| // Copyright 2014 The BoringSSL Authors |
| // |
| // Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); |
| // you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. |
| // You may obtain a copy of the License at |
| // |
| // https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 |
| // |
| // Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software |
| // distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, |
| // WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. |
| // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and |
| // limitations under the License. |
| |
| #include <openssl/aead.h> |
| |
| #include <optional> |
| |
| #include <assert.h> |
| #include <string.h> |
| |
| #include <openssl/cipher.h> |
| #include <openssl/err.h> |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> |
| #include <openssl/span.h> |
| |
| #include "../../internal.h" |
| #include "../../mem_internal.h" |
| #include "internal.h" |
| |
| |
| size_t EVP_AEAD_key_length(const EVP_AEAD *aead) { return aead->key_len; } |
| |
| size_t EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(const EVP_AEAD *aead) { return aead->nonce_len; } |
| |
| size_t EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(const EVP_AEAD *aead) { return aead->overhead; } |
| |
| size_t EVP_AEAD_max_tag_len(const EVP_AEAD *aead) { return aead->max_tag_len; } |
| |
| void EVP_AEAD_CTX_zero(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) { |
| OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD_CTX)); |
| } |
| |
| EVP_AEAD_CTX *EVP_AEAD_CTX_new(const EVP_AEAD *aead, const uint8_t *key, |
| size_t key_len, size_t tag_len) { |
| EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx = |
| reinterpret_cast<EVP_AEAD_CTX *>(OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_AEAD_CTX))); |
| if (!ctx) { |
| return nullptr; |
| } |
| EVP_AEAD_CTX_zero(ctx); |
| |
| if (EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(ctx, aead, key, key_len, tag_len, nullptr)) { |
| return ctx; |
| } |
| |
| EVP_AEAD_CTX_free(ctx); |
| return nullptr; |
| } |
| |
| void EVP_AEAD_CTX_free(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) { |
| if (ctx == nullptr) { |
| return; |
| } |
| EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(ctx); |
| OPENSSL_free(ctx); |
| } |
| |
| int EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_AEAD *aead, |
| const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, size_t tag_len, |
| ENGINE *impl) { |
| if (!aead->init) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_NO_DIRECTION_SET); |
| ctx->aead = nullptr; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(ctx, aead, key, key_len, tag_len, |
| evp_aead_open); |
| } |
| |
| int EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_AEAD *aead, |
| const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, |
| size_t tag_len, |
| enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) { |
| if (key_len != aead->key_len) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE); |
| ctx->aead = nullptr; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| ctx->aead = aead; |
| |
| int ok; |
| if (aead->init) { |
| ok = aead->init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len); |
| } else { |
| ok = aead->init_with_direction(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, dir); |
| } |
| |
| if (!ok) { |
| ctx->aead = nullptr; |
| } |
| |
| return ok; |
| } |
| |
| void EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) { |
| if (ctx->aead == nullptr) { |
| return; |
| } |
| ctx->aead->cleanup(ctx); |
| ctx->aead = nullptr; |
| } |
| |
| // check_alias returns 1 if |out| is compatible with |in| and 0 otherwise. If |
| // |in| and |out| alias, we require that |in| == |out|. |
| static int check_alias(const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *out, |
| size_t out_len) { |
| if (!buffers_alias(in, in_len, out, out_len)) { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| return in == out; |
| } |
| |
| int EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, |
| size_t max_out_len, const uint8_t *nonce, |
| size_t nonce_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, |
| const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) { |
| bool ok = false; |
| bssl::Cleanup cleanup([&] { |
| if (!ok) { |
| // In the event of an error, clear the output buffer so that a caller |
| // that doesn't check the return value doesn't send raw data. |
| OPENSSL_memset(out, 0, max_out_len); |
| *out_len = 0; |
| } |
| }); |
| |
