| /* |
| * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
| * |
| * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
| * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
| * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
| * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
| */ |
| |
| #include <openssl/hmac.h> |
| |
| #include <assert.h> |
| #include <string.h> |
| |
| #include <openssl/digest.h> |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> |
| |
| #include "../../internal.h" |
| #include "../service_indicator/internal.h" |
| |
| |
| uint8_t *HMAC(const EVP_MD *evp_md, const void *key, size_t key_len, |
| const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len, uint8_t *out, |
| unsigned int *out_len) { |
| HMAC_CTX ctx; |
| HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx); |
| |
| // The underlying hash functions should not set the FIPS service indicator |
| // until all operations have completed. |
| FIPS_service_indicator_lock_state(); |
| const int ok = HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, key, key_len, evp_md, NULL) && |
| HMAC_Update(&ctx, data, data_len) && |
| HMAC_Final(&ctx, out, out_len); |
| FIPS_service_indicator_unlock_state(); |
| |
| HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); |
| |
| if (!ok) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| HMAC_verify_service_indicator(evp_md); |
| return out; |
| } |
| |
| void HMAC_CTX_init(HMAC_CTX *ctx) { |
| ctx->md = NULL; |
| EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx->i_ctx); |
| EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx->o_ctx); |
| EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx->md_ctx); |
| } |
| |
| HMAC_CTX *HMAC_CTX_new(void) { |
| HMAC_CTX *ctx = |
| reinterpret_cast<HMAC_CTX *>(OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(HMAC_CTX))); |
| if (ctx != NULL) { |
| HMAC_CTX_init(ctx); |
| } |
| return ctx; |
| } |
| |
| void HMAC_CTX_cleanup(HMAC_CTX *ctx) { |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->i_ctx); |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->o_ctx); |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->md_ctx); |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx, sizeof(HMAC_CTX)); |
| } |
| |
| void HMAC_CTX_cleanse(HMAC_CTX *ctx) { |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanse(&ctx->i_ctx); |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanse(&ctx->o_ctx); |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanse(&ctx->md_ctx); |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx, sizeof(HMAC_CTX)); |
| } |
| |
| void HMAC_CTX_free(HMAC_CTX *ctx) { |
| if (ctx == NULL) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| HMAC_CTX_cleanup(ctx); |
| OPENSSL_free(ctx); |
| } |
| |
| int HMAC_Init_ex(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, size_t key_len, |
| const EVP_MD *md, ENGINE *impl) { |
| int ret = 0; |
| FIPS_service_indicator_lock_state(); |
| |
| if (md == NULL) { |
| md = ctx->md; |
| } |
| |
| // If either |key| is non-NULL or |md| has changed, initialize with a new key |
| // rather than rewinding the previous one. |
| // |
| // TODO(davidben,eroman): Passing the previous |md| with a NULL |key| is |
| // ambiguous between using the empty key and reusing the previous key. There |
| // exist callers which intend the latter, but the former is an awkward edge |
| // case. Fix to API to avoid this. |
| if (md != ctx->md || key != NULL) { |
| uint8_t pad[EVP_MAX_MD_BLOCK_SIZE]; |
| uint8_t key_block[EVP_MAX_MD_BLOCK_SIZE]; |
| unsigned key_block_len; |
| |
| size_t block_size = EVP_MD_block_size(md); |
| assert(block_size <= sizeof(key_block)); |
| assert(EVP_MD_size(md) <= block_size); |
| if (block_size < key_len) { |
| // Long keys are hashed. |
| if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, md, impl) || |
| !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->md_ctx, key, key_len) || |
| !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, key_block, &key_block_len)) { |
| goto out; |
| } |
| } else { |
| assert(key_len <= sizeof(key_block)); |
| OPENSSL_memcpy(key_block, key, key_len); |
| key_block_len = (unsigned)key_len; |
| } |
| // Keys are then padded with zeros. |
| OPENSSL_memset(key_block + key_block_len, 0, block_size - key_block_len); |
| |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < block_size; i++) { |
| pad[i] = 0x36 ^ key_block[i]; |
| } |
| if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx->i_ctx, md, impl) || |
| !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->i_ctx, pad, block_size)) { |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < block_size; i++) { |
| pad[i] = 0x5c ^ key_block[i]; |
| } |
| if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx->o_ctx, md, impl) || |
| !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->o_ctx, pad, block_size)) { |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| ctx->md = md; |
| } |
| |
| ret = EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, &ctx->i_ctx); |
| |
| out: |
| FIPS_service_indicator_unlock_state(); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int HMAC_Update(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len) { |
| return EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->md_ctx, data, data_len); |
| } |
| |
| int HMAC_Final(HMAC_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, unsigned int *out_len) { |
| int ret = 0; |
| unsigned int i; |
| uint8_t buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| |
| FIPS_service_indicator_lock_state(); |
| // TODO(davidben): The only thing that can officially fail here is |
| // |EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex|, but even that should be impossible in this case. |
| if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, buf, &i) || |
| !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, &ctx->o_ctx) || |
| !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->md_ctx, buf, i) || |
| !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, out, out_len)) { |
| *out_len = 0; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| ret = 1; |
| |
| out: |
| FIPS_service_indicator_unlock_state(); |
| if (ret) { |
| HMAC_verify_service_indicator(ctx->md); |
| } |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| size_t HMAC_size(const HMAC_CTX *ctx) { return EVP_MD_size(ctx->md); } |
| |
| const EVP_MD *HMAC_CTX_get_md(const HMAC_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->md; } |
| |
| int HMAC_CTX_copy_ex(HMAC_CTX *dest, const HMAC_CTX *src) { |
| if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&dest->i_ctx, &src->i_ctx) || |
| !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&dest->o_ctx, &src->o_ctx) || |
| !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&dest->md_ctx, &src->md_ctx)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| dest->md = src->md; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| void HMAC_CTX_reset(HMAC_CTX *ctx) { |
| HMAC_CTX_cleanup(ctx); |
| HMAC_CTX_init(ctx); |
| } |
| |
| int HMAC_Init(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int key_len, const EVP_MD *md) { |
| if (key && md) { |
| HMAC_CTX_init(ctx); |
| } |
| return HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, key, key_len, md, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| int HMAC_CTX_copy(HMAC_CTX *dest, const HMAC_CTX *src) { |
| HMAC_CTX_init(dest); |
| return HMAC_CTX_copy_ex(dest, src); |
| } |