| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
| * All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
| * |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
| * the code are not to be removed. |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
| * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
| * distribution. |
| * |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
| * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
| * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
| * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
| * openssl-core@openssl.org. |
| * |
| * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
| * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
| * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
| * |
| * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
| * acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
| * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
| * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
| * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
| * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
| * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
| * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
| * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
| * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * ==================================================================== |
| * |
| * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
| * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
| * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */ |
| |
| #include <openssl/ssl.h> |
| |
| #include <assert.h> |
| #include <limits.h> |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| #include <string.h> |
| |
| #include <openssl/buf.h> |
| #include <openssl/err.h> |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> |
| #include <openssl/rand.h> |
| |
| #include "internal.h" |
| |
| |
| static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const uint8_t *buf, unsigned len); |
| |
| /* kMaxWarningAlerts is the number of consecutive warning alerts that will be |
| * processed. */ |
| static const uint8_t kMaxWarningAlerts = 4; |
| |
| /* ssl3_get_record reads a new input record. On success, it places it in |
| * |ssl->s3->rrec| and returns one. Otherwise it returns <= 0 on error or if |
| * more data is needed. */ |
| static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *ssl) { |
| int ret; |
| again: |
| /* Ensure the buffer is large enough to decrypt in-place. */ |
| ret = ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(ssl, ssl_record_prefix_len(ssl)); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| assert(ssl_read_buffer_len(ssl) >= ssl_record_prefix_len(ssl)); |
| |
| uint8_t *out = ssl_read_buffer(ssl) + ssl_record_prefix_len(ssl); |
| size_t max_out = ssl_read_buffer_len(ssl) - ssl_record_prefix_len(ssl); |
| uint8_t type, alert; |
| size_t len, consumed; |
| switch (tls_open_record(ssl, &type, out, &len, &consumed, &alert, max_out, |
| ssl_read_buffer(ssl), ssl_read_buffer_len(ssl))) { |
| case ssl_open_record_success: |
| ssl_read_buffer_consume(ssl, consumed); |
| |
| if (len > 0xffff) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| SSL3_RECORD *rr = &ssl->s3->rrec; |
| rr->type = type; |
| rr->length = (uint16_t)len; |
| rr->off = 0; |
| rr->data = out; |
| return 1; |
| |
| case ssl_open_record_partial: |
| ret = ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(ssl, consumed); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| goto again; |
| |
| case ssl_open_record_discard: |
| ssl_read_buffer_consume(ssl, consumed); |
| goto again; |
| |
| case ssl_open_record_error: |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| assert(0); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_write_app_data(SSL *ssl, const void *buf, int len) { |
| return ssl3_write_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, buf, len); |
| } |
| |
| /* Call this to write data in records of type |type|. It will return <= 0 if |
| * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. */ |
| int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) { |
| const uint8_t *buf = buf_; |
| unsigned int tot, n, nw; |
| int i; |
| |
| s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; |
| assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX); |
| tot = s->s3->wnum; |
| s->s3->wnum = 0; |
| |
| if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s) && !SSL_in_false_start(s)) { |
| i = s->handshake_func(s); |
| if (i < 0) { |
| return i; |
| } |
| if (i == 0) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out than |
| * the the original len from a write which didn't complete for non-blocking |
| * I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for this in |
| * ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be possible to |
| * end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then promptly send |
| * beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and report the error in |
| * a way the user will notice. */ |
| if (len < 0 || (size_t)len < tot) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| n = (len - tot); |
| for (;;) { |
| /* max contains the maximum number of bytes that we can put into a |
| * record. */ |
| unsigned max = s->max_send_fragment; |
| if (n > max) { |
| nw = max; |
| } else { |
| nw = n; |
| } |
| |
| i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &buf[tot], nw); |
| if (i <= 0) { |
| s->s3->wnum = tot; |
| return i; |
| } |
| |
| if (i == (int)n || (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && |
| (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) { |
| return tot + i; |
| } |
| |
| n -= i; |
| tot += i; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* do_ssl3_write writes an SSL record of the given type. */ |
| static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const uint8_t *buf, unsigned len) { |
| /* If there is still data from the previous record, flush it. */ |
| if (ssl_write_buffer_is_pending(s)) { |
| return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len); |
| } |
| |
| /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ |
| if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { |
| int ret = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ |
| } |
| |
| if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (len == 0) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| size_t max_out = len + ssl_max_seal_overhead(s); |
| if (max_out < len) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| uint8_t *out; |
| size_t ciphertext_len; |
| if (!ssl_write_buffer_init(s, &out, max_out) || |
| !tls_seal_record(s, out, &ciphertext_len, max_out, type, buf, len)) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| ssl_write_buffer_set_len(s, ciphertext_len); |
| |
| /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries |
| * later */ |
| s->s3->wpend_tot = len; |
| s->s3->wpend_buf = buf; |
| s->s3->wpend_type = type; |
| s->s3->wpend_ret = len; |
| |
| /* we now just need to write the buffer */ |
| return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const uint8_t *buf, unsigned int len) { |
| if (s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len || |
| (s->s3->wpend_buf != buf && |
| !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)) || |
| s->s3->wpend_type != type) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| int ret = ssl_write_buffer_flush(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| return s->s3->wpend_ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* ssl3_expect_change_cipher_spec informs the record layer that a |
| * ChangeCipherSpec record is required at this point. If a Handshake record is |
| * received before ChangeCipherSpec, the connection will fail. Moreover, if |
| * there are unprocessed handshake bytes, the handshake will also fail and the |
| * function returns zero. Otherwise, the function returns one. */ |
| int ssl3_expect_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) { |
| if (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0 || s->s3->tmp.reuse_message) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNPROCESSED_HANDSHAKE_DATA); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_read_app_data(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *buf, int len, int peek) { |
| return ssl3_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, buf, len, peek); |
| } |
| |
| void ssl3_read_close_notify(SSL *ssl) { |
| ssl3_read_bytes(ssl, 0, NULL, 0, 0); |
| } |
| |
| static int ssl3_can_renegotiate(SSL *ssl) { |
| switch (ssl->renegotiate_mode) { |
| case ssl_renegotiate_never: |
| return 0; |
| case ssl_renegotiate_once: |
| return ssl->s3->total_renegotiations == 0; |
| case ssl_renegotiate_freely: |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| assert(0); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. |
| * 'type' is one of the following: |
| * |
| * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) |
| * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) |
| * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) |
| * |
| * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first |
| * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). |
| * |
| * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as |
| * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really |
| * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests. |
| * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store |
| * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol |
| * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): |
| * Change cipher spec protocol |
| * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored |
| * Alert protocol |
| * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) |
| * Handshake protocol |
| * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have |
| * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages |
| * here, anything else is handled by higher layers |
| * Application data protocol |
| * none of our business |
| */ |
| int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, uint8_t *buf, int len, int peek) { |
| int al, i, ret; |
| unsigned int n; |
| SSL3_RECORD *rr; |
| void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value) = NULL; |
| |
| if ((type && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) || |
| (peek && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0) { |
| /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ |
| uint8_t *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment; |
| uint8_t *dst = buf; |
| unsigned int k; |
| |
| /* peek == 0 */ |
| n = 0; |
| while (len > 0 && s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0) { |
| *dst++ = *src++; |
| len--; |
| s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--; |
| n++; |
| } |
| /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ |
| for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++) { |
| s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; |
| } |
| return n; |
| } |
| |
| /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */ |
| |
| /* This may require multiple iterations. False Start will cause |
| * |s->handshake_func| to signal success one step early, but the handshake |
| * must be completely finished before other modes are accepted. |
| * |
| * TODO(davidben): Move this check up to a higher level. */ |
| while (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) { |
| assert(type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA); |
| i = s->handshake_func(s); |
| if (i < 0) { |
| return i; |
| } |
| if (i == 0) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| start: |
| s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; |
| |
| /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record |
| * s->s3->rrec.data - data |
| * s->s3->rrec.off - offset into 'data' for next read |
| * s->s3->rrec.length - number of bytes. */ |
| rr = &s->s3->rrec; |
| |
| /* get new packet if necessary */ |
| if (rr->length == 0) { |
| ret = ssl3_get_record(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ |
| |
| /* |change_cipher_spec is set when we receive a ChangeCipherSpec and reset by |
| * ssl3_get_finished. */ |
| if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && |
| rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT) { |
| al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* If we are expecting a ChangeCipherSpec, it is illegal to receive a |
| * Handshake record. */ |
| if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS)) { |
| al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HANDSHAKE_RECORD_BEFORE_CCS); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in |
| * 'peek' mode) */ |
| if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { |
| rr->length = 0; |
| s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (type != 0 && type == rr->type) { |
| s->s3->warning_alert_count = 0; |
| |
| /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */ |
| /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we are doing a |
| * handshake for the first time */ |
| if (SSL_in_init(s) && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && |
| s->aead_read_ctx == NULL) { |
| /* TODO(davidben): Is this check redundant with the handshake_func |
| * check? */ |
| al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Discard empty records. */ |
| if (rr->length == 0) { |
| goto start; |
| } |
| |
| if (len <= 0) { |
| return len; |
| } |
| |
| if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length) { |
| n = rr->length; |
| } else { |
| n = (unsigned int)len; |
| } |
| |
| memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n); |
| if (!peek) { |
| rr->length -= n; |
| rr->off += n; |
| if (rr->length == 0) { |
| rr->off = 0; |
| /* The record has been consumed, so we may now clear the buffer. */ |
| ssl_read_buffer_discard(s); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return n; |
| } |
| |
| /* Process unexpected records. */ |
| |
| if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { |
| /* If peer renegotiations are disabled, all out-of-order handshake records |
| * are fatal. Renegotiations as a server are never supported. */ |
| if (s->server || !ssl3_can_renegotiate(s)) { |
| al = SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* HelloRequests may be fragmented across multiple records. */ |
| const size_t size = sizeof(s->s3->handshake_fragment); |
| const size_t avail = size - s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; |
| const size_t todo = (rr->length < avail) ? rr->length : avail; |
| memcpy(s->s3->handshake_fragment + s->s3->handshake_fragment_len, |
| &rr->data[rr->off], todo); |
| rr->off += todo; |
| rr->length -= todo; |
| s->s3->handshake_fragment_len += todo; |
| if (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len < size) { |
| goto start; /* fragment was too small */ |
| } |
| |
| /* Parse out and consume a HelloRequest. */ |
| if (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] != SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST || |
| s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0 || |
| s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0 || |
