| /* v3_purp.c */ |
| /* |
| * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project |
| * 2001. |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
| * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
| * distribution. |
| * |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
| * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" |
| * |
| * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
| * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
| * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
| * licensing@OpenSSL.org. |
| * |
| * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
| * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
| * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
| * |
| * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
| * acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
| * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
| * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
| * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
| * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
| * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
| * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
| * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
| * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * ==================================================================== |
| * |
| * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
| * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
| * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */ |
| |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| |
| #include <string.h> |
| |
| #include <openssl/buf.h> |
| #include <openssl/err.h> |
| #include <openssl/digest.h> |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> |
| #include <openssl/obj.h> |
| #include <openssl/thread.h> |
| #include <openssl/x509_vfy.h> |
| #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
| |
| #include "../internal.h" |
| |
| #define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1|EXFLAG_SS) |
| #define ku_reject(x, usage) \ |
| (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage))) |
| #define xku_reject(x, usage) \ |
| (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage))) |
| #define ns_reject(x, usage) \ |
| (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage))) |
| |
| static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x); |
| |
| static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x); |
| static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| int ca); |
| static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| int ca); |
| static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| int ca); |
| static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca); |
| static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| int ca); |
| static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| int ca); |
| static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| int ca); |
| static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| int ca); |
| static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); |
| static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); |
| |
| static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE **a, const X509_PURPOSE **b); |
| static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p); |
| |
| static X509_PURPOSE xstandard[] = { |
| {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT, X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0, |
| check_purpose_ssl_client, (char *)"SSL client", (char *)"sslclient", |
| NULL}, |
| {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, |
| check_purpose_ssl_server, (char *)"SSL server", (char *)"sslserver", |
| NULL}, |
| {X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, |
| check_purpose_ns_ssl_server, (char *)"Netscape SSL server", |
| (char *)"nssslserver", NULL}, |
| {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_sign, |
| (char *)"S/MIME signing", (char *)"smimesign", NULL}, |
| {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, |
| check_purpose_smime_encrypt, (char *)"S/MIME encryption", |
| (char *)"smimeencrypt", NULL}, |
| {X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, check_purpose_crl_sign, |
| (char *)"CRL signing", (char *)"crlsign", NULL}, |
| {X509_PURPOSE_ANY, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT, 0, no_check, (char *)"Any Purpose", |
| (char *)"any", NULL}, |
| {X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, ocsp_helper, |
| (char *)"OCSP helper", (char *)"ocsphelper", NULL}, |
| {X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN, X509_TRUST_TSA, 0, |
| check_purpose_timestamp_sign, (char *)"Time Stamp signing", |
| (char *)"timestampsign", NULL}, |
| }; |
| |
| #define X509_PURPOSE_COUNT (sizeof(xstandard)/sizeof(X509_PURPOSE)) |
| |
| static STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE) *xptable = NULL; |
| |
| static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE **a, const X509_PURPOSE **b) |
| { |
| return (*a)->purpose - (*b)->purpose; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509* I |
| * really can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const |
| * things. |
| */ |
| int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca) |
| { |
| int idx; |
| const X509_PURPOSE *pt; |
| x509v3_cache_extensions(x); |
| if (id == -1) |
| return 1; |
| idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id); |
| if (idx == -1) |
| return -1; |
| pt = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); |
