| /* |
| * Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
| * |
| * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
| * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
| * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
| * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
| */ |
| |
| #include <openssl/base.h> |
| |
| #include <string.h> |
| |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> |
| |
| #include "../../internal.h" |
| #include "../aes/internal.h" |
| #include "internal.h" |
| |
| |
| // kSizeTWithoutLower4Bits is a mask that can be used to zero the lower four |
| // bits of a |size_t|. |
| static const size_t kSizeTWithoutLower4Bits = (size_t) -16; |
| |
| |
| #define GCM_MUL(key, ctx, Xi) gcm_gmult_nohw((ctx)->Xi, (key)->Htable) |
| #define GHASH(key, ctx, in, len) \ |
| gcm_ghash_nohw((ctx)->Xi, (key)->Htable, in, len) |
| // GHASH_CHUNK is "stride parameter" missioned to mitigate cache |
| // trashing effect. In other words idea is to hash data while it's |
| // still in L1 cache after encryption pass... |
| #define GHASH_CHUNK (3 * 1024) |
| |
| #if defined(GHASH_ASM_X86_64) || defined(GHASH_ASM_X86) |
| static inline void gcm_reduce_1bit(u128 *V) { |
| if (sizeof(crypto_word_t) == 8) { |
| uint64_t T = UINT64_C(0xe100000000000000) & (0 - (V->hi & 1)); |
| V->hi = (V->lo << 63) | (V->hi >> 1); |
| V->lo = (V->lo >> 1) ^ T; |
| } else { |
| uint32_t T = 0xe1000000U & (0 - (uint32_t)(V->hi & 1)); |
| V->hi = (V->lo << 63) | (V->hi >> 1); |
| V->lo = (V->lo >> 1) ^ ((uint64_t)T << 32); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void gcm_init_ssse3(u128 Htable[16], const uint64_t H[2]) { |
| Htable[0].hi = 0; |
| Htable[0].lo = 0; |
| u128 V; |
| V.hi = H[1]; |
| V.lo = H[0]; |
| |
| Htable[8] = V; |
| gcm_reduce_1bit(&V); |
| Htable[4] = V; |
| gcm_reduce_1bit(&V); |
| Htable[2] = V; |
| gcm_reduce_1bit(&V); |
| Htable[1] = V; |
| Htable[3].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[2].hi, Htable[3].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[2].lo; |
| V = Htable[4]; |
| Htable[5].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[1].hi, Htable[5].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[1].lo; |
| Htable[6].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[2].hi, Htable[6].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[2].lo; |
| Htable[7].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[3].hi, Htable[7].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[3].lo; |
| V = Htable[8]; |
| Htable[9].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[1].hi, Htable[9].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[1].lo; |
| Htable[10].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[2].hi, Htable[10].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[2].lo; |
| Htable[11].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[3].hi, Htable[11].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[3].lo; |
| Htable[12].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[4].hi, Htable[12].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[4].lo; |
| Htable[13].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[5].hi, Htable[13].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[5].lo; |
