| /* Copyright (c) 2023, Google Inc. |
| * |
| * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any |
| * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above |
| * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. |
| * |
| * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES |
| * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF |
| * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY |
| * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES |
| * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION |
| * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN |
| * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. |
| */ |
| |
| //! Implements the HMAC-based Key Derivation Function from |
| //! <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5869>. |
| //! |
| //! One-shot operation: |
| //! |
| //! ``` |
| //! use bssl_crypto::{hkdf, hkdf::HkdfSha256}; |
| //! |
| //! let key: [u8; 32] = HkdfSha256::derive(b"secret", hkdf::Salt::NonEmpty(b"salt"), |
| //! b"info"); |
| //! ``` |
| //! |
| //! If deriving several keys that vary only in the `info` parameter, then part |
| //! of the computation can be shared by calculating the "pseudo-random key". |
| //! This is purely a performance optimisation. |
| //! |
| //! ``` |
| //! use bssl_crypto::{hkdf, hkdf::HkdfSha256}; |
| //! |
| //! let prk = HkdfSha256::extract(b"secret", hkdf::Salt::NonEmpty(b"salt")); |
| //! let key1 : [u8; 32] = prk.expand(b"info1"); |
| //! let key2 : [u8; 32] = prk.expand(b"info2"); |
| //! |
| //! assert_eq!(key1, HkdfSha256::derive(b"secret", hkdf::Salt::NonEmpty(b"salt"), |
| //! b"info1")); |
| //! assert_eq!(key2, HkdfSha256::derive(b"secret", hkdf::Salt::NonEmpty(b"salt"), |
| //! b"info2")); |
| //! ``` |
| //! |
| //! The above examples assume that the size of the outputs is known at compile |
| //! time. (And only output lengths less than 256 bytes are supported.) |
| //! |
| //! ```compile_fail |
| //! use bssl_crypto::{hkdf, hkdf::HkdfSha256}; |
| //! |
| //! let key: [u8; 256] = HkdfSha256::derive(b"secret", hkdf::Salt::None, b"info"); |
| //! ``` |
| //! |
| //! To use HKDF with longer, or run-time, lengths, use `derive_into` and |
| //! `extract_into`: |
| //! |
| //! ``` |
| //! use bssl_crypto::{hkdf, hkdf::HkdfSha256}; |
| //! |
| //! let mut out = [0u8; 50]; |
| //! HkdfSha256::derive_into(b"secret", hkdf::Salt::None, b"info", &mut out).expect( |
| //! "HKDF can't produce that much"); |
| //! |
| //! assert_eq!(out, HkdfSha256::derive(b"secret", hkdf::Salt::None, b"info")); |
| //! ``` |
| |
| use crate::{digest, sealed, with_output_array, FfiMutSlice, FfiSlice, ForeignTypeRef}; |
| use core::marker::PhantomData; |
| |
| /// Implementation of HKDF-SHA-256 |
| pub type HkdfSha256 = Hkdf<digest::Sha256>; |
| |
| /// Implementation of HKDF-SHA-512 |
| pub type HkdfSha512 = Hkdf<digest::Sha512>; |
| |
| /// Error type returned when too much output is requested from an HKDF operation. |
| #[derive(Debug)] |
| pub struct TooLong; |
| |
| /// HKDF's optional salt values. See <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5869#section-3.1> |
| pub enum Salt<'a> { |
| /// No salt. |
| None, |
| /// An explicit salt. Note that an empty value here is interpreted the same |
| /// as if passing `None`. |
| NonEmpty(&'a [u8]), |
| } |
| |
| impl Salt<'_> { |
| fn as_ffi_ptr(&self) -> *const u8 { |
| match self { |
| Salt::None => core::ptr::null(), |
| Salt::NonEmpty(salt) => salt.as_ffi_ptr(), |
| } |
| } |
| |
| fn len(&self) -> usize { |
| match self { |
| Salt::None => 0, |
| Salt::NonEmpty(salt) => salt.len(), |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /// HKDF for any of the implemented hash functions. The aliases [`HkdfSha256`] |
| /// and [`HkdfSha512`] are provided for the most common cases. |
| pub struct Hkdf<MD: digest::Algorithm>(PhantomData<MD>); |
| |
| impl<MD: digest::Algorithm> Hkdf<MD> { |
| /// The maximum number of bytes of key material that can be produced. |
| pub const MAX_OUTPUT_LEN: usize = MD::OUTPUT_LEN * 255; |
| |
| /// Derive key material from the given secret, salt, and info. Attempting |
| /// to derive more than 255 bytes is a compile-time error, see `derive_into` |
| /// for longer outputs. |
| /// |
| /// The semantics of the arguments are complex. See |