| return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, ca); |
| } |
| |
| int X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p, int purpose) |
| { |
| if (X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose) == -1) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| *p = purpose; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void) |
| { |
| if (!xptable) |
| return X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; |
| return sk_X509_PURPOSE_num(xptable) + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; |
| } |
| |
| X509_PURPOSE *X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx) |
| { |
| if (idx < 0) |
| return NULL; |
| if (idx < (int)X509_PURPOSE_COUNT) |
| return xstandard + idx; |
| return sk_X509_PURPOSE_value(xptable, idx - X509_PURPOSE_COUNT); |
| } |
| |
| int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(char *sname) |
| { |
| int i; |
| X509_PURPOSE *xptmp; |
| for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) { |
| xptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i); |
| if (!strcmp(xptmp->sname, sname)) |
| return i; |
| } |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose) |
| { |
| X509_PURPOSE tmp; |
| size_t idx; |
| |
| if ((purpose >= X509_PURPOSE_MIN) && (purpose <= X509_PURPOSE_MAX)) |
| return purpose - X509_PURPOSE_MIN; |
| tmp.purpose = purpose; |
| if (!xptable) |
| return -1; |
| |
| if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_find(xptable, &idx, &tmp)) |
| return -1; |
| return idx + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; |
| } |
| |
| int X509_PURPOSE_add(int id, int trust, int flags, |
| int (*ck) (const X509_PURPOSE *, const X509 *, int), |
| char *name, char *sname, void *arg) |
| { |
| int idx; |
| X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; |
| char *name_dup, *sname_dup; |
| |
| /* |
| * This is set according to what we change: application can't set it |
| */ |
| flags &= ~X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC; |
| /* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */ |
| flags |= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME; |
| /* Get existing entry if any */ |
| idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id); |
| /* Need a new entry */ |
| if (idx == -1) { |
| if (!(ptmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_PURPOSE)))) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| ptmp->flags = X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC; |
| } else |
| ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); |
| |
| /* Duplicate the supplied names. */ |
| name_dup = BUF_strdup(name); |
| sname_dup = BUF_strdup(sname); |
| if (name_dup == NULL || sname_dup == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| if (name_dup != NULL) |
| OPENSSL_free(name_dup); |
| if (sname_dup != NULL) |
| OPENSSL_free(sname_dup); |
| if (idx == -1) |
| OPENSSL_free(ptmp); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic */ |
| if (ptmp->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) { |
| OPENSSL_free(ptmp->name); |
| OPENSSL_free(ptmp->sname); |
| } |
| /* dup supplied name */ |
| ptmp->name = name_dup; |
| ptmp->sname = sname_dup; |
| /* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */ |
| ptmp->flags &= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC; |
| /* Set all other flags */ |
| ptmp->flags |= flags; |
| |
| ptmp->purpose = id; |
| ptmp->trust = trust; |
| ptmp->check_purpose = ck; |
| ptmp->usr_data = arg; |
| |
| /* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */ |
| if (idx == -1) { |
| if (!xptable && !(xptable = sk_X509_PURPOSE_new(xp_cmp))) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| xptable_free(ptmp); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_push(xptable, ptmp)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| xptable_free(ptmp); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p) |
| { |
| if (!p) |
| return; |
| if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC) { |
| if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) { |
| OPENSSL_free(p->name); |
| OPENSSL_free(p->sname); |
| } |
| OPENSSL_free(p); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void X509_PURPOSE_cleanup(void) |
| { |
| unsigned int i; |
| sk_X509_PURPOSE_pop_free(xptable, xptable_free); |
| for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; i++) |
| xptable_free(xstandard + i); |
| xptable = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| int X509_PURPOSE_get_id(X509_PURPOSE *xp) |
| { |
| return xp->purpose; |
| } |
| |
| char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(X509_PURPOSE *xp) |
| { |
| return xp->name; |
| } |
| |
| char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(X509_PURPOSE *xp) |
| { |
| return xp->sname; |
| } |
| |
| int X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(X509_PURPOSE *xp) |
| { |
| return xp->trust; |
| } |
| |
| static int nid_cmp(const void *void_a, const void *void_b) |
| { |
| const int *a = void_a, *b = void_b; |
| |
| return *a - *b; |
| } |
| |
| int X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION *ex) |
| { |
| /* |
| * This table is a list of the NIDs of supported extensions: that is |
| * those which are used by the verify process. If an extension is |
| * critical and doesn't appear in this list then the verify process will |
| * normally reject the certificate. The list must be kept in numerical |
| * order because it will be searched using bsearch. |
| */ |
| |
| static const int supported_nids[] = { |
| NID_netscape_cert_type, /* 71 */ |
| NID_key_usage, /* 83 */ |