| Htable[14].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[6].hi, Htable[14].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[6].lo; |
| Htable[15].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[7].hi, Htable[15].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[7].lo; |
| |
| // Treat |Htable| as a 16x16 byte table and transpose it. Thus, Htable[i] |
| // contains the i'th byte of j*H for all j. |
| uint8_t *Hbytes = (uint8_t *)Htable; |
| for (int i = 0; i < 16; i++) { |
| for (int j = 0; j < i; j++) { |
| uint8_t tmp = Hbytes[16*i + j]; |
| Hbytes[16*i + j] = Hbytes[16*j + i]; |
| Hbytes[16*j + i] = tmp; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| #endif // GHASH_ASM_X86_64 || GHASH_ASM_X86 |
| |
| #ifdef GCM_FUNCREF |
| #undef GCM_MUL |
| #define GCM_MUL(key, ctx, Xi) (*gcm_gmult_p)((ctx)->Xi, (key)->Htable) |
| #undef GHASH |
| #define GHASH(key, ctx, in, len) \ |
| (*gcm_ghash_p)((ctx)->Xi, (key)->Htable, in, len) |
| #endif // GCM_FUNCREF |
| |
| #if defined(HW_GCM) && defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) |
| static size_t hw_gcm_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t len, |
| const AES_KEY *key, uint8_t ivec[16], |
| uint8_t Xi[16], const u128 Htable[16], |
| enum gcm_impl_t impl) { |
| switch (impl) { |
| case gcm_x86_vaes_avx10_256: |
| len &= kSizeTWithoutLower4Bits; |
| aes_gcm_enc_update_vaes_avx10_256(in, out, len, key, ivec, Htable, Xi); |
| CRYPTO_store_u32_be(&ivec[12], CRYPTO_load_u32_be(&ivec[12]) + len / 16); |
| return len; |
| case gcm_x86_vaes_avx10_512: |
| len &= kSizeTWithoutLower4Bits; |
| aes_gcm_enc_update_vaes_avx10_512(in, out, len, key, ivec, Htable, Xi); |
| CRYPTO_store_u32_be(&ivec[12], CRYPTO_load_u32_be(&ivec[12]) + len / 16); |
| return len; |
| default: |
| return aesni_gcm_encrypt(in, out, len, key, ivec, Htable, Xi); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static size_t hw_gcm_decrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t len, |
| const AES_KEY *key, uint8_t ivec[16], |
| uint8_t Xi[16], const u128 Htable[16], |
| enum gcm_impl_t impl) { |
| switch (impl) { |
| case gcm_x86_vaes_avx10_256: |
| len &= kSizeTWithoutLower4Bits; |
| aes_gcm_dec_update_vaes_avx10_256(in, out, len, key, ivec, Htable, Xi); |
| CRYPTO_store_u32_be(&ivec[12], CRYPTO_load_u32_be(&ivec[12]) + len / 16); |
| return len; |
| case gcm_x86_vaes_avx10_512: |
| len &= kSizeTWithoutLower4Bits; |
| aes_gcm_dec_update_vaes_avx10_512(in, out, len, key, ivec, Htable, Xi); |
| CRYPTO_store_u32_be(&ivec[12], CRYPTO_load_u32_be(&ivec[12]) + len / 16); |
| return len; |
| default: |
| return aesni_gcm_decrypt(in, out, len, key, ivec, Htable, Xi); |
| } |
| } |
| #endif // HW_GCM && X86_64 |
| |
| #if defined(HW_GCM) && defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64) |
| |
| static size_t hw_gcm_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t len, |
| const AES_KEY *key, uint8_t ivec[16], |
| uint8_t Xi[16], const u128 Htable[16], |
| enum gcm_impl_t impl) { |
| const size_t len_blocks = len & kSizeTWithoutLower4Bits; |
| if (!len_blocks) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| aes_gcm_enc_kernel(in, len_blocks * 8, out, Xi, ivec, key, Htable); |
| return len_blocks; |
| } |
| |
| static size_t hw_gcm_decrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t len, |
