;
}
return (X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key));
}
ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x) {
if (!x) {
return NULL;
}
return x->cert_info->key->public_key;
}
int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *k) {
EVP_PKEY *xk;
int ret;
xk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
if (xk) {
ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
} else {
ret = -2;
}
switch (ret) {
case 1:
break;
case 0:
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
break;
case -1:
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
break;
case -2:
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
}
if (xk) {
EVP_PKEY_free(xk);
}
if (ret > 0) {
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
// Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
// count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of
// each X509 structure.
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain) {
STACK_OF(X509) *ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
if (ret == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) {
X509_up_ref(sk_X509_value(ret, i));
}
return ret;
}