| if (max_out_len < in_len) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!ctx->aead->seal_scatter) { |
| CRYPTO_IOVEC iovec[1]; |
| iovec[0].in = in; |
| iovec[0].out = out; |
| iovec[0].len = in_len; |
| CRYPTO_IVEC aadvec[1]; |
| aadvec[0].in = ad; |
| aadvec[0].len = ad_len; |
| if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_sealv(ctx, iovec, 1, out + in_len, out_len, |
| max_out_len - in_len, nonce, nonce_len, aadvec, |
| 1)) { |
| *out_len = 0; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| *out_len += in_len; |
| ok = true; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| if (in_len + ctx->aead->overhead < in_len /* overflow */) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!check_alias(in, in_len, out, max_out_len)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_OUTPUT_ALIASES_INPUT); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| size_t out_tag_len; |
| if (ctx->aead->seal_scatter(ctx, out, out + in_len, &out_tag_len, |
| max_out_len - in_len, nonce, nonce_len, in, |
| in_len, nullptr, 0, ad, ad_len)) { |
| *out_len = in_len + out_tag_len; |
| ok = true; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal_scatter(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, |
| uint8_t *out_tag, size_t *out_tag_len, |
| size_t max_out_tag_len, const uint8_t *nonce, |
| size_t nonce_len, const uint8_t *in, |
| size_t in_len, const uint8_t *extra_in, |
| size_t extra_in_len, const uint8_t *ad, |
| size_t ad_len) { |
| bool ok = false; |
| bssl::Cleanup cleanup([&] { |
| if (!ok) { |
| // In the event of an error, clear the output buffer so that a caller |
| // that doesn't check the return value doesn't send raw data. |
| OPENSSL_memset(out, 0, in_len); |
| OPENSSL_memset(out_tag, 0, max_out_tag_len); |
| *out_tag_len = 0; |
| } |
| }); |
| |
| if (!ctx->aead->seal_scatter) { |
| CRYPTO_IOVEC iovec[2]; |
| iovec[0].in = in; |
| iovec[0].out = out; |
| iovec[0].len = in_len; |
| iovec[1].in = extra_in; |
| iovec[1].out = out_tag; |
| iovec[1].len = extra_in_len; |
| CRYPTO_IVEC aadvec[1]; |
| aadvec[0].in = ad; |
| aadvec[0].len = ad_len; |
| if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_sealv(ctx, iovec, extra_in_len ? 2 : 1, |
| out_tag + extra_in_len, out_tag_len, |
| max_out_tag_len - extra_in_len, nonce, nonce_len, |
| aadvec, 1)) { |
| *out_tag_len = 0; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| *out_tag_len += extra_in_len; |
| ok = true; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| // |in| and |out| may alias exactly, |out_tag| may not alias. |
| if (!check_alias(in, in_len, out, in_len) || |
| buffers_alias(out, in_len, out_tag, max_out_tag_len) || |
| buffers_alias(in, in_len, out_tag, max_out_tag_len)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_OUTPUT_ALIASES_INPUT); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!ctx->aead->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in && extra_in_len) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_OPERATION); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (ctx->aead->seal_scatter(ctx, out, out_tag, out_tag_len, max_out_tag_len, |
| nonce, nonce_len, in, in_len, extra_in, |
| extra_in_len, ad, ad_len)) { |
| ok = true; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static bool check_iovec_internal_alias(bssl::Span<const CRYPTO_IOVEC> iovecs) { |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < iovecs.size(); ++i) { |
| // Same index check. |
| if (!check_alias(iovecs[i].in, iovecs[i].len, iovecs[i].out, |
| iovecs[i].len)) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| #if !defined(NDEBUG) |
| // Unrealistic cases; they'd be harmful but also extremely unlikely anyone |
| // will ever get those wrong. Thus skip them in release builds. |
| for (size_t j = i + 1; j < iovecs.size(); ++j) { |
| if (buffers_alias(iovecs[i].in, iovecs[i].len, // |
| iovecs[j].out, iovecs[j].len) || |
| buffers_alias(iovecs[i].out, iovecs[i].len, // |
| iovecs[j].in, iovecs[j].len) || |
| buffers_alias(iovecs[i].out, iovecs[i].len, // |
| iovecs[j].out, iovecs[j].len)) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| } |
| #endif |
| } |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| #if !defined(NDEBUG) |
| static bool check_ivec_buf_alias(bssl::Span<const CRYPTO_IVEC> ivecs, |
| const uint8_t *buf, size_t buf_len) { |
| for (const CRYPTO_IVEC &ivec : ivecs) { |
| if (buffers_alias(ivec.in, ivec.len, buf, buf_len)) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| } |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| static bool check_iovec_out_ivec_alias(bssl::Span<const CRYPTO_IOVEC> iovecs, |
