Fetch entropy from a system daemon in FIPS mode on Android.
Change-Id: I69aba15ccf57d04c66a98755b98221b8688d291a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/52527
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
diff --git a/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/rand.c b/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/rand.c
index f78e66a..54397f9 100644
--- a/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/rand.c
+++ b/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/rand.c
@@ -170,12 +170,6 @@
} else {
CRYPTO_sysrand_for_seed(out_entropy, out_entropy_len);
}
-
- if (boringssl_fips_break_test("CRNG")) {
- // This breaks the "continuous random number generator test" defined in FIPS
- // 140-2, section 4.9.2, and implemented in |rand_get_seed|.
- OPENSSL_memset(out_entropy, 0, out_entropy_len);
- }
}
// In passive entropy mode, entropy is supplied from outside of the module via
diff --git a/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/urandom_test.cc b/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/urandom_test.cc
index dabaf39..37002f9 100644
--- a/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/urandom_test.cc
+++ b/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/urandom_test.cc
@@ -18,15 +18,19 @@
#include <openssl/ctrdrbg.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include "internal.h"
#include "getrandom_fillin.h"
+#include "internal.h"
-#if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) && !defined(BORINGSSL_SHARED_LIBRARY) && \
+#if (defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) || defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64)) && \
+ !defined(BORINGSSL_SHARED_LIBRARY) && \
!defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_DETERMINISTIC_MODE) && defined(USE_NR_getrandom)
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
#include <sys/user.h>
#include "fork_detect.h"
@@ -35,6 +39,21 @@
#define PTRACE_O_EXITKILL (1 << 20)
#endif
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
+static const bool kIsFIPS = true;
+#if defined(OPENSSL_ANDROID)
+static const bool kUsesDaemon = true;
+#else
+static const bool kUsesDaemon = false;
+#endif
+#else
+static const bool kIsFIPS = false;
+static const bool kUsesDaemon = false;
+#endif
+
+// kDaemonWriteLength is the number of bytes that the entropy daemon writes.
+static const size_t kDaemonWriteLength = 496;
+
// This test can be run with $OPENSSL_ia32cap=~0x4000000000000000 in order to
// simulate the absence of RDRAND of machines that have it.
@@ -46,6 +65,10 @@
kOpen,
kUrandomRead,
kUrandomIoctl,
+ kSocket,
+ kConnect,
+ kSocketRead,
+ kSocketClose,
kAbort,
};
@@ -82,6 +105,27 @@
return e;
}
+ static Event Socket() {
+ Event e(Syscall::kSocket);
+ return e;
+ }
+
+ static Event Connect() {
+ Event e(Syscall::kConnect);
+ return e;
+ }
+
+ static Event SocketRead(size_t length) {
+ Event e(Syscall::kSocketRead);
+ e.length = length;
+ return e;
+ }
+
+ static Event SocketClose() {
+ Event e(Syscall::kSocketClose);
+ return e;
+ }
+
static Event Abort() {
Event e(Syscall::kAbort);
return e;
@@ -106,6 +150,19 @@
case Syscall::kUrandomIoctl:
return "ioctl(urandom_fd, RNDGETENTCNT, _)";
+ case Syscall::kSocket:
+ return "socket(UNIX, STREAM, _)";
+
+ case Syscall::kConnect:
+ return "connect(sock, _, _)";
+
+ case Syscall::kSocketRead:
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "read(sock_fd, _, %zu)", length);
+ break;
+
+ case Syscall::kSocketClose:
+ return "close(sock)";
+
case Syscall::kAbort:
return "abort()";
}
@@ -146,7 +203,193 @@
static const unsigned GETRANDOM_ERROR = 16;
// Reading from /dev/urandom gives |EINVAL|.
static const unsigned URANDOM_ERROR = 32;
-static const unsigned NEXT_FLAG = 64;
+static const unsigned SOCKET_ERROR = 64;
+static const unsigned CONNECT_ERROR = 128;
+static const unsigned SOCKET_READ_ERROR = 256;
+static const unsigned SOCKET_READ_SHORT = 512;
+static const unsigned NEXT_FLAG = 1024;
+
+// regs_read fetches the registers of |child_pid| and writes them to |out_regs|.
+// That structure will contain at least the following members:
+// syscall: the syscall number, if registers were read just before entering
+// one.
+// args[0..2]: syscall arguments, if registers were read just before
+// entering one.
+// ret: the syscall return value, if registers were read just after finishing
+// one.
+//
+// This call returns true on success and false otherwise.
+static bool regs_read(struct regs *out_regs, int child_pid);
+
+// regs_set_ret sets the return value of the system call that |child_pid| has
+// just finished, to |ret|. It returns true on success and false otherwise.
+static bool regs_set_ret(int child_pid, int ret);
+
+// regs_break_syscall causes the system call that |child_pid| is about to enter
+// to fail to run.
+static bool regs_break_syscall(int child_pid, const struct regs *orig_regs);
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64)
+
+struct regs {
+ uintptr_t syscall;
+ uintptr_t args[3];
+ uintptr_t ret;
+ struct user_regs_struct regs;
+};
+
+static bool regs_read(struct regs *out_regs, int child_pid) {
+ if (ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGS, child_pid, nullptr, &out_regs->regs) != 0) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ out_regs->syscall = out_regs->regs.orig_rax;
+ out_regs->ret = out_regs->regs.rax;
+ out_regs->args[0] = out_regs->regs.rdi;
+ out_regs->args[1] = out_regs->regs.rsi;
+ out_regs->args[2] = out_regs->regs.rdx;
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool regs_set_ret(int child_pid, int ret) {
+ struct regs regs;
+ if (!regs_read(®s, child_pid)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ regs.regs.rax = ret;
+ return ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGS, child_pid, nullptr, ®s.regs) == 0;
+}
+
+static bool regs_break_syscall(int child_pid, const struct regs *orig_regs) {
+ // Replacing the syscall number with -1 doesn't work on AArch64 thus we set
+ // the first argument to -1, which suffices to break the syscalls that we care
+ // about here.
+ struct user_regs_struct regs;
+ memcpy(®s, &orig_regs->regs, sizeof(regs));
+ regs.rdi = -1;
+ return ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGS, child_pid, nullptr, ®s) == 0;
+}
+
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64)
+
+struct regs {
+ uintptr_t syscall;
+ uintptr_t args[3];
+ uintptr_t ret;
+ uint64_t regs[9];
+};
+
+static bool regs_read(struct regs *out_regs, int child_pid) {
+ struct iovec io;
+ io.iov_base = out_regs->regs;
+ io.iov_len = sizeof(out_regs->regs);
+ if (ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET, child_pid, (void *)/*NT_PRSTATUS*/ 1, &io) !=
+ 0) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ out_regs->syscall = out_regs->regs[8];
+ out_regs->ret = out_regs->regs[0];
+ out_regs->args[0] = out_regs->regs[0];
+ out_regs->args[1] = out_regs->regs[1];
+ out_regs->args[2] = out_regs->regs[2];
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool regs_set(int child_pid, const struct regs *orig_regs,
+ uint64_t x0_value) {
+ uint64_t regs[OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(orig_regs->regs)];
+ memcpy(regs, orig_regs->regs, sizeof(regs));
+ regs[0] = x0_value;
+
+ struct iovec io;
+ io.iov_base = regs;
+ io.iov_len = sizeof(regs);
+ return ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGSET, child_pid, (void *)/*NT_PRSTATUS*/ 1, &io) ==
+ 0;
+}
+
+static bool regs_set_ret(int child_pid, int ret) {
+ struct regs regs;
+ return regs_read(®s, child_pid) && regs_set(child_pid, ®s, ret);
+}
+
+static bool regs_break_syscall(int child_pid, const struct regs *orig_regs) {
+ // Replacing the syscall number with -1 doesn't work on AArch64 thus we set
+ // the first argument to -1, which suffices to break the syscalls that we care
+ // about here.
+ return regs_set(child_pid, orig_regs, -1);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+// SyscallResult is like std::optional<int>.
+// TODO: use std::optional when we can use C++17.
+class SyscallResult {
+ public:
+ SyscallResult &operator=(int value) {
+ has_value_ = true;
+ value_ = value;
+ return *this;
+ }
+
+ int value() const {
+ if (!has_value_) {
+ abort();
+ }
+ return value_;
+ }
+
+ bool has_value() const { return has_value_; }
+
+ private:
+ bool has_value_ = false;
+ int value_ = 0;
+};
+
+// memcpy_to_remote copies |n| bytes from |in_src| in the local address space,
+// to |dest| in the address space of |child_pid|.
+static void memcpy_to_remote(int child_pid, uint64_t dest, const void *in_src,
+ size_t n) {
+ const uint8_t *src = reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(in_src);
+
+ // ptrace always works with ill-defined "words", which appear to be 64-bit
+ // on 64-bit systems.
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_64_BIT)
+#error "This code probably doesn't work"
+#endif
+
+ while (n) {
+ const uintptr_t aligned_addr = dest & ~7;
+ const uintptr_t offset = dest - aligned_addr;
+ const size_t space = 8 - offset;
+ size_t todo = n;
+ if (todo > space) {
+ todo = space;
+ }
+
+ uint64_t word;
+ if (offset == 0 && todo == 8) {
+ word = CRYPTO_load_u64_le(src);
+ } else {
+ uint8_t bytes[8];
+ CRYPTO_store_u64_le(
+ bytes, ptrace(PTRACE_PEEKDATA, child_pid,
+ reinterpret_cast<void *>(aligned_addr), nullptr));
+ memcpy(&bytes[offset], src, todo);
+ word = CRYPTO_load_u64_le(bytes);
+ }
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_POKEDATA, child_pid,
+ reinterpret_cast<void *>(aligned_addr),
+ reinterpret_cast<void *>(word)));
+
+ src += todo;
+ n -= todo;
+ dest += todo;
+ }
+}
// GetTrace runs |thunk| in a forked process and observes the resulting system
// calls using ptrace. It simulates a variety of failures based on the contents
@@ -185,6 +428,10 @@
// process, if it opens it.
int urandom_fd = -1;
+ // sock_fd tracks the file descriptor number for the socket to the entropy
+ // daemon, if one is opened.
+ int sock_fd = -1;
+
for (;;) {
// Advance the child to the next system call.
ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_SYSCALL, child_pid, 0, 0));
@@ -199,76 +446,130 @@
// Otherwise the only valid ptrace event is a system call stop.
ASSERT_TRUE(WIFSTOPPED(status) && WSTOPSIG(status) == (SIGTRAP | 0x80));
- struct user_regs_struct regs;
- ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGS, child_pid, nullptr, ®s));
- const auto syscall_number = regs.orig_rax;
+ struct regs regs;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(regs_read(®s, child_pid));
bool is_opening_urandom = false;
+ bool is_socket_call = false;
bool is_urandom_ioctl = false;
uintptr_t ioctl_output_addr = 0;
- // inject_error is zero to indicate that the system call should run
+ bool is_socket_read = false;
+ uint64_t socket_read_bytes = 0;
+ // force_result is unset to indicate that the system call should run
// normally. Otherwise it's, e.g. -EINVAL, to indicate that the system call
- // should not run and that error should be injected on return.
- int inject_error = 0;
+ // should not run and that the given value should be injected on return.