| s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0) { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0; |
| |
| if (s->msg_callback) { |
| s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, |
| s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
| } |
| |
| if (!SSL_is_init_finished(s) || !s->s3->initial_handshake_complete) { |
| /* This cannot happen. If a handshake is in progress, |type| must be |
| * |SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE|. */ |
| assert(0); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Renegotiation is only supported at quiescent points in the application |
| * protocol, namely in HTTPS, just before reading the HTTP response. Require |
| * the record-layer be idle and avoid complexities of sending a handshake |
| * record while an application_data record is being written. */ |
| if (ssl_write_buffer_is_pending(s)) { |
| al = SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Begin a new handshake. */ |
| s->s3->total_renegotiations++; |
| s->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT; |
| i = s->handshake_func(s); |
| if (i < 0) { |
| return i; |
| } |
| if (i == 0) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* The handshake completed synchronously. Continue reading records. */ |
| goto start; |
| } |
| |
| /* If an alert record, process one alert out of the record. Note that we allow |
| * a single record to contain multiple alerts. */ |
| if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { |
| /* Alerts may not be fragmented. */ |
| if (rr->length < 2) { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_ALERT); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->msg_callback) { |
| s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &rr->data[rr->off], 2, s, |
| s->msg_callback_arg); |
| } |
| const uint8_t alert_level = rr->data[rr->off++]; |
| const uint8_t alert_descr = rr->data[rr->off++]; |
| rr->length -= 2; |
| |
| if (s->info_callback != NULL) { |
| cb = s->info_callback; |
| } else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) { |
| cb = s->ctx->info_callback; |
| } |
| |
| if (cb != NULL) { |
| uint16_t alert = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; |
| cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, alert); |
| } |
| |
| if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) { |
| s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; |
| if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) { |
| s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested renegotiation and |
| * the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal alert because if |
| * application tried to renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and |
| * expects it to succeed. |
| * |
| * In future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if the |
| * peer refused it where we carry on. */ |
| else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) { |
| al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| s->s3->warning_alert_count++; |
| if (s->s3->warning_alert_count > kMaxWarningAlerts) { |
| al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARNING_ALERTS); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) { |
| char tmp[16]; |
| |
| s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; |
| s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); |
| BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%d", alert_descr); |
| ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp); |
| s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; |
| SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session); |
| return 0; |
| } else { |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| goto start; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { |
| /* close_notify has been sent, so discard all records other than alerts. */ |
| rr->length = 0; |
| goto start; |
| } |
| |
| if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
| /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly what the |
| * record payload has to look like */ |
| if (rr->length != 1 || rr->off != 0 || rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ |
| if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { |
| al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS)) { |
| al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS; |
| |
| rr->length = 0; |
| |
| if (s->msg_callback) { |
| s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, |
| s->msg_callback_arg); |
| } |
| |
| s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; |
| if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) { |
| goto err; |
| } else { |
| goto start; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* We already handled these. */ |
| assert(rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT && |
| rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE); |
| |
| al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); |
| |
| f_err: |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
| err: |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) { |
| int i; |
| |
| if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) { |
| i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ; |
| } else { |
| i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) { |
| if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) { |
| /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */ |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; |
| if (!s->enc_method->setup_key_block(s)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (!s->enc_method->change_cipher_state(s, i)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc) { |
| /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */ |
| desc = s->enc_method->alert_value(desc); |
| if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION) { |
| /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */ |
| desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| } |
| if (desc < 0) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */ |
| if (level == 2 && s->session != NULL) { |
| SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session); |
| } |
| |
| s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1; |
| s->s3->send_alert[0] = level; |
| s->s3->send_alert[1] = desc; |
| if (!ssl_write_buffer_is_pending(s)) { |
| /* Nothing is being written out, so the alert may be dispatched |
| * immediately. */ |
| return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); |
| } |
| |
| /* else data is still being written out, we will get written some time in the |
| * future */ |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) { |
| int i, j; |
| void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value) = NULL; |
| |
| s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0; |
| i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2); |
| if (i <= 0) { |
| s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1; |
| } else { |
| /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. If the message |
| * does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, we will not worry too much. */ |
| if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL) { |
| BIO_flush(s->wbio); |
| } |
| |
| if (s->msg_callback) { |
| s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, |
| s->msg_callback_arg); |
| } |
| |
| if (s->info_callback != NULL) { |
| cb = s->info_callback; |
| } else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) { |
| cb = s->ctx->info_callback; |
| } |
| |
| if (cb != NULL) { |
| j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1]; |
| cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return i; |
| } |