| bssl::Span<const CRYPTO_IVEC> ivecs) { |
| for (const CRYPTO_IOVEC &iovec : iovecs) { |
| if (!check_ivec_buf_alias(ivecs, iovec.out, iovec.len)) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| } |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| static bool check_iovec_buf_alias(bssl::Span<const CRYPTO_IOVEC> iovecs, |
| const uint8_t *buf, size_t buf_len) { |
| for (const CRYPTO_IOVEC &iovec : iovecs) { |
| if (buffers_alias(iovec.in, iovec.len, buf, buf_len)) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| if (buffers_alias(iovec.out, iovec.len, buf, buf_len)) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| } |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| static bool check_iovec_out_buf_alias(bssl::Span<const CRYPTO_IOVEC> iovecs, |
| const uint8_t *buf, size_t buf_len) { |
| for (const CRYPTO_IOVEC &iovec : iovecs) { |
| if (buffers_alias(iovec.out, iovec.len, buf, buf_len)) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| } |
| return true; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| static bool check_iovec_alias(bssl::Span<const CRYPTO_IOVEC> iovecs, |
| bssl::Span<const CRYPTO_IVEC> aadvecs, |
| const uint8_t *out, size_t out_len, |
| const uint8_t *in1, size_t in1_len, |
| const uint8_t *in2, size_t in2_len) { |
| return |
| #if !defined(NDEBUG) |
| // Unrealistic cases; they'd be harmful but also extremely unlikely anyone |
| // will ever get those wrong. Thus skip them in release builds. |
| // |
| // iovec.out <-> aadvec. |
| check_iovec_out_ivec_alias(iovecs, aadvecs) && |
| // iovec <-> out. |
| check_iovec_buf_alias(iovecs, out, out_len) && |
| // iovec.out <-> in1. |
| check_iovec_out_buf_alias(iovecs, in1, in1_len) && |
| // iovec.out <-> in2. |
| check_iovec_out_buf_alias(iovecs, in2, in2_len) && |
| // aadvec <-> out. |
| check_ivec_buf_alias(aadvecs, out, out_len) && |
| // out <-> in1. |
| !buffers_alias(out, out_len, in1, in1_len) && |
| // out <-> in2. |
| !buffers_alias(out, out_len, in2, in2_len) && |
| #endif |
| // iovec <-> iovec. |
| check_iovec_internal_alias(iovecs); |
| } |
| |
| static void clear_iovec(bssl::Span<const CRYPTO_IOVEC> iovecs) { |
| for (const CRYPTO_IOVEC &iovec : iovecs) { |
| OPENSSL_memset(iovec.out, 0, iovec.len); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| int EVP_AEAD_CTX_sealv(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const CRYPTO_IOVEC *iovec, |
| size_t num_iovec, uint8_t *out_tag, size_t *out_tag_len, |
| size_t max_out_tag_len, const uint8_t *nonce, |
| size_t nonce_len, const CRYPTO_IVEC *aadvec, |
| size_t num_aadvec) { |
| bssl::Span<const CRYPTO_IOVEC> iovecs(iovec, num_iovec); |
| bssl::Span<const CRYPTO_IVEC> aadvecs(aadvec, num_aadvec); |
| |
| bool ok = false; |
| bssl::Cleanup cleanup([&] { |
| if (!ok) { |
| // In the event of an error, clear the output buffer so that a caller |
| // that doesn't check the return value doesn't send raw data. |
| clear_iovec(iovecs); |
| OPENSSL_memset(out_tag, 0, max_out_tag_len); |
| *out_tag_len = 0; |
| } |
| }); |
| |
| if (!bssl::iovec::IsValid(iovecs) || !bssl::iovec::IsValid(aadvecs)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| // Enforce aliasing rules: no output may alias any input, with the one |
| // exception that an iovec member's |in| and |out| pointers may be identical |
| // for in-place operation. |
| if (!check_iovec_alias(iovecs, aadvecs, out_tag, max_out_tag_len, nonce, |
| nonce_len, nullptr, 0)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_OUTPUT_ALIASES_INPUT); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!ctx->aead->sealv) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_CTRL_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (ctx->aead->sealv(ctx, iovecs, out_tag, out_tag_len, max_out_tag_len, |
| nonce, nonce_len, aadvecs)) { |
| ok = true; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, |
| size_t max_out_len, const uint8_t *nonce, |
| size_t nonce_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, |
| const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) { |
| bool ok = false; |
| bssl::Cleanup cleanup([&] { |
| if (!ok) { |
| // In the event of an error, clear the output buffer so that a caller |
| // that doesn't check the return value doesn't try and process bad |
| // data. |
| OPENSSL_memset(out, 0, max_out_len); |
| *out_len = 0; |
| } |
| }); |
| |
| if (!ctx->aead->open && !ctx->aead->open_gather) { |
| if (ctx->tag_len) { |
| // If the tag length is known, the caller only needs to provide enough |
| // space for in_len - tag_len. |