| const AES_KEY *key, uint8_t ivec[16], |
| uint8_t Xi[16], const u128 Htable[16], |
| enum gcm_impl_t impl) { |
| const size_t len_blocks = len & kSizeTWithoutLower4Bits; |
| if (!len_blocks) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| aes_gcm_dec_kernel(in, len_blocks * 8, out, Xi, ivec, key, Htable); |
| return len_blocks; |
| } |
| |
| #endif // HW_GCM && AARCH64 |
| |
| void CRYPTO_ghash_init(gmult_func *out_mult, ghash_func *out_hash, |
| u128 out_table[16], const uint8_t gcm_key[16]) { |
| // H is passed to |gcm_init_*| as a pair of byte-swapped, 64-bit values. |
| uint64_t H[2] = {CRYPTO_load_u64_be(gcm_key), |
| CRYPTO_load_u64_be(gcm_key + 8)}; |
| |
| #if defined(GHASH_ASM_X86_64) |
| if (crypto_gcm_clmul_enabled()) { |
| if (CRYPTO_is_AVX512BW_capable() && CRYPTO_is_AVX512VL_capable() && |
| CRYPTO_is_VPCLMULQDQ_capable() && CRYPTO_is_BMI2_capable()) { |
| gcm_init_vpclmulqdq_avx10(out_table, H); |
| *out_mult = gcm_gmult_vpclmulqdq_avx10; |
| if (CRYPTO_cpu_avoid_zmm_registers()) { |
| *out_hash = gcm_ghash_vpclmulqdq_avx10_256; |
| } else { |
| *out_hash = gcm_ghash_vpclmulqdq_avx10_512; |
| } |
| return; |
| } |
| if (CRYPTO_is_AVX_capable() && CRYPTO_is_MOVBE_capable()) { |
| gcm_init_avx(out_table, H); |
| *out_mult = gcm_gmult_avx; |
| *out_hash = gcm_ghash_avx; |
| return; |
| } |
| gcm_init_clmul(out_table, H); |
| *out_mult = gcm_gmult_clmul; |
| *out_hash = gcm_ghash_clmul; |
| return; |
| } |
| if (CRYPTO_is_SSSE3_capable()) { |
| gcm_init_ssse3(out_table, H); |
| *out_mult = gcm_gmult_ssse3; |
| *out_hash = gcm_ghash_ssse3; |
| return; |
| } |
| #elif defined(GHASH_ASM_X86) |
| if (crypto_gcm_clmul_enabled()) { |
| gcm_init_clmul(out_table, H); |
| *out_mult = gcm_gmult_clmul; |
| *out_hash = gcm_ghash_clmul; |
| return; |
| } |
| if (CRYPTO_is_SSSE3_capable()) { |
| gcm_init_ssse3(out_table, H); |
| *out_mult = gcm_gmult_ssse3; |
| *out_hash = gcm_ghash_ssse3; |
| return; |
| } |
| #elif defined(GHASH_ASM_ARM) |
| if (gcm_pmull_capable()) { |
| gcm_init_v8(out_table, H); |
| *out_mult = gcm_gmult_v8; |
| *out_hash = gcm_ghash_v8; |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| if (gcm_neon_capable()) { |
| gcm_init_neon(out_table, H); |
| *out_mult = gcm_gmult_neon; |
| *out_hash = gcm_ghash_neon; |
| return; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| gcm_init_nohw(out_table, H); |
| *out_mult = gcm_gmult_nohw; |
| *out_hash = gcm_ghash_nohw; |
| } |
| |
| void CRYPTO_gcm128_init_aes_key(GCM128_KEY *gcm_key, const uint8_t *key, |
| size_t key_bytes) { |
| switch (key_bytes) { |
| case 16: |
| boringssl_fips_inc_counter(fips_counter_evp_aes_128_gcm); |
| break; |
| |
| case 32: |
| boringssl_fips_inc_counter(fips_counter_evp_aes_256_gcm); |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| OPENSSL_memset(gcm_key, 0, sizeof(*gcm_key)); |
| int is_hwaes; |
| gcm_key->ctr = aes_ctr_set_key(&gcm_key->aes, &is_hwaes, &gcm_key->block, key, |
| key_bytes); |
| |
| uint8_t ghash_key[16]; |
| OPENSSL_memset(ghash_key, 0, sizeof(ghash_key)); |
| gcm_key->block(ghash_key, ghash_key, &gcm_key->aes); |
| |
| CRYPTO_ghash_init(&gcm_key->gmult, &gcm_key->ghash, gcm_key->Htable, |
| ghash_key); |
| |
| #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) |