+ SyscallResult force_result;
- switch (syscall_number) {
+ switch (regs.syscall) {
case __NR_getrandom:
if (flags & NO_GETRANDOM) {
- inject_error = -ENOSYS;
+ force_result = -ENOSYS;
} else if (flags & GETRANDOM_ERROR) {
- inject_error = -EINVAL;
+ force_result = -EINVAL;
} else if (flags & GETRANDOM_NOT_READY) {
- if (regs.rdx & GRND_NONBLOCK) {
- inject_error = -EAGAIN;
+ if (regs.args[2] & GRND_NONBLOCK) {
+ force_result = -EAGAIN;
}
}
out_trace->push_back(
- Event::GetRandom(/*length=*/regs.rsi, /*flags=*/regs.rdx));
+ Event::GetRandom(/*length=*/regs.args[1], /*flags=*/regs.args[2]));
break;
case __NR_openat:
- case __NR_open: {
+#if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64)
+ case __NR_open:
+#endif
+ {
// It's assumed that any arguments to open(2) are constants in read-only
// memory and thus the pointer in the child's context will also be a
// valid pointer in our address space.
const char *filename = reinterpret_cast<const char *>(
- (syscall_number == __NR_openat) ? regs.rsi : regs.rdi);
+ (regs.syscall == __NR_openat) ? regs.args[1] : regs.args[0]);
out_trace->push_back(Event::Open(filename));
is_opening_urandom = strcmp(filename, "/dev/urandom") == 0;
if (is_opening_urandom && (flags & NO_URANDOM)) {
- inject_error = -ENOENT;
+ force_result = -ENOENT;
}
break;
}
case __NR_read: {
- const int read_fd = regs.rdi;
+ const int read_fd = regs.args[0];
if (urandom_fd >= 0 && urandom_fd == read_fd) {
- out_trace->push_back(Event::UrandomRead(/*length=*/regs.rdx));
+ out_trace->push_back(Event::UrandomRead(/*length=*/regs.args[2]));
if (flags & URANDOM_ERROR) {
- inject_error = -EINVAL;
+ force_result = -EINVAL;
+ }
+ } else if (sock_fd >= 0 && sock_fd == read_fd) {
+ uint64_t length = regs.args[2];
+ out_trace->push_back(Event::SocketRead(length));
+ if (flags & SOCKET_READ_ERROR) {
+ force_result = -EINVAL;
+ } else {
+ is_socket_read = true;
+ socket_read_bytes = length;
+
+ if (flags & SOCKET_READ_SHORT) {
+ ASSERT_GT(socket_read_bytes, 0u);
+ socket_read_bytes--;
+ flags &= ~SOCKET_READ_SHORT;
+ }
}
}
break;
}
+ case __NR_close: {
+ if (sock_fd >= 0 && static_cast<int>(regs.args[0]) == sock_fd) {
+ out_trace->push_back(Event::SocketClose());
+ sock_fd = -1;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
case __NR_ioctl: {
- const int ioctl_fd = regs.rdi;
+ const int ioctl_fd = regs.args[0];
if (urandom_fd >= 0 && ioctl_fd == urandom_fd &&
- regs.rsi == RNDGETENTCNT) {
+ regs.args[1] == RNDGETENTCNT) {
out_trace->push_back(Event::UrandomIoctl());
is_urandom_ioctl = true;
- ioctl_output_addr = regs.rdx;
+ ioctl_output_addr = regs.args[2];
}
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case __NR_socket: {
+ const int family = regs.args[0];
+ const int type = regs.args[1];
+ if (family == AF_UNIX && type == SOCK_STREAM) {
+ out_trace->push_back(Event::Socket());
+ is_socket_call = true;
+ if (flags & SOCKET_ERROR) {
+ force_result = -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case __NR_connect: {
+ const int connect_fd = regs.args[0];
+ if (sock_fd >= 0 && connect_fd == sock_fd) {
+ out_trace->push_back(Event::Connect());
+ if (flags & CONNECT_ERROR) {
+ force_result = -EINVAL;
+ } else {
+ // The test system might not have an entropy daemon running so
+ // inject a success result.
+ force_result = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ break;
}
}
- if (inject_error) {
- // Replace the system call number with -1 to cause the kernel to ignore
- // the call. The -ENOSYS will be replaced later with the value of
- // |inject_error|.
- regs.orig_rax = -1;
- ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGS, child_pid, nullptr, ®s));
+ if (force_result.has_value()) {
+ ASSERT_TRUE(regs_break_syscall(child_pid, ®s));
}
ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_SYSCALL, child_pid, 0, 0));
@@ -285,15 +586,14 @@
// and know that these events happen in pairs.