| if (in_len < ctx->tag_len) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| size_t plaintext_len = in_len - ctx->tag_len; |
| if (max_out_len < plaintext_len) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| CRYPTO_IOVEC iovec[1]; |
| iovec[0].in = in; |
| iovec[0].out = out; |
| iovec[0].len = plaintext_len; |
| CRYPTO_IVEC aadvec[1]; |
| aadvec[0].in = ad; |
| aadvec[0].len = ad_len; |
| if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_openv_detached(ctx, iovec, 1, nonce, nonce_len, |
| in + plaintext_len, ctx->tag_len, aadvec, |
| 1)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| *out_len = plaintext_len; |
| ok = true; |
| return 1; |
| } else { |
| if (max_out_len < in_len) { |
| // Variable tag length AEADs need to be able to decrypt the entire |
| // plaintext before they can split it up. So the caller has to provide |
| // sufficient max_out_len for temporary data. |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| CRYPTO_IOVEC iovec[1]; |
| iovec[0].in = in; |
| iovec[0].out = out; |
| iovec[0].len = in_len; |
| CRYPTO_IVEC aadvec[1]; |
| aadvec[0].in = ad; |
| aadvec[0].len = ad_len; |
| if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_openv(ctx, iovec, 1, out_len, nonce, nonce_len, aadvec, |
| 1)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| ok = true; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (!check_alias(in, in_len, out, max_out_len)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_OUTPUT_ALIASES_INPUT); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (ctx->aead->open) { |
| if (!ctx->aead->open(ctx, out, out_len, max_out_len, nonce, nonce_len, in, |
| in_len, ad, ad_len)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| ok = true; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| // AEADs that use the default implementation of open() must set |tag_len| at |
| // initialization time. |
| assert(ctx->tag_len); |
| |
| if (in_len < ctx->tag_len) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| size_t plaintext_len = in_len - ctx->tag_len; |
| if (max_out_len < plaintext_len) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (ctx->aead->open_gather(ctx, out, nonce, nonce_len, in, plaintext_len, |
| in + plaintext_len, ctx->tag_len, ad, ad_len)) { |
| *out_len = plaintext_len; |
| ok = true; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int EVP_AEAD_CTX_open_gather(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, |
| const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len, |
| const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, |
| const uint8_t *in_tag, size_t in_tag_len, |
| const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) { |
| bool ok = false; |
| bssl::Cleanup cleanup([&] { |
| if (!ok) { |
| // In the event of an error, clear the output buffer so that a caller |
| // that doesn't check the return value doesn't try and process bad |
| // data. |
| OPENSSL_memset(out, 0, in_len); |
| } |
| }); |
| |
| if (!ctx->aead->open_gather) { |
| CRYPTO_IOVEC iovec[1]; |
| iovec[0].in = in; |
| iovec[0].out = out; |
| iovec[0].len = in_len; |
| CRYPTO_IVEC aadvec[1]; |
| aadvec[0].in = ad; |
| aadvec[0].len = ad_len; |
| if (EVP_AEAD_CTX_openv_detached(ctx, iovec, 1, nonce, nonce_len, in_tag, |
| in_tag_len, aadvec, 1)) { |
| ok = true; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!check_alias(in, in_len, out, in_len)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_OUTPUT_ALIASES_INPUT); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!ctx->aead->open_gather) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_CTRL_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (ctx->aead->open_gather(ctx, out, nonce, nonce_len, in, in_len, in_tag, |
| in_tag_len, ad, ad_len)) { |
| ok = true; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int EVP_AEAD_CTX_openv(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const CRYPTO_IOVEC *iovec, |
| size_t num_iovec, size_t *out_total_bytes, |
| const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len, |
| const CRYPTO_IVEC *aadvec, size_t num_aadvec) { |
| bssl::Span<const CRYPTO_IOVEC> iovecs(iovec, num_iovec); |
| bssl::Span<const CRYPTO_IVEC> aadvecs(aadvec, num_aadvec); |
| |
| bool ok = false; |
| bssl::Cleanup cleanup([&] { |
| if (!ok) { |
| // In the event of an error, clear the output buffer so that a caller |
| // that doesn't check the return value doesn't try and process bad |
| // data. |
| clear_iovec(iovecs); |
| *out_total_bytes = 0; |
| } |
| }); |
| |