| #if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) |
| if (gcm_key->ghash == gcm_ghash_vpclmulqdq_avx10_256 && |
| CRYPTO_is_VAES_capable()) { |
| gcm_key->impl = gcm_x86_vaes_avx10_256; |
| } else if (gcm_key->ghash == gcm_ghash_vpclmulqdq_avx10_512 && |
| CRYPTO_is_VAES_capable()) { |
| gcm_key->impl = gcm_x86_vaes_avx10_512; |
| } else if (gcm_key->ghash == gcm_ghash_avx && is_hwaes) { |
| gcm_key->impl = gcm_x86_aesni; |
| } |
| #elif defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64) |
| if (gcm_pmull_capable() && is_hwaes) { |
| gcm_key->impl = gcm_arm64_aes; |
| } |
| #endif |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| void CRYPTO_gcm128_init_ctx(const GCM128_KEY *key, GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, |
| const uint8_t *iv, size_t iv_len) { |
| #ifdef GCM_FUNCREF |
| void (*gcm_gmult_p)(uint8_t Xi[16], const u128 Htable[16]) = key->gmult; |
| #endif |
| |
| OPENSSL_memset(&ctx->Yi, 0, sizeof(ctx->Yi)); |
| OPENSSL_memset(&ctx->Xi, 0, sizeof(ctx->Xi)); |
| ctx->len.aad = 0; |
| ctx->len.msg = 0; |
| ctx->ares = 0; |
| ctx->mres = 0; |
| |
| uint32_t ctr; |
| if (iv_len == 12) { |
| OPENSSL_memcpy(ctx->Yi, iv, 12); |
| ctx->Yi[15] = 1; |
| ctr = 1; |
| } else { |
| uint64_t len0 = iv_len; |
| |
| while (iv_len >= 16) { |
| CRYPTO_xor16(ctx->Yi, ctx->Yi, iv); |
| GCM_MUL(key, ctx, Yi); |
| iv += 16; |
| iv_len -= 16; |
| } |
| if (iv_len) { |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < iv_len; ++i) { |
| ctx->Yi[i] ^= iv[i]; |
| } |
| GCM_MUL(key, ctx, Yi); |
| } |
| |
| uint8_t len_block[16]; |
| OPENSSL_memset(len_block, 0, 8); |
| CRYPTO_store_u64_be(len_block + 8, len0 << 3); |
| CRYPTO_xor16(ctx->Yi, ctx->Yi, len_block); |
| |
| GCM_MUL(key, ctx, Yi); |
| ctr = CRYPTO_load_u32_be(ctx->Yi + 12); |
| } |
| |
| key->block(ctx->Yi, ctx->EK0, &key->aes); |
| ++ctr; |
| CRYPTO_store_u32_be(ctx->Yi + 12, ctr); |
| } |
| |
| int CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(const GCM128_KEY *key, GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, |
| const uint8_t *aad, size_t aad_len) { |
| #ifdef GCM_FUNCREF |
| void (*gcm_gmult_p)(uint8_t Xi[16], const u128 Htable[16]) = key->gmult; |
| void (*gcm_ghash_p)(uint8_t Xi[16], const u128 Htable[16], const uint8_t *inp, |
| size_t len) = key->ghash; |
| #endif |
| |
| if (ctx->len.msg != 0) { |
| // The caller must have finished the AAD before providing other input. |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| uint64_t alen = ctx->len.aad + aad_len; |
| if (alen > (UINT64_C(1) << 61) || (sizeof(aad_len) == 8 && alen < aad_len)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| ctx->len.aad = alen; |
| |
| unsigned n = ctx->ares; |
| if (n) { |
| while (n && aad_len) { |
| ctx->Xi[n] ^= *(aad++); |
| --aad_len; |
| n = (n + 1) % 16; |
| } |
| if (n == 0) { |
| GCM_MUL(key, ctx, Xi); |
| } else { |
| ctx->ares = n; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // Process a whole number of blocks. |
| size_t len_blocks = aad_len & kSizeTWithoutLower4Bits; |
| if (len_blocks != 0) { |
| GHASH(key, ctx, aad, len_blocks); |
| aad += len_blocks; |
| aad_len -= len_blocks; |
| } |
| |
| // Process the remainder. |
| if (aad_len != 0) { |
| n = (unsigned int)aad_len; |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < aad_len; ++i) { |