ASSERT_TRUE(WIFSTOPPED(status) && WSTOPSIG(status) == (SIGTRAP | 0x80));
- if (inject_error) {
- if (inject_error != -ENOSYS) {
- ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGS, child_pid, nullptr, ®s));
- regs.rax = inject_error;
- ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGS, child_pid, nullptr, ®s));
- }
+ if (force_result.has_value()) {
+ ASSERT_TRUE(regs_set_ret(child_pid, force_result.value()));
} else if (is_opening_urandom) {
- ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGS, child_pid, nullptr, ®s));
- urandom_fd = regs.rax;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(regs_read(®s, child_pid));
+ urandom_fd = regs.ret;
+ } else if (is_socket_call) {
+ ASSERT_TRUE(regs_read(®s, child_pid));
+ sock_fd = regs.ret;
} else if (is_urandom_ioctl) {
// The result is the number of bits of entropy that the kernel currently
// believes that it has. urandom.c waits until 256 bits are ready.
@@ -306,21 +606,19 @@
flags &= ~URANDOM_NOT_READY;
}
- // ptrace always works with ill-defined "words", which appear to be 64-bit
- // on x86-64. Since the ioctl result is a 32-bit int, do a
- // read-modify-write to inject the answer.
- const uintptr_t aligned_addr = ioctl_output_addr & ~7;
- const uintptr_t offset = ioctl_output_addr - aligned_addr;
- union {
- uint64_t word;
- uint8_t bytes[8];
- } u;
- u.word = ptrace(PTRACE_PEEKDATA, child_pid,
- reinterpret_cast<void *>(aligned_addr), nullptr);
- memcpy(&u.bytes[offset], &result, sizeof(result));
- ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_POKEDATA, child_pid,
- reinterpret_cast<void *>(aligned_addr),
- reinterpret_cast<void *>(u.word)));
+ memcpy_to_remote(child_pid, ioctl_output_addr, &result, sizeof(result));
+ } else if (is_socket_read) {
+ // Simulate a response from the entropy daemon since it might not be
+ // running on the current system.
+ uint8_t entropy[kDaemonWriteLength];
+ ASSERT_LE(socket_read_bytes, sizeof(entropy));
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(entropy); i++) {
+ entropy[i] = i & 0xff;
+ }
+ memcpy_to_remote(child_pid, regs.args[1], entropy, socket_read_bytes);
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(regs_set_ret(child_pid, socket_read_bytes));
}
}
}
@@ -332,24 +630,46 @@
RAND_bytes(&byte, sizeof(byte));
}
-static bool have_fork_detection() {
- return CRYPTO_get_fork_generation() != 0;
+static bool have_fork_detection() { return CRYPTO_get_fork_generation() != 0; }
+
+static bool AppendDaemonEvents(std::vector<Event> *events, unsigned flags) {
+ events->push_back(Event::Socket());
+ if (flags & SOCKET_ERROR) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ bool ret = false;
+ events->push_back(Event::Connect());
+ if (flags & CONNECT_ERROR) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ events->push_back(Event::SocketRead(kDaemonWriteLength));
+ if (flags & SOCKET_READ_ERROR) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (flags & SOCKET_READ_SHORT) {
+ events->push_back(Event::SocketRead(1));
+ }
+
+ ret = true;
+
+out:
+ events->push_back(Event::SocketClose());
+ return ret;
}
// TestFunctionPRNGModel is a model of how the urandom.c code will behave when
// |TestFunction| is run. It should return the same trace of events that
// |GetTrace| will observe the real code making.