| if (!bssl::iovec::IsValid(iovecs) || !bssl::iovec::IsValid(aadvecs)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| // Enforce aliasing rules: no output may alias any input, with the one |
| // exception that an iovec member's |in| and |out| pointers may be identical |
| // for in-place operation. |
| if (!check_iovec_alias(iovecs, aadvecs, nullptr, 0, nonce, nonce_len, nullptr, |
| 0)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_OUTPUT_ALIASES_INPUT); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!ctx->aead->openv) { |
| if (ctx->tag_len && ctx->aead->openv_detached) { |
| // Try with a detached tag. |
| bssl::InplaceVector<CRYPTO_IOVEC, CRYPTO_IOVEC_MAX> detached_iovecs; |
| detached_iovecs.CopyFrom(iovecs); |
| |
| uint8_t tagbuf[EVP_AEAD_MAX_OVERHEAD]; |
| std::optional<bssl::Span<const uint8_t>> tag = |
| bssl::iovec::GetAndRemoveSuffix( |
| bssl::Span(tagbuf).first(ctx->tag_len), |
| bssl::Span(detached_iovecs)); |
| |
| if (!tag.has_value()) { // I.e. no |ctx->tag_len| bytes available. |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (ctx->aead->openv_detached(ctx, detached_iovecs, nonce, nonce_len, |
| tag->data(), tag->size(), aadvecs)) { |
| ok = true; |
| *out_total_bytes = |
| bssl::iovec::TotalLength(bssl::Span(detached_iovecs)); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_CTRL_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (ctx->aead->openv(ctx, iovecs, out_total_bytes, nonce, nonce_len, |
| aadvecs)) { |
| ok = true; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int EVP_AEAD_CTX_openv_detached(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, |
| const CRYPTO_IOVEC *iovec, size_t num_iovec, |
| const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len, |
| const uint8_t *in_tag, size_t in_tag_len, |
| const CRYPTO_IVEC *aadvec, size_t num_aadvec) { |
| bssl::Span<const CRYPTO_IOVEC> iovecs(iovec, num_iovec); |
| bssl::Span<const CRYPTO_IVEC> aadvecs(aadvec, num_aadvec); |
| |
| bool ok = false; |
| bssl::Cleanup cleanup([&] { |
| if (!ok) { |
| // In the event of an error, clear the output buffer so that a caller |
| // that doesn't check the return value doesn't try and process bad |
| // data. |
| clear_iovec(iovecs); |
| } |
| }); |
| |
| if (!bssl::iovec::IsValid(iovecs) || !bssl::iovec::IsValid(aadvecs)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (in_tag_len > EVP_AEAD_MAX_OPEN_OVERHEAD) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_TAG_SIZE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| // Enforce aliasing rules: no output may alias any input, with the one |
| // exception that an iovec member's |in| and |out| pointers may be identical |
| // for in-place operation. |
| if (!check_iovec_alias(iovecs, aadvecs, nullptr, 0, nonce, nonce_len, in_tag, |
| in_tag_len)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_OUTPUT_ALIASES_INPUT); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!ctx->aead->openv_detached) { |
| // AEADs with variable overhead may provide openv instead of openv_detached. |
| // While one might call openv and then, on success, discard the result if |
| // the length was wrong, this requires callers to predict the plaintext |
| // length first. We do not expect callers to do this, especially in the TLS |
| // CBC construction, where this length is sensitive to the Lucky 13 attack. |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_CTRL_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (ctx->aead->openv_detached(ctx, iovecs, nonce, nonce_len, in_tag, |
| in_tag_len, aadvecs)) { |
| ok = true; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| const EVP_AEAD *EVP_AEAD_CTX_aead(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->aead; } |
| |
| int EVP_AEAD_CTX_get_iv(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t **out_iv, |
| size_t *out_len) { |
| if (ctx->aead->get_iv == nullptr) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return ctx->aead->get_iv(ctx, out_iv, out_len); |
| } |
| |
| int EVP_AEAD_CTX_tag_len(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, size_t *out_tag_len, |
| const size_t in_len, const size_t extra_in_len) { |
| assert(ctx->aead->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in || !extra_in_len); |
| |
| if (ctx->aead->tag_len) { |
| *out_tag_len = ctx->aead->tag_len(ctx, in_len, extra_in_len); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| if (extra_in_len + ctx->tag_len < extra_in_len) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, ERR_R_OVERFLOW); |
| *out_tag_len = 0; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| *out_tag_len = extra_in_len + ctx->tag_len; |
| return 1; |
| } |