| /// <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5869#section-3>. |
| pub fn derive<const N: usize>(secret: &[u8], salt: Salt, info: &[u8]) -> [u8; N] { |
| Self::extract(secret, salt).expand(info) |
| } |
| |
| /// Derive key material from the given secret, salt, and info. Attempting |
| /// to derive more than `MAX_OUTPUT_LEN` bytes is a run-time error. |
| /// |
| /// The semantics of the arguments are complex. See |
| /// <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5869#section-3>. |
| pub fn derive_into( |
| secret: &[u8], |
| salt: Salt, |
| info: &[u8], |
| out: &mut [u8], |
| ) -> Result<(), TooLong> { |
| Self::extract(secret, salt).expand_into(info, out) |
| } |
| |
| /// Extract a pseudo-random key from the given secret and salt. This can |
| /// be used to avoid redoing computation when computing several keys that |
| /// vary only in the `info` parameter. |
| pub fn extract(secret: &[u8], salt: Salt) -> Prk { |
| let mut prk = [0u8; bssl_sys::EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE as usize]; |
| let mut prk_len = 0usize; |
| let evp_md = MD::get_md(sealed::Sealed).as_ptr(); |
| unsafe { |
| // Safety: `EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE` is the maximum output size of |
| // `HKDF_extract` so it'll never overrun the buffer. |
| bssl_sys::HKDF_extract( |
| prk.as_mut_ffi_ptr(), |
| &mut prk_len, |
| evp_md, |
| secret.as_ffi_ptr(), |
| secret.len(), |
| salt.as_ffi_ptr(), |
| salt.len(), |
| ); |
| } |
| // This is documented to be always be true. |
| assert!(prk_len <= prk.len()); |
| Prk { |
| prk, |
| len: prk_len, |
| evp_md, |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /// A pseudo-random key, an intermediate value in the HKDF computation. |
| pub struct Prk { |
| prk: [u8; bssl_sys::EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE as usize], |
| len: usize, |
| evp_md: *const bssl_sys::EVP_MD, |
| } |
| |
| #[allow(clippy::let_unit_value)] |
| impl Prk { |
| /// Derive key material for the given info parameter. Attempting |
| /// to derive more than 255 bytes is a compile-time error, see `expand_into` |
| /// for longer outputs. |
| pub fn expand<const N: usize>(&self, info: &[u8]) -> [u8; N] { |
| // This is the odd way to write a static assertion that uses a const |
| // parameter in Rust. Even then, Rust cannot reference `MAX_OUTPUT_LEN`. |
| // But if we safely assume that all hash functions output at least a |
| // byte then 255 is a safe lower bound on `MAX_OUTPUT_LEN`. |
| // A doctest at the top of the module checks that this assert is effective. |
| struct StaticAssert<const N: usize, const BOUND: usize>; |
| impl<const N: usize, const BOUND: usize> StaticAssert<N, BOUND> { |
| const BOUNDS_CHECK: () = assert!(N < BOUND, "Large outputs not supported"); |
| } |
| let _ = StaticAssert::<N, 256>::BOUNDS_CHECK; |
| |
| unsafe { |
| with_output_array(|out, out_len| { |
| // Safety: `HKDF_expand` writes exactly `out_len` bytes or else |
| // returns zero. `evp_md` is valid by construction. |
| let result = bssl_sys::HKDF_expand( |
| out, |
| out_len, |
| self.evp_md, |
| self.prk.as_ffi_ptr(), |
| self.len, |
| info.as_ffi_ptr(), |
| info.len(), |
| ); |
| // The output length is known to be within bounds so the only other |
| // possibily is an allocation failure, which we don't attempt to |
| // handle. |
| assert_eq!(result, 1); |
| }) |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /// Derive key material from the given info parameter. Attempting |
| /// to derive more than the HKDF's `MAX_OUTPUT_LEN` bytes is a run-time |
| /// error. |
| pub fn expand_into(&self, info: &[u8], out: &mut [u8]) -> Result<(), TooLong> { |
| // Safety: writes at most `out.len()` bytes into `out`. |
| // `evp_md` is valid by construction. |
| let result = unsafe { |
| bssl_sys::HKDF_expand( |
| out.as_mut_ffi_ptr(), |
| out.len(), |
| self.evp_md, |
| self.prk.as_ffi_ptr(), |
| self.len, |
| info.as_ffi_ptr(), |
| info.len(), |
| ) |
| }; |
| if result == 1 { |
| Ok(()) |
| } else { |
| Err(TooLong) |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| #[cfg(test)] |
| #[allow( |
| clippy::expect_used, |
| clippy::panic, |
| clippy::indexing_slicing, |
| clippy::unwrap_used |
| )] |
| mod tests { |
| use crate::{ |