static std::vector<Event> TestFunctionPRNGModel(unsigned flags) {
-#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
- static const bool is_fips = true;
-#else
- static const bool is_fips = false;
-#endif
-
std::vector<Event> ret;
bool urandom_probed = false;
bool getrandom_ready = false;
+ const bool used_daemon = kUsesDaemon && AppendDaemonEvents(&ret, flags);
+
// Probe for getrandom support
ret.push_back(Event::GetRandom(1, GRND_NONBLOCK));
std::function<void()> wait_for_entropy;
@@ -363,7 +683,7 @@
}
wait_for_entropy = [&ret, &urandom_probed, flags] {
- if (!is_fips || urandom_probed) {
+ if (!kIsFIPS || urandom_probed) {
return;
}
@@ -414,13 +734,15 @@
};
}
- const size_t kSeedLength = CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN * (is_fips ? 10 : 1);
+ const size_t kSeedLength = CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN * (kIsFIPS ? 10 : 1);
const size_t kAdditionalDataLength = 32;
if (!have_rdrand()) {
if ((!have_fork_detection() && !sysrand(true, kAdditionalDataLength)) ||
// Initialise CRNGT.
- !sysrand(true, kSeedLength + (is_fips ? 16 : 0)) ||
+ (!used_daemon && !sysrand(true, kSeedLength + (kIsFIPS ? 16 : 0))) ||
+ // Personalisation draw if the daemon was used.
+ (used_daemon && !sysrand(false, CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN)) ||
// Second entropy draw.
(!have_fork_detection() && !sysrand(true, kAdditionalDataLength))) {
return ret;
@@ -433,7 +755,7 @@
// Opportuntistic entropy draw in FIPS mode because RDRAND was used.
// In non-FIPS mode it's just drawn from |CRYPTO_sysrand| in a blocking
// way.
- !sysrand(!is_fips, CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) ||
+ !sysrand(!kIsFIPS, CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) ||
// Second entropy draw's additional data.
(!have_fast_rdrand() && !have_fork_detection() &&
!sysrand(false, kAdditionalDataLength))) {
@@ -480,12 +802,23 @@
SCOPED_TRACE(buf);
for (unsigned flags = 0; flags < NEXT_FLAG; flags++) {
+ if (!kUsesDaemon && (flags & (SOCKET_ERROR | CONNECT_ERROR |
+ SOCKET_READ_ERROR | SOCKET_READ_SHORT))) {
+ // These cases are meaningless unless the code will try to use the entropy
+ // daemon.
+ continue;
+ }
+
TRACE_FLAG(NO_GETRANDOM);
TRACE_FLAG(NO_URANDOM);
TRACE_FLAG(GETRANDOM_NOT_READY);
TRACE_FLAG(URANDOM_NOT_READY);
TRACE_FLAG(GETRANDOM_ERROR);
TRACE_FLAG(URANDOM_ERROR);
+ TRACE_FLAG(SOCKET_ERROR);
+ TRACE_FLAG(CONNECT_ERROR);
+ TRACE_FLAG(SOCKET_READ_ERROR);
+ TRACE_FLAG(SOCKET_READ_SHORT);
const std::vector<Event> expected_trace = TestFunctionPRNGModel(flags);
CheckInvariants(expected_trace);
@@ -516,5 +849,5 @@
return 0;
}
-#endif // X86_64 && !SHARED_LIBRARY && !UNSAFE_DETERMINISTIC_MODE &&
- // USE_NR_getrandom
+#endif // (X86_64 || AARCH64) && !SHARED_LIBRARY &&
+ // !UNSAFE_DETERMINISTIC_MODE && USE_NR_getrandom
diff --git a/crypto/rand_extra/passive.c b/crypto/rand_extra/passive.c
index f27803b..e091bff 100644
--- a/crypto/rand_extra/passive.c
+++ b/crypto/rand_extra/passive.c
@@ -15,21 +15,145 @@
#include <openssl/ctrdrbg.h>
#include "../fipsmodule/rand/internal.h"
+#include "../internal.h"
#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
+#define ENTROPY_READ_LEN \
+ (/* last_block size */ 16 + CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN * BORINGSSL_FIPS_OVERREAD)
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_ANDROID)
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+static struct CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX g_socket_history_lock =
+ CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_INIT;
+
+// socket_history_t enumerates whether the entropy daemon should be contacted
+// for a given entropy request. Values other than socket_not_yet_attempted are
+// sticky so if the first attempt to read from the daemon fails it's assumed
+// that the daemon is not present and no more attempts will be made. If the
+// first attempt is successful then attempts will be made forever more.