| NID_subject_alt_name, /* 85 */ |
| NID_basic_constraints, /* 87 */ |
| NID_certificate_policies, /* 89 */ |
| NID_ext_key_usage, /* 126 */ |
| NID_policy_constraints, /* 401 */ |
| NID_proxyCertInfo, /* 663 */ |
| NID_name_constraints, /* 666 */ |
| NID_policy_mappings, /* 747 */ |
| NID_inhibit_any_policy /* 748 */ |
| }; |
| |
| int ex_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex)); |
| |
| if (ex_nid == NID_undef) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (bsearch |
| (&ex_nid, supported_nids, sizeof(supported_nids) / sizeof(int), |
| sizeof(int), nid_cmp) != NULL) |
| return 1; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static void setup_dp(X509 *x, DIST_POINT *dp) |
| { |
| X509_NAME *iname = NULL; |
| size_t i; |
| if (dp->reasons) { |
| if (dp->reasons->length > 0) |
| dp->dp_reasons = dp->reasons->data[0]; |
| if (dp->reasons->length > 1) |
| dp->dp_reasons |= (dp->reasons->data[1] << 8); |
| dp->dp_reasons &= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS; |
| } else |
| dp->dp_reasons = CRLDP_ALL_REASONS; |
| if (!dp->distpoint || (dp->distpoint->type != 1)) |
| return; |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) { |
| GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); |
| if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) { |
| iname = gen->d.directoryName; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| if (!iname) |
| iname = X509_get_issuer_name(x); |
| |
| DIST_POINT_set_dpname(dp->distpoint, iname); |
| |
| } |
| |
| static void setup_crldp(X509 *x) |
| { |
| size_t i; |
| x->crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, NULL, NULL); |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) |
| setup_dp(x, sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i)); |
| } |
| |
| static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x) |
| { |
| BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs; |
| PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci; |
| ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage; |
| ASN1_BIT_STRING *ns; |
| EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage; |
| X509_EXTENSION *ex; |
| size_t i; |
| int j; |
| |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_read(&x->lock); |
| const int is_set = x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET; |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_read(&x->lock); |
| |
| if (is_set) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&x->lock); |
| if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) { |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&x->lock); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| X509_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), x->sha1_hash, NULL); |
| /* V1 should mean no extensions ... */ |
| if (!X509_get_version(x)) |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_V1; |
| /* Handle basic constraints */ |
| if ((bs = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, NULL, NULL))) { |
| if (bs->ca) |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CA; |
| if (bs->pathlen) { |
| if ((bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) |
| || !bs->ca) { |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; |
| x->ex_pathlen = 0; |
| } else |
| x->ex_pathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen); |
| } else |
| x->ex_pathlen = -1; |
| BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bs); |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_BCONS; |
| } |
| /* Handle proxy certificates */ |
| if ((pci = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_proxyCertInfo, NULL, NULL))) { |
| if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA |
| || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_alt_name, -1) >= 0 |
| || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_issuer_alt_name, -1) >= 0) { |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; |
| } |
| if (pci->pcPathLengthConstraint) { |
| x->ex_pcpathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pci->pcPathLengthConstraint); |
| } else |
| x->ex_pcpathlen = -1; |
| PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci); |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_PROXY; |
| } |
| /* Handle key usage */ |
| if ((usage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) { |
| if (usage->length > 0) { |
| x->ex_kusage = usage->data[0]; |
| if (usage->length > 1) |
| x->ex_kusage |= usage->data[1] << 8; |
| } else |
| x->ex_kusage = 0; |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_KUSAGE; |
| ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage); |
| } |
| x->ex_xkusage = 0; |
| if ((extusage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) { |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_XKUSAGE; |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage); i++) { |
| switch (OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage, i))) { |
| case NID_server_auth: |
| x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_SERVER; |
| break; |
| |
| case NID_client_auth: |
| x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_CLIENT; |
| break; |
| |
| case NID_email_protect: |
| x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SMIME; |
| break; |
| |
| case NID_code_sign: |
| x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_CODE_SIGN; |
| break; |
| |
| case NID_ms_sgc: |
| case NID_ns_sgc: |
| x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SGC; |
| break; |
| |
| case NID_OCSP_sign: |
| x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_OCSP_SIGN; |
| break; |
| |
| case NID_time_stamp: |
| x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_TIMESTAMP; |
| break; |
| |
| case NID_dvcs: |
| x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_DVCS; |
| break; |
| |
| case NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage: |
| x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_ANYEKU; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extusage, ASN1_OBJECT_free); |
| } |
| |
| if ((ns = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_netscape_cert_type, NULL, NULL))) { |
| if (ns->length > 0) |
| x->ex_nscert = ns->data[0]; |
| else |
| x->ex_nscert = 0; |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_NSCERT; |
| ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ns); |
| } |
| x->skid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, NULL, NULL); |
| x->akid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL, NULL); |
| /* Does subject name match issuer ? */ |
| if (!X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x))) { |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI; |
| /* If SKID matches AKID also indicate self signed */ |
| if (X509_check_akid(x, x->akid) == X509_V_OK && |
| !ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SS; |
| } |
| x->altname = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL); |
| x->nc = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_name_constraints, &j, NULL); |
| if (!x->nc && (j != -1)) |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; |
| setup_crldp(x); |
| |
| for (j = 0; j < X509_get_ext_count(x); j++) { |
| ex = X509_get_ext(x, j); |
| if (OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex)) |
| == NID_freshest_crl) |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_FRESHEST; |
| if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex)) |
| continue; |
| if (!X509_supported_extension(ex)) { |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET; |
| |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&x->lock); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * CA checks common to all purposes return codes: 0 not a CA 1 is a CA 2 |
| * basicConstraints absent so "maybe" a CA 3 basicConstraints absent but self |
| * signed V1. 4 basicConstraints absent but keyUsage present and keyCertSign |
| * asserted. |
| */ |
| |
| static int check_ca(const X509 *x) |
| { |
| /* keyUsage if present should allow cert signing */ |
| if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) |
| return 0; |
| if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) { |
| if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) |
| return 1; |
| /* If basicConstraints says not a CA then say so */ |
| else |
| return 0; |
| } else { |
| /* we support V1 roots for... uh, I don't really know why. */ |
| if ((x->ex_flags & V1_ROOT) == V1_ROOT) |
| return 3; |
| /* |
| * If key usage present it must have certSign so tolerate it |
| */ |
| else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) |
| return 4; |
| /* Older certificates could have Netscape-specific CA types */ |
| else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT && x->ex_nscert & NS_ANY_CA) |
| return 5; |
| /* can this still be regarded a CA certificate? I doubt it */ |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| int X509_check_ca(X509 *x) |
| { |
| x509v3_cache_extensions(x); |
| return check_ca(x); |
| } |
| |
| /* Check SSL CA: common checks for SSL client and server */ |
| static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x) |
| { |
| int ca_ret; |
| ca_ret = check_ca(x); |
| if (!ca_ret) |
| return 0; |
| /* check nsCertType if present */ |
| if (ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CA) |
| return ca_ret; |
| else |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| int ca) |
| { |
| if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_CLIENT)) |
| return 0; |
| if (ca) |
| return check_ssl_ca(x); |
| /* We need to do digital signatures or key agreement */ |
| if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)) |
| return 0; |
| /* nsCertType if present should allow SSL client use */ |
| if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_CLIENT)) |
| return 0; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Key usage needed for TLS/SSL server: digital signature, encipherment or |
| * key agreement. The ssl code can check this more thoroughly for individual |
| * key types. |
| */ |
| #define KU_TLS \ |
| (KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT|KU_KEY_AGREEMENT) |
| |
| static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| int ca) |
| { |
| if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_SERVER | XKU_SGC)) |
| return 0; |
| if (ca) |
| return check_ssl_ca(x); |
| |
| if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_SERVER)) |
| return 0; |
| if (ku_reject(x, KU_TLS)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return 1; |
| |
| } |
| |
| static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| int ca) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| ret = check_purpose_ssl_server(xp, x, ca); |
| if (!ret || ca) |
| return ret; |
| /* We need to encipher or Netscape complains */ |
| if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) |
| return 0; |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* common S/MIME checks */ |
| static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca) |
| { |
| if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SMIME)) |
| return 0; |
| if (ca) { |
| int ca_ret; |
| ca_ret = check_ca(x); |
| if (!ca_ret) |
| return 0; |
| /* check nsCertType if present */ |
| if (ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME_CA) |
| return ca_ret; |
| else |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) { |
| if (x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME) |
| return 1; |
| /* Workaround for some buggy certificates */ |
| if (x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CLIENT) |
| return 2; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| int ca) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| ret = purpose_smime(x, ca); |
| if (!ret || ca) |
| return ret; |
| if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_NON_REPUDIATION)) |
| return 0; |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| int ca) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| ret = purpose_smime(x, ca); |
| if (!ret || ca) |
| return ret; |
| if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) |
| return 0; |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| int ca) |
| { |
| if (ca) { |
| int ca_ret; |
| if ((ca_ret = check_ca(x)) != 2) |
| return ca_ret; |
| else |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (ku_reject(x, KU_CRL_SIGN)) |
| return 0; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * OCSP helper: this is *not* a full OCSP check. It just checks that each CA |
| * is valid. Additional checks must be made on the chain. |
| */ |
| |
| static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) |
| { |
| /* |
| * Must be a valid CA. Should we really support the "I don't know" value |
| * (2)? |
| */ |
| if (ca) |
| return check_ca(x); |
| /* leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify() */ |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| int ca) |
| { |
| int i_ext; |
| |
| /* If ca is true we must return if this is a valid CA certificate. */ |
| if (ca) |
| return check_ca(x); |
| |
| /* |
| * Check the optional key usage field: |
| * if Key Usage is present, it must be one of digitalSignature |
| * and/or nonRepudiation (other values are not consistent and shall |
| * be rejected). |
| */ |
| if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) |
| && ((x->ex_kusage & ~(KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) || |
| !(x->ex_kusage & (KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)))) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* Only time stamp key usage is permitted and it's required. */ |
| if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) || x->ex_xkusage != XKU_TIMESTAMP) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* Extended Key Usage MUST be critical */ |
| i_ext = X509_get_ext_by_NID((X509 *)x, NID_ext_key_usage, -1); |
| if (i_ext >= 0) { |
| X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_get_ext((X509 *)x, i_ext); |
| if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) |
| { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Various checks to see if one certificate issued the second. This can be |
| * used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates which have been looked |
| * up using some simple method such as by subject name. These are: 1. Check |
| * issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer) 2. If akid(subject) exists |
| * check it matches issuer 3. If key_usage(issuer) exists check it supports |
| * certificate signing returns 0 for OK, positive for reason for mismatch, |
| * reasons match codes for X509_verify_cert() |
| */ |
| |
| int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject) |
| { |
| if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer), |
| X509_get_issuer_name(subject))) |
| return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH; |
| x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer); |
| x509v3_cache_extensions(subject); |
| |
| if (subject->akid) { |
| int ret = X509_check_akid(issuer, subject->akid); |
| if (ret != X509_V_OK) |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| if (subject->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { |
| if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) |
| return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE; |
| } else if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) |
| return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN; |
| return X509_V_OK; |
| } |
| |
| int X509_check_akid(X509 *issuer, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid) |
| { |
| |
| if (!akid) |
| return X509_V_OK; |
| |
| /* Check key ids (if present) */ |
| if (akid->keyid && issuer->skid && |
| ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(akid->keyid, issuer->skid)) |
| return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH; |
| /* Check serial number */ |
| if (akid->serial && |
| ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(issuer), akid->serial)) |
| return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH; |
| /* Check issuer name */ |
| if (akid->issuer) { |
| /* |
| * Ugh, for some peculiar reason AKID includes SEQUENCE OF |
| * GeneralName. So look for a DirName. There may be more than one but |
| * we only take any notice of the first. |
| */ |
| GENERAL_NAMES *gens; |
| GENERAL_NAME *gen; |
| X509_NAME *nm = NULL; |
| size_t i; |
| gens = akid->issuer; |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { |
| gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); |
| if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) { |
| nm = gen->d.dirn; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| if (nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer))) |
| return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH; |
| } |
| return X509_V_OK; |
| } |
