Prevent out of bound read in do_buf (a_strex).

(Imported from upstream's 7e6c0f56e65af0727d87615342df1272cd017e9f)

Change-Id: I1d060055c923f78311265510a3fbe17a34ecc1d4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28084
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
diff --git a/crypto/x509/a_strex.c b/crypto/x509/a_strex.c
index 465ad08..c0c346d 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/a_strex.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/a_strex.c
@@ -178,18 +178,37 @@
                   int type, unsigned char flags, char *quotes, char_io *io_ch,
                   void *arg)
 {
-    int i, outlen, len;
+    int i, outlen, len, charwidth;
     unsigned char orflags, *p, *q;
     uint32_t c;
     p = buf;
     q = buf + buflen;
     outlen = 0;
+    charwidth = type & BUF_TYPE_WIDTH_MASK;
+
+    switch (charwidth) {
+    case 4:
+        if (buflen & 3) {
+            OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_INVALID_UNIVERSALSTRING_LENGTH);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        break;
+    case 2:
+        if (buflen & 1) {
+            OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_INVALID_BMPSTRING_LENGTH);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        break;
+    default:
+        break;
+    }
+
     while (p != q) {
         if (p == buf && flags & ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253)
             orflags = CHARTYPE_FIRST_ESC_2253;
         else
             orflags = 0;
-        switch (type & BUF_TYPE_WIDTH_MASK) {
+        switch (charwidth) {
         case 4:
             c = ((uint32_t)*p++) << 24;
             c |= ((uint32_t)*p++) << 16;
@@ -210,6 +229,7 @@
             i = UTF8_getc(p, buflen, &c);
             if (i < 0)
                 return -1;      /* Invalid UTF8String */
+            buflen -= i;
             p += i;
             break;
         default: