ssl/s3_both.cc - boringssl - Git at Google

 /*
  * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
  *
  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
  * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
  * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
  */

 #include <openssl/ssl.h>

 #include <assert.h>
 #include <limits.h>
 #include <string.h>

 #include <tuple>

 #include <openssl/buf.h>
 #include <openssl/bytestring.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/md5.h>
 #include <openssl/mem.h>
 #include <openssl/nid.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include <openssl/sha.h>

 #include "../crypto/internal.h"
 #include "internal.h"


 BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN

 static bool add_record_to_flight(SSL *ssl, uint8_t type,
                                  Span<const uint8_t> in) {
   // The caller should have flushed |pending_hs_data| first.
   assert(!ssl->s3->pending_hs_data);
   // We'll never add a flight while in the process of writing it out.
   assert(ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset == 0);

   if (ssl->s3->pending_flight == nullptr) {
     ssl->s3->pending_flight.reset(BUF_MEM_new());
     if (ssl->s3->pending_flight == nullptr) {
       return false;
     }
   }

   size_t max_out = in.size() + SSL_max_seal_overhead(ssl);
   size_t new_cap = ssl->s3->pending_flight->length + max_out;
   if (max_out < in.size() || new_cap < max_out) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
     return false;
   }

   size_t len;
   if (!BUF_MEM_reserve(ssl->s3->pending_flight.get(), new_cap) ||
       !tls_seal_record(ssl,
                        (uint8_t *)ssl->s3->pending_flight->data +
                            ssl->s3->pending_flight->length,
                        &len, max_out, type, in.data(), in.size())) {
     return false;
   }

   ssl->s3->pending_flight->length += len;
   return true;
 }

 bool tls_init_message(const SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb, CBB *body, uint8_t type) {
   // Pick a modest size hint to save most of the |realloc| calls.
   if (!CBB_init(cbb, 64) ||      //
       !CBB_add_u8(cbb, type) ||  //
       !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(cbb, body)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
     CBB_cleanup(cbb);
     return false;
   }

   return true;
 }

 bool tls_finish_message(const SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb, Array<uint8_t> *out_msg) {
   return CBBFinishArray(cbb, out_msg);
 }

 bool tls_add_message(SSL *ssl, Array<uint8_t> msg) {
   // Pack handshake data into the minimal number of records. This avoids
   // unnecessary encryption overhead, notably in TLS 1.3 where we send several
   // encrypted messages in a row. For now, we do not do this for the null
   // cipher. The benefit is smaller and there is a risk of breaking buggy
   // implementations.
   //
   // TODO(crbug.com/374991962): See if we can do this uniformly.
   Span<const uint8_t> rest = msg;
   if (!SSL_is_quic(ssl) && ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->is_null_cipher()) {
     while (!rest.empty()) {
       Span<const uint8_t> chunk = rest.subspan(0, ssl->max_send_fragment);
       rest = rest.subspan(chunk.size());

       if (!add_record_to_flight(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, chunk)) {
         return false;
       }
     }
   } else {
     while (!rest.empty()) {
       // Flush if |pending_hs_data| is full.
       if (ssl->s3->pending_hs_data &&
           ssl->s3->pending_hs_data->length >= ssl->max_send_fragment &&
           !tls_flush_pending_hs_data(ssl)) {
         return false;
       }

       size_t pending_len =
           ssl->s3->pending_hs_data ? ssl->s3->pending_hs_data->length : 0;
       Span<const uint8_t> chunk =
           rest.subspan(0, ssl->max_send_fragment - pending_len);
       assert(!chunk.empty());
       rest = rest.subspan(chunk.size());

       if (!ssl->s3->pending_hs_data) {
         ssl->s3->pending_hs_data.reset(BUF_MEM_new());
       }
       if (!ssl->s3->pending_hs_data ||
           !BUF_MEM_append(ssl->s3->pending_hs_data.get(), chunk.data(),
                           chunk.size())) {
         return false;
       }
     }
   }

   ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, msg);
   // TODO(svaldez): Move this up a layer to fix abstraction for SSLTranscript on
   // hs.
   if (ssl->s3->hs != NULL &&  //
       !ssl->s3->hs->transcript.Update(msg)) {
     return false;
   }
   return true;
 }

 bool tls_flush_pending_hs_data(SSL *ssl) {
   if (!ssl->s3->pending_hs_data || ssl->s3->pending_hs_data->length == 0) {
     return true;
   }

   UniquePtr<BUF_MEM> pending_hs_data = std::move(ssl->s3->pending_hs_data);
   auto data = Span(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(pending_hs_data->data),
                    pending_hs_data->length);
   if (SSL_is_quic(ssl)) {
     if ((ssl->s3->hs == nullptr || !ssl->s3->hs->hints_requested) &&
         !ssl->quic_method->add_handshake_data(ssl, ssl->s3->quic_write_level,
                                               data.data(), data.size())) {
       OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_QUIC_INTERNAL_ERROR);
       return false;
     }
     return true;
   }

   return add_record_to_flight(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, data);
 }

 bool tls_add_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl) {
   if (SSL_is_quic(ssl)) {
     return true;
   }

   static const uint8_t kChangeCipherSpec[1] = {SSL3_MT_CCS};
   if (!tls_flush_pending_hs_data(ssl) ||
       !add_record_to_flight(ssl, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
                             kChangeCipherSpec)) {
     return false;
   }

   ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
                       kChangeCipherSpec);
   return true;
 }

 int tls_flush(SSL *ssl) {
   if (!tls_flush_pending_hs_data(ssl)) {
     return -1;
   }

   if (SSL_is_quic(ssl)) {
     if (ssl->s3->write_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_none) {
       OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
       return -1;
     }

     if (!ssl->quic_method->flush_flight(ssl)) {
       OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_QUIC_INTERNAL_ERROR);
       return -1;
     }
   }

   if (ssl->s3->pending_flight == nullptr) {
     return 1;
   }

   if (ssl->s3->write_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_none) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
     return -1;
   }

   static_assert(INT_MAX <= 0xffffffff, "int is larger than 32 bits");
   if (ssl->s3->pending_flight->length > INT_MAX) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
     return -1;
   }

   // If there is pending data in the write buffer, it must be flushed out before
   // any new data in pending_flight.
   if (!ssl->s3->write_buffer.empty()) {
     int ret = ssl_write_buffer_flush(ssl);
     if (ret <= 0) {
       ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE;
       return ret;
     }
   }

   if (ssl->wbio == nullptr) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
     return -1;
   }

   // Write the pending flight.
   while (ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset < ssl->s3->pending_flight->length) {
     int ret = BIO_write(
         ssl->wbio.get(),
         ssl->s3->pending_flight->data + ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset,
         ssl->s3->pending_flight->length - ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset);
     if (ret <= 0) {
       ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE;
       return ret;
     }

     ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset += ret;
   }

   if (BIO_flush(ssl->wbio.get()) <= 0) {
     ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE;
     return -1;
   }

   ssl->s3->pending_flight.reset();
   ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset = 0;
   return 1;
 }

 static ssl_open_record_t read_v2_client_hello(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_consumed,
                                               Span<const uint8_t> in) {
   *out_consumed = 0;
   assert(in.size() >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
   // Determine the length of the V2ClientHello.
   size_t msg_length = ((in[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | in[1];
   if (msg_length > (1024 * 4)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
     return ssl_open_record_error;
   }
   if (msg_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - 2) {
     // Reject lengths that are too short early. We have already read
     // |SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH| bytes, so we should not attempt to process an
     // (invalid) V2ClientHello which would be shorter than that.
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
     return ssl_open_record_error;
   }

   // Ask for the remainder of the V2ClientHello.
   if (in.size() < 2 + msg_length) {
     *out_consumed = 2 + msg_length;
     return ssl_open_record_partial;
   }

   CBS v2_client_hello = CBS(in.subspan(2, msg_length));
   // The V2ClientHello without the length is incorporated into the handshake
   // hash. This is only ever called at the start of the handshake, so hs is
   // guaranteed to be non-NULL.
   if (!ssl->s3->hs->transcript.Update(v2_client_hello)) {
     return ssl_open_record_error;
   }

   ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, 0 /* V2ClientHello */,
                       v2_client_hello);

   uint8_t msg_type;
   uint16_t version, cipher_spec_length, session_id_length, challenge_length;
   CBS cipher_specs, session_id, challenge;
   if (!CBS_get_u8(&v2_client_hello, &msg_type) ||
       !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &version) ||
       !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &cipher_spec_length) ||
       !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &session_id_length) ||
       !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &challenge_length) ||
       !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &cipher_specs, cipher_spec_length) ||
       !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &session_id, session_id_length) ||
       !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &challenge, challenge_length) ||
       CBS_len(&v2_client_hello) != 0) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
     return ssl_open_record_error;
   }

   // msg_type has already been checked.
   assert(msg_type == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO);

   // The client_random is the V2ClientHello challenge. Truncate or left-pad with
   // zeros as needed.
   size_t rand_len = CBS_len(&challenge);
   if (rand_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) {
     rand_len = SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
   }
   uint8_t random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
   OPENSSL_memset(random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
   OPENSSL_memcpy(random + (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - rand_len), CBS_data(&challenge),
                  rand_len);

   // Write out an equivalent TLS ClientHello directly to the handshake buffer.
   size_t max_v3_client_hello = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2 /* version */ +
                                SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 /* session ID length */ +
                                2 /* cipher list length */ +
                                CBS_len(&cipher_specs) / 3 * 2 +
                                1 /* compression length */ + 1 /* compression */;
   ScopedCBB client_hello;
   CBB hello_body, cipher_suites;
   if (!ssl->s3->hs_buf) {
     ssl->s3->hs_buf.reset(BUF_MEM_new());
   }
   if (!ssl->s3->hs_buf ||
       !BUF_MEM_reserve(ssl->s3->hs_buf.get(), max_v3_client_hello) ||
       !CBB_init_fixed(client_hello.get(), (uint8_t *)ssl->s3->hs_buf->data,
                       ssl->s3->hs_buf->max) ||
       !CBB_add_u8(client_hello.get(), SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) ||
       !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(client_hello.get(), &hello_body) ||
       !CBB_add_u16(&hello_body, version) ||
       !CBB_add_bytes(&hello_body, random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
       // No session id.
       !CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) ||
       !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&hello_body, &cipher_suites)) {
     return ssl_open_record_error;
   }

   // Copy the cipher suites.
   while (CBS_len(&cipher_specs) > 0) {
     uint32_t cipher_spec;
     if (!CBS_get_u24(&cipher_specs, &cipher_spec)) {
       OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
       return ssl_open_record_error;
     }

     // Skip SSLv2 ciphers.
     if ((cipher_spec & 0xff0000) != 0) {
       continue;
     }
     if (!CBB_add_u16(&cipher_suites, cipher_spec)) {
       OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
       return ssl_open_record_error;
     }
   }

   // Add the null compression scheme and finish.
   if (!CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 1) ||  //
       !CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) ||  //
       !CBB_finish(client_hello.get(), NULL, &ssl->s3->hs_buf->length)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
     return ssl_open_record_error;
   }

   *out_consumed = 2 + msg_length;
   ssl->s3->is_v2_hello = true;
   return ssl_open_record_success;
 }

 static bool parse_message(const SSL *ssl, SSLMessage *out,
                           size_t *out_bytes_needed) {
   if (!ssl->s3->hs_buf) {
     *out_bytes_needed = 4;
     return false;
   }

   CBS cbs;
   uint32_t len;
   CBS_init(&cbs, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(ssl->s3->hs_buf->data),
            ssl->s3->hs_buf->length);
   if (!CBS_get_u8(&cbs, &out->type) ||  //
       !CBS_get_u24(&cbs, &len)) {
     *out_bytes_needed = 4;
     return false;
   }

   if (!CBS_get_bytes(&cbs, &out->body, len)) {
     *out_bytes_needed = 4 + len;
     return false;
   }

   CBS_init(&out->raw, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(ssl->s3->hs_buf->data),
            4 + len);
   out->is_v2_hello = ssl->s3->is_v2_hello;
   return true;
 }

 bool tls_get_message(const SSL *ssl, SSLMessage *out) {
   size_t unused;
   if (!parse_message(ssl, out, &unused)) {
     return false;
   }
   if (!ssl->s3->has_message) {
     if (!out->is_v2_hello) {
       ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, out->raw);
     }
     ssl->s3->has_message = true;
   }
   return true;
 }

 bool tls_can_accept_handshake_data(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert) {
   // If there is a complete message, the caller must have consumed it first.
   SSLMessage msg;
   size_t bytes_needed;
   if (parse_message(ssl, &msg, &bytes_needed)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
     *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
     return false;
   }

   // Enforce the limit so the peer cannot force us to buffer 16MB.
   if (bytes_needed > 4 + ssl_max_handshake_message_len(ssl)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
     *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
     return false;
   }

   return true;
 }

 bool tls_has_unprocessed_handshake_data(const SSL *ssl) {
   size_t msg_len = 0;
   if (ssl->s3->has_message) {
     SSLMessage msg;
     size_t unused;
     if (parse_message(ssl, &msg, &unused)) {
       msg_len = CBS_len(&msg.raw);
     }
   }

   return ssl->s3->hs_buf && ssl->s3->hs_buf->length > msg_len;
 }

 bool tls_append_handshake_data(SSL *ssl, Span<const uint8_t> data) {
   // Re-create the handshake buffer if needed.
   if (!ssl->s3->hs_buf) {
     ssl->s3->hs_buf.reset(BUF_MEM_new());
   }
   return ssl->s3->hs_buf &&
          BUF_MEM_append(ssl->s3->hs_buf.get(), data.data(), data.size());
 }

 ssl_open_record_t tls_open_handshake(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_consumed,
                                      uint8_t *out_alert, Span<uint8_t> in) {
   *out_consumed = 0;
   // Bypass the record layer for the first message to handle V2ClientHello.
   if (ssl->server && !ssl->s3->v2_hello_done) {
     // Ask for the first 5 bytes, the size of the TLS record header. This is
     // sufficient to detect a V2ClientHello and ensures that we never read
     // beyond the first record.
     if (in.size() < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
       *out_consumed = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
       return ssl_open_record_partial;
     }

     // Some dedicated error codes for protocol mixups should the application
     // wish to interpret them differently. (These do not overlap with
     // ClientHello or V2ClientHello.)
     auto str = bssl::BytesAsStringView(in);
     if (str.substr(0, 4) == "GET " ||   //
         str.substr(0, 5) == "POST " ||  //
         str.substr(0, 5) == "HEAD " ||  //
         str.substr(0, 4) == "PUT ") {
       OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST);
       *out_alert = 0;
       return ssl_open_record_error;
     }
     if (str.substr(0, 5) == "CONNE") {
       OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST);
       *out_alert = 0;
       return ssl_open_record_error;
     }

     // Check for a V2ClientHello.
     if ((in[0] & 0x80) != 0 && in[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO &&
         in[3] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
       auto ret = read_v2_client_hello(ssl, out_consumed, in);
       if (ret == ssl_open_record_error) {
         *out_alert = 0;
       } else if (ret == ssl_open_record_success) {
         ssl->s3->v2_hello_done = true;
       }
       return ret;
     }

     ssl->s3->v2_hello_done = true;
   }

   uint8_t type;
   Span<uint8_t> body;
   auto ret = tls_open_record(ssl, &type, &body, out_consumed, out_alert, in);
   if (ret != ssl_open_record_success) {
     return ret;
   }

   if (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
     *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
     return ssl_open_record_error;
   }

   // Append the entire handshake record to the buffer.
   if (!tls_append_handshake_data(ssl, body)) {
     *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
     return ssl_open_record_error;
   }

   return ssl_open_record_success;
 }

 void tls_next_message(SSL *ssl) {
   SSLMessage msg;
   if (!tls_get_message(ssl, &msg) ||  //
       !ssl->s3->hs_buf ||             //
       ssl->s3->hs_buf->length < CBS_len(&msg.raw)) {
     assert(0);
     return;
   }

   OPENSSL_memmove(ssl->s3->hs_buf->data,
                   ssl->s3->hs_buf->data + CBS_len(&msg.raw),
                   ssl->s3->hs_buf->length - CBS_len(&msg.raw));
   ssl->s3->hs_buf->length -= CBS_len(&msg.raw);
   ssl->s3->is_v2_hello = false;
   ssl->s3->has_message = false;

   // Post-handshake messages are rare, so release the buffer after every
   // message. During the handshake, |on_handshake_complete| will release it.
   if (!SSL_in_init(ssl) && ssl->s3->hs_buf->length == 0) {
     ssl->s3->hs_buf.reset();
   }
 }

 namespace {

 class CipherScorer {
  public:
   using Score = int;
   static constexpr Score kMinScore = 0;

   virtual ~CipherScorer() = default;

   virtual Score Evaluate(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) const = 0;
 };

 // AesHwCipherScorer scores cipher suites based on whether AES is supported in
 // hardware.
 class AesHwCipherScorer : public CipherScorer {
  public:
   explicit AesHwCipherScorer(bool has_aes_hw) : aes_is_fine_(has_aes_hw) {}

   virtual ~AesHwCipherScorer() override = default;

   Score Evaluate(const SSL_CIPHER *a) const override {
     return
         // Something is always preferable to nothing.
         1 +
         // Either AES is fine, or else ChaCha20 is preferred.
         ((aes_is_fine_ || a->algorithm_enc == SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305) ? 1 : 0);
   }

  private:
   const bool aes_is_fine_;
 };

 // CNsaCipherScorer prefers AES-256-GCM over AES-128-GCM over anything else.
 class CNsaCipherScorer : public CipherScorer {
  public:
   virtual ~CNsaCipherScorer() override = default;

   Score Evaluate(const SSL_CIPHER *a) const override {
     if (a->id == TLS1_3_CK_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
       return 3;
     } else if (a->id == TLS1_3_CK_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
       return 2;
     }
     return 1;
   }
 };

 }  // namespace

 bool ssl_tls13_cipher_meets_policy(uint16_t cipher_id,
                                    enum ssl_compliance_policy_t policy) {
   switch (policy) {
     case ssl_compliance_policy_none:
     case ssl_compliance_policy_cnsa_202407:
       return true;

     case ssl_compliance_policy_fips_202205:
       switch (cipher_id) {
         case TLS1_3_CK_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 & 0xffff:
         case TLS1_3_CK_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 & 0xffff:
           return true;
         case TLS1_3_CK_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 & 0xffff:
           return false;
         default:
           assert(false);
           return false;
       }

     case ssl_compliance_policy_wpa3_192_202304:
       switch (cipher_id) {
         case TLS1_3_CK_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 & 0xffff:
           return true;
         case TLS1_3_CK_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 & 0xffff:
         case TLS1_3_CK_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 & 0xffff:
           return false;
         default:
           assert(false);
           return false;
       }
   }

   assert(false);
   return false;
 }

 const SSL_CIPHER *ssl_choose_tls13_cipher(CBS cipher_suites, bool has_aes_hw,
                                           uint16_t version,
                                           enum ssl_compliance_policy_t policy) {
   if (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) % 2 != 0) {
     return nullptr;
   }

   const SSL_CIPHER *best = nullptr;
   AesHwCipherScorer aes_hw_scorer(has_aes_hw);
   CNsaCipherScorer cnsa_scorer;
   CipherScorer *const scorer =
       (policy == ssl_compliance_policy_cnsa_202407)
           ? static_cast<CipherScorer *>(&cnsa_scorer)
           : static_cast<CipherScorer *>(&aes_hw_scorer);
   CipherScorer::Score best_score = CipherScorer::kMinScore;

   while (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) {
     uint16_t cipher_suite;
     if (!CBS_get_u16(&cipher_suites, &cipher_suite)) {
       return nullptr;
     }

     // Limit to TLS 1.3 ciphers we know about.
     const SSL_CIPHER *candidate = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite);
     if (candidate == nullptr ||
         SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(candidate) > version ||
         SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version(candidate) < version) {
       continue;
     }

     if (!ssl_tls13_cipher_meets_policy(SSL_CIPHER_get_protocol_id(candidate),
                                        policy)) {
       continue;
     }

     const CipherScorer::Score candidate_score = scorer->Evaluate(candidate);
     // |candidate_score| must be larger to displace the current choice. That way
     // the client's order controls between ciphers with an equal score.
     if (candidate_score > best_score) {
       best = candidate;
       best_score = candidate_score;
     }
   }

   return best;
 }

 BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
	/*
	* Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
	* Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
	*
	* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
	* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
	* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
	* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
	*/

	#include <openssl/ssl.h>

	#include <assert.h>
	#include <limits.h>
	#include <string.h>

	#include <tuple>

	#include <openssl/buf.h>
	#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
	#include <openssl/err.h>
	#include <openssl/evp.h>
	#include <openssl/md5.h>
	#include <openssl/mem.h>
	#include <openssl/nid.h>
	#include <openssl/rand.h>
	#include <openssl/sha.h>

	#include "../crypto/internal.h"
	#include "internal.h"


	BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN

	static bool add_record_to_flight(SSL *ssl, uint8_t type,
	Span<const uint8_t> in) {
	// The caller should have flushed \|pending_hs_data\| first.
	assert(!ssl->s3->pending_hs_data);
	// We'll never add a flight while in the process of writing it out.
	assert(ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset == 0);

	if (ssl->s3->pending_flight == nullptr) {
	ssl->s3->pending_flight.reset(BUF_MEM_new());
	if (ssl->s3->pending_flight == nullptr) {
	return false;
	}
	}

	size_t max_out = in.size() + SSL_max_seal_overhead(ssl);
	size_t new_cap = ssl->s3->pending_flight->length + max_out;
	if (max_out < in.size() \|\| new_cap < max_out) {
	OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
	return false;
	}

	size_t len;
	if (!BUF_MEM_reserve(ssl->s3->pending_flight.get(), new_cap) \|\|
	!tls_seal_record(ssl,
	(uint8_t *)ssl->s3->pending_flight->data +
	ssl->s3->pending_flight->length,
	&len, max_out, type, in.data(), in.size())) {
	return false;
	}

	ssl->s3->pending_flight->length += len;
	return true;
	}

	bool tls_init_message(const SSL ssl, CBB cbb, CBB *body, uint8_t type) {
	// Pick a modest size hint to save most of the \|realloc\| calls.
	if (!CBB_init(cbb, 64) \|\| //
	!CBB_add_u8(cbb, type) \|\| //
	!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(cbb, body)) {
	OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
	CBB_cleanup(cbb);
	return false;
	}

	return true;
	}

	bool tls_finish_message(const SSL ssl, CBB cbb, Array<uint8_t> *out_msg) {
	return CBBFinishArray(cbb, out_msg);
	}

	bool tls_add_message(SSL *ssl, Array<uint8_t> msg) {
	// Pack handshake data into the minimal number of records. This avoids
	// unnecessary encryption overhead, notably in TLS 1.3 where we send several
	// encrypted messages in a row. For now, we do not do this for the null
	// cipher. The benefit is smaller and there is a risk of breaking buggy
	// implementations.
	//
	// TODO(crbug.com/374991962): See if we can do this uniformly.
	Span<const uint8_t> rest = msg;
	if (!SSL_is_quic(ssl) && ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->is_null_cipher()) {
	while (!rest.empty()) {
	Span<const uint8_t> chunk = rest.subspan(0, ssl->max_send_fragment);
	rest = rest.subspan(chunk.size());

	if (!add_record_to_flight(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, chunk)) {
	return false;
	}
	}
	} else {
	while (!rest.empty()) {
	// Flush if \|pending_hs_data\| is full.
	if (ssl->s3->pending_hs_data &&
	ssl->s3->pending_hs_data->length >= ssl->max_send_fragment &&
	!tls_flush_pending_hs_data(ssl)) {
	return false;
	}

	size_t pending_len =
	ssl->s3->pending_hs_data ? ssl->s3->pending_hs_data->length : 0;
	Span<const uint8_t> chunk =
	rest.subspan(0, ssl->max_send_fragment - pending_len);
	assert(!chunk.empty());
	rest = rest.subspan(chunk.size());

	if (!ssl->s3->pending_hs_data) {
	ssl->s3->pending_hs_data.reset(BUF_MEM_new());
	}
	if (!ssl->s3->pending_hs_data \|\|
	!BUF_MEM_append(ssl->s3->pending_hs_data.get(), chunk.data(),
	chunk.size())) {
	return false;
	}
	}
	}

	ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, msg);
	// TODO(svaldez): Move this up a layer to fix abstraction for SSLTranscript on
	// hs.
	if (ssl->s3->hs != NULL && //
	!ssl->s3->hs->transcript.Update(msg)) {
	return false;
	}
	return true;
	}

	bool tls_flush_pending_hs_data(SSL *ssl) {
	if (!ssl->s3->pending_hs_data \|\| ssl->s3->pending_hs_data->length == 0) {
	return true;
	}

	UniquePtr<BUF_MEM> pending_hs_data = std::move(ssl->s3->pending_hs_data);
	auto data = Span(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(pending_hs_data->data),
	pending_hs_data->length);
	if (SSL_is_quic(ssl)) {
	if ((ssl->s3->hs == nullptr \|\| !ssl->s3->hs->hints_requested) &&
	!ssl->quic_method->add_handshake_data(ssl, ssl->s3->quic_write_level,
	data.data(), data.size())) {
	OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_QUIC_INTERNAL_ERROR);
	return false;
	}
	return true;
	}

	return add_record_to_flight(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, data);
	}

	bool tls_add_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl) {
	if (SSL_is_quic(ssl)) {
	return true;
	}

	static const uint8_t kChangeCipherSpec[1] = {SSL3_MT_CCS};
	if (!tls_flush_pending_hs_data(ssl) \|\|
	!add_record_to_flight(ssl, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
	kChangeCipherSpec)) {
	return false;
	}

	ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
	kChangeCipherSpec);
	return true;
	}

	int tls_flush(SSL *ssl) {
	if (!tls_flush_pending_hs_data(ssl)) {
	return -1;
	}

	if (SSL_is_quic(ssl)) {
	if (ssl->s3->write_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_none) {
	OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
	return -1;
	}

	if (!ssl->quic_method->flush_flight(ssl)) {
	OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_QUIC_INTERNAL_ERROR);
	return -1;
	}
	}

	if (ssl->s3->pending_flight == nullptr) {
	return 1;
	}

	if (ssl->s3->write_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_none) {
	OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
	return -1;
	}

	static_assert(INT_MAX <= 0xffffffff, "int is larger than 32 bits");
	if (ssl->s3->pending_flight->length > INT_MAX) {
	OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
	return -1;
	}

	// If there is pending data in the write buffer, it must be flushed out before
	// any new data in pending_flight.
	if (!ssl->s3->write_buffer.empty()) {
	int ret = ssl_write_buffer_flush(ssl);
	if (ret <= 0) {
	ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE;
	return ret;
	}
	}

	if (ssl->wbio == nullptr) {
	OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
	return -1;
	}

	// Write the pending flight.
	while (ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset < ssl->s3->pending_flight->length) {
	int ret = BIO_write(
	ssl->wbio.get(),
	ssl->s3->pending_flight->data + ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset,
	ssl->s3->pending_flight->length - ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset);
	if (ret <= 0) {
	ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE;
	return ret;
	}

	ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset += ret;
	}

	if (BIO_flush(ssl->wbio.get()) <= 0) {
	ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE;
	return -1;
	}

	ssl->s3->pending_flight.reset();
	ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset = 0;
	return 1;
	}

	static ssl_open_record_t read_v2_client_hello(SSL ssl, size_t out_consumed,
	Span<const uint8_t> in) {
	*out_consumed = 0;
	assert(in.size() >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
	// Determine the length of the V2ClientHello.
	size_t msg_length = ((in[0] & 0x7f) << 8) \| in[1];
	if (msg_length > (1024 * 4)) {
	OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
	return ssl_open_record_error;
	}
	if (msg_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - 2) {
	// Reject lengths that are too short early. We have already read
	// \|SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH\| bytes, so we should not attempt to process an
	// (invalid) V2ClientHello which would be shorter than that.
	OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
	return ssl_open_record_error;
	}

	// Ask for the remainder of the V2ClientHello.
	if (in.size() < 2 + msg_length) {
	*out_consumed = 2 + msg_length;
	return ssl_open_record_partial;
	}

	CBS v2_client_hello = CBS(in.subspan(2, msg_length));
	// The V2ClientHello without the length is incorporated into the handshake
	// hash. This is only ever called at the start of the handshake, so hs is
	// guaranteed to be non-NULL.
	if (!ssl->s3->hs->transcript.Update(v2_client_hello)) {
	return ssl_open_record_error;
	}

	ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read /, 0 / V2ClientHello */,
	v2_client_hello);

	uint8_t msg_type;
	uint16_t version, cipher_spec_length, session_id_length, challenge_length;
	CBS cipher_specs, session_id, challenge;
	if (!CBS_get_u8(&v2_client_hello, &msg_type) \|\|
	!CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &version) \|\|
	!CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &cipher_spec_length) \|\|
	!CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &session_id_length) \|\|
	!CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &challenge_length) \|\|
	!CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &cipher_specs, cipher_spec_length) \|\|
	!CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &session_id, session_id_length) \|\|
	!CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &challenge, challenge_length) \|\|
	CBS_len(&v2_client_hello) != 0) {
	OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
	return ssl_open_record_error;
	}

	// msg_type has already been checked.
	assert(msg_type == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO);

	// The client_random is the V2ClientHello challenge. Truncate or left-pad with
	// zeros as needed.
	size_t rand_len = CBS_len(&challenge);
	if (rand_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) {
	rand_len = SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
	}
	uint8_t random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
	OPENSSL_memset(random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
	OPENSSL_memcpy(random + (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - rand_len), CBS_data(&challenge),
	rand_len);

	// Write out an equivalent TLS ClientHello directly to the handshake buffer.
	size_t max_v3_client_hello = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2 /* version */ +
	SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 /* session ID length */ +
	2 /* cipher list length */ +
	CBS_len(&cipher_specs) / 3 * 2 +
	1 /* compression length / + 1 / compression */;
	ScopedCBB client_hello;
	CBB hello_body, cipher_suites;
	if (!ssl->s3->hs_buf) {
	ssl->s3->hs_buf.reset(BUF_MEM_new());
	}
	if (!ssl->s3->hs_buf \|\|
	!BUF_MEM_reserve(ssl->s3->hs_buf.get(), max_v3_client_hello) \|\|
	!CBB_init_fixed(client_hello.get(), (uint8_t *)ssl->s3->hs_buf->data,
	ssl->s3->hs_buf->max) \|\|
	!CBB_add_u8(client_hello.get(), SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) \|\|
	!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(client_hello.get(), &hello_body) \|\|
	!CBB_add_u16(&hello_body, version) \|\|
	!CBB_add_bytes(&hello_body, random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) \|\|
	// No session id.
	!CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) \|\|
	!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&hello_body, &cipher_suites)) {
	return ssl_open_record_error;
	}

	// Copy the cipher suites.
	while (CBS_len(&cipher_specs) > 0) {
	uint32_t cipher_spec;
	if (!CBS_get_u24(&cipher_specs, &cipher_spec)) {
	OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
	return ssl_open_record_error;
	}

	// Skip SSLv2 ciphers.
	if ((cipher_spec & 0xff0000) != 0) {
	continue;
	}
	if (!CBB_add_u16(&cipher_suites, cipher_spec)) {
	OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
	return ssl_open_record_error;
	}
	}

	// Add the null compression scheme and finish.
	if (!CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 1) \|\| //
	!CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) \|\| //
	!CBB_finish(client_hello.get(), NULL, &ssl->s3->hs_buf->length)) {
	OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
	return ssl_open_record_error;
	}

	*out_consumed = 2 + msg_length;
	ssl->s3->is_v2_hello = true;
	return ssl_open_record_success;
	}

	static bool parse_message(const SSL ssl, SSLMessage out,
	size_t *out_bytes_needed) {
	if (!ssl->s3->hs_buf) {
	*out_bytes_needed = 4;
	return false;
	}

	CBS cbs;
	uint32_t len;
	CBS_init(&cbs, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(ssl->s3->hs_buf->data),
	ssl->s3->hs_buf->length);
	if (!CBS_get_u8(&cbs, &out->type) \|\| //
	!CBS_get_u24(&cbs, &len)) {
	*out_bytes_needed = 4;
	return false;
	}

	if (!CBS_get_bytes(&cbs, &out->body, len)) {
	*out_bytes_needed = 4 + len;
	return false;
	}

	CBS_init(&out->raw, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(ssl->s3->hs_buf->data),
	4 + len);
	out->is_v2_hello = ssl->s3->is_v2_hello;
	return true;
	}

	bool tls_get_message(const SSL ssl, SSLMessage out) {
	size_t unused;
	if (!parse_message(ssl, out, &unused)) {
	return false;
	}
	if (!ssl->s3->has_message) {
	if (!out->is_v2_hello) {
	ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, out->raw);
	}
	ssl->s3->has_message = true;
	}
	return true;
	}

	bool tls_can_accept_handshake_data(const SSL ssl, uint8_t out_alert) {
	// If there is a complete message, the caller must have consumed it first.
	SSLMessage msg;
	size_t bytes_needed;
	if (parse_message(ssl, &msg, &bytes_needed)) {
	OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
	*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
	return false;
	}

	// Enforce the limit so the peer cannot force us to buffer 16MB.
	if (bytes_needed > 4 + ssl_max_handshake_message_len(ssl)) {
	OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
	*out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
	return false;
	}

	return true;
	}

	bool tls_has_unprocessed_handshake_data(const SSL *ssl) {
	size_t msg_len = 0;
	if (ssl->s3->has_message) {
	SSLMessage msg;
	size_t unused;
	if (parse_message(ssl, &msg, &unused)) {
	msg_len = CBS_len(&msg.raw);
	}
	}

	return ssl->s3->hs_buf && ssl->s3->hs_buf->length > msg_len;
	}

	bool tls_append_handshake_data(SSL *ssl, Span<const uint8_t> data) {
	// Re-create the handshake buffer if needed.
	if (!ssl->s3->hs_buf) {
	ssl->s3->hs_buf.reset(BUF_MEM_new());
	}
	return ssl->s3->hs_buf &&
	BUF_MEM_append(ssl->s3->hs_buf.get(), data.data(), data.size());
	}

	ssl_open_record_t tls_open_handshake(SSL ssl, size_t out_consumed,
	uint8_t *out_alert, Span<uint8_t> in) {
	*out_consumed = 0;
	// Bypass the record layer for the first message to handle V2ClientHello.
	if (ssl->server && !ssl->s3->v2_hello_done) {
	// Ask for the first 5 bytes, the size of the TLS record header. This is
	// sufficient to detect a V2ClientHello and ensures that we never read
	// beyond the first record.
	if (in.size() < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
	*out_consumed = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
	return ssl_open_record_partial;
	}

	// Some dedicated error codes for protocol mixups should the application
	// wish to interpret them differently. (These do not overlap with
	// ClientHello or V2ClientHello.)
	auto str = bssl::BytesAsStringView(in);
	if (str.substr(0, 4) == "GET " \|\| //
	str.substr(0, 5) == "POST " \|\| //
	str.substr(0, 5) == "HEAD " \|\| //
	str.substr(0, 4) == "PUT ") {
	OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST);
	*out_alert = 0;
	return ssl_open_record_error;
	}
	if (str.substr(0, 5) == "CONNE") {
	OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST);
	*out_alert = 0;
	return ssl_open_record_error;
	}

	// Check for a V2ClientHello.
	if ((in[0] & 0x80) != 0 && in[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO &&
	in[3] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
	auto ret = read_v2_client_hello(ssl, out_consumed, in);
	if (ret == ssl_open_record_error) {
	*out_alert = 0;
	} else if (ret == ssl_open_record_success) {
	ssl->s3->v2_hello_done = true;
	}
	return ret;
	}

	ssl->s3->v2_hello_done = true;
	}

	uint8_t type;
	Span<uint8_t> body;
	auto ret = tls_open_record(ssl, &type, &body, out_consumed, out_alert, in);
	if (ret != ssl_open_record_success) {
	return ret;
	}

	if (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
	OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
	*out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
	return ssl_open_record_error;
	}

	// Append the entire handshake record to the buffer.
	if (!tls_append_handshake_data(ssl, body)) {
	*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
	return ssl_open_record_error;
	}

	return ssl_open_record_success;
	}

	void tls_next_message(SSL *ssl) {
	SSLMessage msg;
	if (!tls_get_message(ssl, &msg) \|\| //
	!ssl->s3->hs_buf \|\| //
	ssl->s3->hs_buf->length < CBS_len(&msg.raw)) {
	assert(0);
	return;
	}

	OPENSSL_memmove(ssl->s3->hs_buf->data,
	ssl->s3->hs_buf->data + CBS_len(&msg.raw),
	ssl->s3->hs_buf->length - CBS_len(&msg.raw));
	ssl->s3->hs_buf->length -= CBS_len(&msg.raw);
	ssl->s3->is_v2_hello = false;
	ssl->s3->has_message = false;

	// Post-handshake messages are rare, so release the buffer after every
	// message. During the handshake, \|on_handshake_complete\| will release it.
	if (!SSL_in_init(ssl) && ssl->s3->hs_buf->length == 0) {
	ssl->s3->hs_buf.reset();
	}
	}

	namespace {

	class CipherScorer {
	public:
	using Score = int;
	static constexpr Score kMinScore = 0;

	virtual ~CipherScorer() = default;

	virtual Score Evaluate(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) const = 0;
	};

	// AesHwCipherScorer scores cipher suites based on whether AES is supported in
	// hardware.
	class AesHwCipherScorer : public CipherScorer {
	public:
	explicit AesHwCipherScorer(bool has_aes_hw) : aes_is_fine_(has_aes_hw) {}

	virtual ~AesHwCipherScorer() override = default;

	Score Evaluate(const SSL_CIPHER *a) const override {
	return
	// Something is always preferable to nothing.
	1 +
	// Either AES is fine, or else ChaCha20 is preferred.
	((aes_is_fine_ \|\| a->algorithm_enc == SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305) ? 1 : 0);
	}

	private:
	const bool aes_is_fine_;
	};

	// CNsaCipherScorer prefers AES-256-GCM over AES-128-GCM over anything else.
	class CNsaCipherScorer : public CipherScorer {
	public:
	virtual ~CNsaCipherScorer() override = default;

	Score Evaluate(const SSL_CIPHER *a) const override {
	if (a->id == TLS1_3_CK_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
	return 3;
	} else if (a->id == TLS1_3_CK_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
	return 2;
	}
	return 1;
	}
	};

	} // namespace

	bool ssl_tls13_cipher_meets_policy(uint16_t cipher_id,
	enum ssl_compliance_policy_t policy) {
	switch (policy) {
	case ssl_compliance_policy_none:
	case ssl_compliance_policy_cnsa_202407:
	return true;

	case ssl_compliance_policy_fips_202205:
	switch (cipher_id) {
	case TLS1_3_CK_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 & 0xffff:
	case TLS1_3_CK_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 & 0xffff:
	return true;
	case TLS1_3_CK_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 & 0xffff:
	return false;
	default:
	assert(false);
	return false;
	}

	case ssl_compliance_policy_wpa3_192_202304:
	switch (cipher_id) {
	case TLS1_3_CK_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 & 0xffff:
	return true;
	case TLS1_3_CK_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 & 0xffff:
	case TLS1_3_CK_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 & 0xffff:
	return false;
	default:
	assert(false);
	return false;
	}
	}

	assert(false);
	return false;
	}

	const SSL_CIPHER *ssl_choose_tls13_cipher(CBS cipher_suites, bool has_aes_hw,
	uint16_t version,
	enum ssl_compliance_policy_t policy) {
	if (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) % 2 != 0) {
	return nullptr;
	}

	const SSL_CIPHER *best = nullptr;
	AesHwCipherScorer aes_hw_scorer(has_aes_hw);
	CNsaCipherScorer cnsa_scorer;
	CipherScorer *const scorer =
	(policy == ssl_compliance_policy_cnsa_202407)
	? static_cast<CipherScorer *>(&cnsa_scorer)
	: static_cast<CipherScorer *>(&aes_hw_scorer);
	CipherScorer::Score best_score = CipherScorer::kMinScore;

	while (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) {
	uint16_t cipher_suite;
	if (!CBS_get_u16(&cipher_suites, &cipher_suite)) {
	return nullptr;
	}

	// Limit to TLS 1.3 ciphers we know about.
	const SSL_CIPHER *candidate = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite);
	if (candidate == nullptr \|\|
	SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(candidate) > version \|\|
	SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version(candidate) < version) {
	continue;
	}

	if (!ssl_tls13_cipher_meets_policy(SSL_CIPHER_get_protocol_id(candidate),
	policy)) {
	continue;
	}

	const CipherScorer::Score candidate_score = scorer->Evaluate(candidate);
	// \|candidate_score\| must be larger to displace the current choice. That way
	// the client's order controls between ciphers with an equal score.
	if (candidate_score > best_score) {
	best = candidate;
	best_score = candidate_score;
	}
	}

	return best;
	}

	BSSL_NAMESPACE_END