+enum socket_history_t {
+ // initial value, no connections to the entropy daemon have been made yet.
+ socket_not_yet_attempted = 0,
+ // reading from the entropy daemon was successful
+ socket_success,
+ // reading from the entropy daemon failed.
+ socket_failed,
+};
+
+enum socket_history_t g_socket_history = socket_not_yet_attempted;
+
+// DAEMON_RESPONSE_LEN is the number of bytes that the entropy daemon replies
+// with.
+#define DAEMON_RESPONSE_LEN 496
+
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(ENTROPY_READ_LEN == DAEMON_RESPONSE_LEN,
+ "entropy daemon response length mismatch");
+
+static int get_seed_from_daemon(uint8_t *out_entropy, size_t out_entropy_len) {
+ // |RAND_need_entropy| should never call this function for more than
+ // |DAEMON_RESPONSE_LEN| bytes.
+ if (out_entropy_len > DAEMON_RESPONSE_LEN) {
+ abort();
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_read(&g_socket_history_lock);
+ const enum socket_history_t socket_history = g_socket_history;
+ CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock_read(&g_socket_history_lock);
+
+ if (socket_history == socket_failed) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ int ret = 0;
+ const int sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ if (sock < 0) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ struct sockaddr_un sun;
+ memset(&sun, 0, sizeof(sun));
+ sun.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+ static const char kSocketPath[] = "/dev/socket/prng_seeder";
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(sun.sun_path, kSocketPath, sizeof(kSocketPath));
+
+ if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sun, sizeof(sun))) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ uint8_t buffer[DAEMON_RESPONSE_LEN];
+ size_t done = 0;
+ while (done < sizeof(buffer)) {
+ ssize_t n;
+ do {
+ n = read(sock, buffer + done, sizeof(buffer) - done);
+ } while (n == -1 && errno == EINTR);
+
+ if (n < 1) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+ done += n;
+ }
+
+ if (done != DAEMON_RESPONSE_LEN) {
+ // The daemon should always write |DAEMON_RESPONSE_LEN| bytes on every
+ // connection.
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ assert(out_entropy_len <= DAEMON_RESPONSE_LEN);
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(out_entropy, buffer, out_entropy_len);
+ ret = 1;
+
+out:
+ if (socket_history == socket_not_yet_attempted) {
+ CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_write(&g_socket_history_lock);
+ if (g_socket_history == socket_not_yet_attempted) {
+ g_socket_history = (ret == 0) ? socket_failed : socket_success;
+ }
+ CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock_write(&g_socket_history_lock);
+ }
+
+ close(sock);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#else
+
+static int get_seed_from_daemon(uint8_t *out_entropy, size_t out_entropy_len) {
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif // OPENSSL_ANDROID
+
// RAND_need_entropy is called by the FIPS module when it has blocked because of
// a lack of entropy. This signal is used as an indication to feed it more.
void RAND_need_entropy(size_t bytes_needed) {
- uint8_t buf[/* last_block size */ 16 +
- CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN * BORINGSSL_FIPS_OVERREAD];
+ uint8_t buf[ENTROPY_READ_LEN];
size_t todo = sizeof(buf);
if (todo > bytes_needed) {
todo = bytes_needed;
}
int want_additional_input;
- CRYPTO_get_seed_entropy(buf, todo, &want_additional_input);
+ if (get_seed_from_daemon(buf, todo)) {
+ want_additional_input = 1;
+ } else {
+ CRYPTO_get_seed_entropy(buf, todo, &want_additional_input);
+ }
+
+ if (boringssl_fips_break_test("CRNG")) {
+ // This breaks the "continuous random number generator test" defined in FIPS
+ // 140-2, section 4.9.2, and implemented in |rand_get_seed|.
+ OPENSSL_memset(buf, 0, todo);
+ }
+
RAND_load_entropy(buf, todo, want_additional_input);
}