| ctx->Xi[i] ^= aad[i]; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| ctx->ares = n; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(const GCM128_KEY *key, GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, |
| const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t len) { |
| #ifdef GCM_FUNCREF |
| void (*gcm_gmult_p)(uint8_t Xi[16], const u128 Htable[16]) = key->gmult; |
| void (*gcm_ghash_p)(uint8_t Xi[16], const u128 Htable[16], const uint8_t *inp, |
| size_t len) = key->ghash; |
| #endif |
| |
| uint64_t mlen = ctx->len.msg + len; |
| if (mlen > ((UINT64_C(1) << 36) - 32) || |
| (sizeof(len) == 8 && mlen < len)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| ctx->len.msg = mlen; |
| |
| if (ctx->ares) { |
| // First call to encrypt finalizes GHASH(AAD) |
| GCM_MUL(key, ctx, Xi); |
| ctx->ares = 0; |
| } |
| |
| unsigned n = ctx->mres; |
| if (n) { |
| while (n && len) { |
| ctx->Xi[n] ^= *(out++) = *(in++) ^ ctx->EKi[n]; |
| --len; |
| n = (n + 1) % 16; |
| } |
| if (n == 0) { |
| GCM_MUL(key, ctx, Xi); |
| } else { |
| ctx->mres = n; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(HW_GCM) |
| // Check |len| to work around a C language bug. See https://crbug.com/1019588. |
| if (key->impl != gcm_separate && len > 0) { |
| // |hw_gcm_encrypt| may not process all the input given to it. It may |
| // not process *any* of its input if it is deemed too small. |
| size_t bulk = hw_gcm_encrypt(in, out, len, &key->aes, ctx->Yi, ctx->Xi, |
| key->Htable, key->impl); |
| in += bulk; |
| out += bulk; |
| len -= bulk; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| uint32_t ctr = CRYPTO_load_u32_be(ctx->Yi + 12); |
| ctr128_f stream = key->ctr; |
| while (len >= GHASH_CHUNK) { |
| (*stream)(in, out, GHASH_CHUNK / 16, &key->aes, ctx->Yi); |
| ctr += GHASH_CHUNK / 16; |
| CRYPTO_store_u32_be(ctx->Yi + 12, ctr); |
| GHASH(key, ctx, out, GHASH_CHUNK); |
| out += GHASH_CHUNK; |
| in += GHASH_CHUNK; |
| len -= GHASH_CHUNK; |
| } |
| |
| size_t len_blocks = len & kSizeTWithoutLower4Bits; |
| if (len_blocks != 0) { |
| size_t j = len_blocks / 16; |
| (*stream)(in, out, j, &key->aes, ctx->Yi); |
| ctr += (uint32_t)j; |
| CRYPTO_store_u32_be(ctx->Yi + 12, ctr); |
| in += len_blocks; |
| len -= len_blocks; |
| GHASH(key, ctx, out, len_blocks); |
| out += len_blocks; |
| } |
| |
| if (len) { |
| key->block(ctx->Yi, ctx->EKi, &key->aes); |
| ++ctr; |
| CRYPTO_store_u32_be(ctx->Yi + 12, ctr); |
| while (len--) { |
| ctx->Xi[n] ^= out[n] = in[n] ^ ctx->EKi[n]; |
| ++n; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| ctx->mres = n; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(const GCM128_KEY *key, GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, |
| const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t len) { |
| #ifdef GCM_FUNCREF |
| void (*gcm_gmult_p)(uint8_t Xi[16], const u128 Htable[16]) = key->gmult; |
| void (*gcm_ghash_p)(uint8_t Xi[16], const u128 Htable[16], const uint8_t *inp, |
| size_t len) = key->ghash; |
| #endif |
| |
| uint64_t mlen = ctx->len.msg + len; |
| if (mlen > ((UINT64_C(1) << 36) - 32) || |
| (sizeof(len) == 8 && mlen < len)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| ctx->len.msg = mlen; |
| |
| if (ctx->ares) { |