| hkdf::{HkdfSha256, HkdfSha512, Salt}, |
| test_helpers::{decode_hex, decode_hex_into_vec}, |
| }; |
| |
| #[test] |
| fn sha256() { |
| let ikm = decode_hex_into_vec("0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b"); |
| let salt_vec = decode_hex_into_vec("000102030405060708090a0b0c"); |
| let salt = Salt::NonEmpty(&salt_vec); |
| let info = decode_hex_into_vec("f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9"); |
| let okm: [u8; 42] = HkdfSha256::derive(ikm.as_slice(), salt, info.as_slice()); |
| let expected = decode_hex( |
| "3cb25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d56ecc4c5bf34007208d5b887185865", |
| ); |
| assert_eq!(okm, expected); |
| } |
| |
| #[test] |
| fn sha512() { |
| let ikm = decode_hex_into_vec("5d3db20e8238a90b62a600fa57fdb318"); |
| let salt_vec = decode_hex_into_vec("1d6f3b38a1e607b5e6bcd4af1800a9d3"); |
| let salt = Salt::NonEmpty(&salt_vec); |
| let info = decode_hex_into_vec("2bc5f39032b6fc87da69ba8711ce735b169646fd"); |
| let okm: [u8; 42] = HkdfSha512::derive(ikm.as_slice(), salt, info.as_slice()); |
| let expected = decode_hex( |
| "8c3cf7122dcb5eb7efaf02718f1faf70bca20dcb75070e9d0871a413a6c05fc195a75aa9ffc349d70aae", |
| ); |
| assert_eq!(okm, expected); |
| } |
| |
| // Test Vectors from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869. |
| #[test] |
| fn rfc5869_sha256() { |
| struct Test { |
| ikm: Vec<u8>, |
| salt: Vec<u8>, |
| info: Vec<u8>, |
| okm: Vec<u8>, |
| } |
| let tests = [ |
| Test { |
| // Test Case 1 |
| ikm: decode_hex_into_vec("0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b"), |
| salt: decode_hex_into_vec("000102030405060708090a0b0c"), |
| info: decode_hex_into_vec("f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9"), |
| okm: decode_hex_into_vec("3cb25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d56ecc4c5bf34007208d5b887185865") |
| }, |
| Test { |
| // Test Case 2 |
| ikm: decode_hex_into_vec( |
| "000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f\ |
| 101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f\ |
| 202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f\ |
| 303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f\ |
| 404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f", |
| ), |
| salt: decode_hex_into_vec( |
| "606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f\ |
| 707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f\ |
| 808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f\ |
| 909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f\ |
| a0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf", |
| ), |
| info: decode_hex_into_vec( |
| "b0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebf\ |
| c0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecf\ |
| d0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedf\ |
| e0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeef\ |
| f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff", |
| ), |
| okm: decode_hex_into_vec( |
| "b11e398dc80327a1c8e7f78c596a4934\ |
| 4f012eda2d4efad8a050cc4c19afa97c\ |
| 59045a99cac7827271cb41c65e590e09\ |
| da3275600c2f09b8367793a9aca3db71\ |
| cc30c58179ec3e87c14c01d5c1f3434f\ |
| 1d87", |
| ) |
| }, |
| Test { |
| // Test Case 3 |
| ikm: decode_hex_into_vec("0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b"), |
| salt: Vec::new(), |
| info: Vec::new(), |
| okm: decode_hex_into_vec( |
| "8da4e775a563c18f715f802a063c5a31b8a11f5c5ee1879ec3454e5f3c738d2d9d201395faa4b61a96c8"), |
| }, |
| ]; |
| |
| for Test { |
| ikm, |
| salt, |
| info, |
| okm, |
| } in tests.iter() |
| { |
| let salt = if salt.is_empty() { |
| Salt::None |
| } else { |
| Salt::NonEmpty(&salt) |
| }; |
| let mut okm2 = vec![0u8; okm.len()]; |
| assert!( |
| HkdfSha256::derive_into(ikm.as_slice(), salt, info.as_slice(), &mut okm2).is_ok() |
| ); |
| assert_eq!(okm2.as_slice(), okm.as_slice()); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| #[test] |
| fn max_output() { |
| let hkdf = HkdfSha256::extract(b"", Salt::None); |
| let mut longest = vec![0u8; HkdfSha256::MAX_OUTPUT_LEN]; |
| assert!(hkdf.expand_into(b"", &mut longest).is_ok()); |
| |
| let mut too_long = vec![0u8; HkdfSha256::MAX_OUTPUT_LEN + 1]; |
| assert!(hkdf.expand_into(b"", &mut too_long).is_err()); |
| } |
| } |