blob: 9888876c35ce5a815fca9ef96035f3180441c187 [file] [log] [blame]
/* Copyright (c) 2018, Google Inc.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include "../internal.h"
#include "handshake_util.h"
#include "test_config.h"
#include "test_state.h"
using namespace bssl;
namespace {
bool HandbackReady(SSL *ssl, int ret) {
return ret < 0 && SSL_get_error(ssl, ret) == SSL_ERROR_HANDBACK;
}
bool Handshaker(const TestConfig *config, int rfd, int wfd,
Span<const uint8_t> input, int control) {
UniquePtr<SSL_CTX> ctx = config->SetupCtx(/*old_ctx=*/nullptr);
if (!ctx) {
return false;
}
UniquePtr<SSL> ssl = config->NewSSL(ctx.get(), nullptr, false, nullptr);
// Set |O_NONBLOCK| in order to break out of the loop when we hit
// |SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ|, so that we can send |kControlMsgWantRead| to the
// proxy.
if (fcntl(rfd, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) != 0) {
perror("fcntl");
return false;
}
SSL_set_rfd(ssl.get(), rfd);
SSL_set_wfd(ssl.get(), wfd);
CBS cbs, handoff;
CBS_init(&cbs, input.data(), input.size());
if (!CBS_get_asn1_element(&cbs, &handoff, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
!DeserializeContextState(&cbs, ctx.get()) ||
!SetTestState(ssl.get(), TestState::Deserialize(&cbs, ctx.get())) ||
!GetTestState(ssl.get()) ||
!SSL_apply_handoff(ssl.get(), handoff)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Handoff application failed.\n");
return false;
}
int ret = 0;
for (;;) {
ret = CheckIdempotentError(
"SSL_do_handshake", ssl.get(),
[&]() -> int { return SSL_do_handshake(ssl.get()); });
if (SSL_get_error(ssl.get(), ret) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) {
// Synchronize with the proxy, i.e. don't let the handshake continue until
// the proxy has sent more data.
char msg = kControlMsgWantRead;
if (write(control, &msg, 1) != 1 ||
read(control, &msg, 1) != 1 ||
msg != kControlMsgWriteCompleted) {
fprintf(stderr, "read via proxy failed\n");
return false;
}
continue;
}
if (!config->async || !RetryAsync(ssl.get(), ret)) {
break;
}
}
if (!HandbackReady(ssl.get(), ret)) {
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
return false;
}
ScopedCBB output;
CBB handback;
Array<uint8_t> bytes;
if (!CBB_init(output.get(), 1024) ||
!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(output.get(), &handback) ||
!SSL_serialize_handback(ssl.get(), &handback) ||
!SerializeContextState(ssl->ctx.get(), output.get()) ||
!GetTestState(ssl.get())->Serialize(output.get()) ||
!CBBFinishArray(output.get(), &bytes)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Handback serialisation failed.\n");
return false;
}
char msg = kControlMsgHandback;
if (write(control, &msg, 1) == -1 ||
write(control, bytes.data(), bytes.size()) == -1) {
perror("write");
return false;
}
return true;
}
ssize_t read_eintr(int fd, void *out, size_t len) {
ssize_t ret;
do {
ret = read(fd, out, len);
} while (ret < 0 && errno == EINTR);
return ret;
}
ssize_t write_eintr(int fd, const void *in, size_t len) {
ssize_t ret;
do {
ret = write(fd, in, len);
} while (ret < 0 && errno == EINTR);
return ret;
}
} // namespace
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
TestConfig initial_config, resume_config, retry_config;
if (!ParseConfig(argc - 1, argv + 1, &initial_config, &resume_config,
&retry_config)) {
return 2;
}
const TestConfig *config = initial_config.handshaker_resume
? &resume_config : &initial_config;
#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_DETERMINISTIC_MODE)
if (initial_config.handshaker_resume) {
// If the PRNG returns exactly the same values when trying to resume then a
// "random" session ID will happen to exactly match the session ID
// "randomly" generated on the initial connection. The client will thus
// incorrectly believe that the server is resuming.
uint8_t byte;
RAND_bytes(&byte, 1);
}
#endif // BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_DETERMINISTIC_MODE
// read() will return the entire message in one go, because it's a datagram
// socket.
constexpr size_t kBufSize = 1024 * 1024;
bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> buf((uint8_t *) OPENSSL_malloc(kBufSize));
ssize_t len = read_eintr(kFdControl, buf.get(), kBufSize);
if (len == -1) {
perror("read");
return 2;
}
Span<uint8_t> handoff(buf.get(), len);
if (!Handshaker(config, kFdProxyToHandshaker, kFdHandshakerToProxy, handoff,
kFdControl)) {
char msg = kControlMsgError;
if (write_eintr(kFdControl, &msg, 1) != 1) {
return 3;
}
return 1;
}
return 0;
}