| // First call to decrypt finalizes GHASH(AAD) |
| GCM_MUL(key, ctx, Xi); |
| ctx->ares = 0; |
| } |
| |
| unsigned n = ctx->mres; |
| if (n) { |
| while (n && len) { |
| uint8_t c = *(in++); |
| *(out++) = c ^ ctx->EKi[n]; |
| ctx->Xi[n] ^= c; |
| --len; |
| n = (n + 1) % 16; |
| } |
| if (n == 0) { |
| GCM_MUL(key, ctx, Xi); |
| } else { |
| ctx->mres = n; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(HW_GCM) |
| // Check |len| to work around a C language bug. See https://crbug.com/1019588. |
| if (key->impl != gcm_separate && len > 0) { |
| // |hw_gcm_decrypt| may not process all the input given to it. It may |
| // not process *any* of its input if it is deemed too small. |
| size_t bulk = hw_gcm_decrypt(in, out, len, &key->aes, ctx->Yi, ctx->Xi, |
| key->Htable, key->impl); |
| in += bulk; |
| out += bulk; |
| len -= bulk; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| uint32_t ctr = CRYPTO_load_u32_be(ctx->Yi + 12); |
| ctr128_f stream = key->ctr; |
| while (len >= GHASH_CHUNK) { |
| GHASH(key, ctx, in, GHASH_CHUNK); |
| (*stream)(in, out, GHASH_CHUNK / 16, &key->aes, ctx->Yi); |
| ctr += GHASH_CHUNK / 16; |
| CRYPTO_store_u32_be(ctx->Yi + 12, ctr); |
| out += GHASH_CHUNK; |
| in += GHASH_CHUNK; |
| len -= GHASH_CHUNK; |
| } |
| |
| size_t len_blocks = len & kSizeTWithoutLower4Bits; |
| if (len_blocks != 0) { |
| size_t j = len_blocks / 16; |
| GHASH(key, ctx, in, len_blocks); |
| (*stream)(in, out, j, &key->aes, ctx->Yi); |
| ctr += (uint32_t)j; |
| CRYPTO_store_u32_be(ctx->Yi + 12, ctr); |
| out += len_blocks; |
| in += len_blocks; |
| len -= len_blocks; |
| } |
| |
| if (len) { |
| key->block(ctx->Yi, ctx->EKi, &key->aes); |
| ++ctr; |
| CRYPTO_store_u32_be(ctx->Yi + 12, ctr); |
| while (len--) { |
| uint8_t c = in[n]; |
| ctx->Xi[n] ^= c; |
| out[n] = c ^ ctx->EKi[n]; |
| ++n; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| ctx->mres = n; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int CRYPTO_gcm128_finish(const GCM128_KEY *key, GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, |
| const uint8_t *tag, size_t len) { |
| #ifdef GCM_FUNCREF |
| void (*gcm_gmult_p)(uint8_t Xi[16], const u128 Htable[16]) = key->gmult; |
| #endif |
| |
| if (ctx->mres || ctx->ares) { |
| GCM_MUL(key, ctx, Xi); |
| } |
| |
| uint8_t len_block[16]; |
| CRYPTO_store_u64_be(len_block, ctx->len.aad << 3); |
| CRYPTO_store_u64_be(len_block + 8, ctx->len.msg << 3); |
| CRYPTO_xor16(ctx->Xi, ctx->Xi, len_block); |
| GCM_MUL(key, ctx, Xi); |
| CRYPTO_xor16(ctx->Xi, ctx->Xi, ctx->EK0); |
| |
| if (tag && len <= sizeof(ctx->Xi)) { |
| return CRYPTO_memcmp(ctx->Xi, tag, len) == 0; |
| } else { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(const GCM128_KEY *key, GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, uint8_t *tag, |
| size_t len) { |
| CRYPTO_gcm128_finish(key, ctx, NULL, 0); |
| OPENSSL_memcpy(tag, ctx->Xi, len <= sizeof(ctx->Xi) ? len : sizeof(ctx->Xi)); |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(OPENSSL_X86) || defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) |
| int crypto_gcm_clmul_enabled(void) { |
| #if defined(GHASH_ASM_X86) || defined(GHASH_ASM_X86_64) |
| return CRYPTO_is_FXSR_capable() && CRYPTO_is_PCLMUL_capable(); |
| #else |
| return 0; |
| #endif |
| } |
| #endif |